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C-32 and the BlackBerry PlayBook: A reply to Michael Geist

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Michael Geist’s recent blog post “The PlayBook Tax: Why the Conservative’s Copyright Plans Create a Hidden Cost for RIM’s PlayBook” makes the claim that “the Conservative plan for copyright reform (as found in Bill C-32) establishes a significant barrier that could force many consumers to pay hundreds in additional costs in order to switch their content from existing devices” to RIM’s BlackBerry PlayBook. He calls this a “PlayBook tax” and claims switching costs apply to “any digital content with a digital lock”.

Michael Geist’s blog post was cunningly timed to coincide with the launch of RIM’s BlackBerry PlayBook and the current federal election campaign. Unfortunately, he has misled Canadian consumers while doing a disservice to an excellent new tablet product from one of Canada’s most important technology leaders, RIM. His use of the term “tax” is clearly inaccurate and designed to maximize the political impact of his blog post which has more to do with promoting his own copyright proposals than being factually accurate.

Bill C-32 died when the election was called so the debate is about a Bill that does not exist. Nevertheless, let us look at the actual facts pertaining to what the effects of Bill C-32 would have been on the BlackBerry PlayBook across the music, e-book and video markets.

Music

Music can be consumed on the PlayBook either by copying music from existing media such as CDs or music downloads onto the PlayBook or by streaming music content to the PlayBook. In almost all cases there would be no “new cost to consumers” and no “barriers” to the adoption of the PlayBook.

When it comes to selling CDs or music downloads, most digital vendors do so without any form of copy protection. iTunes has been selling TPM-free music for more than two years; Amazon MP3 was selling TPM-free tracks before then.[1] (The PlayBook also comes preloaded with an icon to RIM’s new MusicStore, which also sells TPM free music.)

Songs bought on iTunes come in AAC format while Amazon sells MP3 files. The PlayBook will play content in both these formats as well as in AVI, WAV, WMA, WMV, ASF, MP4, MPEG-4, MOV, M4V, M4A, 3GP2 and 3GP formats.

Music CDs can easily be converted into the MP3 format for listening on the PlayBook. Music already downloaded from services including iTunes can also be transferred and played on the PlayBook with no “taxes”. The ease with which this can be done on the PlayBook was noted in the review from the same newspaper that syndicated Geist’s blog, the Ottawa Citizen:

RIM deserves applause for making it easy to get content on to the device. As opposed to many competitors, PlayBook doesn’t need extra software (such as iTunes) to put files onto the device. Plug PlayBook into a computer and it shows up as a drive. Users can simply drag-and-drop files right on to it.

Music streaming services are usually protected from unauthorized copying by TPMs. The most popular music streaming service in Canada today is Slacker Radio. Any iPad user who decides to upgrade to the PlayBook would not lose a dime on their Slacker subscription. The Slacker Radio app for PlayBook comes pre-loaded on the PlayBook. Even if another music streaming service is being accessed from another device, users can simply cancel their old accounts without incurring any sort of “PlayBook Tax”.

E-Books

Geist is also inaccurate when it comes to e-books. He claims that “Consumers with Amazon Kindles or other e-book readers who have invested in e-books that have digital locks…will find that they are unable to legally transfer the content to their new device.”

In fact, consumers who have purchased e-books through Toronto-based Kobo Books will have the capability of transferring their collections to the PlayBook. Like Slacker Radio for music, a Kobo eReading app comes pre-loaded on the PlayBook. The app will enable full transferability of purchased e-books – it will even remember which page you were last reading on your Kobo eReader when you access the book on the PlayBook. Kobo users are also able to sync their e-book library on the PlayBook through the tablet’s Wi-Fi connection.

According to RIM:

“Kobo also offers free reading applications for BlackBerry® smartphones, computers and other devices, which all sync together across a user’s account.  Kobo members can pick up and read on any device without ever losing their place.”

As for the Kindle, Amazon has announced that it is working on a PlayBook app that will allow users to transfer their Kindle books from one device to the PlayBook:

“Like all Kindle apps, the Kindle app for the new BlackBerry PlayBook will let customers Buy Once, Read Everywhere—on Kindle, Kindle 3G, Kindle DX, iPad, iPod touch, iPhone, Mac, PC, BlackBerry, Android-based devices, and in the coming months, the new BlackBerry PlayBook. Amazon’s Whispersync technology syncs your place across devices, so you can pick up where you left off.”

Accordingly, e-books purchased from leading bookstores and vendors including Amazon, Kobo, Borders, Chapters, Indigo and Barnes & Nobles will be transferable and playable on the PlayBook – without switching costs contrary to what Geist asserted. Kindle compatibility may also enable Canadians to borrow e-books from their local libraries and read them on their PlayBooks when this service becomes available in Canada.

Videos

Geist also contends that individuals will be deterred from buying a PlayBook because they cannot make copies of DVDs they own that are protected from piracy by the Content Scrambling System (CSS). The idea that consumers will be dissuaded from purchasing PlayBook tablets because of an alleged inability to transfer their DVD collections onto the PlayBook is ridiculous. DVDs have been sold with CSS anti-copying technology for more than 15 years. This did not stop the adoption of iPads, nor did it hinder the adoption of Blu-Ray players, On-Demand video, iTunes or other digital video services. An inability to instantly scan books into a Kobo e-Reader also did not create a “Kobo Tax” or prevent the runaway success of Kobo. (It is of course also unreasonable to expect studios to make major investments to create motion pictures and other programming and not protect them by using TPMs or other means to prevent massive file sharing over internet file sharing sites and services.)

In any event, Geist is engaging in speculation when he makes the statement that consumers would “immediately also face the PlayBook tax since Bill C-32 would block them from making digital copies of their DVDs to play on the PlayBook” and that “they would similarly be forced to repurchase the same content again”. Beginning in 2007 and 2008, the major motion picture studios including Disney, Paramount, Warner-Bros., 20th Century Fox, Sony Pictures, and Universal began selling DVDs together with portable Digital Copies. The bundle gives the DVD purchaser the right to make a digital copy for play on personal computers and portable devices. Given the PlayBook’s importance as a platform, it is reasonable to expect that it is only a matter of time before Digital Copies will be playable on the PlayBook.

Geist asserts that individuals will be unable to transfer their own video library unto other devices because “the presence of a digital lock will mean that the content is legally locked down to the original device or format”. It is true that Apple contractually prohibits the transfer of a downloaded video to another device other than to one of its own devices or personal computers. It enforces this restriction through its fair play DRM. Geist claims the switching costs to a consumer would “effectively double” the cost of the PlayBook. But, he provides no source or data to support this exaggerated contention. It is highly unlikely that the average user will have anywhere near the paid for video downloads that Geist claims. Moreover, given the increasing trend toward digital rentals, it is likely that a major portion of purchases from iTunes was for short term rentals rather than purchases.

In any event, Geist’s unqualified statement that individuals will be “unable to transfer their own video library unto other devices” because “the presence of a digital lock will mean that the content is legally locked down to the original device or format” is purely speculative and unwarranted. Most of the other popular video download services do not restrict the type of device that video files are copied onto. For instance movies purchased through Best Buy’s CinemaNow service may be played on “5 Devices including Portable Players”. Cineplex also recently launched a digital download and video on demand service. Digital downloads purchased from Cineplex.com can be played on personal computers and other compatible devices including mobile devices. RIM’s PlayBook supports video formats which include 3GP, 3GP2, M4A, M4V, MOV, MP4, MPEG-4, ASF, WMV, WMA and F4V. It is reasonable to expect that it will only be a matter of time before these various services work with the PlayBook.

The PlayBook also has some of the most advanced mobile video streaming technology which can take advantage of the tremendous growth in this digital market. Unlike Apple’s iPad, RIM did not shy away from providing full support for Adobe Flash 10.1, Adobe AIR and HTML 5. This means that a huge amount of online video content will be unlocked for PlayBook users compared to users of mobile devices without native Flash support, like the iPad. PlayBook users in Canada will not have to wait for the development of a specialized app before viewing commercial TV shows and other videos from sites like Youtube, CTV, CBC, GlobalTV and the Comedy Network. With the addition of Flash support for the PlayBook, it is likely that PlayBook users will have a greater choice of providers for movie streaming providers than iPad users as well.[2]

Of course, Geist’s main point about digital locks on DVDs and video content also ignores the increasing trend towards device interoperability, all of which are supported by DRM systems that enable this consumer friendly way of enjoying entertainment products. For example, under Ultraviolet, Canadian families will soon be able to access content purchased from UltraViolet media – such as Blu-ray, DVDs or Internet download – and get the enduring right to access it from any UltraViolet device registered to the household account. This includes obtaining it via streaming through devices at home or on the go.

Conclusion

Michael Geist has disseminated inaccurate and misleading blog posts and articles about Bill C-32 and its TPM and other provisions to support his own copyright proposals before. See, for example, Separating copyright fiction from facts about C-32’s TPM provisions, Separating facts from hype about C-32, Turning up the rhetoric on C-32’s TPM provisionsAre the TPM provisions in C-32 more restrictive than those in the DMCA?, A Response to Professor Michael Geist’s Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion,  Are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Prof. Geist?,  Legends and reality about the 1996 WIPO Treaties in the light of certain comments on Bill C-32, Are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Prof. Geist? His recent blog post does this again.

Geist’s proposal is to legalize circumventing TPMs that protect copyright content from digital piracy to enable individuals to make free and uncompensated copies of content for any purpose that is not intended to cause an additional separate act of infringement. If this proposal was incorporated into a successor to Bill C-32, it would make Canada the only country in the industrialized world to permit this and it would contravene our treaty obligations. See, An FAQ on TPMs, Copyright and Bill C-32.

Importantly, Geist’s proposal would also undermine existing and future digital business models that rely on TPMs including streaming music services such as Slacker Radio and Spotify, e-book download services such as those offered by Chapters/Indigo and Amazon, e-book library lending from companies such as Sony and Amazon, video download and streaming services such as those offered by Cineplex, CinemaNow and Netflix, household video access to be enabled through Ultrasviolet, as well as the numerous and existing business models that use TPMs in the entertainment software and software industries. Ultimately, Geist’s proposal would undermine access to and the dissemination of digital content to the Canadian public and hurt everyone involved in the digital industries including the consumers he professes to represent.

While Bill C-32 died on the Order Paper with the election call, most agree that it is essential for Canada to update it’s copyright laws to keep pace with technological change and legislative changes in other jurisdictions. When Canada’s copyright legislation is re-introduced in the next Parliament, let us be sure that Canadian consumers and their representatives are well informed about the facts.

For more information about the Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11 or copyright reform, see Change and the Copyright Modernization Act.


[1] As stated in the Amazon MP3 Store FAQ: “The MP3 files you purchase from Amazon.com do not contain any software (frequently referred to as “digital rights management” software) that will restrict your use of the file.”

[2] In fact, one early PlayBook reviewer has praised the PlayBook’s ability to play streaming videos from Amazon’s new Instant Video service (not currently available in Canada) as compared to other devices like the iPad:

I tested Amazon’s Instant Video and Cloud Player services on the PlayBook. Both worked like a charm. As a user of both services (I have three Sony Blue-ray players in my house that are Amazon Instant Video-enabled) this alone may make the PlayBook worth keeping long term.

To my knowledge (and please correct me if I’m wrong), the PlayBook is now the first tablet to play nice with Amazon’s Instant Video service. Some Nokia phones can playback Amazon Instant Videos, but Amazon’s PC software Amazon Unbox is required to download a special version of the program and then transfer it to the phone. With the PlayBook, no software is required; video simply streams to the device. Wow, it seems like I have waited years for this development.


Some observations on Bill C-11: The Copyright Modernization Act

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Last Thursday the Government of Canada introduced into the House of Commons Bill C-11, an Act to Amend the Copyright Act. In a press release describing the Bill, Heritage Minister James Moore and Industry Minister Christian Paradis, stated that the Bill will ensure that Canada’s copyright laws “are modern, flexible, and in line with current international standards” and will “protect and help create jobs, promote innovation, and attract new investment to Canada.”

In the press conference announcing the Bill at the Ottawa office of software producer bitHeads Inc., Minister Paradis added “With the reintroduction of today’s legislation, Canadians will soon have a modern and responsive copyright law for the digital age that protects and helps create jobs, promotes innovation and attracts new investment to Canada”. In the House of Commons Minister Moore also said “we introduced a bill that is fair to everyone, both creators and consumers. What artists across the country need right now is copyright legislation that will make piracy illegal in Canada. That is what Bill C-11 will do.”

Bill C-11 is the fourth attempt to amend the Copyright Act since 2005 — to bring the Act into the digital age. The Bill will likely make good the promise made in the Conservative Party Platform on Copyright that, “A Stephen Harper-led majority Government will also reintroduce and pass the Copyright Modernization Act, a key pillar in our commitment to make Canada a leader in the global digital economy.” It will also likely deliver on the commitment made in the Throne Speech to swiftly pass “copyright legislation that balances the needs of creators and users.”

Bill C-11 contains the same proposed amendments as its predecessor, Bill C-32.  This was anticipated based on statements made by Minister Moore and others prior to its introduction. According to a press release announcing that Canada had signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the “bill informed and guided Canada’s approach to the ACTA negotiations.”

Along with Bill C-11, the Government released Fact Sheets, an FAQ, and a Backgrounder.[1] These are all available on the Government`s website: www.balancedcopyright.gc.ca.

The FAQ describe certain aspects of the Bill including the following summary that says the Copyright Modernization Act will:

  • implement the rights and protections of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet treaties;
  • give copyright owners the tools they need to combat piracy;
  • clarify the roles and responsibilities of ISPs and search engines;
  • promote creativity and new methods of teaching in the classroom by providing greatly expanded exceptions for education;
  • encourage innovation in the private sector through exceptions for technical computer processes;
  • provide legal protection for businesses that choose to use technological protection measures or “digital locks” to protect their work as part of their business models; and,
  • give consumers the ability to, among other things, record their favourite TV shows for later viewing, transfer music from a CD to a digital device, and create a mash-up to post via social media.

I previous provided an overview of the Bill`s key provisions. See, Some thoughts on Bill-C-32: An Act to Modernize Canada’s copyright laws.

As I noted in My C-32 opening remarks to the Legislative Committee that studied Bill C-32, I support the government’s objectives. There are, however, areas where the Bill would have significant unintended consequences if passed without amendments consistent with those objectives. Many of these are technical. Perrin Beatty, President and CEO, Canadian Chamber of Commerce, referred to this in a press release when Bill C-11 was introduced on Sept. 29th:

While the Canadian Chamber supports the principles behind this copyright legislation, improvements still need to be made to the bill. As currently drafted, the bill still contains some possible unintended consequences that could prove problematic for business. We look forward to a rigorous review of the bill at committee stage that will make sure that it achieves the purposes for which it is designed.

In the Government background documents the Government stated that it will refer the Bill to a House of Commons committee and that the “work and testimony from the previous Parliament will be carefully considered and taken into account.” Minister Paradis also confirmed at the press conference that the Government “…will make any technical fixes necessary to achieve our objectives of taking meaningful action on copyright piracy, protecting right owners and promoting creativity, innovation and legitimate business models for the benefit of the consumers.” The Government`s objective remains to have the Bill passed by Christmas.

There has been considerable debate concerning some of proposed amendments. Some of the main issues that will be debated as the Bill winds its way through a House of Commons committee and, ultimately, into law are the following:

  • Technological Protection Measures
  • The Enablement Right
  • The Non-Commercial User-Generated Content (UGC) Exception
  • Statutory damages
  • The Internet Service Provider and Search Engine Exceptions and Responsibilities
  • The Fair Dealing for Education Exception
  • The Copyright Exceptions to Encourage Innovation

Technological Protection Measures (aka digital locks or TPMs)

Bill C-11 will prohibit circumventing (hacking) of TPMs that control access to a work. It will also prohibit trafficking of tools or provision of services that can be used for this purpose. The Government background documents explained the TPM provisions and the rationale for protecting TPMs as follows:

Innovative companies, such as video game developers, will have the legal tools to protect the investments they have made in order to reinvest in future innovation and jobs.

Protecting digital locks gives copyright industries the certainty they need to roll out new products and services, such as online subscription services, software and video games, if they choose to use this technology. Not only will this promote investment and growth in Canada’s digital economy, it will also encourage the introduction of innovative online services that offer access to content. Such services are increasingly available in other countries.

The Bill recognizes that certain protections, such as restricted content on news websites or locked video games, are important tools for copyright owners to protect their digital works and are often an important part of online and digital business models.

Opponents of legal protection for TPMs — such as Michael Geist — have made inaccurate statements about the legal protection for TPMs. Michael Geist’s relentless misinformation campaign[2] against them makes it difficult and confusing for many Canadians to form informed views about the Bill’s TPM provisions. Michael Geist repeated some of the inaccurate or misleading statements in a blog post and in the media after the Bill was introduced. For example:

  • He continues to suggest that “digital lock rules trump education rights”. However, since Bill C-11 does not prohibit circumventing copy control TPMs, it would be legal to hack a copy control TPM for an educational or any other purpose. Once hacked, a person would be able to make copies of the unprotected work under the new fair dealing for education exception, as long as the dealing is “fair”. However, a person could not bypass a technical control that protects a work against access the person is not entitled to in the first place.[3] The prohibition against hacking access control TPMs is not about “trumping education rights”. It is about ensuring that people who want to make copies of a work for an educational purpose obtain legal access to the work such as by purchasing or licensing a copy in order that the creator or other rights holder may be compensated.
  • He also continues to argue that “digital lock rules extend far beyond those required for compliance with the WIPO Internet treaties”; that Canada can properly implement the WIPO Treaties by limiting the prohibition on circumvention to an infringing purpose; that the WIPO Treaties would permit hacking TPMs for the purpose of format shifting; that many of our trading partners have implemented the WIPO Treaties in these ways; and that “many of our trading partners have adopted more balanced digital lock rules”. He makes these arguments although they have been found to be completely inconsistent with the minimum requirements of the Treaties by the leading international expert , Dr. Mihaly Ficscor here, here, here, and here. Michael Geist’s proposals would, essentially, eviscerate the business and policy reasons for protecting TPMs.
  • Further, he suggests that the U.S. DMCA’s TPM provisions “offer more flexibility than Canada”.  This statement is misleading as I have shown here, here, and here.

There is also considerable misunderstanding about the TPM provisions within the general public. For example,

  • the National Post, Vancouver Sun, Winnipeg Free Press, Calgary Herald, and other newspapers just published an article stating that the TPM “provisions would make consumers liable for thousands of dollars in legal damages if they break the digital encryption on a purchased DVD or video game to make a backup copy for themselves.”
  • the Montreal Gazette published an article stating that Bill C-11 contains a “blanket provision against breaking digital locks, even for purposes of personal use; The bill provides for $5,000 fines for even the smallest such violations. This provision was apparently included as a result of heavy pressure from U.S. authorities and in the interest of maintaining cross-border trade and exemption from protectionist measures that would prevent Canadian firms from bidding on U.S. government procurement contracts.”

These statements are just plain wrong. The Bill does not prohibit hacking copy control digital locks for any purpose and there are multiple exceptions that permit circumventing access control TPMs. Moreover, Section 41.1(3) of the Bill expressly precludes an award of statutory damages against an individual who circumvents a TPM for his or her own private purposes. Accordingly, it is flat out wrong to claim that an individual could be liable for “thousands of dollars in legal damages” for hacking a TPM for personal purposes. Further, even if statutory damages did apply, which they do not, the Bill would limit such damages to a range, the maximum of which would be $5,000 for the most egregious case.

In my blog post, An FAQ on TPMs, Copyright and Bill C-32, I tried to set the record straight on the following questions about the legal protection for TPMs to enable the public to make their own assessment of the TPM provisions in Bill C-32 based on correct information:

  • Whether Bill C-32 properly implements the WIPO Treaties consistent with the practices of our trading partners
  • Whether the Bill permits copying for fair dealing, educational, and other purposes
  • Whether the circumvention exceptions in the Bill are flexible enough to deal with unforeseen or unintended consequences
  • Whether Canada can properly implement the WIPO Treaties by limiting the prohibition on circumvention to an infringing purpose
  • Whether other jurisdictions limit protection of TPMs to circumvention for an infringing purpose
  • Whether circumvention of TPMs for the purposes of format shifting, time shifting, and making back-up copies for private purposes (private copying) ought to be permitted
  • (Given that one of the legislative goals is to follow international standards) whether other jurisdictions permit exceptions for private copying to trump TPMs
  • Whether an exception for private copying that permits circumvention of TPMs for such purpose would comply with the Berne Three Step Test
  • Whether the WIPO Treaties which Canada has committed to ratify permit circumventing TPMs for private copying
  • Whether Michael Geist`s two proposals for amending the TPM provisions in Bill C-32 (now Bill C-11) have international precedents.

Other posts such as the ones set out below also correct inaccurate statements made about legal protection for TPMs.

The Enablement Right

Section 27(2.3) of Bill C-11 would create a new cause of action referred to in the Bill as “enablement”. The Government background documents describe this new right and the rationale for it as follows:

The Bill gives copyright owners the tools to pursue those who wilfully and knowingly enable copyright infringement online, such as operators of websites that facilitate illegal file-sharing.

It recognizes that the most effective way to stop online copyright infringement is to target those who enable and profit from the infringements of others. By allowing copyright owners to pursue these “enablers”, such as illegal peer-to-peer file sharing sites, this Bill supports the development of significant legitimate markets for downloading and streaming in Canada. This supplements existing criminal punishments for those who aid and abet infringement.

The Government background documents also state that the “proposed legislation will ensure that services that enable infringement will not benefit from the liability limitations afforded to ISPs and search engines.”

From the appearances and submissions to the Legislative Committee that studied C-32, there is a consensus supporting the enablement provision. Michael Geist, however, opposes giving rights holders tools to go after pirate sites and services like IsoHunt calling into question the need for an enablement amendment. I responded to his contradictory posts on the state of Canadian secondary liability law in a blog post, Are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Prof. Geist? I concluded that:

It is clear that Prof. Geist’s objective in this recent spate of activity is to persuade policy makers and the public that the new proposed enablement cause of action is not needed because Canada’s copyright laws are already robust enough to deal with what Minister Clement calls “the wealth destroyers” like IsoHunt. However, for years Prof. Geist has consistently and repeatedly been writing and telling the public that Canada’s laws related to authorization might not be effective against pirate sites and services and that Canada does not have contributory liability laws that can be used against these sites and services…

The only conclusion that can be drawn from a review of his writings is that he has either changed his long standing opinion about the state of Canadian law – now believing it is effective enough to shut down the wealth destroyers like IsoHunt- or that he is inaccurately describing what he believes Canadian law to be to oppose the amendments in Bill C-32 that are intended to give rights holders the tools needed to close down wealth destroyers.

While the new enablement right could be a very useful tool in fighting online pirate sites and services, it has some technical drafting deficiencies that need to be fixed to ensure that the new cause of action can be used as intended. Perrin Beatty of the Canadian Chamber of Commerce noted this in the Q&A at the press conference in Ottawa where he stated that the concept of “designed primarily to enable infringement” needed to be clarified and that this clarification is an “essential technical amendment to ensure that the bill in fact achieves the purpose for which it was intended.”

I addressed the drafting problems in My C-32 opening remarks to the Legislative Committee and in an article co-written with Dan Glover titled C-32 enablement remedy targets secondary copyright infringement. There we noted three of the technical amendments that are needed to ensure the Government`s objectives of targeting the “wealth destroyers” are met.

  • First, Parliament must recognize that pirate sites and services often are “not designed primarily to enable” acts of copyright infringement. The design is very often neutral, but the site or service is operated to induce, aid or abet infringing activities, or is primarily operated or used for infringing purposes.
  • Second, Parliament must ensure that this provision clearly trumps all of the online service provider exceptions to avoid a circumstance in which enablers like wealth destroying pirate hosting sites can avoid liability for enablement.
  • Third, to provide an adequate and effective remedy against enablement, Parliament should confirm that rightsholders may rely on the full scale of statutory damages against those who are liable for enablement, regardless of whether such persons were operating for commercial purposes or not.

The Non-Commercial User-Generated Content (UGC) Exception

Bill C-11 contains a new exception that would permit individuals to use existing content to create new ‘user generated content’. The Government background documents describe this amendment and its objective as follows:

The Bill permits the use of legitimately acquired material in user-generated content created for non-commercial purposes. This applies only to creations that do not affect the market for the original material. Examples could include making a home video of your friends and family dancing to a popular song and posting it online, or creating a “mash-up” of video clips.

The Government background documents also state that the changes proposed are in “conformity with Canada’s international obligations”.

In My C-32 opening remarks to the Legislative Committee studying Bill C-32 I pointed out some of the unintended consequences of the draft wording in the UGC amendment stating the following:

This is an exception that, to my knowledge, does not exist anywhere else in the world.

From a technical drafting perspective, the exception is so widely cast that it would most likely violate Canada’s WTO TRIPS obligations. TRIPs mandates that exceptions must be subject to what is known internationally as the 3 step test.

The exception, as drafted, would permit individuals to do almost anything that the author could do with his/her work including creating translations, sequels, or other derivative works and publish them on the internet.

They could also create a “collective work” or “compilation” of works such as “the best” of a TV series or artists’ works, or iPod playlist and post those on the internet.

They can also do a lot more.

The result is that the author loses significant control over the uses of his/her work.

But, over and above this, there could be significant economic consequences to the author. The intention is to permit uses which have no effect on the market for the work. However, the drafting permits aggregate effects on the market for the work that could be very substantial.

Also, the individual’s use of the new UGC work must be non-commercial. But a web site operator can charge for disseminating the UGC work. But, the author gets none of that. They would however in other countries which don’t have this exception and which have let the market solve the problem.

I also highlighted some of the potential problems with the draft language of the UGC, format shifting, time shifting, and back-up copying exceptions in a speech on Bill C-32’s fair dealing and other new copyright exceptions at Osgoode Hall Law School’s professional development program on understanding Bill C-32.

Statutory damages

Bill C-11 would cap statutory damages against individuals who infringe copyright for non-commercial purposes to a range of between $100 and $5,000 for all works involved in the proceeding. It also specifically exempts persons who are liable under the new enablement provision from any statutory damages. The Government background documents describe this amendment and its objective as follows:

This Bill ensures that Canadians will not face disproportionate penalties for minor infringements of copyright by distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial infringement.

The Bill ensures that Canadians are not subject to unreasonable penalties by significantly reducing statutory damages for infringement for non-commercial purposes by individuals, providing the courts with the flexibility to award between $100 and $5,000 in total damages. Using the same example of five illegally downloaded songs, the individual would only be liable for a penalty of between $100 and $5,000 under the proposed changes. The Bill will ensure that courts take proportionality into account in awarding damages.

It appears that the rationale for capping statutory damages against individuals is to preclude large judgements against them when they engage in unauthorized downloading of copyright content over the internet. The underlying concern seems to stem from a fear that a Canadian court would award large damages such as have been awarded in the United States.

The existing Canadian and U.S. regimes are very different, however. In the U.S., the statutory damages per work infringed range from $750 to $30,000 for non-wilful infringements. This range can be increased to $750 to $150,000 for wilful infringements. Canada’s statutory damages range is lower- from $500 to $20,000- and cannot be increased even if the infringement is wilful. However, they can be reduced to a range of between $200 to $500 where a person, such as an individual, had no reasonable grounds to believe he or she was infringing. A Canadian Court also has the discretion to lower the damages to zero where there is multiple copying onto a single medium and the award would be grossly out of proportion to the infringement. The Canadian statutory damages regime, unlike the regime in the U.S., therefore already reflects a proportionality principle. Moreover, there has never been a case in Canada where a copyright owner has been awarded anything close to the maximum statutory damages against an individual who downloaded copies of copyright content from file sharing networks.

This Bill would accomplish the Government’s objectives of ensuring that Canadians will not face “disproportionate penalties for minor infringements of copyright by distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial infringement.” However, it does so in a way that undermines the Government’s objectives of deterring wide scale infringements and providing effective remedies against those infringements that can cause significant economic harm. For example:

  • the proposal would cap the recovery of statutory damages against infringements undertaken by organized groups like those who trade in Warez – pirated copyrighted works distributed without fees or royalties and without any commercial purpose – in violation of copyright law.[4] This would effectively cap statutory damages at $5,000 for persons who cause large scale commercial damage, but who do so for reasons other than profit. Some of the most notorious pirates and pirate sites are operated for reputational rather than profit motives.
  • the proposal would preclude recovery of statutory damages against any pirate site or service that was liable under the new enablement cause of action. If the site was operated for a non-commercial e.g. reputational, purpose statutory damages could be not be recovered. However, statutory damages would still not be recoverable even against a for profit pirate site or service because of the special exception for statutory damages according to such sites.[5] Ironically, under Bill C-11 a person who is liable for enablement – a “wealth destroyer” to use the words of former Industry Minister Tony Clement- would be subject to no statutory damages while an individual who causes minimal damage and who infringes for a non-commercial purpose would be.
  • the proposal would cap statutory damages at $5,000 even though a person might copy, distribute, and make available over the internet hundreds of software, video games, e-books, movies, music and other copyright content that are downloaded by thousands of other individuals as long as these acts are done for “non-commercial purposes”; for example, it would enable individuals to copy and store entire libraries of works and to distribute them to all of the person’s friends, including all of the person’s friends on social networks, high school, university or work colleagues, and over file sharing networks like IsoHunt  to millions of potential downloaders, and the maximum statutory damages would still be $5,000.

In amending the statutory damages regime, the Government should not inadvertently undermine the usefulness of statutory damages which are necessary to ensure there are effective remedies against infringers, discourage infringement, reduce the costs of litigation, and encourage parties to settle litigation. When the statutory damages regime was enacted by the Government in 1997 (the same year Canada signed the WIPO Treaties), it explained the rationale for them as follows:

A copyright owner who commences proceedings for infringement must prove not only the infringement, but also the losses suffered as a result. However, it is often difficult, sometimes impossible, to prove such losses because evidence as to the extent of infringement is usually difficult and/or expensive to find. Statutory damages alleviate this difficulty by guaranteeing a minimum award of damages once infringement is established. They also ease the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in proceedings for infringement, deter future infringements, reduce the cost of litigation and encourage the parties to settle matters out of court.

The above rationale for statutory damages is still valid.

The Internet Service Provider and Search Engine Exceptions and Responsibilities

Bill C-11 contains four new exceptions referred to as the network service, caching, hosting, and information location tool (aka search engine or ILT) exceptions. The object of these exceptions is explained in the Government background documents as follows:

The Bill ensures that ISPs and search engines will not be held liable for the copyright infringements of their subscribers, to the extent that they are acting as neutral intermediaries (e.g., when they provide Internet access, allow users to download material they have stored in online personal storage space they control, or make temporary cached copies for network efficiency).

The bill will clarify that Internet service providers (ISPs) and search engines are exempt from liability when they act strictly as intermediaries in communication, caching, and hosting activities. The proposed legislation will ensure that services that enable infringement will not benefit from the liability limitations afforded to ISPs and search engines.

These provisions also require technical amendments to ensure the Government`s objectives are met. On March 22, 2010, TELUS, Bell and Rogers appeared before the Legislative Committee studying Bill C-32. who appeared for TELUS acknowledged that some technical amendments are needed to the ISP and ILT exceptions stating the following:

TELUS would support amendments that would give rights holders more powerful tools to go after those who actively enable infringement, and also amendments that would prevent the bad guys from taking advantage of the legal safe harbours intended to protect only the good guys…

TELUS does have some recommendations, but they’re relatively minor. They’re focused on making the notice and notice system work better, more efficiently, and more fairly for all the stakeholders involved. As I have also indicated, we recognize the concerns on the part of some rights holders that the provisions designed to protect innocent intermediaries may be drafted too broadly. They may allow not-so-innocent intermediaries to slip in underneath them. That’s not a desirable result, so we would certainly be open to amendments designed to tighten those up.

The Bill would also create a notice and notice regime. The process and its rationale are described in the Government background documents as follows:

The Bill formalizes the voluntary “notice and notice” regime currently used by Canadian ISPs. Under this system, when an ISP receives a notice from a copyright holder that a subscriber might be infringing copyright, it forwards a notice to the subscriber. The identity of the subscriber may then be released with a court order. This uniquely Canadian approach has been effective at discouraging infringement and is consistent with Canadian values.

A notice and notice process is somewhat useful in dealing with infringing activity across P2P networks and other transitory network communications. It should become part of Canadian law. Notice and notice is not effective, however, in permanently stopping online file sharing by users unless the individuals receiving the notices believe that sanctions could be imposed unless they stop such activity. We have had a de facto notice and notice system in Canada for many years and there is no empirical evidence that it materially changes people’s behaviour to stop illicit file sharing and purchase creative products from legitimate services. Research by our trading partners shows that while a simple notice may have a temporary effect in reducing online file sharing, only notices that have a threat of some sanction operate as an effective deterrent. I dealt with this issue in my submission to the Copyright Consultation in 2009 and in other blog posts including here and here.

Given the Government`s statements about copyright reform, it does not appear that any graduated response system will be put in place under any amendments to Bill C-11. However, as noted above in the testimony of Craig McTaggart some technical amendments are required to make the notice and notice system work as intended.

The Fair Dealing for Education Exception

Bill C-11 proposes to add education to the current list of fair dealing purposes. The Government background documents describe the proposed amendment and its objective as follows:

The Bill enables the use of copyrighted materials for the purpose of education, provided the use is “fair” (i.e., it does not harm the market for a work).

It expands fair dealing to recognize education in a structured context as a legitimate purpose.

As drafted, the proposed wording of the amendment would not accomplish the Government’s objective. The proposed amendment is not clearly limited to only enabling the use of copyrighted materials for the purpose of education “in a structured context”. Unlike all of the current educational purpose exceptions, the proposed amendment is not expressly limited to specific institutional beneficiaries. As well, the term “education” conveys a meaning that appears to go beyond any structured context.

Limiting the exception to dealings that are “fair” will also not ensure that the dealings do “not harm the market for a work. “Fairness” does not provide any assurance against this harm to rights holders. The courts in Canada have developed a list of six non-exclusive factors to assist in determining whether a dealing is fair. Of these six, the effect of the dealing on the work is only one factor to be considered. The Supreme Court in theCCH case stated that while the effect of the dealing on the market of the copyright owner is an important factor, “it is neither the only factor nor the most important factor that a court must consider in deciding if the dealing is fair.”This means that a court may be able to conclude that a dealing is fair even if it harms the market for a work. In contrast, in the United States, the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work is “the most important, and indeed, the central fair use factor”. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, (1985), Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens LP, (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 2010)

Prof. Giuseppina D’Agostino, a professor of Intellectual Property at Osgoode Hall Law School, in her testimony before the Legislative Committee stated the following in relation to the proposed new fair dealing exception:

This new purpose is too broad and invites years of litigation to clarify it, which will lead to access-to-justice issues and will force the courts to resolve matters that are for the government to legislate with confidence in so doing…

On fair dealing, one thing I haven’t talked about is my own analysis of the six factors. When you line up Canada with respect to the U.K. and the U.S., you see that the court says there are more or less six factors, and there could be more. At the same time, in terms of the effect of the dealing on the works–meaning the actual market considerations, the market substitute–the Supreme Court of Canada says that it’s not the only factor, nor the most important.

We know that this is not the case in the U.K. and not the case in the U.S. What we have in Canada with CCH is a broad and liberal interpretation of both the actual purposes and the fairness factor. Left unchecked, the way it’s configured now means that when you compound education plus CCH, you will have something broad, unless we are able to itemize exactly what we mean.

Ysolde Gendreau a professor of law at the University of Montreal and the President of Association Littéraire et Artistique Internationale (ALAI Canada) in her testimony before the Legislative Committee stated the following:

I would like to submit a few examples of this found in Bill C-32, which, in ALAI’s view, undermines the three-step principle, because these exceptions are too broad, because they are based on unrealistic conditions that, once again, make them too broad. Here we’re talking about fair dealing for the purpose of education, the new section 29. We’re talking about non-commercial user-generated content, private copying under section 29.22…

In a law review article on the subject of the proposed fair dealing exception Professor Gendreau also expressed the opinion that the term “education” would not be read to mean “education in a structured context” and that the proposed exception would likely not meet any of the steps in the Berne Three Step Test.[6]

Michael Geist published a series of blog posts commenting on the scope of this new exception including one entitled “Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion: Fair Dealing and Bill C-32”. He concluded that this amendment would not affect the balance between creators of educational materials and the users of such materials or negatively impact the market for publications. My colleague Dan Glover wrote a series of blog posts responding to the incorrect assertions made by Michael Geist and others and demonstrating the need for amendments to the new exception in order to meet Government’s objectives. The posts are:

The Copyright Exceptions to Encourage Innovation

Bill C-11 would create news exceptions for developing interoperable computer programs, encryption research, network security testing, and technological processes. The rationale for these exceptions is explained in the Government background documents as follows:

The Copyright Modernization Act aims to eliminate some of the uncertainty facing innovative businesses. Provisions aimed at the software industry permit the reproduction of software and the hacking of digital locks in order to engage in reverse engineering, security testing and encryption research. Such provisions support, for example, companies that test software for security flaws and then develop and sell patches. Where copyright owners believe these tools have been misused, they will have recourse to deal with any infringement or inappropriate hacking of digital locks. The Bill also clarifies that companies do not face any copyright liability for technical copies that are essential but incidental to a product or service they offer.

These amendments also need technical fixes to ensure that the Government`s objectives are met. The need for this was addressed by John Manley, the President and CEO of the Canadian Council of Chief Executives, in his testimony before the Legislative Committee. After stating that he strongly endorsed “the overall thrust of this legislation” he said:

Having said that, I believe the committee may wish to consider certain technical changes to the bill so as to avoid unintended consequences. For example, important concerns have been raised with respect to the impact on Canada’s software industry of provisions dealing with encryption research, network security, reverse engineering and copying for interoperability purposes.

In addition, some of the language dealing with user-generated content and copying for private purposes may be too broad.

I also canvassed these amendments in a speech to the 14th Annual IT.Can Conference titled Bill C-32’s impacts on the IT community.

Conclusion

After many failed attempts to modernize Canada’s copyright laws, it now appears there is a Bill before Parliament that will do this. The Copyright Modernization Act, however, still requires careful scrutiny to ensure that appropriate technical amendments are made so that the Government’s objectives are met and to avoid significant inadvertent consequences inconsistent with the Government’s objectives.

For more information about the Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11 or copyright reform, see Change and the Copyright Modernization Act.


[1] These are referred to collectively here as the “Government background documents”

[2] Michael Geist accuses the book publishers of engaging in “a relentless misinformation campaign” against the fair dealing for education exception. His assertion is ironic since it is he that has engaged in this behaviour on copyright reform issues.

[3] See, James Gannon, TPMs: A comprehensive guide for Canadian copyright law

[4] See, Wikipedia, Warez http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warez

[5] Section 38.1(6)(d)

[6] Ysolde Gendreau Canada and the Three Step test: A Step in Which Direction? 15 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 309 (2011). In the article she said:

The purpose of education is introduced within the context of an exception, fair dealing, that does not have a statutory list of criteria for its evaluation. The fair dealing exception also entails that it applies to all categories of works and to all rights, reproduction rights as well as performing rights. Moreover, its application is not limited to educational institutions because of the following a contrario argument: the wording of the specific educational exceptions shows that they are intended for educational institutions while that of the fair dealing for the purpose of education makes no such mention. Consequently, the notion of education extends the application of this exception beyond educational institutions. Government representatives say that the exception is to be a test ground for exceptions that may eventually give rise to specific exceptions. However, they still maintain that it refers to education in a structured context.

It is easy to doubt such a statement because educational institutions do represent a structured context. Courts are likely to say that, in the absence of a specific reference to such institutions, the reference to “education” is not limited to structured contexts. So this new exception would introduce a very broad notion of education in a statute that does not include criteria for the appreciation of fair use either.

After discussing why the proposed exception would have difficulty passing all three of the three steps she concluded by saying:

Generally speaking, since the three-step test has become the standard by which to judge exceptions, I would say there is a fairly strong case for stating that the proposed provision on fair dealing for the purpose of education is so broadly drafted that it goes against the three-step test of the Berne Convention and of the TRIPS Agreement.

Reining in the rhetoric on copyright reform

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This blog post is a longer version of the article entitled This Bill is no SOPA published in the Financial Post  today.

While recent attempts by the usual suspects making hysterical predictions about copyright reform in Canada have been ratcheted up yet again, this time the claims are so outrageous that they can perhaps best be described as having “jumped the shark”. Canadians are being told that Bill C-11, an act to amend Canada’s outdated copyright law, could be used to shut down popular web sites like YouTube, fundamentally change the Internet, sabotage online freedoms, and hog-tie innovators.

Canadians are being urged to protest the impending Bill C-11 “Internet lockdown” by activist organizations making wild claims about the bill that have no basis in reality like OpenMediaandAvaaz illicit businesses who sell hacking devices for pirated video games, and the online BitTorrent site isoHunt, all urging online protests and all relying on the hyperbolic musings of what might or possibly or could one day happen from Michael Geist. To fully ratchet up the frenzy, these groups are claiming attempts are being made to bring SOPA to Canada.

These warnings are an attempt to exploit the controversy and unpopular anti-copyright sentiments about the much misunderstood U.S. legislation in Congress called the StopOnline Piracy Act (SOPA), to derail parts of Bill C-11 and proposals to amend it. It doesn’t seem to matter that SOPA and Bill C-11 are entirely different pieces of legislation, with different goals, and legislative text. Canadians should examine the facts and see the hysteria for what it is.[1]

Bill C-11 contains many provisions that would greatly expand the freedoms of Canadians to copy creative products like music, movies, TV programming, books, software and games for private purposes. The bill proposes new exceptions for format shifting onto personal computers, tablets like the iPad and PlayBook, and even to private clouds. It would also permit copying for time shifting purposes. Individuals would be able to make and disseminate user-generated content – mash-ups – without fear of accusations copyright infringement.

Bill C-11 also proposes new exceptions to promote innovation that will permit reverse engineering of computer programs, copying for encryption research and security testing.  Making temporary copies of works to view them online or to disseminate them would not create liability.  ISPs, hosting providers, search engines and other service providers would have new and wider exceptions to protect them from infringement charges when they act as neutral intermediaries. Broadcasters would be able to make temporary copies of music without paying rights holders. The Bill also proposes new exceptions to support learning and education.

With these new exceptions, Canada’s copyright law would become one of the most user friendly, if not by far the most user friendly, in the world. An Internet lockdown? Hardly.

Bill C-11 also proposes amendments to enable Canada to ratify the two 1996 WIPO Internet treaties and clarify Canadian secondary liability laws so that entities that use the Internet in ways that primarily enable copyright infringement –  the “wealth destroyers” – can be shut down.

To satisfy the requirements of the treaties, Bill C-11 would provide protection against hacking and trafficking in technological protection measures (sometimes referred to as digital locks or TPMs) created to safeguard intellectual property products. These proposed amendments would adopt internationally accepted measures to protect and promote innovation in digital products and services such as video game software and online music and movie streaming services.  The bill contains numerous exceptions which permit circumvention of TPMs such as to facilitate interoperability, encryption research, personal information and network security testing. The bill also has more flexible processes to expand the exceptions in case of need than the processes of our trading partners in the US, the European Union, and elsewhere.

Some opponents of legal protection for technological measures have called for amendments to these provisions to limit violations to intended infringement of copyright. These proposals would eviscerate the usefulness of the law in promoting innovation in digital products and have been authoritatively rejected by the former Deputy General of WIPO as not meeting the standards of protection required by the treaties.

The SOPA rhetoric has led opponents of legal protection for TPMs to mount further opposition to Bill C-11 by trying to link the anti-copyright sentiments about SOPA to the TPM provisions in Bill C-11, arguing, for example, that they are the “Canadian version of SOPA”. They do this even though there is no connection whatsoever between them. Some opponents, including a trade organization called the Canadian Coalition for Electronic Rights’ (CCER) that represents commercial sellers of “mod chips” that let users hack video game decks – the very businesses targeted by the TPM provisions in Bill C-11 – have encouraged the public to protest this SOPA-like law by using their letter writing wizard.

Bill C-11 also proposes an amendment intended to make it an infringement of copyright for a person using the Internet to knowingly enable copyright infringement. The poster children for this legislation are BitTorrent sites like IsoHunt that have been found to facilitate the distribution of files 95% to 99% of which are infringing and peer to peer file sharing networks like LimeWire which was found to enable the distribution of files 98.8% of which were copyright protected or highly likely copyright protected.

Other targets of the enablement provision are sites like MegaUpload, a cyber locker site whose principals were just indicted for criminal copyright infringement. That site had an average of 50 million daily visits and accounted for a remarkable 4% of total Internet traffic. The FBI estimates that the founder, Mr. Kim Dotcom personally made $115,000 a day from his network of sites.

This provision is currently worded to apply only to sites that are “designed primarily to enable acts of copyright infringement”. Michael Geist claims that clarifying the wording to expressly cover services that are “primarily operated to enable infringement or induce infringement” could be used to shut down sites like YouTube and would stifle innovation. These claims are ridiculous, though not surprising given his historical antipathy to laws designed to protect the creative industries from theft.

To be clear, SOPA was intended to target foreign rogue websites that would already be illegal under US copyright law if those sites were operated from the US.[2] The US already has robust contributory infingement laws that can be and have been used against sites that primarily enable or induce copyright infringement. Other countries around the world have similar laws that have been successfully used against pirate sites.

Bill C-11 is not about foreign pirate sites. It is Canada’s attempt to establish rules about what is and isn’t legal in Canada. This is long overdue. The fact that Canada has not updated its copyright laws to deal with the Internet environment has led to our reputation as a haven for internet piracy operations both with our trading partners and pirate operators including MegaUpload’s Kim Dotcom.

The current wave of opposition to the amendments appears to be an opportunist effort to turn the tide on effective copyright reform by leveraging anti-SOPA public opinion. The amendments that are being objected to were first tabled before the Parliamentary Committee examining Bill C-32 in March 2011 and were publically disseminated including by Michael Geist – well before the SOPA uproar. Until the recent SOPA ruckus, even he did not publicly oppose the new enablement right or the proposed amendments as going too far. Rather, he argued the enablement right was not needed because it was “old wine in new bottles”, even telling a Parliamentary Committee examining Bill C-32, “I don’t have a problem with it.”

The new argument that amendments would cover sites like YouTube is spurious. Bill C-11 provides a series of criteria that a court would need to consider in determining if a site primarily enables infringement. The targeted sites are those: marketed or promoted to enable acts of infringement; that know they are being used to enable a significant number of acts of infringement; that have no significant uses other than to enable acts of infringement; that refuse to take actions available to them to limit the acts of infringement; that benefit from enabling the acts of infringement; and that would be economically unviable were it not for enabling acts of infringement. YouTube would clearly not be an enabler under these criteria.

The argument that these amendments could “stifle new innovation” leaves only one real possibility about the kind of sites the opponents must be concerned with protecting. It is not YouTube. The types of “new innovation” that would be affected are sites like IsoHunt and MegaUpload, the very wealth destroying “innovators” that the bill targets.

Bill C-11 is an important framework law that is intended to bring Canada’s copyright laws into the 21st century. It has the potential to benefit consumers, other IP users, intermediaries, authors and owners of copyright. The government has recognized that technical amendments are required for the bill to meet its policy objectives. A healthy debate based on facts can be expected as Parliament’s Special Legislative Committee continues to consider it and thoughtful debate is always helpful to ensuring a proposed law meets its objectives. But lets not be fooled by chicken little claims. Canadians will all be hurt if the debate continues to be marred by political opportunism and misinformation spread for political purposes.

For more information about the Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11 or copyright reform, see Change and the Copyright Modernization Act.


[1] For some background on SOPA and the debates about it in the US, see, Lobbyists 1, Internet 0: An Alternative Take on SOPA ; Who Really Stopped SOPA, and Why?; The False Ideals of the Web; No oil meets no copyright; What Wikipedia Won’t Tell You; The Truth Behind Google’s Copyright-Bills Hysteria; Anti-piracy battle reveals dysfunctional thinking; Behind he music: What if the culture industry shut down for a day? ; If you critique SOPA, read the text. If you read the text, read it right; SOPA: A Bad Solution to a Very Real Problem; Protecting Americans from Web scams ; Fighting Online Piracy; Put Down the Pitchforks on SOPA; ITIF Comments on PIPA/SOPA Developments; My DNS Filtering Research before House SOPA Panel; DNS Filtering is Essential to the Internet

[2] For an overview of SOPA’s provisions, see, Terry Hart, Hey, what happened to Wikipedia? (An intro to SOPA) and Terry Hart New remedies for existing liability

Michael Geist: A question of values

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With Bill C-11, the Copyright Modernization Act, on its way to clause by clause review Canadians have a chance to think about what values they want copyright to reflect. Canadians are being bombarded with a dizzying array of information about amendments that have been proposed including amendments related to enablement, statutory damages, TPMs and fair dealing. Much of the information is inaccurate and emotionally super-charged to garner as much visceral reaction as possible. A significant portion of it originates from Internet activist Michael Geist and is repeated throughout the blogosphere and in the traditional news media, usually with no attempt at analysis.

Average Canadians must be totally bewildered. They are told by Michael Geist that “extreme measures” are being demanded by creator groups that would, amongst other things, “create new liability risks for social networking sites, search engines, blogging platforms, video sites, and many other websites featuring third party contributions”. They are also warned against “SOPA-style demands” and “SOPA-style reforms” and are encouraged to petition against a “radical reform of the Internet in Canada”. These warnings are an attempt to exploit the controversy and unpopular anti-copyright sentiments about the much misunderstood U.S. legislation in Congress called the StopOnline Piracy Act (SOPA). See, Reining in the rhetoric on copyright reform.

Of course, none of this sounds plausible and the average Canadian who spends any time at all considering these improbables would have to wonder how they could be true. Anyone spending enough time would surely realize that they aren’t. The challenge for the average Canadian, however, would be to figure out why a supposedly independent academic like Michael Geist would engage in such scaremongering[i] to try and create such moral panics over copyright.[ii]

What the average Canadian does not know is that Michael Geist’s antipathy to copyright is part of an effort in many countries to systematically oppose the rights of authors, creators, and other rights holders. This battle is not only about Bill C-11. The opposition entails extensive lobbying against virtually any laws intended to bring to the Internet the same laws that apply off line.[iii] In fact, Michael Geist is held up as the poster child for this movement in a case study in Winning the Web, a book written by the former head of the Open Rights Group, an organization similar to the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). Michael Geist is also on the Advisory Board of the EFF, which regularly intervenes in US cases opposing rights holders.

Michael Geist’s ideological antagonism towards copyright is an extreme departure from traditional values about it. Canadian copyright law has traditionally been built on the historical foundations and theoretical framework of UK copyright legislation, and in particular the UK 1911 Copyright Act. That legislation consistently protected the efforts of authors either as an end in itself, or at the very least, as the primary goal of copyright.[iv] Canadian copyright legislation historically was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada as having these purposes.[v]

Mainstream thinking about copyright now recognizes that the law of copyright is concerned with finding an appropriate balance between promoting the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of the works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator or, more accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator from appropriating whatever benefits may be generated. Accordingly, owner rights and exceptions (sometimes called “user rights”) are given fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation.[vi]

In Canada, our copyright law derives from multiple sources and draws on both common law tradition and continental civil law concepts. Thus, in Canadian copyright law, the intention is to establish rights that are centered on the person of the author, this being derived from the civil structures of the right of ownership, and a dynamic set of economic rights centered on its economic function.[vii] These historical roots and values were described by Justice Gonthier (with three other justices in dissent) in the Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc case as follows:

Even though our legislation derives from the common law, it is important to  recall the origin and significance of copyright. In 1777, P.‑A. Caron de Beaumarchais, who founded the Société des auteurs dramatiques, stated:

[TRANSLATION] It is said in the theatre lobby that it is not noble for authors to write for the worthless pursuit of money, they who pride themselves on their claim to fame. Indeed, they are right, fame is appealing. But they forget that nature condemns us to dine 365 times in order to bask in glory merely for a year.  For the authors, they are not defending a privilege, but the sacred right of all rights to retain ownership of their works. . . .  (Preface by M. Pagnol in J. Boncompain, Le droit d’auteur au Canada: Étude critique (1971), at p. 9)…

J. Herman, in “Moral Rights and Canadian Copyright Reform: The Impact on Motion Picture Creators” (1989‑1990), 20 R.D.U.S. 407, at p. 411, analyses and defines the purpose of the concept of copyright and its relationship with society as follows:

The relationship between the artist and society may be characterized in straightforward economic terms: society places demands on its members to share with it the fruits of their intellectual labour. Artists supply those demands; however, if society recognizes an artist’s right of ownership of his intellectual work, he may set conditions and exact a price for the society’s consumption of it. Copyright confers in the creator a monopoly to exploit his work in public for his own economic self‑interest.

Mainstream thinking about copyright law in the Supreme Court continues to view copyright as an important tool for the economic management of rights in relation to works and other subject matter.[viii] Recent Supreme Court opinions have emphasized that copyright continues to apply to the Internet and digital media. In the SOCAN Tariff 22 case, the Supreme Court stated:

The capacity of the Internet to disseminate “works of the arts and intellect” is one of the great innovations of the information age. Its use should be facilitated rather than discouraged, but this should not be done unfairly at the expense of those who created the works of arts and intellect in the first place.[ix]

In the Robertson v. Thomson Corp. case the Supreme Court emphasized that works in digital form must be treated with the same respect for the law as works in traditional analogue forms:

Media neutrality is reflected in s. 3(1) of the Copyright Act which describes a right to produce or reproduce a work “in any material form whatever”. Media neutrality means that the Copyright Act should continue to apply in different media, including more technologically advanced ones. But it does not mean that once a work is converted into electronic data anything can then be done with it. The resulting work must still conform to the exigencies of the Copyright Act. Media neutrality is not a licence to override the rights of authors — it exists to protect the rights of authors and others as technology evolves.[x]

In mainstream thinking, the protection of authors’ creations is also viewed as such an important societal value that they are protected as a human right. For example, in the European Union, the protection of the right to intellectual property is enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Under EU law, there is an obligation to protect intellectual property and to provide rights that confer effective remedies.[xi] An Irish court recently held that the right to be identified with and to reasonably exploit one’s original creative endeavour in the Internet context is regarded as a human right.[xii] The Quebec Court of Appeal has twice held that the intentional infringement of copyright is a violation of the copyright owner’s right to the enjoyment of property protected under Articles 6 and 49 of the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[xiii]

Michael Geist’s views about copyright are a radical departure from these traditional values. He does not believe in the importance of exclusive copyright rights on the Internet or for a need to create a viable legal infrastructure that will support legal markets for digital products. In fact, he regularly opposes these values, and has advocated instead that creators can compete with free on the Internet; that exclusive rights on the Internet should not apply to non-commercial file sharing; and that creators should be paid through a universal levy on ISPs or rely on Government subsidies to survive.

Michael Geist’s ideological views about copyright were expressed on March 25, 2010 when he appeared before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage on Canada and New Media. In response to questions from Mr. Rod Bruinooge and Mr. Royal Galipeau about his philosophy towards digital markets, he compared cultural products to water, suggesting that creators could compete with “free” by selling enhanced cultural offerings – “bottled water” – rather than extracting value from their cultural creations and copyrights.[xiv]

In November 2011, he gave a speech entitled Why Copyright Reform Is Not the Cure for What Ails the Music Industry. In it he opposed legal protection for technological protection measures (TPMs). In lieu of conferring legal rights on rights holders, he endorsed a proposal by the Songwriters Association of Canada that would “make it legal to share music between two or more parties, whether over Peer-to-Peer networks, wireless networks, email, CD, DVD, hard drives, etc.” Under this regime, creators and rights holders would receive equitable remuneration through a levy on ISPs in the amount of $5.00 per Internet subscription. This proposal is somewhat similar to a proposal made by Michael Geist’s ideological mentor Lawrence Lessig in his book Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity. The effect of this would be to utterly undermine or destroy markets for works in digital form and likely replace property rights with a governmentally administered reward system that monitors all uses of culture on the Internet and allocates remuneration based on their assessments of value.[xv] In an earlier proposal, he advocated for supporting Canadian creators by providing funding for grant programs instead of expanding the private copying levy to include digital devices.

Given his values about copyright, it is not surprising that Michael Geist opposes every attempt to make intellectual property laws effective. He opposed amending Canadian laws to curtail counterfeiting, telling a Parliamentary Committee “there is likely to be limited economic impact in Canada from counterfeiting”. He was the only witness to take this view and his evidence was rejected by the Committee finding that “there is no doubt that counterfeiting and piracy cause economic harm to intellectual property owners, private companies and Canadian governments.” He opposes Canada’s negotiations of a free trade agreement with the EU that would include minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property. In prepared opening remarks to the Parliamentary Standing Committee on International Trade on the subject of CETA, he told them “CETA represents a very significant change that is part of a broader effort to pressure Canada to change its copyright laws”. To convince them of this he admitted to incorrectly telling them that “copyright provisions were not part of the Canada – US FTA or NAFTA”. He opposes Canada’s participation in the Trans Pacific Partnership negotiations, or at least in so far as they relate to intellectual property. He also was a strong opponent of ACTA. However, rather than accurately focusing on perceived problems, he resorted to scaremongering tactics to demonize it. See, Fear Mongering and Misinformation Used to Slag ACTA, A reply to ACTA critics, and More hype than facts about ACTA from its critics.

In a speech given in June 2010 about Bill C-32 Heritage Minister James Moore warned against being fooled by opponents of copyright reform who “don’t believe in copyright”, who “pretend” to be experts in copyright, but are misleading the public about what it.  According to the Minister:

“…Those people who are out there who’re saying copyright legislation/copyright reform is not good, these are people who are dressing up the fact that they don’t believe in copyright reform at all. There’s people out there who don’t believe in copyright at all. They just say well Bill C-61, the old copyright legislation, we disagree with these specific revisions.  Well, Bill C-32 we have these specific amendments. Don’t fool yourself.  These voices that are out there, there’s people out there who pretend to experts that the media cites all the time, they don’t believe in any copyright reform whatsoever. They will find any excuse to oppose this bill to drum up fear to mislead to misdirect and to push people in the wrong direction and to undermine what has been a meaningful comprehensive year-long effort to get something right. This hasn’t been done as I said since 1997, three years after I graduated high school. It’s been a long time.

We need to amend our legislation and those people out there who try to pretend that they’re copyright experts and they want to amend copyright in a meaningful way. Don’t be fooled by some of these people. They don’t believe in any copyright. They don’t believe in individuals’ rights to protect their own creations and when they speak, they need to be confronted. If it’s on Facebook, if it’s on Twitter or if it’s on a talk show, if it’s in a newspaper, confront them and tell them they are wrong. Canada from the Hudson’s Bay Company to FTA and NAFTA to the G8 and G20, Canada always has been always will be a trading nation. Our future and our past and our prosperity has always been dependant on investment into Canada be in compliance with international standards opening ourselves up to the world, welcoming investment and working with the world, not being an outlier in the world, disregarding international treaties like WIPO that we’ve signed, disregarding our obligations to protect foreign investment into Canada, Canadian investments into Canadian businesses. We need to protect those investments, protect those jobs and make sure that those voices who try to find technical nonsensical fear-mongering reasons to oppose copyright reform, are confronted every step of the way and they are defeated. And when we do that, this bill will pass and Canada will be better for it.”

The clause by clause review of Bill C-11 is an important part of the process in which members of the Special Legislative Committee have a chance to make technical amendments to the bill to ensure it meets its objectives. This is a time for reason and not rhetoric, and for sound values, to prevail.

For more information about the Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11 or copyright reform, see Change and the Copyright Modernization Act.


[i] “Scaremongering” means “a person who spreads stories that cause public fear”. Cambridge Dictionaries Online.

[ii] According to William Patry a “moral panic” is a “reaction by a group of people based on the false or exaggerated perception that some cultural behavior of group…is dangerously deviant and poses a menace to society”.  William Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (Oxford University Press, 2009) at p. 135

[iii] Did Mr. La Rue Miss the Elephant in the Room? A Critique of the Report of the Special Rapporteur to the U.N. Human Rights Council (Complete Post)

[iv] See, for example, Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 All E.R. 465 (H.L.) Lord Devlin stated in relation to the purpose of copyright “it protects property. It is no more interference with trade than is the law against larceny. Free trade does not require that one man should be allowed to appropriate without payment the fruits of another’s labour”. (at P. 479); Walter v. Lane, [1900] A.C. 539 (U.K. H.L.) Lord Davey stated at P. 552 “it is a sound principle that a man shall not avail himself of another’s skill, labour and expense by copying the written product thereof”. Lord Halsbury stated at p. 545 “I should very much regret it if I were compelled to come to the conclusion that the state of the law permitted one man to make profit and to appropriate to himself the labour, skill and capital of another”; MacMillan & Co. Ltd. v. Cooper (1923), 40 T.L.R. 186 (India P.C.) There Lord Atkinson stated that the moral basis of copyright rests on the 8th commandment “Thou shalt not steal”. at P. 187.

[v] See, Bishop v. Stevens, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 467 at P. 478 Justice McLachlin of the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the Copyright Act “was passed with a single object, namely, the benefit of authors of all kinds”; Vigneux v. Canadian Performing Rights Society, [1943] S.C.R. 348, reversed [1945] A.C. 108 (Canada P.C.) Justice Duff of the Supreme Court of Canada stated at pp. 353-354 in relation to the Copyright Act that the purpose of copyright is to prevent persons from “unfairly availing themselves of the work of others” and that the “protection of authors is the object to be attained by all copyright laws.”; CAPAC v. Kiwanis Club of Western Ontario, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 111 at P. 116 Justice Rand of the Supreme Court of Canada stated in relation to interpreting an exemption from infringement in the Act “to extend the language of the proviso would unnecessarily run counter to those principles of justice which accord to owners, particularly of property in the truest sense they have created, the accepted privileges of ownership”.

[vi] Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc. 2002 SCC 34; SOCAN v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45; CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 13.

[vii] Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc., 2002 SCC 34 per L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier and LeBel JJ.(in dissent)

[viii] Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) inc., 2003 SCC 17, [2003] 1 SCR 178

[ix] Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45

[x] Robertson v. Thomson Corp.,2006 SCC 43 (emphasis added)

[xi] British Telecommunications plc) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin), Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU Case C-275/06 29 January 2008, Scarlet Extended SA v SABAM, (ECJ Case C-70/10) 24 November, 2011, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, Case C‑360/10, 16 February 2012

[xii] EMI Records & Ors v Eircom Ltd, [2010] IEHC 108.

[xiii] Construction Denis Desjardins inc. c. Jeanson, [2010] RJQ 1600, France Animation v Robinson, 2011 QCCA 136. See, France Animation v Robinson – a case comment

[xiv] Here is the interchange:

Mr. Bruinooge:

On that, I’ll maybe bridge now into a philosophy I think you are espousing in relation to how the market should be able to essentially accommodate the content creators. I guess that type of market philosophy is obviously something that I hold. I’m not going to say that you share that same philosophy. Essentially, when someone’s creating something—in this case, artistic—or any type of endeavour that becomes digital, if a consumer can get similar degrees of content for free, then in theory, there’s no market. If that artist can then differentiate themselves to the point where their content is so desirable, then only at that point can they extract value from it and have a market. I think that’s kind of the philosophy. Unfortunately, we’re on the Internet. Is that kind of what you were talking about?

Prof. Michael Geist: It’s obvious that it is a challenge to compete with free content, but I don’t think that we should be of the view that just because something is available for free, no market can  develop. iTunes has sold well over a billion songs, and all of those songs are freely available online. Let’s not kid ourselves. You can access through it peer-to-peer. You can access it—as I see how my kids and other kids with music—through YouTube. It is effectively licensed, but they listen to the song. That’s all they wanted to do anyway. They just wanted to listen to the song anyway. There are lots of ways of accessing that song. Some are paid, while others are not. The truth of the matter is that there is value associated with the way of accessing a song through iTunes or through a CD, so that you can compete with free content. The oldest example that people like to offer is that they got a glass of water for free, and there are plenty of people walking out right now with a bottle of Dasani or Perrier or other kinds of bottled water, for which they pay the basically same thing. They’ll pay two or three more dollars for it.

Mr. Royal Galipeau: But it’s not as good as that water.

Prof. Michael Geist: There you go. So you can compete with free content. The truth is that you can compete with free content if you provide value. One of the really exciting things about the Internet is that we’re seeing innovators coming up with all kinds of different ways where they can add value and entice the customer too.

[xv] Here is an extract of what he said:

Why isn’t the industry, in particular such as CRIA using the existing legal rules to see whether or not they work. If they don’t work then of course, let’s ensure that the tools are there to ensure that the law is effective.  But where we find that it already works, the notion that more legal rules onto rules that are already in place, it seems to me don’t make a lot of sense.  And finally we ought to be thinking about innovative solutions.  The idea that somehow digital lock rules are innovative, rules that date back into the 1990s when the vision of the industry was lets take content, lets lock it down using this DRM and people will continue just to view and purchase all this stuff in the same way that they always have, not interact with it in a way that they are turned out to do, not move from platform to platform as it turns out that they do; not become themselves new kinds of creator as it turns out they do.  This is not innovative law making at all.  This is very old style law-making that, as I say, the experience in other jurisdictions as shown has done very little to work.  There are groups out there that are proposing new kinds of solutions.  Songwriters Association of Canada, for example, and put on the table different sorts of approaches that we could be thinking about; that would seek to reflect the reality that peer to peer is here  and there are ways to try to address that and find ways to monetise at the same time.  I think if we were serious about forward-looking solutions to the extent to which we need some of these solutions, those are the kinds of things that we ought to be talking about, not talking about trying to lock things down.

My remarks to the Senate Committee studying Bill C-11

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The following are my opening remarks to the Senate Committee studying Bill C-11 earlier today. The link to the webcast can be found here.

I would like to thank the committee for inviting me to appear today to provide input on Bill C-11.

Before starting my remarks, I would like to give you some background about myself.

  • I am a senior partner with the law firm McCarthy Tétrault.
  • I am an adjunct professor at Osgoode Hall Law School where I teach IP law.
  • I am the author of 5 books including the leading 6 volume treatise on Computer, Internet and E-Commerce Law.
  • I have also been involved in copyright matters for creators, users, and intermediaries spanning decades of practice.

I am telling you this so will understand I don’t approach these issues only from an academic perspective, but also as someone who has insights into how modern copyright laws affect the digital economy.

I am here today in my personal capacity and not representing any clients.

Senators, the Bill does a number of very important things to bring Canada into the 21st century. It contains amendments required by the WIPO Treaties. This will provide Canadian creators standards of copyright protection creative industries receive around the world.

The new enablement section creates a new tool that will give creators a new means of shutting down pirate sites that facilitate massive online content theft. This is a very important framework law which will help Canada be leader in digital economy.

The Bill also protects Internet intermediaries from copyright liability where they might have been technically liable for infringement. It also legalizes certain individuals uses of content such as format and time shifting.

Technical Amendments

When I appeared before the House of Commons Legislative Committee studying this Bill, I drew to the Committee’s attention that the Bill needed some technical amendments to ensure that the objectives of the Government were met. The Legislative Committee made important and needed amendments to clarify the Bill.

These included amendments to clarify that the new enablement section would apply to all sites that primarily enable infringement; to ensure that the pirate services caught  by the enablement provision could not hide behind the new Internet safe harbors in the Bill; and to ensure that those pirate services would be subject to statutory damages necessary to deter commercial-scale infringement.

Technological Protection Measures

Senators, a significant feature of the Bill is the legal protection for TPMs. You often hear them referred to as digital locks to suggest they frustrate consumer uses of content.

Infact, TPMs are enablers of content access that greatly benefit consumers and content owners. Legal protection for TPMs will support current and future innovative product and service offerings that consumers want. These include music streaming subscription services such as Slacker Radio, Spotify, and Sirius, video streaming services like Netflix and YouTube, and distribution of entertainment software and movies.

Legal protection for TPMs has been in place for over a decade in the EU, North America, Asia, and around the world. In fact, 89 countries around the world, including every one of Canada’s leading trading partners, are Contracting Parties to the WIPO Copyright Treaty. Our leading trading partners use legal protections for TPMs to support new innovative digital offerings.

There were submissions made to the Legislative Committee to significantly weaken the legal protections for TPMs including by Michael Geist. His proposals were scrutinized by Dr Ficsor the former Assistant Director General of WIPO. He concluded that his main proposals would be contrary to the requirements of the Treaties. I have given the Clerk a copy of his exhaustive paper which deals with this.

There were also concerns expressed about the need for specific exceptions. The Bill contains express exemptions from the TPM provisions. Furthermore, it provides broad powers to create new exceptions by regulation. Accordingly, there should be no concern about the framework for legal protection for TPMs in the Bill.

Potential Problems

The Bill has a mandatory review process. That is good because technology moves quickly and can raise unanticipated problems. It is also good because there are several potential problems with the Bill which need to be watched closely. I will highlight two of them.

Non-Commercial User-Generated Content Exception

One is the exception for “user generated content”.

The intent is to permit an individual to use content to make a home video or create “mash-ups” of video clips.

As I noted in my remarks to the Legislative Committee, the exception is so widely cast that it would most likely violate Canada’s WTO TRIPS obligations to comply with what is known internationally as the 3 step test.

The Fair Dealing for Education Exception

Another potential problem is the proposal to add education to the current list of fair dealing purposes. The Government background documents say that the permitted uses cannot harm the market for a work.

Yet, there is no assurance this will be the case. This was pointed out at the Legislative Committee including by Profs. D’Agostino and Gendreau, two distinguished copyright law professors.

I would like to thank the committee again for inviting me to appear. I look forward to answering any questions you may have about my remarks or the bill.

* Cor. June 22, 2012

For more information about the Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11 or copyright reform, see Change and the Copyright Modernization Act.

 

The Andersen P2P file sharing study on the purchase of music CDs in Canada

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In 2006, the highly regarded economics professor Prof. Liebowitz, Director of the Center for Economic Analysis of Property Rights and Innovation at University of Texas, surveyed the entire field of econometric studies on file sharing. On the basis of his comprehensive review (which displayed a remarkable consensus on the issue), he concluded that “file-sharing has brought significant harm to the recording industry”. Prior to that in a comprehensive article published in 2005 Prof. Liebowitz criticized the theory that unlicensed file sharing helps copyright owners. He said those that professed this view saw “gains from copying in every nook and cranny of the economy, when in reality the instances of such gains are likely to be rather limited.”

Despite the exhaustive work of Prof. Liebowitz and others, Industry Canada retained Birgitte Andersen, a Danish academic working as a Reader in London, England, at Birkbeck College, to study the impact of P2P file-sharing on the purchase of music in Canada. Her report, titled The Impact of Music Downloads and P2P File-Sharing on the Purchase of Music:  A Study for Industry Canada, was published in 2007 on Industry Canada’s website. It confirmed that a “review of existing econometric studies suggests that P2P file-sharing tends to decrease music purchasing.” However, based on a study of evidence from new consumer surveys, the study counter-intuitively concluded “the opposite, namely that P2P file sharing tends to increase rather than decrease music purchasing.”

Immediately after the study was published it was acclaimed as a “must read” by Michael Geist. He used the study to further his copyright agenda claiming that the music industry “has benefited from P2P” and “that there is no “emergency” that necessitates legislative intervention” to reform the Copyright Act. Over the years, Michael Geist continued to cite the study and to defend Ms. Andersen, including when her paper was criticized by Prof. Liebowitz, who after analyzing the study found “a result that is not only implausible but is actually impossible to be true”. Michael Geist vouched for the study, claiming it was “not a study with a particular desired outcome”. Yet at the time she was retained to do the study, Ms. Andersen’s published writings evidenced an antagonism towards both the music industry and the copyright system.[1]

In March 2010, Ms. Andersen backed away significantly from the published findings in her 2007 study. In a revised paper she dropped her claim that unauthorized file sharing helped the music industry. However, along with her co-author Marion Frenz, she now claimed instead that “the Industry Canada data showed no association between the number of P2P files downloaded and CD album sales”.  She concluded that “P2P file-sharing is not to blame for the decline in CD markets”.

Despite Ms Andersen’s own abandonment of the key conclusion in the 2007 study, Industry Canada continues inexplicably to post the abandoned 2007 study on its website or to even publish a notice that the conclusions in the study were abandoned by its authors, who published a subsequent paper using the same data that came to a different conclusion.

Earlier this week, Prof. George Barker, the Director of the Centre for Law and Economics, at the College Of Law, Australian National University, published a comprehensive study using the same raw data used by Ms. Andersen to re-examine the findings in her two papers. Prof. Barker subjected the data to a rigorous analysis, correcting for what he identified as serious flaws in Ms. Andersen’s studies. He found that not only did the underlying data not support the conclusions in either of the previous studies, it supported the exact opposite conclusion.

Prof. Barker’s conclusion was that both the initial and the reworked Andersen studies were fundamentally flawed. When the same raw data was analyzed correcting for the errors he identified, it showed that P2P file-sharing reduced demand for CDs. In particular, that “a 10% increase in P2P downloads reduces CD demand by around 0.4%”.

Prof. Barker’s summarized his corrected analysis of the Industry Canada data as follows:

All of our regression results (reported in Tables 2 and 3 above) show a negative association between P2P downloading and CD demand.  We consistently find a negative and statistically significant partial correlation between CD purchases and P2P downloads.  The range of these estimated correlations is between -0.039 and -0.050, with more consistent, mid-range values coming from the difference on difference regressions (-0.041 and -0.043).  This implies a 10% increase in P2P downloads reduces CD demand by around 0.4%.

This directly contradicts the much cited and controversial conclusion of Andersen and Frenz… AF claimed that the data showed “… no association between the number of P2P files downloaded and CD album sales,” claiming therefore that “… this paper show (sic) that P2P file-sharing is not to blame for the decline in CD markets.  Music markets are not simply undermined by free music downloading and P2P file-sharing.”

In this paper we have corrected for two fundamental errors in the previous analysis by AF leading to their erroneous conclusion. First we corrected for the fact AF biased their results by excluding from their analysis the group of consumers who had completely stopped purchasing CD’s (potentially because of P2P activity) prior to 2005.  This is the very group who were most responsive, or likely to have substituted P2P downloading for CD purchases.  Second we controlled for the fact that the level of an individual’s demand for CD’s, and the level of an individual’s P2P downloading may be correlated simply because they are both affected by the same third factor, such as love of music, so that high (or low) levels of CD demand is likely to be associated with high (low) levels of P2P demand.  Such a positive association between the level of demand and level of P2P downloading may have led AF to mistakenly conclude they had found evidence of a positive market creation effect, as AF regressed the level of individuals CD demand against the level of individuals P2P downloading.  Instead we focused on the changes in CD demand and changes in P2P downloading, using data in the survey that AF ignored on 2004 and 2005 behaviours of participants.  By focusing on a longitudinal analysis of how the change in individual P2P downloading behaviour affected the change in CD demand we were better able to isolate the true relationship between increases or changes in P2P downloading and changes in CD demand.

Prof. Barker’s conclusions about the Industry Canada data are consistent with what Prof. Liebowitz concluded before the first Andersen paper was published, namely, that the vast majority of econometric studies conducted around the world show that unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing of music harms sales of music.

All the same, the evidence here supports the current findings from almost all econometric studies that have been undertaken to date, including those in this issue—file sharing has brought significant harm to the recording industry.  The birth of file sharing and the very large decline in CD sales that immediately followed is a powerful piece of evidence on its own.  The 2004 increase in CD sales, temporarily reversing the decline, largely matches a reversal in the amount of file-sharing activity.  Furthermore, analysis of the various possible alternative explanations for the decline in CD sales fails to find any viable candidates.

This conclusion, preliminary though it might be, should not be much of a surprise.  Common sense is, or should be, the handmaiden of economic analysis.  When given the choice of free and convenient high-quality copies versus purchased originals, is it really a surprise that a significant number of individuals will choose to substitute the free copy for the purchase?  The conditions needed to override this basic intuition are demanding and seemingly not met in the case of file sharing.

Prof. Barker’s study once again raises fundamental questions about the Andersen study. One could ask why Industry Canada commissioned the study, why the department selected Ms. Andersen to be the primary author of it, how it chose to vet the study`s conclusions before publication, whether it had a desired outcome, and why it was published when it was. These are questions to which we may never know the complete answer.[2]

What we do know is that Industry Canada continues to publish the original 2007 Andersen study on its website. It does so even after the conclusions were abandoned by its authors and after distinguished economists have detailed fundamental reasons for doubting its correctness.

The 2007 Andersen study is available in PDF form from Industry Canada’s website through a direct link to a page hosted by Industry Canada. Industry Canada also publishes a webpage version on the Industry Canada Intellectual Property Directorate site. Both versions contain a disclaimer that the views in the paper are not to be attributed to Industry Canada. In the PDF version of the paper, the disclaimer appears on the first page and states: “THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHORS. NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEM SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO INDUSTRY CANADA.”

The Industry Canada webpage version contains a somewhat different disclaimer that is published by the Intellectual Property Directorate of Industry Canada. This disclaimer says:

These studies were funded by the Intellectual Property Policy Directorate, Industry Canada. The opinions expressed in these studies are those of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the policies or opinions of Industry Canada or the Government of Canada.

This Industry Canada disclaimer is accessible only through a link at the bottom of the page to the word “disclaimer”. Readers will not even be aware of it unless they scroll down to the bottom of the page and click on the link. Like a browse wrap (web wrap) agreement that courts don’t enforce when the link to the agreement is buried at the bottom of a web page, the Industry Canada link to the disclaimer is hardly sufficient notice to readers that Industry Canada does not endorse the opinions in the study.[3]

As the paper continues to be published by Industry Canada, readers, who may be excused for not researching the economics literature to assess its accuracy or lineage, will undoubtedly wrongly conclude that Industry Canada does, in fact, endorse its contents. Moreover, the study has been referred to by third parties such as Michael Geist as the “Industry Canada Sponsored P2P Study”, the “Industry Canada P2P Study” and one of the “Industry Canada studies on the music industry”. The public reading these blogs, which are still being disseminated, will not likely be aware of the Industry Canada disclaimer or the admitted inaccuracies in, or criticisms of, the study.

The continued dissemination of the study could lead even objective researchers to imply an association or endorsement by Industry Canada. For example, The Library of Parliament in its Legislative Summary of Bill C-11 referred to the Andersen 2007 study as an “Industry Canada released study investigating the effects on music sales of music downloading”.

In light of its acknowledged inaccuracies and the continued potential of the 2007 Andersen study to mislead the public about what the Industry Canada data shows and whether the opinions in the study are endorsed by Industry Canada, the study should be removed from Industry Canada’s website. At the very least, like cigarettes, it should be appropriately labelled with a prominent notice.

* Update: Industry Canada subsequently removed the webpage version of the study from its website.

__________________________________

[2] These questions were explored by Chris Castle following a review of access to information requests about the study. See, ibid, The Industry Canada Music Study, Part II, or Who Are You Going to Believe?

[3] See, Canadian Real Estate Association v. Sutton (Quebec) Real Estate Services Inc. (2003), 2003 CarswellQue 682 (S.C.), Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F. 3d 16 (2d Cir. 2002), Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc. 668 F.Supp.2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), Hoffman v. Supplements Togo Management Company, LLC., 2011 WL 1885675 (N.J. Super.A.D. 2011)

 

Did the Supreme Court eviscerate Access Copyright’s business model? A reply to Michael Geist

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Michael Geist in a series of recent blog posts claims that the decisions of the Supreme Court in the SOCAN v. Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36 (SOCAN v Bell) and Alberta (Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 SCC 37 (Access Copyright) cases eviscerated Access Copyright’s business model.[1] He asserts that the cases make all copying that would be subject to a license from Access Copyright fair dealings. Moreover, he claims that publishers would not suffer significant economic harm if all copying permitted under Access Copyright licenses or model licenses were fair dealings and no educational institution, whether elementary, secondary, or post-secondary, paid a penny for all such uses.

Michael Geist’s claims, which rely extensively on the decision of the Supreme Court in the Access Copyright case, are flawed and cannot be supported by the reasons of the Supreme Court. The decision in the case, which deals with “short excerpts”, such as a page from a supplementary math textbook used for classroom instruction, is no precedent that all copying in K-12 and post-secondary institutions that would be covered by an Access Copyright tariff or license is covered by fair dealing. Similarly, there is no basis in the decision or in the evidence before the Court for his conclusion that this uncompensated copying would not create “significant economic harm” to publishers.

The Access Copyright Ruling

The appeal in the Access Copyright case arose from a judicial review of the Copyright Board decision which certified a tariff requiring elementary and secondary schools to pay royalties to compensate authors and publishers for reprographic copying. The issue in the appeal related to whether a single class of copying in these schools was a fair dealing under the Copyright Act. Specifically, the question was whether the Copyright Board was correct to conclude that copying of short excerpts from supplementary books in K-12 schools for distribution to students for use during class instruction was a fair dealing.

The Copyright Board did not define the length of the short excerpts in issue. It stated in its reasons that “teachers generally limit themselves to reproducing relatively short excerpts from a work”. However, in its Supreme Court Appeal Factum, the Council of Ministers explained that what was in issue was the copying of an occasional page from a book, amounting to no more than 4.5 pages per student per school year.

“The factual record of the Board proceeding establishes that teachers in Canadian elementary and secondary schools (outside of Quebec) typically copy “short excerpts.” The purpose of this copying is to supplement material in the textbook which has been provided to a student. For example, a teacher might occasionally provide a page of math problems from a different math textbook to supplement the problems in a student’s textbook, in order to address the needs of a particular student, a group of students or a class of students.”

“The four and a half pages per student per year are the pages that the Board placed in Category 4 of its fair dealing analysis”. (emphasis added)

The Copyright Board ruled that this copying was not covered by fair dealing and had to be paid for by schools. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed a judicial review from this holding. The Supreme Court ruled that the Board had misapplied three of the six non-exclusive fairness factors used to determine whether a dealing is fair and instructed the Board to reconsider its decision. Specifically, the Court was of the opinion that the Board made the following errors:

  • In considering the purpose of the dealing factor, the Board concluded that the predominant purpose was that of the teacher, namely, “instruction” or “non-private study”. The Board therefore found that this factor tended to make the copies in issue unfair. The Court ruled that the purpose of the copying was private study. The Board had not considered whether copying for this purpose tended to make the dealing fair or unfair.
  • The Board considered the total aggregate copying that took place in the schools under the amount of the dealing factor. It was appropriate for the Board to consider the aggregate copying. However, this was to be considered under the “character of the dealing” factor. The “amount” factor is intended to be “an examination ofthe proportion betweenthe excerpted copy and the entire work, not the overall quantity of what is disseminated.” By “reapplying this same quantitative concern when assessing the “amount of the dealing”, it conflated the two factors, which had the effect of erasing proportionality from the fairness analysis.”
  • The Board concluded that the impact of the photocopying was sufficiently important to compete with textbook sales in assessing the effect of the dealing on the work. But the Court said there was “no evidence from Access Copyright demonstrating any link between photocopying short excerpts and the decline in textbook sales”.

Michael Geist’s Claims

Immediately after the decision in the Access Copyright case was released, Michael Geist, a longtime critic of Access Copyright, published a series of blogs.[2] In these blogs he makes the following three claims:

Assertion: As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court, no elementary, secondary, or post-secondary educational institution needs a license from Access Copyright to cover the reprographic and digital copying that would be covered by an Access Copyright tariff or by the AUCC or ACCC model licenses.

“More broadly, the decision eviscerates the current Access Copyright business model that is heavily reliant on educational revenues…the need for an additional Access Copyright licence for schools at all levels is now unquestionably in doubt.”

“With the court’s strong endorsement of fair dealing in the classroom, it completely eviscerates much of Access Copyright’s business model and calls into question the value of the model licence signed by many Canadian universities.”

“Since the Access Copyright – AUCC model licence only covers up to ten percent of a print work, the licence largely duplicates fair dealing and is likely to be viewed by educational institutions as unnecessary.”

“the Access Copyright licence – which typically only covers 10 percent of a work – will rarely add value beyond what is permitted under fair dealing.”

“the Supreme Court decision has eliminated need for the additional Access Copyright licence”.

Assertion: As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court, all or almost all copying licensed by Access Copyright through tariffs or the AUCC or ACCC model licenses is fair dealing. Further, publishers would not suffer any significant economic harm if all copying that would be covered by the Access Copyright tariffs or model licenses is not compensated.

“Claiming that the last 6% is fair dealing is consistent with the law and does not pose a significant threat to Canadian publishers and authors, who have granted permission for the vast majority of copying that takes place in schools.”

“At issue is only 5.8 percent of copying for which Access Copyright is demanding millions in compensation. Yet the Court’s analysis of fair dealing provides very strong guidance that the overwhelming majority of these remaining copies qualify as fair dealing and do not require additional compensation.”

“Moreover, given that there is permission for 88% of copying, claims that Canadian publishing is at risk or that the fair dealing copying creates significant economic harm are simply false (a unanimous court found no evidence of economic harm).”

Assertion: As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court, educational institutions should change or consider their policies and practices and not pay for the copying that would be covered by the Access Copyright tariffs or model licenses.

When combined with the addition of education to the list of fair dealing categories, all Canadian educational institutions should reexamine their copyright practices with the view to adopting a far more aggressive, user-oriented approach.

More broadly, the decision eviscerates the current Access Copyright business model that is heavily reliant on educational revenues…the need for an additional Access Copyright licence for schools at all levels is now unquestionably in doubt.

[I]t will be very difficult for educational institutions to justify the Access Copyright licence in light of this decision… the licence largely duplicates fair dealing and is likely to be viewed by educational institutions as unnecessary.

The schools argue that this tiny portion of copying qualifies as fair dealing and given the Supreme Court’s analysis of the six factors, there is no doubt that position has been strengthened and schools should be developing their copying practices with that in mind.

Misinterpretations of the Access Copyright decision by Michael Geist

Michael Geist exaggerates what the Court decided and ignores that the Court’s opinion was on a very narrow issue

The Supreme Court has said on three occasions that whether something is a fair dealing is a question of fact. In the CCH and SOCAN v Bell cases, the Court stated “The Copyright Act does not define what will be “fair”; whether something is fair is a question of fact and depends on the facts of each case”. In the Access Copyright case it re-iterated this saying “whether something is “fair” is a question of fact and “a matter of impression””.

In the Access Copyright case, the Supreme Court was concerned with the following facts:

  • Copying by teachers only in K-12 schools.
  • The copying was limited to “short excerpts”.
  • The “short excerpts” were from textbooks used to supplement/complement texts already purchased.
  • These excerpts were equivalent to a “page of math problems” not exceeding 4.5 pages a year per student on average.
  • The supplemental texts were purchased by the school and were in the library or already in class.
  • The excerpts were used for class instruction.
  • There was, according to the Court, no evidence of any link showing harm to the market from the copying of the 4.5 pages per year per student.
  • The short excerpts were not substitutes for buying textbooks. The court found that schools would not have purchased the various texts for each student to make the short excerpts.

Michael Geist’s claims assume that all copying in all schools is the same as what was in issue in the Access Copyright case. He ignores the fundamental principle that fair dealing is a question of fact and fails to recognize that the Access Copyright decision did not address any other forms of copying including for example only:

  • Copying in post-secondary institutions
  • Copying of primary textbooks to facilitate book sharing
  • Copying of other types of works e.g. workbooks, short stories, articles, newspapers
  • Reprographic copying for course packs, digital copying of course collections, copying of primary textbooks for students for other purposes
  • Multiple copying of short excerpts from the same textbook
  • Digital storage and storage and distribution through learning management systems
  • Electronic reserve systems
  • Other digital copying, scanning, downloading, emailing
  • Copying by other staff members

Michael Geist misinterprets or exaggerates what the Supreme Court said about the fairness factors in the Access Copyright case

Michael Geist’s arguments in support of his claims based on what the Court said about the fairness factors also cannot be supported.

He claims that the purpose of the dealing factor will always tend to be weighted as fair given that most copying in schools will be regarded as research or private study, or after Bill C-11 is enacted, as education. He says:

“purpose of the dealing now clearly favours education as the court concluded (1) that research is extremely broad; (2) that instruction is covered by research and private study; and (3) that teachers share a symbiotic purpose with students.”

He wrongly assumes that merely because a dealing is for an allowable purpose that all uses will weigh in favor of being fair. But CCH held “some dealings, even if for an allowable purpose, may be more or less fair than others”. There would be no use for the “purpose” factor if all allowable purposes were ipso facto fair.

The Access Copyright case only addressed the purpose of copying short excerpts of supplementary/complementary texts for classroom instructional use by K-12 students. Yet, even here the Court made no finding that the purpose of such copying tended to be fair. It remitted this issue to the Board for consideration. Other purposes, even for the purposes of education, may not be regarded as “fair”; for example, copying by copy shops, copying by commercial educational institutions, or dealings that fail to meet conditions of other educational exceptions that were intended to ensure those exempted activities were fair.

There may also be cases where the copying may be for an allowable purpose, but the real motivation for the uncompensated copying is some ulterior purpose that makes the dealing unfair. The Court alluded to this twice. It said: “copiers cannot camouflage their own distinct purpose by purporting to conflate it with the research or study purposes of the ultimate user.” It also said: “If, as in the “course pack” cases, the copier hides behind the shield of the user’s allowable purpose in order to engage in a separate purpose that tends to make the dealing unfair, that separate purpose will also be relevant to the fairness analysis.”

Michael Geist attempts to lead his readers to conclude in discussing the amount of the copying factor, that the Court rejected that the aggregate amounts of copying by educational institutions was a relevant consideration. He says:

Abella then rejects Access Copyright’s claims that fair dealing analysis depends on examining the aggregate amount of copying.

The overall quantity of copying has long been a major Access Copyright argument (it is even raised again in response to media coverage of the decision), but the court ruled it is not relevant in considering the amount of the dealing.

The Court did not rule that the overall quantity of copying was not relevant. This copying is to be considered under the “character of the dealing factor”. In CCH the Court stated If multiple copies of works are being widely distributed, this will tend to be unfair. If, however, a single copy of a work is used for a specific legitimate purpose, then it may be easier to conclude that it was a fair dealing.” This was repeated in the Access Copyright case.

Moreover, as discussed in the companion case SOCAN v. Bell, the “amount” factor is not a quantitative assessment based on aggregate use, it is an examination of the proportion between the excerpted copy and the entire work, not the overall quantity of what is disseminated. The quantification of the total number of pages copied, as the Court noted in CCH, is considered under a different factor: the “character of the dealing”.

In discussing the character of the dealing factor, Michael Geist acknowledged that “The character of the dealing might favour Access Copyright if there is widespread copying of the particular work”.

He also suggests under the alternatives to the dealing factor that buying books for students is not a practical alternative to fair dealing. For example, he says:

“alternatives to the dealing also favour education since the court concluded that buying books for every excerpt for every student is not a realistic alternative.” “Buying books for all students is not a realistic alternative to fair dealing copying”.

The decision does not, however, suggest that in general “buying books for all students is not a realistic alternative to fair dealing copying”. The Court’s reasons were based on the facts before the Court. The copying was limited to short excerpts of supplementary/complementary texts for schools that had already purchased original copies that were kept in class or in the library. In that situation, on the facts, the Court expressed the view that buying texts as an alternative to copying short excerpts for students was not reasonable. According to the Court:

“In my view, buying books for each student is not a realistic alternative to teachers copying short excerpts to supplement student textbooks. First, the schools have already purchased originals that are kept in the class or library, from which the teachers make copies. The teacher merely facilitates wider access to this limited number of texts by making copies available to all students who need them. In addition, purchasing a greater number of original textbooks to distribute to students is unreasonable in light of the Board’s finding that teachers only photocopy short excerpts to complement existing textbooks. Under the Board’s approach, schools would be required to buy sufficient copies for every student of every text, magazine and newspaper in Access Copyright’s repertoire that is relied on by a teacher. This is a demonstrably unrealistic outcome. Copying short excerpts, as a result, is reasonably necessary to achieve the ultimate purpose of the students’ research and private study.”

On the facts of the case, the Court was considering the proposition of buying books instead of copying 4.5 pages per student per year. Michael Geist gives no reasons for jumping to the conclusion that a court would make the same finding in other situations such as where hundreds of pages per student/per year are copied into course packs or posted on course management sites, as is routinely the case in the post-secondary sector.

Michael Geist argues that copying without paying license fees under an Access Copyright license would be a fair dealing because it would have no detrimental effect on publishers. He relies on what the Court stated in the Access Copyright case on the effects on the market factor:

“a unanimous court dismissed claims of economic harm from the copying”.

“a unanimous court found no evidence of economic harm”

“Abella also dismisses claims that copying in schools has a detrimental economic impact.”

But, the Court did not decide that copying by educational institutions could not affect the market or have detrimental effects on publishers and authors. The Court found no evidence on the facts before it of any link between the copying of the short excerpts in issue and a decline in book sales. That finding was premised on the specifics of the case where the Court doubted that the schools would have purchased more copies of the texts to make copies of these short excerpts.

The final problematic application of a fairness factor by the Board was its approach to the “effect of the dealing on the work”, which assesses whether the dealing adversely affects or competes with the original work. Access Copyright pointed out that textbook sales had shrunk over 30 percent in 20 years. However, as noted by the Coalition, there was no evidence that this decline was linked to photocopying done by teachers…

other than the bald fact of a decline in sales over 20 years, there is no evidence from Access Copyright demonstrating any link between photocopying short excerpts and the decline in textbook sales.

In addition, it is difficult to see how the teachers’ copying competes with the market for textbooks, given the Board’s finding that the teachers’ copying was limited to short excerpts of complementary texts. If such photocopying did not take place, it is more likely that students would simply go without the supplementary information, or be forced to consult the single copy already owned by the school.

The Court in discussing the effect on the market factor was not making any general finding that all or any other copying that takes place in educational institutions would not harm or have effects on the market. The decision, therefore, is no precedent for uses where the copying would be a substitute for or reduce book sales. Michael Geist’s assertion that copying 10% of a book for any and all uses in educational institutions would not harm markets for works is not supported by the reasons of the Court. It is an assertion not backed up with any analysis or evidence.

Michael Geist argues that even if publishers and authors are paid nothing under Access Copyright licenses that those losses would not cause significant economic harm. According to Access Copyright’s financial statements its license revenues in 2010 were over $32 million. They were over $33 million in 2009. None of these revenues included royalties for digital copying that would be covered under the AUCC and ACCC model licenses.

Michael Geist gives no reasons why the year over year losses of tens of millions of dollars in licensing revenues would not be considered as a significant loss. He does not even mention these losses. His sole argument is that publishers are paid for a large percentage of their book, periodical, and newspaper copying and can afford not to be paid for other unlicensed copying. One need not even consider the scope of what would be lost. He says:

Access Copyright is simply irrelevant for the overwhelming majority of copying even before anyone conducts a fair dealing analysis. Moreover, given that there is permission for 88% of copying, claims that Canadian publishing is at risk or that the fair dealing copying creates significant economic harm are simply false (a unanimous court found no evidence of economic harm).

Michael Geist’s argument is essentially that a publisher cannot suffer any significant economic harm from the uncompensated copying of some books if the publisher or some other publisher is paid for the copying of those books or some other books. Under this Geistonomics-moral-legal theory a seller of products has no cause to complain if someone walks off without paying for merchandise as long as the seller (or another seller of these types of products) is paid for a large percentage of the goods offered for sale by the seller.

Leaving aside the illogic of his argument, Michael Geist’s summary of the Circum Network Inc. study to support his claim about how much textbook copying in schools is licensed is misleading. He suggests that 88% of the copying that was the subject of the study was licensed by the publishers. His number includes “reproducibles”. These are often referred to as “Blackline Masters” such as exercise sheets that come with the purchase of textbooks and which can be copied for classroom use. It also included consumables such as workbooks. When copying reproducibles (approx. 2.6 billion pages) and consumables (approx. 170 million pages) are removed from the volume, the schools covered by the study had permission to copy a very small percentage of texts. So even his argument that the Circum study shows that publishers are paid for the vast amounts of textbook copying in schools is premised on an inaccurate interpretation or presentation of the study.

Michael Geist also seeks to draw conclusions that span all educational institutions even though the Circum study was a snapshot of copying in K-12 schools only. He gives no explanation and does no analysis that even tries to show how the study might be applicable to post-secondary institutions.

Conclusions and Comments

Michael Geist’s claim that the Supreme Court’s decision eviscerates Access Copyright’s business model does not stand up to scrutiny. His assertions are devoid of legal analysis. His claims also completely ignore the teachings of the Supreme Court that whether something is a fair dealing is a question of fact.

His arguments essentially can be reduced to two unsupported propositions: (1) if copying a total of 4.5 pages per year per student in elementary and secondary schools, in many cases a single page at a time, from supplementary textbooks for classroom use may be a fair dealing (the Board still has to decide if it is), then all copying in all schools that would be covered by Access Copyright’s tariffs or model licenses must also be fair dealings; and (2) publishers won’t be hurt by this uncompensated copying because they, or some other publishers, will be paid for other copying.

For whatever reasons, Michael Geist wants to persuade educational institutions that they don’t need Access Copyright, or any licenses from publishers, for the copying that would be covered by Access Copyright licenses. A simple consideration of Access Copyright’s licenses shows that much more is permitted under the licences than under the fair dealing that was considered in the Supreme Court case. His lack of analysis of the licenses to support his claims should be recognized by those making decisions about their institution’s copyright policies. If the basic tenets of academia include verification of one’s “facts”, then someone should double-check Michael Geist’s “facts” in order to satisfy themselves that they have been presented with ‘the straight goods”.

His claims about the implications of the Supreme Court decision should also be assessed in light of his well-known antipathy and ideological antagonism towards copyrights and copyright owners.[iii] His argument that publishers will not suffer harm from unlicensed and uncompensated copying is another instance of the claims he has repeatedly made that unauthorized copying doesn’t hurt rights holders who should, accordingly, be left without recourse or remedies. For example, he has opposed laws to reduce counterfeiting by denouncing statements that counterfeiting is a significant problem in Canada, views expressly rejected by a Parliamentary Committee which concluded otherwise.[iv] He also opposed giving rights holder the tools needed to shut down online piracy services arguing that unauthorized online file sharing didn’t hurt rights holders.[v]

Educational institutions have long histories of working collaboratively with authors and publishers and respecting their copyrights. In fact, many teachers and professors are authors and owners of copyright works and have strong moral compasses about honoring copyrights. As authors of works they understand the investments of time, money, and intellectual energy which are necessary to produce textbooks. In light of the serious flaws in Michael Geist’s arguments, teachers, professors, and educational institutions might well consider whether the information they are using to inform their decisions is analytically sound and, if followed, could break with their most fundamental values.

 

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[1] Neil Finkelstein of my firm McCarthy Tétrault, was co-counsel in the Access Copyright appeal with Claude Brunet of Norton Rose Canada. Dan Glover and I were counsel for the interveners the Canadian Publishers’ Council, the Association of Canadian Publishers and the Canadian Educational Resources Council.

[iii] See, Barry Sookman A question of values

Even more on Access Copyright and the Supreme Court: eviscerated or not?

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My mother warned me to be suspicious when people give gratuitous compliments. So, I read with some suspicion the recent blog post by Ariel Katz, who responded to my post Did the Supreme Court eviscerate Access Copyright’s business model? A reply to Michael Geist, generously calling me a “well experienced lawyer” and a “smart well-trained lawyer”.[[1]]

In that post I argued that Michael Geist’s claim that the Supreme Court’s decision eviscerated Access Copyright’s business model did not stand up to scrutiny. I pointed out that his assertions completely ignored the teachings of the Supreme Court that whether something is a fair dealing is a question of fact and that his claims were not based on any analysis to demonstrate why the Supreme Court decision had the effects he claimed.

Ariel Katz’s reply did not attempt to refute my assertions. Nor, like Michael Geist, did he engage in any analysis of the decision of the Supreme Court to try and show what impacts the case might have on future cases involving educational copying.

His main claim seems to be that I sought to underplay what the Supreme Court had to say; that I tried to distinguish the case and to argue that the holding was limited to its specific facts but inapplicable to others. He sought to establish this by making the following arguments, none of which make his point or establish how the Supreme Court decision could be applied in settings other than those in issue in the Access Copyright case:

  • He claims the Supreme Court does not hear appeals unless it intends to lay down principles that are intended to apply to other settings. I agree this is generally the case. But, this assertion sheds no light on how the court’s actual decision will be applied in future cases. It also provides no foundation for any argument that Copyright Access’ business model will be eviscerated by the decision.
  • He claims that in a motion for leave to intervene in the appeal made by organizations representing publishers which my firm represented, arguments were made that the decision rendered by the court would likely be applied in a variety of future cases. Of course a decision of the Supreme Court will be applied in future cases. But, again this assertion sheds no light on how the court’s actual decision will be applied in those future cases. It also provides no basis for the argument that Copyright Access’ business model will be eviscerated by the decision.

To be fair, even though Ariel Katz’s post may have been intended to support Michael Geist’s claims, he did not expressly advance Michael Geist’s argument that the Supreme Court decision will eviscerate Access Copyright’s business model. In fact, he acknowledges the exact legal principle that was at the heart of one of the two main flaws in Michael Geist’s post. He says “Of course, the Court offered guidelines that will have to be applied in different factual settings, and there’s no question that what may be fair dealing in one situation may not be in another, and that how exactly they apply in each and every instance may not always be certain.” (emphasis added)

Further, unlike Michael Geist, he does not claim that as a result of the decision of the Supreme Court all or almost copying that would be covered by an Access Copyright license would be covered by fair dealing.[[2]] He interprets the case as laying down a rule that a dealing would be fair where a work is reproduced “for educational and other legitimate purposes as long as what is being copied is reasonably necessary to achieve those purposes, when there is no realistic alternative to the copying, and the copying does not adversely affect or competes with the original work.” The implication of his interpretation is that dealings by educational institutions falling outside of this factual matrix may well be considered unfair. Whether they will or won’t will always be a question of fact.

Without a doubt, future cases will clarify the actual scope of what the Supreme Court decided and how other facts not before the court fit into the CCH/Access Copyright framework. I don’t agree with Ariel Katz’s interpretation of the Access Copyright case. For example, the Supreme Court did not turn Canada’s fair dealing defense into US fair use by expanding the allowable purpose of a dealing to be for any “legitimate purpose”. It also didn’t rule that all dealings for an educational purpose in K-12 and higher educational settings would be considered research or private study or would be considered under the first fairness factor as tending to be fair. Nor did it rule that under the amount of the dealing factor that copying any amount that may be reasonably necessary would tend to be fair. His suggested interpretation also leaves out any consideration of the character of the dealing factor which examines, among other things, the aggregate amounts of copying and the nature of the work factor.

For the reasons explained in my original blog post, the factual situation considered by the Supreme Court, and its ruling, are much narrower than either Michael Geist or Ariel Katz claim.

Ariel Katz’s post is also an interesting read for another reason. In it, he attacked Access Copyright for allegedly discrediting some of its critics in academia (presumably including him) as “anti-copyright ideologues” and “ivory-tower-out-of-touch-non-pragmatic-wishful-thinking-academics” and for making “empirically unfound and theoretically hollow arguments”. He then attacked Access Copyright, other collectives, and the creative community claiming:

  • all copyright collectives – which include the 35 collectives that operate in Canada – “are driven by a single objective: to maximize that license fees that they collect”;[[3]]
  • all copyright collectives – which include over 400 collectives that operate worldwide – “perceive any meaningful application of fair dealing as an existential threat”;
  • all copyright collectives – which include collectives which administer rights on behalf of actors, broadcasters, choreographers, composers, dancers, directors, documentary producers, film producers, music publishers, musicians and other performers, playwrights, poets, print publishers, record producers, screenwriters, songwriters, sports teams (as broadcasters), television producers, visual artists and writers – “abhor fair dealing”;
  • members of the cultural community who had argued that the fair dealing exception had to be construed to be in compliance with Canada’s international obligations including the Berne Three Step test were incorrect;[[4]]
  • Access Copyright and its supporters “took the most extreme and arrogant position” that copying by an educational institution for the purpose of education or training is categorically excluded from the purview of fair dealing”, even though cases from Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand had consistently held that copying for educational or training purposes did not fall into the allowable fair dealing for private study purpose, and even though Parliament amended Section 29 to add fair dealing for education as a new allowable purpose because copying for an educational purpose was not regarded as falling into the private study purpose;
  • Access Copyright is “an oppressive cartel” “cartelizing the market”; and
  • Access Copyright threatens “to terrorize universities”.[[5]]

He also appeared to disparage all collectives for not being “creators or producers of content” or “disseminators of creative works” – although they play a vital role in facilitating access to and the dissemination of culture .

His post reveals his perspectives about Access Copyright in particular and collectives in general, and by implication the individuals and organizations that make up the entire cultural community in Canada who are represented by and are members of collectives and who themselves are both creators and users of copyright.

Michael Geist calls Ariel Katz’s blog a “must-read post”. I agree with him, not only because of the generous compliments Ariel gives me or because his post provides an excellent window for understanding the tone, temperature, and perspectives of some of those who attack Access Copyright and others in the cultural community. His post clearly acknowledges that whether something is a fair dealing is a question of fact, that what may be fair dealing in one situation may not be in another and that, accordingly, educational institutions cannot simply assume they don’t need licenses for copying that would be covered by an Access Copyright license.

For more information about the Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11 or copyright reform, see Change and the Copyright Modernization Act.

 

 


[1] Neil Finkelstein of my firm McCarthy Tétrault, was co-counsel in the Access Copyright appeal with Claude Brunet of Norton Rose Canada. Dan Glover and I were counsel for the interveners the Canadian Publishers’ Council, the Association of Canadian Publishers and the Canadian Educational Resources Council.

[2] The closest he comes to expressing any views is when he says: ““Several groups have wasted no time to embrace a “copy-free” interpretation of the ruling by incorrectly asserting that educational institutions no longer need licences to copy.” I don’t know who are those several groups, but I haven’t seen any such “copy-free” interpretation. The interpretations that I have read only suggest that the licenses that Access Copyright offers are likely unnecessary.”

[3] He says: “Copyright collectives are single-purpose organizations. They are not creators or producers of content, nor are they disseminators of creative works. They are driven by a single objective: to maximize that license fees that they collect, and they firmly believe that any use and any dealing should, in principle, pay paid for, and they view themselves as entitled to those payments. Copyright collectives such as Access Copyright abhor fair dealing, because fair dealing, by definition, is a use that does not require license or payment, and they resent the notion that when licenses are needed, they can often be granted on more competitive terms without their involvement. Consequently, they view any reform that would facilitate transactions in a competitive market as a lost opportunity to collectively license this activity, and perceive any meaningful application of fair dealing as an existential threat.”

[4] The Supreme Court did not have to decide the issue having found that there was no evidence before the court that the dealing in issue had any detrimental effects on the market.

[5] See John Degen’s reply to this claim, latest from the freecult – you’re either with us, or you’re a terrorist.


Change and the Copyright Modernization Act

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Bill C-11, the Copyright Modernization Act, with a few exceptions, is now law with the publication of the Governor General Order in Council. The fourth attempt to amend the Copyright Act since 2005 succeeded where Bills C-60 (2005), C-61 (2008), and C-32 (2010) did not.

A lot has changed since 2005 when Bill C-60 was first introduced. That Bill would have made a limited, but important, set of amendments. Its summary reminds us that it would have amended the “Copyright Act to implement the provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, to clarify the liability of network service providers, to facilitate technology-enhanced learning and interlibrary loans, and to update certain other provisions of the Act.”  Bill C-11 addresses far more than this.

When Bill C-60 was first introduced in 2005, Canada’s main trading partners had already modernized their copyright laws. The United States had passed the DMCA. Australia had adopted legislation similar to Bill C-60. The European Union had enacted the Copyright or InfoSoc Directive  and the Electronic Commerce Directive. These continent-wide laws addressed, among other things, WIPO Treaty-required measures such as legal protection for technological measures (TPMs), as well as safe harbors for internet intermediaries. The EU directives went further than Bill C-60. They created exemptions for reverse engineering of computer programs for interoperability purposes, and making temporary copies of works as part of technical processes. These exemptions are now in Bill C-11. They also permitted certain private copying of digital works in exchange for levies paid to rights holders.

The EU directives also went further than Bill C-60 by enabling courts to make orders requiring ISPs to block pirate web sites. This power has been used extensively in the EU to block pirate sites like the Pirate Bay in order to protect domestic markets from these “wealth destroyers”.

While Canada was studying reforming our laws after Bill C-60 died, countries which had already dealt with these “first generation issues” moved ahead to the next generation of legal reforms to address the evolving digital landscape. For example, Japan amended its laws to create strong criminal penalties for copyright piracy. France, New Zealand, UK and South Korea enacted graduated response legislation to promote the legal purchase of creative products and services and to discourage online file sharing.

The EU, which has had a de facto notice and takedown regime for over a decade, launched a study to develop a uniform notice and action procedure for illegal content hosted by online intermediaries. In January, the EU Commission announced an initiative on “notice-and-action” procedures, and in June, it launched a public consultation on such procedures.  In July, the EU Commission published a proposed directive on collective management of copyright and related rights in music. Last month, the Council adopted a directive on orphan works. France and Germany are both considering laws to require search engines like Google to compensate publishers for caching, indexing and making headlines and snippets of news articles available such as through Google News. In the UK, the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual Property and Growth made numerous recommendations for further changes to address digital issues. The UK Government accepted a number of these recommendations and made broad proposals for an orphan works scheme, extended collective licensing, and a limited private copying exception.

In August, the Australia Law Reform Commission (ALRC) initiated a public consultation on copyright policy with the release of an Issues Paper. The issues being canvassed include expansion of exceptions to enable individuals to make copies for transformative uses, or for social, private or domestic purposes. Ireland has now completed an extensive public consultation conducted by its Copyright Review Committee. A report is expected by the end of this year. China is also in the process of modernizing its copyright laws.

Today, with the Copyright Modernization Act now law, depending on the issue and country or territory, we find ourselves at par with, in front of, or often behind, our trading partners in dealing with the challenges posed by digital technologies. A complete analysis of the similarities and differences would be a large undertaking.  However, at a high level (and without considering the differences and nuances of drafting), some observations follow here.

One of the first objectives behind our four copyright bills was to enact legislation required for Canada to ratify the WIPO Treaties. The treaties require this to include, among other things, adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of TPMs and protection for rights management information. Bill C-11 meets the requirements of the treaties for these rights and its implementation methodology is consistent with those of our major trading partners, including member states of the EU, the US, and Australia. Bill C-11 also includes amendments intended to implement the requirements for the rights of making available and distribution under the treaties.

The international treaties do not prescribe minimum standards for exceptions for internet intermediaries. In the EU, three categories of exceptions are explicitly mandated: a network service exception, an exception for hosts, and a caching exception. The US DMCA has the same categories of exceptions, as well as an exception covering certain activities of search engines. Under Bill C-11, Canada has the same four categories of exceptions, although the wording and conditions associated with each may differ. For example, unlike the US, Canada did not enact a formal notice and takedown regime. On the other hand, as in the EU, the internet intermediary exceptions are intended to apply only to neutral intermediaries and not to a service provider who, for example, is culpable in the infringement including a provider that primarily enables infringement (such as an intermediary who is liable under the new enablement cause of action in Section 27(2.3) of the Act). Unlike in the EU, Bill C-11 contains no express provisions entitling rights holders to obtain orders blocking foreign pirate web sites like the Pirate Bay.

Unlike the US, Canada will have a statutorily-mandated notice and notice regime (once the regulations are established) intended to stem unlicensed file sharing over peer-to-peer networks. In the US, the leading ISPs and creative industries have cooperated to develop a voluntary notice regime under the Center for Copyright Information (CCI), that unlike the bare minimum prescription in Bill C-11, contains escalating provisions intended to educate and curb file sharing by repeat infringers.  Canada did not adopt a form of graduated response that has the proven effect of increasing legitimate sales of cultural products and services such as France’s HADOPI.

As well, the international treaties provide no uniform list of exceptions to exclusive rights that would apply in digital environments. The scope of possible exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights are constrained by the conventions and treaties to which countries like Canada are a party, such as the Berne Convention, TRIPs, NAFTA, the WIPO Treaties, and the Rome Convention. The most important of these international constraints on exceptions and limitations is the Three Step Test.

The Copyright Modernization Act creates an unprecedented breadth of the new exceptions. For example, and to my knowledge, no country has a copyright law that expressly exempts: format and time shifting of any works including onto devices or a cloud for personal use and without levies; creating and disseminating user generated content for non-commercial purposes; fair dealing for educational purposes without express limitations on the users, the categories of use, or associated conditions; broad rights of educational institutions to make copies of publicly available materials (PAM); and reverse engineering for encryption research and security testing. Some countries may have one or more of these exceptions, usually, however, in a much narrower form. Most have none. Some are studying whether to expand their laws to cover some of these. Some of the exceptions, such as for making and disseminating user generated content (UGC), are without precedent anywhere. Individually and cumulatively the exceptions in Bill C-11 could prompt questions about Canada’s compliance with international obligations.

A lot has also happened since 2005 in the dialogues about copyright. Opponents of copyright now strenuously lobby to thwart meaningful changes to the law that might interfere with free and uncompensated use of copyrighted materials. Self-proclaimed internet and “free culture” advocates increasingly use a playbook of tools, including social media, to spread highly emotive messages in order to turn public opinion. Moreover, some major technology companies and their industry organizations are now publicly advocating for freer or totally uncompensated uses of copyright materials claiming that copyrights stifle innovation in digital services. This has led to vigorous rejoinders by representatives of the cultural community who cite these desired uses as a “Free Ride” that hurts creators and stifles investment and innovation in the creation and dissemination of cultural products. ACTA was a casualty of these developments as was the US legislation known as SOPA.

The Internet activist playbook was brought to Canada during the copyright reform process. For example, Michael Geist, who has been held out as a poster child for Internet activists, the Canadian Coalition for Electronic Rights (CCER), and others used the playbook to actively promote eviscerated legal protection for TPMs that would have prevented Canada from meeting its obligations under the WIPO Treaties. In the case of the CCER, which actively tried to game the 2009 copyright consultations to gut legal protection for TPMs, it was presumably so that its members could continue to distribute devices that would enable individuals to illegally download and use pirated copies of video game software and other products. It was also used to press for amendments to the format and time shifting exemptions to enable individuals to legally hack and copy copyright content protected by TPMs. The proposals would have undermined the government’s policy of encouraging innovation in digital products and services beneficial to consumers and the public at large. The playbook was also used to try and dissuade the Government from making technical amendments to the wording of the new enablement provision so that it could be useful against its intended targets, pirate sites and services like isoHunt. The government refused to give effect to these positions in spite of the full playbook monty.

Today, as the Copyright Modernization Act comes into force, Canada ends one chapter of reform to bring Canada’s copyright laws into the digital age. It took Canada a long time to get here. In that time a lot has changed. Given the inexorable changes in technology and the experiences of our trading partners, we can expect the need for more reforms sooner rather than later.

For more information about the Copyright Modernization Act or Bill C-11 or copyright reform, see the following blog posts.

Notice and Notice Regime under C-11 Coming into Force, June 17, 2014

Copyright Bill C-11 Passes Senate and Given Royal Asset (Update), June 29, 2012

Canada Ratifying WIPO Internet Treaties, May 24, 2014

Intellectual Property Education: Are Canadian Law Schools Doing Enough to Support Innovation? November 26, 2013

Combating Counterfeit Products Act Before Standing Committee, November 5, 2013

Private Copying Levy on Death Row, September 3, 2013

Fair Use for Australia? A Report From the Kernochan Centre, May 6, 2013

Copyright Law 2012: The Year in Review in Canada and Around the World, January 11, 2013

Copyright Board to Construe the Making Available Right, December 7, 2012

Copyright Modernization Act Soon to be Law in Canada, October 30, 2012

Even More on Access Copyright and the Supreme Court: Eviscerated or Not? September 24, 2012

My Remarks to the Senate Committee Studying Bill C-11, June 22, 2012

Bill C-11 ready for Third Reading, March 13, 2012

Michael Geist: A Question of Values, March 12, 2012

Bill C-11 off to Legislative Committee (updated), February 19, 2012

Bill C-11 to be law by April, February 8, 2012

Reining in the Rhetoric on Copyright Reform, February 8, 2012

Legislative Committee for C-11, October 28, 2011

Copyright Bill C-11 Gets Second Reading in the House of Commons, October 19, 2011

Some Observations on Bill C-11: The Copyright Modernization Act, October 3, 2011

Canada Signs ACTA, September 30, 2011

What’s Next for Copyright Reform in Canada? (Update), September 10, 2011

UK Moving Ahead With Graduated Response After Hargreaves Review of IP, August 20, 2011

C-32 Copyright Bill Described in WTO Reports, June 24, 2011

Throne Speech Promises Swift Passage of Copyright Amendments, June 3, 2011

C-32 and the BlackBerry PlayBook: A reply to Michael Geist April 25, 2011Conservative Party Platform on Copyright, April 8, 2011

Rethinking Notice and Notice After C-32, April 4, 2011

C-60, C-61, C-32?, March 25, 2011

Are Canada’s Copyright Laws Friendly or Unfriendly Towards Wealth Destroyers According to Prof. Geist? March 9, 2011

C-32 enablement remedy targets secondary copyright infringement February 18, 2011

Margaret Atwood at the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C-32 March 18, 2011

Response to Professor Michael Geit’s Clearing Up the Copyright Confusion, January 9, 2011

Liberals announce proposals to amend Bill C-32 December 16, 2010

An FAQ on TPMs, Copyright and Bill C-32, December 14, 2010

Key issues on the legal protection for TPMs under Bill C-32 December 8, 2010

My C-32 opening remarks to Parliamentary Committee December 1, 2010

Copyright Fiction from Facts About C-32’s TPM Provisions, November 24, 2010

Some observations about the debates on Bill C-32 in the House of Commons November 9, 2010

Turning up the rhetoric on C-32′s TPM provisions October 25, 2010

“Musicians have rights, too”, Maia Davies August 13, 2010

Moore’s Speech on C-32, June 23, 2010

Legends and reality about the 1996 WIPO Treaties in the light of certain comments on Bill C-32 June 17, 2010

Some Thoughts on Bill C-32: An Act to Modernize Canada’s Copyright Laws, June 3, 2010

 

Geist: “STFU Until You See the Bill”, May 10, 2010

Canada’s New Copyright Bill: What Will It Look Like? May 6, 2010

Canada Called Out For Weak Copyright Laws by IFPI and at the Heritage Committee, April 30, 2010

Graduated response: a least cost solution to reducing online copyright infringement April 26, 2010

Is graduated response necessary to protect human rights from online copyright infringement? April 19, 2010

The costs and benefits of graduated response in copyright enforcement February 1, 2010

Analysis of the Canadian Copyright Consultations: What Are The Implications? April 21, 2010

Levy Debate Sparks Impassioned Pleas in Parliament for Copyright Reform, April 15, 2010

What Did the Supreme Court of Canada Say About Notice and Notice in the SOCAN Tariff 22 Case? March 8, 2010

The Speech from the Throne: A Digital Strategy and IP Reform, March 4, 2010

Canada Again in the Penalty Box Over Poor IP Laws and Enforcement According to 2010 IIPA 301 Report, February 19, 2010

Reflections on the Liberal Roundtable on the Digital Economy, February 17, 2010

How Can Copyright Reform Best Balance the Rights of Creators, Intermediaries and Users? February 11, 2010

Graduated Response and Copyright: An Idea That is Right for the Times, January 20, 2010

Dr. Fiscor is Right; Prof. Geist is Wrong About the WIPO Internet Treaties, December 23, 2009

Only once more – and then Marry Christmas and Happy New Year to everybody, including Professor Geist and his devoted followers: the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference, the WIPO Treaties and the balance of interests December 23, 2009

Dr. Ficsor: An invitation to Canada to join the international community by ratifying the WIPO Internet Treaties December 21, 2009

Launches Consultations on Copyright Exceptions, December 13, 2009

Lord Mandelson Speech Transcript on P2P Copyright and Creative Industries, November 11, 2009

Copyright Reform in Canada-Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 25, 2009

Copyright Reform for Canada: What Should We Do? My Submission to the Copyright Consultation, September 13, 2009

What Happens When Copyright Goes Digital, August 6, 2009

Bill C-61 A Presentation for ITAC, February 23, 2009

Proposed Canadian Copyright Reform – Bill C-61, July 16, 2008

* Amended

 

Michael Geist on CASL: flaws not Festivus grievances

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Last week Michael Geist published a blog post summarizing his remarks to Industry Minister Moore as to why the almost universal criticisms of Canada’s anti-spam/malware law CASL are unfounded. He suggested it is intense lobbying by “squeaky wheels” with “knee jerk” “greatly exaggerated” and “Festivus” grievances about CASL” that has delayed bringing the law into effect”. He acknowledges that CASL creates new compliance obligations but suggests they are not onerous and even standard internationally (when referring to “opt-in” for spam) and that there is not much more to CASL than “a simple proposition – obtain customer consent and you can do pretty much whatever you like.”

Michael Geist is categorically wrong about CASL, the criticisms of it, and why CASL is not yet in force. In fact, he has been wrong about CASL since his testimony in 2009 before the Parliamentary Committee which studied what became CASL before it was passed by Parliament.

No one disputes that harmful forms of spam, malware or spyware need to be deterred. No one disputes that the public and especially consumers would benefit from an effective anti-spam/spyware law. No one disputes that CASL is intended to and would somewhat advance those goals.

The “squeaky wheels” Michael Geist refers to are organizations and individuals representing all sectors of the Canadian public including charities, not-for profit and educational institutions, private individuals, small, medium and large businesses, retailers, publishers, financial institutions, technology and telecom companies who want CASL fixed before it becomes law. Over 130 of them took the time to write to the Government to comment on the draft Industry Canada Regulations, almost all of them asking for CASL or the draft regulations to be changed.

Moreover, these “squeeky wheels” obviously read CASL to be a lot more involved and onerous than “a simple proposition – obtain customer consent and you can do pretty much whatever you like.”

The public’s “knee jerk” “grievances” about CASL is that its goals are not being met in a proportionate way and that, as structured and drafted, it would do far more harm than good to our digital economy, the protection of privacy, and digital freedoms and to everyone that has an interest in them including individuals, consumers, charities, not-for profits and businesses.

There is no good reason for a law that is intended to protect consumers to deprive them of valuable information they want and need by making it illegal to send messages that they will incur roaming charges, that a mortgage or other financial product of theirs is coming due, or other transactional or service messages, merely because they may not want other types of messages.

There is no good reason for a law that is intended to protect consumers to make it illegal to send them product recall information or safety or security information about products, goods or services the consumers use, have used or purchased, that may also inform them what their commercial options may be.

There is no good reason for a charity to have to cut off the poorest and most vulnerable members of society from receiving newsletters with needed information merely because it has some ad supported content unless the charity can obtain new express consents to replace the PIPEDA compliant consents they have been using for years.

There is no good reason for a law that is intended to promote privacy and security of online information to impair organizations from being able to secure their computer systems and networks and consumers’ personal information.

There is no good reason for a law that is intended to promote individual privacy to require individuals who want to send text (SMS) or similar messages that are CEMs to publicly post their names and addresses on a website and to thereby be forced to choose not to use their cells phones to send messages or to violate their own privacy interests.

There is no good reason for a law that is intended to be technologically neutral and to foster new business models to impose regulatory requirements designed for e-mail technologies on different more innovative messaging systems like social networks, portals, and IM networks where the regulatory requirements make no sense and can’t easily be complied with.

There is no good reason why a law that is intended to promote the use of open networks like the internet would define the term commercial electronic message so broadly that almost any type of content delivered by email becomes burdened by regulation including digital products such as ebooks, newsletters, magazines, music, videos, video games, and software (especially if they contain a hyperlink to the vendor’s website, the vendor’s logos or some information that tells consumers how to get an upgrade, update, or warranty service).

There is no good reason why a law that is intended to promote the growth of digital commerce would place our high tech industries in positions where they cannot compete with foreign competitors including in fast growing industries like cloud computing, computer outsourcing, and software distribution, maintenance and support.

There is no good reason for a law which is intended to protect individuals against the most harmful forms of spam to be so invasive as to make their most ordinary activities illegal including (contrary to what Michael Geist claims) a child sending out emails to invite neighbors to buy a glass of lemonade at his/her lemonade stand;[i] a child emailing the parent of a friend asking to baby sit or to shovel snow or mow a lawn for some extra school money; a child e-mailing her parents friends to buy Girl Guide cookies or to sponsor her in a school event; and e-mails sent out to acquaintances, colleagues, and business contacts asking them for sponsorship in a charitable event such as to raise money for cancer research or many other worthy causes.

There is no good reason why a law that is intended to promote expression using the internet would impair its use to such an extent that the public’s right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms would be significantly impinged. These and many other criticisms about CASL are not “Festivus” grievances.

I have explained in detail elsewhere why CASL has these and other unintended consequences.[ii] It is CASL’s flawed structure and approach to spam and malware and poor drafting that has delayed its coming into force.

Michael Geist claims that CASL’s opt-in model is standard in most of the world including Australia. He has been saying this since Bill C-27 was first introduced. For example, when he testified about Bill C-27 before the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology in June of 2009 he said that Australia has the “same opt-in consent model” He also testified that the term commercial electronic messages was defined “in much the same way”. He also testified that there was an exception for charities in CASL. He also told them that under that exception a University could send its alumni a newsletter that has advertising such as for a university branded credit card. He also told the Committee that CASL permitted sending newsletters, business publications, or company information to a consumer who made an inquiry about a company’s products or services more than six months before.

Michael Geist was inaccurate in what he told the Parliamentary Committee studying Bill C-27 and he continues to be inaccurate today when he describes CASL. For example, Australia’s SPAM ACT 2003 only targets a closed list of messages and consent can either be express or inferred,something that was pointed out to him at the INDU Committee by Liberal MP Siobhan Coady.[iii] The Australian law also has broader exemptions, such as for charities and educational institutions which CASL does not have.[iv] CASL would also have made it illegal to respond to the consumer inquiry, something Industry Canada recognized and had intended to fix in the second draft of its regulations.[v]

In his 2009 testimony, Michael Geist also made the claim that “any business or any organization can do anything it likes with respect to electronic marketing or software installation as long as it obtains consent”. This is essentially the same assertion he made to Minister Moore last week at “Festivus”. This simplistic view of CASL failed then and fails now to recognize that there are a plethora of situations where an express consent cannot always be obtained or should not be necessary. A classic example is where consumers’ safety is at risk, a situation that Michael Geist acknowledged was a potential problem with CASL on being questioned about CASL in 2009 by Liberal MP Marc Garneau.[vi] That is why both Australia (and New Zealand), which Michael Geist has always held out as a model for Canada, also recognizes consents that can be inferred from the conduct and business and other relationships of the persons concerned.

What is surprising is that Michael Geist continues to be CASL’s most staunch supporter. Ordinarily he advocates for an open Internet, technologically neutral solutions to Internet regulation, freedoms of speech, especially internet speech, protection of privacy, advancing the interests of consumers, and digital strategies that support new and innovative business models. Yet, overall, his unqualified support of CASL runs counter to these principles.

There was good reason for Minister Moore to meet with Canadian organizations from all sectors to hear about the problems with CASL. Minister Moore has a very good appreciation and interest in digital issues. One can hope he will recognize what just about everyone else does and fix CASL before it becomes law.

For more information about CASL See, CASL: the unofficial FAQ, regulatory impact statement, and compliance guideline

[i] Michael Geist’s response to my blog about the illegality of the child emailing neighbors to come to his/her lemonade stand does not really disagree with me that the activity would be illegal. Rather the criticism is that one need not worry because factually it is not likely to happen e.g., because kids historically promote their lemonade stands with flyers or because the email addresses may not be available. He goes on to suggest, however, that “where the community has actively requested the email addresses for use by the community (often going door-to-door)” there is no concern because “those on the list have provided consent”. The reality is that it will become effectively illegal for a person to go door to door to collect email addresses for use by the community as it will be virtually impossible for the community collector to put in place a system that complies with the burdensome rules related to obtaining consents on behalf of unidentified third parties in s.10(2)(b) of the Act s.5 of the draft Industry Canada regulations.
[ii] See, My submission to the Industry Canada consultation on the draft regulations, Evaluating the Industry Canada CASL regulations: family relationships and personal relationships, Evaluating the Industry Canada CASL regulations: the B2B exception (Part I-SMEs), Evaluating the IC CASL regulations: the B2B exception (Part II-Non-business entities), Evaluating the Industry Canada CASL regulations: jurisdictional overreach, Evaluating the Industry Canada CASL regulations: defining commercial electronic message,Evaluating the Industry Canada CASL regulations: countering cyber-security threats, Will CASL Hurt Charities? Let Us Count The Ways,Rethinking CASL (Canada’s Anti-SPAM law), Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations – Much Work Remains, Will it be illegal to recommend a dentist under Canada’s new anti-spam law (CASL)?, Canada’s anti-spam law, too much of a good thing.

[iii] Michael Geist asserts that Australia has an opt in model that is the same as what is in CASL. However, he was corrected about this when he made the same assertion in 2009 at the INDU Committee by a MP Siobhan Coady:

“Ms. Siobhan Coady: I’m going to move to consent provisions again, similar to what I started talking about an hour and a half ago. One of the concerns that keeps getting raised to me is that the consent provisions for the anti-spam prohibition are narrow. I’m going to look at what was adopted by PIPEDA and quoted by the anti-spam task force. It defined implied consent much more broadly than the legislation currently does. It says: “…where consent may reasonably be inferred from the action or inaction of the individual.” This covers situations where intended use or disclosure is obvious from the context…. What I’m reading in this particular bill is much more narrow than that. When I look at instances–for example, the Australia Spam Act, or the New Zealand spam act–that actually define consent to include express consent or consent that can be inferred from the conduct and business and other relationships without limiting the circumstances in which such consent can exist, then I’m concerned that we’re a bit narrow in this bill. Can you just give me some assurances? The anti-spam task force again recommended broader exceptions. For example, it said on page 44: If the organization has service, warranty or product-upgrade information, or if there are health and safety issues related to the product purchase, the organization may send e-mail messages to its customers. As I read Bill C-27, it doesn’t do that.

Prof. Michael Geist: I’m going to repeat this. As long as you understand that there’s a huge, massive exception, get consent. All of this is permitted as long as you obtain consent. We are now only in that basket where someone hasn’t actually obtained the person’s consent in the first place. They don’t really know whether the person wants to get this information. In every other instance where the person has actually given them consent, it’s fair game, and they can do whatever they like. So we’re only in that particular basket.”

[iv] See Schedule 1-Designated commercial electronic messages. Under CASL, there is only a limited exception for charities where the specific criteria for the existing non-business relationship consent exception can be met, which is why Imagine Canada is asking for an exception.

[v] S6(5)(b) exempts sending a message to a person engaged in a commercial activity that consists solely of an inquiry or application related to that activity. It does not permit a reply to be sent. See the RIAS to the draft Industry Canada Regulations: “Another example concerns responses to inquiries. While the legislation includes an exemption for individuals to contact businesses to inquire about their business, no exemption is provided for businesses to respond to such inquiries. Furthermore, since consent is defined in the Act, there is no existing mechanism to infer consent for these communications. Requiring unsubscribe mechanisms or consent in these circumstances would impede legitimate business, would not be consistent with consumer expectations, and would not advance the goals of the legislation. To address these concerns, the proposed Regulations include an exemption for messages sent in response to requests.”

[vi] In the 2009 INDU Committee hearing MP Marc Garneau had this interchange with Michael Geist on this subject:

Mr. Marc Garneau: Let me ask you about some examples of what might be considered spam under the bill as currently written. A business that sends an electronic message that provides warranty, product recall, safety or security information about goods purchased more than 18 months previously, is that an example of spam, in your opinion?

Prof. Michael Geist: It’s not, and it’s not a problem under this bill. If I purchase a car seat for my daughter and send in the warranty card and give them consent to send me regular updates, as I no doubt would, because I’m going to be concerned about the prospect of safety recalls, then they can continue—and I would hope that they would—to send me any of that information. All they have to do is to obtain the necessary consent. It’s open to the consumer in every instance to ensure they get that warranty information.

Mr. Marc Garneau: So you’re saying that if the consent has not been given, it would constitute spam.

Prof. Michael Geist: I’m saying that if it is outside the 18 months and the consumer didn’t give consent for that warranty information to be sent to them, then I suppose, yes, it might be.

Neither Marc Garneau nor Michael Geist canvassed the challenges of interpreting s6(6)(a) to determine its actual scope.

TPP, copyright, e-commerce and digital policy: a reply to Michael Geist

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The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a comprehensive and complex agreement. It presents major economic opportunities for Canada. It deserves, as Lawrence Herman, the former head of the Economic and Treaty Law Section of Canada’s External Affairs Department, pointed out, “careful, reasoned and balanced assessment”. Some individuals have stepped forward to do that with respect to the intellectual property and e-commerce chapters, such as:

Yet, as Lawrence Herman also noted “there’s been a flurry of media reporting and commentary, some of it breathless”.

Michael Geist doesn’t like the TPP. He has been telling Canadians it will “kill digital policy,” create a “digital policy failure,” potentially “cripple” the backbone of the innovation economy, and put health care data at risk, among other things, citing primarily the intellectual property and e-commerce chapters as the reasons why. His most recent tirades against the treaty began on October 9, 2015, when WikiLeaks published what was represented to be the final, or penultimate, copy of the intellectual property chapter. His criticisms continued up to and after the release of the final text of the TPP on November 5, 2015.[1]

Geist says that the intellectual property and e-commerce chapters of the TPP are a major digital policy failure. In fact, he goes much further. In a Toronto Star article attacking the TPP entitled “TPP Will Kill Digital Policy”, he claims that “Rules around copyright and privacy form the backbone of the innovation economy, but they could be crippled by the Trans Pacific Partnership”. He says the “Canadian negotiators adopted a defensive strategy by seeking to maintain existing national laws and doing little” “to promote some of Canada’s more innovative copyright policies in the agreement”.[2]

Michael Geist could have made his assessments about the TPP in a careful, reasoned and balanced manner. Instead, as shown below, he chose to criticize the TPP’s intellectual property and e-commerce chapters by incorrectly or misleadingly describing them, using exaggeration, and basing his criticisms on unreasonable assertions about what one could expect in a trade deal.  This matters. The potential benefits of joining the TPP are large, as are the opportunity costs of not joining.  With so much potentially at stake, Canadians and their policy makers deserve better.

Claim 1: Canada will be required to implement notice and takedown

Michael Geist’s claims

On October 9, 2015, WikiLeaks posted what was represented to be either the final, or penultimate, copy of the TPP’s intellectual property chapter. Michael Geist immediately published a blog post, Canada Caves on Copyright in TPP: Commits to Longer Term, Urge ISPs to Block Content, claiming that Canada had caved to demands from the US on copyright and had agreed to a provision in the TPP that would require Canada to amend its laws to induce Internet service providers to engage in content takedowns and blocking.[3] Geist claimed:

Canada has now agreed to induce providers to “remove or disable” access to content upon becoming aware of a decision of a court of a copyright infringement. The broadly worded provision could force Canadian ISPs to block content on websites after being notified of a foreign court order – without first having to assess whether the site is even legal under Canadian law.

Four days later, Michael Geist published another blog post entitled Why the TPP Creates a Backdoor Copyright Takedown System in Canada. He re-iterated his claims that Canadian negotiators had caved to US demands that Canada implement a US notice and takedown system.[4] He claimed the problem stemmed from a requirement in the Annex to the IP provisions, which would require Canada to:

induce Internet Service Providers carrying out the function referred to in paragraph 2(c) [providing hosting services] to remove or disable access to material upon becoming aware of a decision of a court to the effect that the person storing the material infringes copyright in the material.

Geist claimed that because Canada could not fulfill this condition, Canada would have to introduce an express notice and takedown system based on the U.S. DMCA processes. Michael Geist repeated his claims that same day in a post on the digital rights activist site OpenMedia.ca entitled, Geist: Why the TPP Creates a Backdoor Copyright Takedown System in Canada | OpenMedia.ca.

Geist’s claims were not true and they had the effect of creating a moral panic. [5] As described below, they were disseminated in the social media, in the national press, and on TV. The Globe and Mail was misled and even did an editorial about it.

Geist was plainly wrong about the TPP and notice and takedown

The basis of Geist’s claim that Canada would be required to implement a notice and takedown system was set out in his blog as follows:

The problem stems from the following requirement in the annex, which requires a country to:

induce Internet Service Providers carrying out the function referred to in paragraph 2(c) to remove or disable access to material upon becoming aware of a decision of a court to the effect that the person storing the material infringes copyright in the material….

Moreover, there is an argument that the entire U.S. notice-and-takedown system will actually apply in Canada through the TPP. The annex for Canada comes with the following condition:

In order to facilitate the enforcement of copyright on the Internet and to avoid unwarranted market disruption in the online environment, paragraph(s) 3-4 shall not apply to a Party, provided that, if upon the date of agreement in principle of this Agreement, it continues to:

This condition – which requires a country to have the full system described in the annex in place upon the date of agreement in principle – was aimed at limiting the alternative approach to Canada since other countries could not create a Canadian-style system and use that approach to comply with the TPP.

The problem is that Canada does not comply at the date of agreement in principle (which has essentially passed). The Canadian government has not “induced” Internet providers to remove or disable content based on awareness of [a] court decision. In fact, it has done the opposite, promoting the fact that Canada does not have a takedown system. Given that Canada does not comply with the annex on the date of agreement in principle, it would appear that the annex cannot be used and that the U.S. DMCA notice-and-takedown approach is coming to Canada. (emphasis added)

In fact, as is plain, the draft of the TPP described by Geist contained an exception with listed conditions that were clearly drafted for the express purpose of excluding Canada from the notice-and-takedown requirement. This was something Geist claims Canada had pushed hard to keep in the TPP negotiations.[6] The conditions closely tracked provisions in Canadian law that are unique in the world. In other words, far from creating a requirement that Canada adopt a notice and takedown system, the draft of the TPP provided that Canada was the only party to the treaty who doesn’t have to do so.

Somehow Michael Geist has tried to convince the public that an exception clearly drafted expressly to allow Canada to be the only party to the TPP to avoid a notice and takedown requirement is mere surplusage – treaty window dressing with no purpose or effect. His interpretation of the Annex contradicts the most basic cannon of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, which states in Article 31 that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”

What is astonishing is that Geist made his claims without making any reference to subsection 31.1(5) of the Copyright Act. This Section, which is set out below, has been in the Copyright Act since 2012, when the Copyright Modernization Act was proclaimed into force and is a condition which hosting providers must comply with in order to obtain the benefit of the hosting safe harbour in Subsection 31.1(4):

(5) Subsection (4) does not apply in respect of a work or other subject-matter if the person providing the digital memory knows of a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction to the effect that the person who has stored the work or other subject-matter in the digital memory infringes copyright by making the copy of the work or other subject-matter that is stored or by the way in which he or she uses the work or other subject-matter.

The wording of the condition in the Annex (Annex E to Schedule J) of the TPP practically tracks the wording of Subsection 31.1(5). In fact, in June 2005, Geist described the condition in Section 31.1(5) in Bill C-60 (a predecessor to Bill C-11 which eventually became law) using practically the same language as the wording in the Annex, and without making any reference to the order referred to having to be from a Canadian court:

The bill also provides immunity against copyright infringement for ISPs for the content that they host (Section 31.1(4)). That immunity is limited, however, since it does not apply where the ISP has actual knowledge of a court decision that the person who has stored the content on the ISPs servers has infringed copyright by doing so. (emphasis added)

When the final text of the TPP was released, the condition in the Annex was amended to further clarify that the exception only requires that the hosting provider remove or disable access to material upon becoming aware of a domestic court decision:

(e) induce Internet service providers carrying out the function referred to in Article 18.82.2(c) (Legal Remedies and Safe Harbours) [hosting providers] to remove or disable access to material upon becoming aware of a decision of a court of that Party to the effect that the person storing the material infringes copyright in the material.

After the final text of the TPP was released, Geist published another blog post noting the clarification:

From a copyright perspective, the TPP IP chapter leaked soon after the deal was concluded and the chapter looks largely consistent with that document. There is a notable change involving the Internet provider and host takedown rules, however. I earlier blogged that the chapter included a takedown provision not found in Canadian law that would have required blocking content based on being made aware of a court order finding infringement. I noted that the provision would have allowed decisions from other countries to effectively overrule Canadian law. The released text has been amended to limit the provision to domestic court rulings ensuring that only Canadian court rulings would apply. This is a positive change that better reflects current law…(emphasis added)

That post implicitly admitted that Annex E does not require Canada to implement an express notice and takedown system. But, it was not until November 15, 2015, weeks after misleading the public about this aspect of the TPP, that Geist admitted this was not the case. In a later post he unequivocally admitted that the “intellectual property chapter includes an annex that permits Canada’s notice-and-notice rules to qualify as an alternative to the TPP’s notice-and-takedown system”.

Geist also claims that the “U.S. has allowed Canada to keep its “notice-and-notice” policy for Internet providers, but on the condition that no other TPP country may adopt it.” That is not strictly true. Any other country is free to adopt notice and notice. In fact, several countries already have a notice and notice or a graduated response notice-based regime along with notice and takedown, the worldwide standard for the hosting provider safe harbour and an extremely useful public policy approach to dealing with online piracy (an approach that many argue could be improved if it was a “notice and stay down” system). Geist may well have intended to say that since Annex E of the TPP can only be fulfilled by Canada, all other parties must have notice and takedown, whether or not they also want to implement a notice and notice system. If that was the case it could have been said in a clear and less misleading way.

Claim 2: Canada will have to add new criminal sanctions to the Act to its digital lock rules

Geist claims that under the TPP, “Canada is required to add new criminal provisions to its digital lock rules”. The term “digital locks” is widely understood to refer to technological protection measures or TPMs which are used by content creators and publishers on physical media such as CDs, DVDs, e-books and other devices and in service offerings such as music and video streaming services.

The TPP requires each party to provide criminal sanctions where a person is found to have wilfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain (which may be treated under the TPP as “commercial purposes”) violated the legal protections for TPMs required by the treaty.[7]

The Canadian Copyright Act provides criminal sanctions for knowingly and for commercial purposes circumventing TPMs – in other words, for breaking digital locks. (Sec. 42(3.1)) Accordingly, Geist’s claim that the TPP would require Canada “to add new criminal provisions to its digital lock rules” is not accurate.

Geist has also claimed that the TPP will require Canada to add “new criminal liability for the removal of “rights management information”. This claim does not accurately describe the TPP’s requirement which targets violations of the rights management information (RMI) prohibitions wilfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain. In short, the provision requires sanctions against digital pirates who carry on businesses directed at content theft, a sanction that as a matter of public policy is hard to argue with.

It might be argued that Geist’s claim that “Canada is required to add new criminal provisions to its digital lock rules” was intended to refer to RMI and not TPMs. This would contradict the plain meaning of the word “lock”. Moreover, Geist, has consistently referred to “digital locks” as being synonymous with TPMs and the digital lock rules as being legislative measures prohibiting acts of circumvention or providing tools or services to circumvent TPMs.[8] Further, the general public would understand his claim as pertaining to TPMs and not to RMI. Accordingly, even if his claim could be construed to refer to RMI and not TPMs, his claim would be misleading to most people.

Claim 3: Exceptions to copyright in the TPP didn’t promote Canada’s policies

Geist claims that “there was little effort to promote some of Canada’s more innovative copyright policies in the agreement.” He says “Canadian policies that promote user generated content…or establish consumer exceptions are all missing from TPP”.

One can question whether the amendments to the Copyright Act in 2012 referred to by Geist were good policy choices or not. They were controversial and subject to much debate. They are unique internationally. But, regardless of one’s views about whether they reflected good or bad policy, one could not under any reasonable scenario have expected that these exceptions would be hard coded into the laws of the other parties as part of the TPP.

Geist’s claims that Canada’s “innovative” exceptions to copyright should have been expressly required by the TPP fails to take into account how treaties in relation to copyright are structured. For example, in relation to exceptions to infringement, conventions and treaties such as the Berne Convention, Rome Convention, TRIPS, and the WIPO Internet Treaties do not contain an exhaustive list of specifically enumerated and prescriptively worded exceptions that member states’ laws must have. Accordingly, none of those instruments specifically contain specific requirements to permit format shifting or time shifting of copyright materials.

The parties to the TPP all have differently tailored exceptions to copyright and one could not have expected a trade deal like the TPP to even attempt to harmonize all exceptions to copyright, let alone to those Canada unique to Canada. Further, if as Geist claims, the TPP’s copyright provisions were all “Made in America”, Canada would have been forced to introduce fair use, with all its attendant pros and considerable problems and uncertainty, a policy decision Canada specifically rejected despite calls to do so from Michael Geist and others.[9]

There is a strong case to be made that broad exceptions to copyright will only serve to reduce incentives for the development and dissemination of new creative works, which in turn is likely to reduce overall social welfare. Further, that the development of the digital economy requires the opposite response – namely the strengthening of copyright and the limiting of exceptions.[10] Nevertheless, whatever one’s views on the issue of broad exceptions for copyright, the TPP leaves the parties with flexibility to maintain or establish exceptions.

First, it preserved the status quo, by permitting exceptions in accordance with the internationally recognized three-step-test,[11] a test that Canada has already accepted in other international agreements including the Berne Convention, TRIPs, and the WIPO Internet Treaties.[12] This leaves the contracting parties, including Canada, the flexibility to establish exceptions they deem appropriate for their countries within the parameters of this internationally recognized framework.

Second, the TPP went even further. It mandated a requirement for balance in parties’ copyright laws, referencing specific limitations and exceptions, including many exceptions currently in Canada’s copyright laws and those Canada has announced it plans to enact such as the Marrakesh Treaty.[13]

Third, the treaty makes clear (Art. 18.5) that each party is free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the IP chapter, including those related to exemptions, within its own legal system and practice.

Claim 4: Statutory damages for copyright infringement in the TPP didn’t promote Canada’s policies

Geist argues that the TPP is also a digital policy failure because the treaty doesn’t require all parties to enact Canadian limitations on statutory damages.[14] His claims appear to refer to the 2012 amendments to the Act, which created a differential level of statutory damages depending on whether the infringement is for a commercial or non-commercial purpose.

One can argue about the merits of this amendment to Canada’s statutory remedy provisions in the Act. The purpose of such damages is, among others, to ensure there are effective remedies against infringers, discourage infringement, reduce the costs of litigation, and encourage parties to settle litigation. This purpose should not be undermined.[15]

However, regardless about one’s views about the appropriate policy towards statutory damages, Article 18.74.6 of the TPP, which deals with statutory damages, does not prescribe any level or levels of “pre-established damages” or prevent a party from having different levels of pre-established damages depending on the purpose of the infringement. Moreover, a party does not even have to have statutory damages if its law provides for additional damages, which may include exemplary or punitive damages.

Canada’s laws recognize exemplary damages for infringement of copyright, so its digital policies towards such remedies are not only preserved, but also available to other countries who wish to follow Canada’s model.[16]

Claim 5: Extending the copyright term by 20 years will lock down content and harm Canadian heritage

The TPP requires that parties protect copyright in works for a term of 70 years from the life of the author. The term of protection under current Canadian law is 50 years. Geist claims that the 20 year extension in the term of copyright will “lock down the public domain for decades”, be “a massive blow to access to Canadian heritage”, and “do enormous harm to Canadian heritage”.

Geist likes to use the emotionally super-charged metaphor of content being “locked up” or “locked down” because of copyright to garner maximum visceral reaction for his claim. It sounds from listening to him like all works that were scheduled to fall into the public domain will immediately be made inaccessible by being pulled from stores and libraries and be buried as radioactive waste at the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository, or some similar facility.

Of course works that remain in copyright for another 20 years wouldn’t be locked away. That hasn’t happened in the 90 or so countries that have copyright terms of 70 years or more from the life of the author. These works would continue to be available in libraries and would continue to be offered for sale in traditional or digital formats, and licenses for their continued exploitation would not be yanked because of a term extension. In fact, as economist Professor Marcel Boyer pointed out in a study entitled Assessing the Economic Impact of Copyright Reform commissioned by Industry Canada, copyright holders and the publishers and sellers of copyright protected goods have every incentive to ensure that their content continues to remain widely available to the public:

Many observers fear that the current proposals for copyright reform will make access to significant number of ‘old’ works very difficult. But the contrary may be closer to the truth. Insofar as the copyright owners are interested parties in making their works accessible to large public in order to derive revenues from them, one may expect that different arrangement will emerge so that as many users as possible and profitable can have access to a large number of high quality copies of “old” copyrighted works than it is the case now.

Copyright law also provides only thin protection for creators who want to create new works by copying or building upon the ideas, facts, concepts, processes, methods, or discoveries in a work, as only original expression is protected by copyright. Copying and other uses of works for many purposes may also be done without infringing copyright where an exception exists. The Act has many exceptions, including fair dealing with a work for research, private study, education, parody, criticism and news reporting. Many other exceptions exist, including specific exemptions for libraries and museums, educational institutions, the disabled, encryption research and security testing.

Canada also has a system that enables the Copyright Board to license orphan works (works where the copyright owner cannot be located) for exploitation in Canada.[17] These rules would continue to apply to works that remain in copyright for another two decades so as to make them available for exploitation purposes.

Since a term extension does not “lock-down” content, Geist’s real claim appears to be not that works that would have fallen into the public domain won’t be available; only that they won’t be available without some payment to copyright owners. Accordingly, the main issue is an economic one.

Geist claims that the costs to the public of a term extension will “exceed $100 million per year”. He bases this on a questionable New Zealand estimate that the net costs to that country would be NZ$55 million (or approximately Can $47.85 million) per year. Yet, he makes no attempt to examine the assumptions in the New Zealand study or to determine their applicability to Canada. Neither Canada nor the $100 million figure Geist cites appear anywhere in the New Zealand study. This figure is apparently simply made up by Geist. Unfortunately, this made up figure has subsequently been cited as gospel by others who simply repeat what he says without question. This includes the Globe and Mail.18]

What is most puzzling, however, is that Geist ignores entirely an Industry Canada-commissioned a study on this very issue, The Industry Canada study, conducted by Université de Montréal economics Professor Abraham Hollander, did not quantify the exact costs of a term extension, but concluded that the user costs of a 20 year term extension “may increase slightly in response to a higher cost of locating right holders and negotiating rights to works whose protection term has been extended”. (emphasis added) Geist didn’t fail to cite the Hollander study because he was unaware of it. He had referred to, and in fact relied on, the Hollander study in one of his own blog posts recently on the issue of the economic impacts of the term extension for sound recordings.

The reality is that determining the net benefits or burdens of a term extension is a complex task. Economists and law and economics scholars, lawyers and others have debated the issue with a number of them providing reasons (including the reasons set out below) justifying a term increase. Michael Geist did not refer to any of these in his criticisms of the TPP term extension.

  • Whether there are really significant economic costs to users associated with a term extension; some economists dispute this based on empirical evidence showing the prices of public domain works are not cheaper or significantly cheaper than those authorized by copyright holders. The real effect of shorter term is a reallocation to public domain vendors who don’t use proceeds of their sales to re-invest in creative works or creators.[19]
  • There are net benefits to Canadians by being able to take advantage of longer terms of protection in Member States of the European Union, Australia, Israel, Japan, and India, which only provide longer terms of protection for foreign works on a reciprocal basis by relying on the Berne Convention Rule of the shorter term. As the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003), this reciprocity rule in the EU was one of the reasons the U.S. increased its copyright term.[20]
  • Canada’s largest trading partner and other countries (about 90) including member states of the European Union (including the UK and France), Australia, Russia and Japan, Israel and Mexico, all have terms for works of 70+ years. Harmonizing Canada’s term of protection with our major trading partners can facilitate copyright compliance and rights clearances, especially today where material is made available online across geographic boundaries.
  • Some economists counter the argument that extending copyright terms would have only very limited effects on the creation of additional works. Empirical evidence has shown that, in at least some cases, a 20 year term extension has economically significant positive effects on the production of copyright content.[21]
  • Some economists also contend that even small increases in expected payments from a term extension need not have small impacts on the creation of additional works. “There is a possibility that for some authors, in some range of income and propensity to create, a small increase in present value could make an important difference in creative output, perhaps because they reach a point where they switch to full-time writing.” On this basis, “the present value of additional benefits is not necessarily small as the benefits from any additional creative works begin to accrue immediately; they are not discounted far into the future, the way that incremental revenues and incremental costs are.”[22]
  • While some have claimed that creators would not rationally be motivated by the extra 20 years, others argue that creators do not make decisions using purely rational criteria and that behavioral economics suggests that a longer term may influence creators.[23]
  • A term extension compensates for the recent developments associated with digitization and distribution, which have dramatically reduced the costs of copying and distribution over the Internet, and militate in favour of an increase in the term of protection to preserve incentives.[24]
  • A 20 term extension maintains the historical reason for having the 50 year term which was to provide a source of revenues for three generations, the author and two further generations. The 70 year term from the life of the author takes into account that the average life expectancy has increased.
  • An underlying theory behind attacks on term extension is that whatever good there may be in copyright, the public domain is better. No one denies there is value in the public domain, but the myth that a work that remains in copyright somehow diminishes a countries’ heritage overstates the value of the public domain. Copyright not only provides incentives to create and disseminate works. It also encourages investment by optimizing uses of property, something the public domain does not do.[25] Consequently, ultimately there will be more works created, and therefore more supply into the public domain and more works made available, with a longer copyright term.[26]

Kamil Gérard Ahmed has argued that “Parliament must not ignore EU and US copyright law developments and should amend the Canadian Copyright Act by extending the term of copyright to 70 years after the author’s death, for the benefit of Canadian copyright title holders”.[27] He contends that economic arguments advanced against term extension are improperly premised “on the assumption of a closed economy” when in fact we operate in an open economy setting. His conclusions in favour of a term extension for Canada were set out as follows:

Parliament must amend the Copyright Act to extend the current life plus 50 term of copyright by an additional 20 years…Some 95% of Canada’s reported FDI [foreign direct investment] in 2003 originated from life plus 70 nation-states. Parliament must not ignore these data. Indeed, in an era of multinational publishers and instantaneous electronic transmission – harmonization has obvious practical benefits and is a necessary and proper measure to meet contemporary circumstances for Canada’s prosperity.

US copyright title holders can earn monopoly rents for an additional 20 years in the EU, for example, and the opposite is also true. Canadian copyright title holders cannot do the same further to the Berne Convention and are thus ab initio precluded from earning additional revenue in life plus 70 nation-states – this is unfair, unnecessary and disadvantages Canadian copyright title holders. Moreover, the incremental NPV [net present value] of extending the term of copyright in Canada per average investor may be small, but as an industry, Canadian copyright title holders stand to gain a NPV of some $150 million assuming a 7% discount rate. This sum is certainly not insignificant. Furthermore, copyright title holders often perceive a longer term of copyright to be more valuable and this belief cannot be ignored. An aging population with a longer life expectancy, complemented by technologically driven times further support extending the term of copyright in Canada.

The Canadian business community that has a vested interest in copyright term duration would prefer a life plus 70 term and Parliament must indeed remain responsive to these needs for a basket of reasons. The copyright-related industry in Canada is indeed very important to the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). According to Industry Canada, [i]n 2000, the … GDP … of the copyright-related sectors publishing, film, music, software, visual arts, etc.) was estimated at $65.9 billion or 7.4 percent of Canadian GDP. Between 1992 and 2000, the value of these sectors increased by an annual average of 6.6 percent, compared with 3.3 percent for the rest of the Canadian economy. Together, these sectors formed the third most important contributor to the growth of Canada’s economy. Despite the importance of the copyright-related industry to Canada’s GDP, amending the Copyright Act to extend the current term of copyright has been a politically oft-ignored matter…

Claim 6: The TPP requires intellectual property protection for country code domain names

Geist claims that “the TPP mandates… intellectual property protections for each country-code domain”. An example is a domain name ending with the .ca suffix for Canada. The TPP does no such thing. It mandates that there be a remedy for unfair predatory conduct; it does not require that parties create a new intellectual property right in domain names.

Art. 18.28 requires that there be an appropriate procedure for settling disputes based on the internationally recognized ICANN approved UDRP process, or another process that (i) is designed to resolve disputes expeditiously and at low cost; (ii) is fair and equitable; (iii) is not overly burdensome; and (iv) does not preclude resort to judicial proceedings. It also requires parties to have remedies to address bad faith intent to profit from a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar to a trade mark. These processes are designed to provide a means to combat cyber-piracy and predatory and parasitical practices such as cybersquatting that have been adopted by some to exploit the lack of connection between the purposes for which the domain name system was designed and those for which intellectual property protection subsists.[28]

Canada meets these requirements including through CIRA’s Canadian Dispute Resolution Policy (the CDRP), the first of which was adopted by CIRA in 2002 while Geist was a member of its Board of Directors. The current CDRP Rules and privacy policy were also established while Geist was a Director of CIRA.

Neither of the TPP provisions related to domain names requires that a party confer a trade-mark or other intellectual property right in a domain name, although many countries including Canada enable domain names to be protected as trade-marks if they otherwise meet the requirements for being a trade mark under applicable law. Further, many countries including Canada have found that domain names can infringe either registered or common law rights in trade-marks, such as when they are identical or confusingly similar to a trade mark.[29]

Claim 7: The TPP will prohibit Provinces such as British Columbia and Nova Scotia from storing government data in-province

Geist claims that “data localization requirements” in the TPP would prevent British Columbia and Nova Scotia from requiring the use of local servers for storage of government information such as health data.[30]

Geist has failed to explain that this obligation is subject to important exceptions. Art. 14.11 expressly recognizes “that each Party may have its own regulatory requirements concerning the transfer of information by electronic means”. Moreover, under Article 14.2(3) there is a clear statement that the entirety of Chapter 14, including all restrictions therein, do not apply to government procurement or information held or processed by or on behalf of a Party, or measures related to such information, including measures related to its collection. As political subdivisions of Canada, provinces would benefit from both exemptions.

Claim 8: The TPP will prohibit parties from enacting reasonable data residency laws that prevent the cross-border transfer of personal data to other parties where the data could be subject to mass surveillance.

Geist more generally claims that the TPP’s data localization provision “restricts legislative initiatives that require storage of personal information in Canada or that limit data transfers outside the country”. The data localization provision is an important one to online commerce and to businesses — including Canadian businesses — that want to keep high paying IT and services jobs in their home countries. It is also a recognition of the pragmatics of international trade in the 21st century.

Geist, however, raises concerns about restrictions on data residency requirements in “a post-Snowden environment”, a concern recently brought to the fore by the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Schrems case invalidating the EU-US safe harbour and ongoing negotiations between the EU and the US on a revised EU-ES Safe Harbour.

Geist’s concerns about the data localization rules make no mention of the exceptions to them. In fact, the TPP expressly allows restrictions on data flows to address any “legitimate public policy objective,” provided that the restriction “(a) is not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade; and (b) does not impose restrictions on transfers of information greater than are required.[31]

Furthermore, the provisions Geist complains about are in fact subject to limitations that expressly allow parties to impose restrictions on data flow to protect privacy. (Art 29.1(3), which makes all of Chapter 14 subject to permitted limitations in paragraph (c) of Article XIV of GATS.) These limitations permit Parties to secure compliance with laws or regulations to “the protection of the privacy of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual records and accounts”. This right was confirmed in the Progress Report to the General Council Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services (GATS) on 19 July 1999 in the context of the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, which specifically endorsed the right to protect both public morals and privacy as being important considerations in the e-commerce provision of services, as long as the measures taken do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a disguised restriction on trade in services.[32]

Geist also complains that the treaty did not go far enough, as it “allows countries “to meet the privacy requirements with enforceable “voluntary undertakings”” as long as the “voluntary undertakings can be enforced by a regulator”. Geist’s complaint effectively amounts to a criticism that the TPP isn’t an international privacy treaty, which it isn’t. Nor is it an international climate change treaty. But that doesn’t mean it’s not a good international trade treaty.

Not surprisingly, the TPP doesn’t purport to harmonize privacy laws across the laws of all of the parties based on Canada’s federal privacy law, PIPEDA. However, neither does it require Canada or any other country to adopt the framework of the U.S., under which an individual’s personal information is protected through a patchwork of State laws, including common law torts, and federal laws including federal law enforced by the FTC against, inter alia, companies that do not comply with their privacy policies.[33]

Geist’s suggestion that the TPP should have reflected Canadian privacy laws would also raise questions about Canadian implementation, given that our provincial laws related to the collection, disclosure and use of personal information are not even harmonized to our federal privacy law, PIPEDA.

Claim 9: Bans on disclosure of source code will lead to cyber-security and environmental risks

Geist claims that Article 14.17 of the TPP bans parties from requiring the disclosure of software source code found in certain mass-market products.[34] He claims that this prohibition “has cyber-security experts and consumer advocates concerned about the implications for detecting harmful software or products that fail to comply with consumer protection or environmental standards”. In particular, he claims that Parties would be precluded under the TPP from mandating the disclosure of source code to agencies regulating vehicle emission standards (such as a law that would require the disclosure of source codes to computer programs in Volkswagen automobiles that provide data vehicle emissions).[35]

This provision is an important one for technology businesses which generally distribute mass market software only in object code form to preserve trade secrets in software products. Disclosing source code could also make it much easier for hackers to insert malware or spyware into software products that could increase cyber-security risks. Accordingly, there are good public policy reasons for the Article, something that Geist does not explain.

Geist also does not consider the actual scope of the wording in the obligation or that it is subject to important limitations.

First, the prohibition is limited to “mass-market” software and products containing such software.  For software to be “mass-market”, it must be marketed or sold openly (like Windows 7, or Word etc.).[36] An example of a product that contains mass market software is a personal computer that is bundled with Windows 7. Software such as the emissions control software at issue in the Volkswagen emissions scandal is not mass-market software. Automobiles that are sold with such software are very likely not to be products that contain mass market software. 

Further, under Article 14.2(2) the provisions of Chapter 14 apply only to “measures adopted or maintained by a Party that affect trade by electronic means”. Accordingly, it has been suggested that Article 14.17(1) likely only applies to subject matter when the products involved are sold in electronic commerce. [37] Accordingly, on this basis, the prohibition might apply to mass market software like Windows 7 or to personal computers that are sold pre-loaded with such software. But it would not likely apply to vehicles or other products that are sold in bricks and mortar commerce.

Second, the prohibition is against requiring the transfer of, or access to, source code of software “as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software”. The prohibition does not expressly purport to prevent the requirement to disclose source code to software for public policy purposes, such as to prevent cybersecurity threats, to prevent fraudulent vehicle emission test results, or other consumer protection reasons.

Third, the Article Is subject to Art 29.1(3), which includes the limitations in paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article XIV of GATS. This includes limitations necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, including environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Further, and especially as to Geist’s claim about the Article’s creating potential cyber-security threats, parties can also take measures to secure compliance with laws or regulations related to safety, or to prevent the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices, or to protect the privacy of individuals, in relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data.

Finally, the Article is also subject to permitted security exceptions in Article 29.2, which provides that nothing in the TPP “shall be construed to preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for… the protection of its own essential security interests”. The effect of this provision gives full scope to governments to make their own national security decisions which could include prohibitions, for example, to combat cyber-security threats.[38]

Claim 10: The parties should have agreed to harmonize their anti-spam/malware laws to CASL

Perhaps the most hysterical and absurd of all Geist’s claims is that the TPP is a digital policy failure because Canada’s anti-spam rules cannot be found in the TPP. Once again, Geist’s criticism of the trade treaty seems to be that it’s a trade treaty – and not an anti-spam treaty.

The absurdity of that criticism aside, in fact, far from being a defect, this shows the wisdom of the parties. CASL is an ill-conceived, indefensible law, which overly restricts commercial speech without justification. CASL has been ridiculed by the Canadian press and commentators which have called it, among other things, a Monty-Python-esque farce, a Spamaflop, deeply stupid, a sledgehammer that is ludicrous regulatory overkill, a looming disaster, and a bad and draconian law. It is all that and more including almost certainly being unconstitutional. Michael Geist was one of the chief supporters of this extremely flawed law and is one of the few supporters it still has in Canada. See Michael Geist’s defense of Canada’s indefensible anti-spam law CASL, CASL Industry Canada regulations: summary and comments, and CASL: the unofficial FAQ, regulatory impact statement, and compliance guideline. As I recently wrote:

CASL has likely cost Canadians millions of dollars in compliance costs and miles of red tape. It is a drag on innovation and hurts the competitiveness of Canadian businesses, which alone among their foreign competitors have to comply with such significant barriers to commercial electronic commerce. It acts as an impediment to foreign investment in Canadian high paying technology jobs and has resulted in Canadian businesses moving IT operations out of the country.

Ultimately, it is also ordinary Canadian consumers who suffer because of CASL. They indirectly have to foot the hefty CASL compliance costs and disproportionate fines exacted by the CRTC. All of these costs get passed on to consumers as higher costs for goods and services. So when you get a price hike on your next purchases of media products from Rogers Media, thank CASL and the CRTC.

CASL should be repealed or significantly amended. Fixing CASL should be at the top of the new Government agenda of inherited laws that need fixing.

It is ironic that Geist complains that CASL, arguably the world’s worst anti-spam law (and computer program distribution law which masquerades as a law targeting only harmful programs like viruses), should have been foisted on the other treaty partners, while objecting to minor incremental amendments to Canadian laws that generally harmonize our law with international standards.

Geist’s attacks on the TPP prejudices public understandings of the treaty

Any claim that the TPP is a digital policy failure would necessarily have to weigh the potential benefits and burdens of ratifying the treaty. Yet, Geist doesn’t even attempt to consider or weigh any of the potential benefits of the TPP including the IP or e-commerce chapters when declaring that the two chapters are a failure. Accordingly, even if his criticisms of the TPP had merit or weren’t completely devoid of any merit, his jumping to the conclusion that the TPP is a digital policy failure would be premature.

The TPP presents a major opportunity for Canada. As a nation that depends on trade, it is potentially very important that we have most favoured nation status with our largest trading partners, the U.S. and Japan, and expand such MFN relationships to the faster growing economies of the other TPP parties and those who may join later such as South Korea, China or India. The costs of being left behind could be staggering for Canada in the long term. If Canada does not joint the TPP, it would retain WTO-level MFN treatment from the TPP parties and get NAFTA-level preferential treatment from the U.S. and Mexico. But, as Lawrence Herman points out, Canada would not obtain the preferences accorded by the TPP member countries among themselves including preferential treatment the U.S. is required to give to its TPP partners.

Moreover, there is much in the IP and e-commerce chapters that could be of great importance to Canadian businesses. If Canadians are going to succeed in the 21st century knowledge economy our laws and regulatory frameworks must support innovation and creativity and facilitate the success of Canadian innovators and creators in foreign markets. Unquestionably, intellectual property rights and digital policy frameworks are pillars of this international economy.

The IP chapter of the TPP reflects legal frameworks that have supported and enabled some of the world’s most successful technology companies such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, IBM, and Facebook. It has also supported and enabled innovation in the creative industries including in the music, movie, book publishing, software, and entertainment software industries. These industries rely on and require robust intellectual property protection to support investment in the creation and distribution of creative products.

The TPP’s provisions on intellectual property largely maintain the standards Canada has already agreed to in other treaties, including the Berne Convention, Rome Convention, TRIPS, and the WIPO Internet Treaties. For the most part, it comports with Canadian laws, including those recently enacted such as the Combating Counterfeit Products Act, which brought Canadian border measures to, or closer to, international standards.

The presence of the e-commerce chapter in the TPP reflects the growing importance of online trade and requires parties to take steps to promote policies that will encourage this form of commerce. For example, it attempts to facilitate recognition of online transactions, much like the provincial and federal initiatives in Canada did more than a decade ago by requiring parties not to deny the validity of a signature solely because it is in electronic form. It also requires parties to protect consumers online including against fraudulent and deceptive commercial activities. These types of laws were also adopted provincially and federally in Canada to provide confidence in electronic commerce. It commits the parties to collaborating on cyber-security matters, a scourge that plagues Canada and other countries. It also seeks to block potential barriers to online commerce in other ways described above.

The IP and e-commerce chapters of the TPP reflect, to a great extent, the types of digital policies Canadian federal and provincial governments have been promoting for more than a decade and a half. One could reasonably expect our present and future innovators and creators would welcome opportunities to expand their knowledge based businesses into foreign countries under these frameworks and to be able to do so from facilities in Canada to create and keep high paying jobs for Canadians.

One would also expect Canadian businesses would be grateful for the protections provided by the investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) system that provides, inter alia, protections with respect to national treatment, MFN treatment, expropriation, and fair and equitable treatment. The ISDS system, however, departs significantly from other investment agreements by narrowing the types of claims that can be brought and by giving parties including Canada new measures of flexibility to ensure they are not prevented from acting in their own interests.[39]

The TPP presents Canada with potentially large economic opportunities if Canada ratifies the treaty and potential major opportunity costs should Canada not join it. Assuming the U.S. moves ahead to ratify the treaty, Canadians will be faced with a very important policy choice. The TPP deserves to be reviewed as a whole in a careful, reasoned and balanced way. The intellectual property and e-commerce chapters should be given a level-headed assessment as part of that overall review. A balanced assessment of the IP and e-commerce chapters would necessarily look at the projected benefits and burdens of those chapters. This is something Geist didn’t even try to do before declaring them a digital public policy failure.

The public expects that when Michael Geist, a Professor of Law, the Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law, a blogger with a significant following, and a columnist with the Toronto Star, makes pronouncements about a major issue of public policy such as the TPP, that he has done his homework, knows what he is talking about, and is factually accurate, as well as being opinionated. On issues as potentially important for Canada’s economic future as the TPP there would be an expectation that his views will be reasoned and balanced, or if not that, then at least accurate, or if not that, then at least not be misleading, or if not that, then at least not a scare tactic, and that claims about treaty defects can reasonably have been within the parameters of what one could expect for this kind of treaty. As shown above, however, Michael Geist’s assertions about the TPP’s intellectual property and e-commerce chapters fall short on all of those reasonable yardsticks.

All of this matters. If the public is misled, public debate and policy may suffer and Canada’s long term economic prospects associated with the TPP could be put at risk.

An example of the dangers of Geist’s approach to the TPP is the moral panic he created with his incorrect assertions that the TPP would require Canada to implement an express notice and takedown regime. Without any apparent effort to confirm the accuracy of his claims, his assertions were uncritically disseminated in the social media, and by traditional media, including The Globe & Mail, CBC, CTV, National Post and others. Geist was wrong about this aspect of the TPP but the media unwittingly published his incorrect views to the general public.

The news commentators on social media gave credence to Geist’s claims, assuming them to be accurate and newsworthy. On October 9, 2015, Daniel Tencer of The Huffington Post Canada published an article repeating Geist’s claims about the TPP and notice and takedown. Reilly Yeo of Openmedia then published another post on October 16, 2015, noting that Michael Geist “has the clearest breakdown” of how the TPP “might undo Canada’s copyright notification system entirely” (referring and linking to Michael Geist’s October 13 bog post).

The supposedly reputable Canadian news media then got on the Geist notice and takedown TPP bandwagon. On October 22, 2015, The Globe and Mail published an editorial, Copyright concessions may be downside of TPP deal. Referring to Geist’s interpretation of the TPP, it told its readers “Canada’s internet providers may be forced into a U.S.-style regime of “notice and takedown” – wherein complaints result in blocked or removed content even if they haven’t been ruled as a violation by a court”.

Geist’s interpretation of the TPP got even more circulation in a news article written by Peter Henderson of The Canadian Press on October 25, 2015, which was widely syndicated and published by the Toronto Star, CBC, CTV, The Globe and Mail, iPolitics, 660News, among others. The article featured quotes from “copyright expert” Michael Geist (and a colour photo of him to emphasize his importance in the article). The article featured quotes from Meghan Sali from OpenMedia, who repeated Geist’s interpretation of the TPP, saying that the “deal could replace this so-called notice-and-notice system with the U.S. notice-and-takedown system, in which content is blocked or removed as soon as the first complaint is made”.

As described above, Geist later admitted that the TPP does not require Canada to implement an express notice and takedown system. His admission did not, however, undo the damage done by the misinformation he spread. It did nothing to correct the information on the many blogs and newspapers (including the Globe and Mail editorial) in which it was disseminated. Geist hasn’t even made on a note on his erroneous blog postings to inform readers who come across his posts that they aren’t true. Even now, I continue to hear from people who still believe Geist’s assertions are true.

Geist was wrong about notice and takedown, just as he was wrong about many other aspects of the IP and e-commerce chapters of the TPP. The media was also wrong to uncritically disseminate his views on the TPP. This, unfortunately, is an all too familiar pattern with respect to policies he opposes.[40] The difference now are the stakes involved. With so much of Canada’s economic future at risk, surely a higher standard of discourse should be expected from Canada’s Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law.

_________________________

[1] This blog posts relies on statements made by Michael Geist in the following blog posts, articles and presentations: Michael Geist, October 9, 2015, Canada Caves on Copyright in TPP: Commits to Longer Term, Urge ISPs to Block Content , Michael Geist, Toronto Star, , October 13, 2015, How the TPP may put your health care data at risk: Geist | Toronto Star; Michael Geist, October 13, 2015, Why the TPP Creates a Backdoor Copyright Takedown System in Canada ; Michael Geist, October 15, 2015, How the TPP May Put Your Health Care Data at Risk , Michael Geist at CIGI, November 12, 2015, Canada and the TPP: A Digital Policy Failure, Michael Geist, CBC News, November 12, 2015, TransPacific Partnership puts Canadian IT at disadvantage, says Michael Geist, Michael Geist, November 13, 2012, What the New Copyright Law Means For You, Michael Geist, Star Touch, November 15, 2015, TPP will kill digital policy, Michael Geist, November 18, 2015, Why the TPP is a Canadian Digital Policy Failure, Michael Geist, November 24, 2015, Signing vs. Ratifying: Unpacking the Canadian Government Position on the TPP – Michael Geist, Michael Geist, November 30, 2015, What Canadian Heritage Officials Didn’t Tell Minister Mélanie Joly About Copyrightist, Technology and the TPP: What’s At Stake, University of Ottawa, November 30, 2015, The Hill Times TPP Forum, DEC. 8, 2015.

[2] These claims were made, inter alia, in the blogs referred to above, in a lecture he gave to the Centre for International Governance Innovation Canada (CIGI) entitled the TPP: A Digital Policy Failure and in several subsequent blog posts before and after the text of the treaty was released, including How the TPP may put your health care data at risk, his Toronto Star column TPP Will Kill Digital Policy, and in a CBC interview.

[3] According to Geist:

Moreover, the government will “induce” Internet providers to engage in content blocking even where Canadian courts have not ruled on whether the content infringes copyright. As a result (and as expected – this was raised years ago), the government’s “made in Canada” approach to copyright – which it has frequently touted as representing a balanced approach – faces a U.S. demanded overhaul…

The Canadian government was able to preserve the notice-and-notice system for Internet providers, but at a very high price. Canada has now agreed to induce providers to “remove or disable” access to content upon becoming aware of a decision of a court of a copyright infringement. The broadly worded provision could force Canadian ISPs to block content on websites after being notified of a foreign court order – without first having to assess whether the site is even legal under Canadian law. (emphasis added)

[4] According to Geist:

Section I of the copyright chapter creates a U.S. style notice-and-takedown system. The Canadian solution was to create a special annex that provides an alternative to the U.S. approach. While the annex was designed specifically for Canada, it would appear that it fails to prevent copyright takedowns from coming to Canada.

The problem stems from the following requirement in the annex, which requires a country to:
induce Internet Service Providers carrying out the function referred to in paragraph 2(c) to remove or disable access to material upon becoming aware of a decision of a court to the effect that the person storing the material infringes copyright in the material.

This is an obvious takedown and content blocking provision. If it applies simply to a standard Internet provider, it would mandate content blocking upon becoming aware of a court decision that the content infringes copyright. Note that the court decision does not need to be a Canadian court. This means that another court could rule on the legality of the content based on its domestic copyright law and the Canadian provider would still be required to remove or disable access. Content that is perfectly legal in Canada (e.g. qualifies for fair dealing or is non-commercial user generated content) could therefore still be blocked or taken down based on the application of foreign copyright law. The “made in Canada” approach would be lost.

The implications of this provision go even further, however. The reference to paragraph 2 (c) refers to instances where content is stored or controlled by a network provider. This language comes from the U.S. DMCA and applies to a wide range of companies such as YouTube, Facebook, Flickr, and Dropbox. In a Canadian context, it would apply to Shopify, Hootsuite, and many other well-known Canadian Internet companies. In other words, all of those companies now face a Canadian takedown system through the TPP based merely on being made aware of any court decision. Note that this Canadian takedown system is even worse than the U.S. approach since there is no counter-notification or “put-back” mechanism.

[5] Copyright scholar William Patry defines a “moral panic” as a “reaction by a group of people based on the false or exaggerated perception that some cultural behavior or group…is dangerously deviant and poses a menace to society”. William Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (Oxford University Press, 2009) at p. 135.

[6] Technology and the TPP: What’s At Stake, “the Canadian government quite clearly wanted to ensure that notice and notice survived. There was a lot of political capital that went into that. So much so that when you read through the text, it’s clear that that issue more than other was the one that needed to survive”.

[7] A footnote to the TPP clarifies that “the Parties understand that a Party may treat “financial gain” as “commercial purposes”.”

[8] See Michael Geist’s Digital Economy Consultation Submission “Unfortunately, the anti-circumvention provisions (often referred to as legal protection for digital locks) — unquestionably the biggest and most controversial digital copyright issue — is the one area where there is no compromise. Despite a national copyright consultation that soundly rejected inflexible protections for digital locks on CDs, DVDs, e-books, and other devices, the government has caved to U.S. pressure and brought back rules that mirror those found in the United States. These rules limit more than just copying as they can also block Canadian consumers from even using products they have purchased.”; Michael Geist `TPMs’: A perfect storm for consumers “Although the use of the technological restriction was relatively unimportant — a speed bump rather than a full blocking mechanism — its use highlights the increasing reliance on technological protection measures (TPMs) to control access to, and use of, digital content. The proliferation of technological protection measures, alongside new legislative proposals designed to protect these digital locks, represent a perfect storm of danger to consumers, who may find themselves locked out of content they have already purchased, while sacrificing their privacy and free speech rights in the process.”; Michael Geist testimony before the Legislative Committee on Bill C-32 “With regard to digital locks, which have been among the most discussed and most criticized aspects of the bill, I should start by clarifying that much of the concern does not come from digital locks per se. Companies are free to use them if they so choose, and there is general agreement that there should be some legal protection for digital locks since it is a requirement of the WIPO Internet treaties, and that’s a clear goal of this legislation. Rather, the concern stems from Bill C-32‘s unbalanced position on digital locks, in which the locks trump virtually all other rights, as the committee itself heard just last week from Mr. Blais in the context of education. This distorts the copyright balance not only for the existing exceptions within the Copyright Act, but also for the new consumer rights, which can be trumped by a digital lock just at the time they are widely found in devices, DVDs, electronic books, and more”; Michael Geist What the New Copyright Law Means For You “The most significant new restriction involves the controversial digital lock rules that prohibit by-passing technological protections found on DVDs, software, and electronic books. There are some exceptions to this prohibition (including the ability to circumvent the digital lock to protect personal information, unlock a cellphone, or access content if the person has a perceptual disability), but these are drafted in a very restrictive manner.”

[9] Barry Sookman and Dan Glover, “Why Canada Should Not Adopt Fair Use: A Joint Submission to the Copyright Consultations”, Osgoode Hall Review of Law and Policy, Volume 2 Number 2 Volume 2, Number 2 (November 2009), Barry Sookman “Fair use for Australia? A report from the Kernochan Centre”, Dr. George Barker, “Agreed Use and Fair Use: The Economic Effects of Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions”, Paper Presented to the 2013 Annual Congress of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI) held in MINES ParisTech, Paris (France), 09, July, 2013, Tom Syndor “Why exporting fair use through TPP is a bad idea”.

[10] Dr. George Barker, “Agreed Use and Fair Use: The Economic Effects of Fair Use and Other Copyright Exceptions”, Paper Presented to the 2013 Annual Congress of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI) held in MINES ParisTech, Paris (France), 09, July, 2013

[11] Article 18.65: Limitations and Exceptions states:

With respect to this Section, each Party shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work, performance, or phonogram, and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.

[12] See also Article 18.2 that states the “protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare”.

[13] Article 18.66 of the TPP states:

Each Party shall endeavour to achieve an appropriate balance in its copyright and related rights system, among other things by means of limitations or exceptions that are consistent with Article 18.65 (Limitations and Exceptions), including those for the digital environment, giving due consideration to legitimate purposes such as, but not limited to: criticism; comment; news reporting; teaching, scholarship, research, and other similar purposes; and facilitating access to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print disabled.

[14] “Meanwhile, Canadian policies that promote user-generated content, limit statutory damages, or establish consumer exceptions are all missing from TPP.” “Just this week in Silicon Valley, several members of the US Congress held hearings, held a hearing about copyright reform in the United States and many within the tech community specifically cited Canadian new caps on statutory damages recognizing there needed to be a difference between the damages for commercial piracy, commercial infringement, compared to non-commercial activity. We have that reflected in our law and it’s a positive reform, but you will not find it in the TPP.”

[15] See Barry Sookman, “Some observations on Bill C-11: The Copyright Modernization Act

[16] The Supreme Court of Canada recently underscored the importance of punitive damages in the Robinson case, ruling that Quebec courts have the jurisdiction to order such damages in order to provide adequate remedies for the infringement of copyright, remedies which the court found were necessary under the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms.

[17] See Barry Sookman, Orphan works: the Canadian solution, Barry Sookman, Fordham’s debate about Canada’s unlocatable copyright owner regime.

[18] Globe and mail editorial, Copyright concessions may be downside of TPP deal. ”Extending the copyright would come at a cost to Canadian consumers, possibly in the hundreds of millions of dollars.”

[19] See EU Commission, “Impact Assessment on the Legal and Economic Situation of Performers and Record Producers in the European Union”, SEC(2008) 2288; PwC Economics, “Impact of Copyright Extension for Sound Recordings in the UK” (28 April 2006); Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright “ ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 154, 2002); Prof. Barker, “Common Myths About the Economic Effect of Copyright Term Extensions for Sound Recordings”; Kamil Gérard Ahmed, “A Case for a Longer Term of Copyright in Canada – Implications of Eldred v Ashcroft Case” (2006) 37 R.D.U.S.

[20] Canada relies on this principle to deny foreigners a shorter term of protection than Canadians receive where their foreign country does not give Canadian creators a reciprocal level of protection.

[21] See I.P.L. Png et al, Qiu-hong Wang September 2006, “Copyright Duration and the Supply of Creative Work: Evidence from the Movies” “At various dates between 1991-2002, nineteen OECD countries extended the duration of copyright, typically from the author’s life plus 50 years to author’s life plus 70 years. We study the impact of the extensions on the production of movies. We find that the extensions were associated with an increase in movie production ranging between 8.51% (±4.60%) and 10.4% (±4.89%)… The extension of copyright duration applied retrospectively to owners of existing film libraries and might have reduced their cost of capital… Our results suggest that contrary to received thinking among leading economists and lawyers, extensions of copyright duration far in the future did have economically significant effects on the production of movies.”

[22] Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis “Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics and Network Effects”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Volume 18, Number 2 Spring 2005

[23]A Case for a Longer Term of Copyright in Canada – Implications of Eldred v Ashcroft Case” (2006) 37 R.D.U.S.

[24] W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law”, 18 J. Leg. Stud. 325, 325-33, 344-53 (1989)

[25] Scott M. Martin, “The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection”, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 253 (2002); Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, “Indefinitely Renewable Copyright “ ( John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 154, 2002)

[26] Prof. Barker, “Common Myths About the Economic Effect of Copyright Term Extensions for Sound Recordings

[27]A Case for a Longer Term of Copyright in Canada – Implications of Eldred v Ashcroft Case” (2006) 37 R.D.U.S.

[28] See, Final Report of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process, April 30, 1999

[29] See, Source Media Group Corp. v. Black Press Group Ltd., 2014 FC 1014

[30] Geist writes:

“[P]rovinces such as British Columbia and Nova Scotia have enacted laws to keep government information (such as health data) within the country. The TPP is designed to counter these efforts by restricting the ability of governments to mandate local data storage.”

[31] Art. 14.11 states: “3. Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining measures inconsistent with paragraph 2 to achieve a legitimate public policy objective, provided that the measure: (a) is not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade; and (b) does not impose restrictions on transfers of information greater than are required.”

[32] Progress Report to the General Council Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services, 19 July 1999 at p. 3.

[33] See FTC v Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (3rd Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).

[34] Article 14.17 of the TPP reads as follows:

Article 14.17: Source Code

  1. No Party shall require the transfer of, or access to, source code of software owned by a person of another Party, as a condition for the import, distribution, sale or use of such software, or of products containing such software, in its territory.
  2. For the purposes of this Article, software subject to paragraph 1 is limited to mass-market software or products containing such software and does not include software used for critical infrastructure.
  3. Nothing in this Article shall preclude: (a) the inclusion or implementation of terms and conditions related to the provision of source code in commercially negotiated contracts; or (b) a Party from requiring the modification of source code of software necessary for that software to comply with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with this Agreement…

[35] Geist writes:

“The TPP also bans certain digital protections that may come back to haunt Canadian policy makers. For example… [I]t also creates a ban on rules requiring the disclosure of software source code found in mass-market products, a provision that has cyber-security experts and consumer advocates concerned about the implications for detecting harmful software or products that fail to comply with consumer protection or environmental standards (such as Volkswagen’s emissions violations).” “What happens when consumer agencies and others take a look at what happened to Volkswagen’s emissions standards and argue one of the ways to try and deal with those kinds of violations is to mandate the availability of the source code that was underlying those technologies. And yet the TPP now says you cannot mandate the disclosure of coding in those contexts.”

[36] See The IT Law Wik defining the term mass market software a “software that is (1) generally available to the public by sale, without restriction, from stock at retail selling points through over-the-counter, telephone, and mail transactions and (2) designed for user installation without substantial supplier support.”

[37] See TPP Article 14.17 & Free Software: No Harm, No Foul

[38] See Lawrence Herman Trans-Pacific Trade and Cyber Security

[39] John Boscario et al Trans-Pacific Partnership – Investment Protection and Investor-State Claims, McCarthy Tétrault LLP, November 27, 2015, Josh Scheinert et al, TPP and the evolution of investor rights, CBA National December 9, 2015

[40] See, Barry Sookman, Michael Geist: A question of values

Grasping at straws: the trouble with “The Trouble with the TPP”, a further reply to Michael Geist

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I recently had the privilege of speaking about the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) at the Fordham 24th Annual Intellectual Property Law and Policy Conference, a stellar international IP conference. The other speakers on my panel were Probir Mehta (lead U.S. negotiator of the IP portion of the TPP), Pedro Velasco Martins (lead EU negotiator of the IP portion of the TTIP), and Daren Tang (lead Singapore negotiator of the IP portion of the TPP). The title of the panel was “Examination of TPP & TTIP”. My talk focused on how the IP provisions of the TPP are being inaccurately depicted to the public.

I had previously responded to a series of blog posts and articles by Michael Geist on the TPP. In one of my prior blog posts, TPP, copyright, e-commerce and digital policy: a reply to Michael Geist, I showed that he criticized the TPP’s intellectual property and e-commerce chapters by incorrectly or misleadingly describing them, using exaggeration, and basing his criticisms on unreasonable or inapt expectations for a trade deal.

To prepare for the Fordham conference, I took a look at his latest salvo of attacks on the IP portions of the TPP in his “The Trouble with the TPP” series. Gone were some of his prior assertions that had been thoroughly debunked (such as his claim that the TPP required Canada to implement a DMCA notice and takedown process). However, his new series contains new claims about the TPP (as well as some repeated ones) that continue to be inaccurate or misleading. Some of his claims also reveal just how extreme his anti-intellectual property opinions are.

I discuss some of the claims pertaining to the IP chapter below. For the sake of brevity, I do not repeat criticisms of his opinions about the TPP set out in my prior blog post.[1]

Adding border measures without court oversight

Geist claims that Canada will have to implement new border measures that “will require Canada to create a system to allow for the detention of goods with “confusingly similar” trademarks. He warns that customs officers don’t have the training to make these assessments; that Canada opposed this during the TPP negotiations and caved to pressure from the U.S. He made these assertions saying:

Article 18.76 of the TPP establishes “special requirements related border measures” which includes allowing for applications to detain suspected confusingly similar trademark goods as well as procedures for rights holders to suspend the release of those goods. The required change is striking since Canada just overhauled its rules for border measures under pressure from the U.S. The Canadian approach did not include “confusingly similar” trademark goods, recognizing that such goods are not counterfeit and that requiring border guards (who rarely have legal training) to make exceptionally difficult judgments about whether imported goods violate the law is bad policy.”

Given those concerns, it should not come as a surprise that Canada opposed the extension to confusingly similar trademarks throughout the TPP negotiations. In fact, earlier leaked drafts show that almost half the TPP opposed the extension (Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Canada). Yet as is the case in so many other areas, Canada ultimately caved on the issue and if we decide to ratify the TPP, will be required to change domestic law months after passing new rules specifically designed to provide enhanced border measures provisions.

Geist is wrong. He misreads the TPP and the Trade-marks Act. Geist failed to notice that the border measures he refers to that pertain to “confusingly similar” trademark goods permits detention to be made by “competent authorities”, which the TPP makes clear includes “the appropriate judicial, administrative or law enforcement authorities under a Party’s law.” (emphasis added) The detention powers required by Article 17.86 already exist in Section 53 of the Trade-marks Act and are not exercised by customs officers.[2]

Geist also claims that Canada caved to U.S. demands that Canada agree to expand the powers of customs officers to initiate border measures for goods that are in-transit (i.e., not destinated to stay within the country). However, as he concedes, footnote 123 (not 122, to which Geist mistakenly refers) provides an exemption where a Party merely makes available “information to another Party in respect of goods that it has examined without a local consignee and that are transhipped through its territory and destined for the territory of the other Party, to inform that other Party’s efforts to identify suspect goods upon arrival in its territory”. Canada also offered to the US a side letter which provides for semi-annual reporting of its compilations of such efforts.

Geist concludes that by negotiating the exemption option, “Canada is once again bullied into complying with U.S. demands on intellectual property laws and enforcement”. This is untrue. Canada actually refused to agree to the U.S. demand for border measures for in-transit goods. Leaving aside the separate question of the appropriateness of Canada’s refusing to inspect these goods for the common purpose of combatting counterfeiting, on any reasonableness basis, an obligation to provide periodic reports should be viewed as a win for Canada in this negotiation context.

Statutory damages for circumventing technological protection measures (TPMs)

The TPP permits Parties to exempt not-for-profit libraries from statutory damages for violating the anti-circumvention provisions of the TPP. Geist claims that if Canada decides to ratify the TPP, it will have to amend the Copyright Act (the “Act”) to remove for-profit libraries from a current exemption which limits statutory damages against libraries. After referring to the exemption in the TPP he says:

First, the Canadian Copyright Act includes a similar, though not identical, damages exclusion for a library, archive, museum or educational institution at Section 41.2… . However, the Canadian provision is not limited to non-profit libraries (think of a commercial digital library that charges subscription fees or an online library archive) and limits the remedies solely to an injunction… . Given the difference between the treaty and Canadian law, there may be instances where Canada excludes the possibility damages in violation of the TPP.

Geist is simply wrong. The exemption in s.41.2 which applies to a library, archive, or museum is limited to not-for-profit entities, as the definition in the Act makes clear.[3] No amendment would be required.

This is not his only error regarding remedies respecting TPMs. Geist also now claims that the TPP requires Parties to provide either statutory damages or additional damages as a remedy for circumventing a TPM, and that Canada does not provide additional damages for such violations. Accordingly, he says Canada will need to amend the Act to add statutory damages to comply with the TPP.

Geist is wrong again. He either misinterprets the TPP or doesn’t understand the remedies available under the Act for copyright infringement. The TPP makes clear that the term “additional damages” “may include exemplary or punitive damages”.[4] Both exemplary and punitive damages are available for infringement under the Act and would be available as a remedy for violation of the anti-circumvention provisions.[5]

No requirement to implement the Marrakesh Treaties

Geist claims that the TPP is unbalanced, favoring rights over exceptions. As an example, he asserts that the TPP contains no obligation for Parties to implement the Marrakesh Treaty. He says:

For example, consider the international IP treaty obligations in the TPP. Article 18.7 identifies nine international IP treaties and protocols that are all requirements for TPP members (Patent Cooperation Treaty, Paris Convention, Berne Convention, Madrid Protocol, Budapest Treaty, Singapore Treaty, UPOV 1991, WCT, and WPPT). What about the Marrakesh Treaty to facilitate access to published works for the blind and visually impaired? It is relegated to a footnote with no obligation to implement.

He is wrong. He misinterprets the TPP. Art.18.66 contains an explicit obligation to endeavor to facilitate access “to published works for persons who are blind, visually impaired or otherwise print disabled”, a clear reference to the Marrakesh Treaty. (Canada just tabled Bill C-11 intended to bring Canada into compliance with that treaty.) In another blog post, he interprets an “endeavour” obligation to be a “best efforts” obligation.

Geist also inaccurately describes the footnote in the treaty to which he refers. Rather than being a footnote about implementing Marrakesh, it recognizes that under the TPP the parties can go beyond Marrakesh to make works available to persons who are blind or visually impaired:

As recognised by the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, done at Marrakesh, June 27, 2013 (Marrakesh Treaty). The Parties recognise that some Parties facilitate the availability of works in accessible formats for beneficiaries beyond the requirements of the Marrakesh Treaty. (emphasis added)

Geist also complains that the objectives set out in the IP chapter of the TPP do not maintain “a balance between rights holders and users on all IP provisions”. He asserts this is because some objectives were removed from the leaked draft that was still being negotiated (such as “the legitimate interests of users”) though, as he points out, “there are references to some of these issues elsewhere within the text”.

Many would dispute Geist’s claims as to what is the proper balance in copyright and whether his views about the balance should have been reflected in the treaty. However, he is wrong to suggest that the objectives and agreed understanding about the IP chapter set out in the treaty are not balanced.

It is true some of the objectives were removed as the text was being negotiated and finalized, including to remove duplication between the objectives at the beginning of the chapter and those that deal with specific subject matter. But, as he fails to acknowledge, the final text in Article 18.2 (which he refers to) contains explicit references to “balance”, including to the mutual advantages of producers and users, social and economic welfare and a balance of rights and obligations.

The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.

He also fails to refer to Article 18.4 titled “Understandings in Respect of this Chapter” which expressly refers to “taking into account the interests of relevant stakeholders, including right holders, service providers, users and the public”.

Restrictions on creating TPM exemptions

The Act gives the Governor in Council broad powers to issue regulations to create new exemptions from the anti-circumvention provisions of the Act. This includes a right provided by s.41.21(2) to enact a regulation requiring the owner of the copyright in a work protected by a TPM to provide access to the work.

Geist claims that this may not be permitted by Art. 18.68(4) of the TPP, which permits parties to provide limitations or exemptions in a broad variety of circumstances.[6] He argues that the right to enact this form of regulation in the Act is

not a limitation or exception as it does not envision the possibility of permitting a user to circumvent a digital lock. Instead, it lays the groundwork to create a requirement to unlock content. The Trouble with the TPP is that its limitation and exception may not permit requiring this form of unlocking requirement.

It is not clear why Geist has any concerns here. He points to no case in which such a regulation has been required in Canada. In any event, Geist is wrong and misinterprets the TPP. The TPP does not create any prohibition on a law that requires providing access to a work protected by a TPM. The prohibitions fall into two broad classes: circumventing TPMs and trafficking in circumvention devices and services. Thus, enacting a regulation that requires providing access to a TPM protected work is not prohibited by the TPP. In fact, the owner of the copyright in the work would likely not have to circumvent any TPMs to provide a TPM-free copy if required to do so. However, even if the only copies of the work were protected by a TPM (which would likely not be the case), the person would be required by regulation to circumvent a TPM to comply with the regulation. The TPP permits Parties to enact exemptions or limitations that permit circumventing TPMs. This would include those reasonably required to provide access to a work, free from a TPM protection.

Locks in US notice and takedown system

Geist claims the TPP “lock(s)-in the [U.S.] DMCA notice-and-takedown system within the TPP”. Leaving aside the question as to whether that is a bad thing, he is wrong to claim the TPP requires it. Article. 18.62 of the TPP provides for a basic notice and take-down system and, like the notice and take-down regimes of many of Canada’s trading partners, does not include some of the prescriptive requirements of the DMCA.

Geist often complains that the TPP is too prescriptive when it comes to the IP chapter. Yet, while arguing that the TPP locks in the DMCA notice and take-down process, he criticizes the TPP because it does not hard code DMCA-specific processes and formalities into the TPP – in other words he criticizes the TPP for mandating the DMCA notice and take-down process and for not including several features of the DMCA process.

The TPP, in fact, gives parties flexibility in how they can meet the notice and take-down conditions, such as by not requiring the Parties to provide a system for counter-notices (although, like Article 5.5 of CETA, it does permit the Parties to do so and is a useful process) and not requiring more than basic information that must be in notices.

Geist asserts that by not mandating some of the processes required by the DMCA, the TPP is not as protective of speech as the DMCA. He quotes from an article by Prof. Annemarie Bridy, who compares the TPP notice and take-down and DMCA notice and take-down processes. Yet he doesn’t mention one of her key points, namely that “the TPP is potentially more user-friendly and more speech-protective than the DMCA,” as it does not contain its requirement that exemptions from infringements be conditioned on the service provider’s adoption and implementation of a policy to terminate the accounts repeat infringers. While many would disagree with prof. Bridy’s characterization of this condition as impinging on free speech and would contend instead it is a reasonable condition in view of the safe harbour protections given to service providers, her comparison shows that the TPP does not reproduce the DMCA notice and take-down regime into the TPP, as Geist claims.

Geist’s criticisms of the notice and take-down section of the TPP highlights the striking inconsistency in his standards for evaluating different TPP provisions. Where he opposes a particular part of the treaty, as he does for notice and take-down, he criticizes the inclusion of prescriptive measures (although, as pointed out, the TPP doesn’t actually do that). However, where the TPP does not include prescriptive measures he favours, he claims that is a problem.

For example, he claims that the TPP has weaker anti-spam provisions than those in Canada. Leaving aside that the TPP is not an anti-spam treaty and the impracticalities of even trying to reach international agreement on the nuances of a law to combat spam, the Canadian law (CASL) is the worst law of its kind anywhere and would hardly serve as a model any country would want to emulate.

Another example is the TPP provision that addresses minimum standards for privacy, which he claims should have been more prescriptive. Though he acknowledges that the TPP is a trade treaty and not a privacy treaty, he completely ignores the realpolitik of even attempting to force countries including the U.S. to re-write their privacy laws as part of the trade treaty and the challenges attendant with harmonizing privacy laws across all Parties.

The same inconsistency is apparent in his criticism of the net neutrality rules, which he claims are too weak and his claim that the TPP should have contained an outright ban on laws that permit judicial orders to unlock encryption on cell phones. He uses the dispute between Apple and the FBI as an example of the latter, completely oblivious to the difficult public policy issues which have not yet even been resolved in the U.S., let alone in all TPP countries.

Changes to the TPM provisions

Geist claims “the TPP will require Canada to make further changes to its “digital lock rules”. Yet, the TPP requires no changes to the anti-circumvention (TPM) provisions of the Act. Geist makes a references to a change in the protection of rights management information (RMI), but gives no examples of any change required to the existing TPM provisions.[7]

Changes to the rights management information (RMI) provisions

Geist claims that “Article 18.69 of the TPP requires Canada to add criminal liability to the list of potential remedies.” Geist exaggerates the scope of any potentially required amendment.

The TPP’s criminal provisions relating to RMI only require criminal sanctions where a “person is found to have engaged willfully [requiring knowledge] and for the purposes of commercial advantage or financial gain [or commercial purposes]”. In short, the provision requires sanctions against digital pirates who carry on businesses directed at content theft by removing information that identifies the owner of the copyright in the good, a sanction that as a matter of public policy is hard to argue with.

Geist, in his latest series of blog posts goes further now expressly asserting that this potential amendment has “troubling impact” on the agreement and Canadian law. He does not explain why he believes that criminal sanctions against those who willfully facilitate content theft are inappropriate. His position on this issue is itself troubling, illustrating just how extreme his anti-intellectual property views are.

Protection of trade secrets

Geist takes issue with the trade secret provisions in the TPP. His first criticism is stated as follows:

Trade secrets represent an ill-fitting part of intellectual property law. While rules for patents and copyright seek to strike a balance between rights and access (patents requiring disclosure of the invention and copyright balancing creator and user rights), trade secrets do not involve any disclosure. In fact, trade secrets must remain secret to constitute a trade secret. (emphasis added)

Geist doesn’t explain why trade secrets are “an ill-fitting part of intellectual property law”. His statement appears to be a claim that trade secrets should not be protected as they involve no requirement for public disclosure of information, or that they should not be protected as an intellectual property right. A clear inference from his statement, however, is that providing legal protection for trade secrets is somehow problematic.

Geist clearly misunderstands the need, and the basis, for the protection of trade secrets. Trade secrecy is a legal regime that protects relationships of trust.[8] The common law has protected confidential information such as trade secrets for hundreds of years. It is an essential part of the law that protects information that is disclosed in confidence from being used for a purpose other than that for which it was disclosed to the detriment of the disclosing party. It also protects trade secrets against misappropriation, a right that has increased in importance with the proliferation of cyber-crime. At its core, the law that protects trade secrets encourages parties to disclose confidential information to others and prevents the recipient from dealing with the information in an unconscientious manner.

In recognition of the challenges of addressing misappropriation of trade secrets, both the European Union and the United States are in the process of enhancing their laws to give trade secrets more robust protection. In December 2015, the European Parliament and the Council reached a preliminary agreement on the text of a new Directive. The agreement will need to be formalised by the European Parliament and the Council. The U.S. Senate recently passed a Bill, The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, to provide federal protection for trade secrets.

The EU[9] and U.S. [10] reports leading up to the proposed EU Directive and to the recently passed U.S. Senate bill explain how important trade secret protection is for business competitiveness as well as for research and development and innovative performance. The EC report summarizes the importance of trade secret protection as follows:

Businesses and non-commercial research institutions invest in acquiring, developing and applying know-how and information, which is the currency of the knowledge economy and gives a competitive advantage. This investment in generating and applying intellectual capital determines their competitiveness and innovative performance in the market and therefore their returns to investment, which is the underlying motivation for business research and development… By protecting such a wide range of know-how and commercial information, whether as a complement or as an alternative to intellectual property rights, trade secrets allow the creator to derive profit from his/her creation and innovations and therefore are particularly important for business competitiveness as well as for research and development and innovative performance…

Collaborative research, including cross-border cooperation, is particularly important to increase the levels of business research and development within the internal market. The dissemination of knowledge and information should be considered essential for the purpose of ensuring dynamic, positive and equal business development opportunities, especially for SMEs…Trade secrets have an important role in protecting the exchange of knowledge between businesses, including, in particular, SMEs, and research institutions within and across the borders of the internal market, in the context of research and development and innovation. Trade secrets are amongst the most used form of protection of intellectual creation and innovative know-how by businesses, yet they are at the same time the least protected by the existing Union legal framework against their unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure by third parties.

The report also describes the increasing threats and challenges to protecting trade secrets:

Innovative businesses are increasingly exposed to dishonest practices aiming at misappropriating trade secrets, such as theft, unauthorised copying, economic espionage, breach of confidentiality requirements, whether from within or from outside of the Union. Recent developments, such as globalisation, increased outsourcing, longer supply chains, increased use of information and communication technology contribute to increasing the risk of those practices. The unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret compromises the legitimate trade secret holder’s ability to obtain first mover returns using the outputs of its innovative efforts.

Without effective and comparable legal means for defending trade secrets across the Union, incentives to engage in innovative cross-border activity within the internal market are undermined and trade secrets are unable to fulfil their potential as drivers of economic growth and jobs. Thus, innovation and creativity are discouraged and investment diminishes, affecting the smooth functioning of the internal market and undermining its growth enhancing potential.

Geist’s claim that protection for trade secrets is an “ill-fitting part of intellectual property law” (and the implicit suggestion that trade secrets should not be subject to protection) because such protection is for information that is secret – the universally understood basis for protection of trade secrets – is a radical departure from core precepts about what is a legitimate and necessary framework to promote honesty in business and to maintain a competitive and innovative economy.

Geist also criticizes the measures in the TPP that requires parties in very limited circumstances to add a criminal sanction for trade secret violations. He claims the “TPP dramatically changes trade secret law by also requiring criminal penalties, raising the spectre of government prosecutions for violations.” He notes that the TPP creates “some flexibility for TPP countries,” but never quotes from the TPP provision or explains the full breadth of the flexibility or the type of conduct that the criminal provisions would cover.

As I explained in a prior blog post, TPP and trade secrets: a wonderful idea, the actual requirements of Art. 18.78 of the treaty would enable parties to limit criminal liability quite significantly. For example, Canada could comply by having a criminal sanction that solely targets computer hacking to steal trade secrets that is detrimental to Canada’s economic interests, international relations, or Canada’s defense or national security.

Geist claims there is a concern that the U.S. may ask Canada to go further. But, under the treaty, the U.S. has no right to do so.

Canadians from all sectors know, as the recent EU and U.S. reports explain, that cyber-crime is a significant threat to individuals, businesses, and governments. Geist’s suggestion that trade secrets should not be subject to trade secret protection and his opposition to limited criminal sanctions against cyber-criminals, including state sponsored criminals that would threaten Canada’s economic interests, international relations, defense or national security, is very troubling. It illustrates, again, just how extreme his anti-intellectual property opinions are.

Term Extension

Geist continues to criticize the TPP’s requirement to extend the term of copyright from life plus 50 to life plus 70 years. His most recent post does not even attempt to address the economic and other arguments summarized in my prior blog post that would justify a term extension.

He continues to rely on a questionable New Zealand estimate for the claim that extending the copyright term would costs Canadians millions. In testimony recently to a Senate committee studying the TPP, he stated:

The Government of New Zealand conducted a study on what its term extension will cost, estimating that the extension alone will cost $55 million New Zealand per year. As an economy that is nine times the size, that estimate suggests that term extension alone will run costs… in Canada into the hundreds of millions of dollars.

Although in his most recent blog post he now makes a reference to an Industry Canada study conducted by Université de Montréal economics Professor Abraham Hollander, he makes no mention of one of its most relevant findings, namely its conclusion that the user costs of a 20 year term extension “may increase slightly in response to a higher cost of locating right holders and negotiating rights to works whose protection term has been extended”[11]. He also didn’t mention it to the Senate committee studying the TPP, where he made his exaggerated claim about the economic costs of a term extension.

Despite the continual reliance on the New Zealand estimate, Geist never explained why he believes the estimate is reliable or applicable to Canada. In fact, the accuracy of New Zealand estimate has been seriously undermined by a study conducted by renowned economist, Professor. George Barker. His paper, Copyright Term Extension and the Effect on the NZ Economy, concluded that the New Zealand estimate “is clearly incorrect, and indeed seriously over-estimates costs, when in fact it is likely the term extension will have a net benefit for the New Zealand economy”.[12]

Concluding remarks

Michael Geist’s commentary on the TPP continues to show that many of his claims are incorrect, misleading, or exaggerated. It also illustrates how extreme some of his anti-intellectual opinions are, something that former Industry Minister James Moore referred to during the Canadian copyright reform process.[13] His most recent series “The Trouble with the TPP” does not appear to have been written in haste. Accordingly,  one does have to ask why so many of his assertions could be just so wrong or unreliable or grasps at straws.

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[1] This article focuses only on the blog posts referred to here. It does not address his other blogs, including those dealing with patent law or the e-commerce Chapter, which are also problematic.

[2] Section 53 states: “Where a court is satisfied, on application of any interested person, that any registered trade-mark or any trade-name has been applied to any goods that have been imported into Canada or are about to be distributed in Canada in such a manner that the distribution of the goods would be contrary to this Act…, the court may make an order for the interim custody of the goods, pending a final determination of the legality of their importation or distribution in an action commenced within such time as is prescribed by the order.”

[3] “library, archive or museum” is defined to mean:

(a) an institution, whether or not incorporated, that is not established or conducted for profit or that does not form a part of, or is not administered or directly or indirectly controlled by, a body that is established or conducted for profit, in which is held and maintained a collection of documents and other materials that is open to the public or to researchers, or

(b) any other non-profit institution prescribed by regulation;

[emphasis added]

[4] See footnote 112 to Art 18.76(6).

[5] See section 4.1.(2), which sets out the available remedies for violating the anti-circumvention provisions in the Act: “(2) The owner of the copyright in a work, a performer’s performance fixed in a sound recording or a sound recording in respect of which paragraph (1)(a) has been contravened is, subject to this Act and any regulations made under section 41.21, entitled to all remedies — by way of injunction, damages, accounts, delivery up and otherwise — that are or may be conferred by law for the infringement of copyright against the person who contravened that paragraph.” Both exemplary and punitive damages are available as remedies for copyright infringement. Pro Arts, Inc. v. Campus Crafts Holdings Ltd., 1980 CanLII 1636 (ON SC), Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. 486353 B.C. Ltd., 2008 BCSC 799 (CanLII), Microsoft Corporation v. PC Village Co. Ltd., 2009 FC 401 (CanLII), Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed Co. Ltd. v. Sleep-King Adjustable Bed Co. Ltd., 1984 CanLII 54 (BC SC).

[6] Exemptions or limitations can be provided “in order to enable non-infringing uses if there is an actual or likely adverse impact of those measures on those non-infringing uses, as determined through a legislative, regulatory, or administrative process in accordance with the Party’s law, giving due consideration to evidence when presented in that process, including with respect to whether appropriate and effective measures have been taken by rights holders to enable the beneficiaries to enjoy the limitations and exceptions to copyright and related rights under that Party’s law”.

[7] As I pointed out in my prior blog post, TPP, copyright, e-commerce and digital policy: a reply to Michael Geist, “the term “digital locks” is widely understood to refer to technological protection measures or TPMs which are used by content creators and publishers on physical media such as CDs, DVDs, e-books and other devices and in service offerings such as music and video streaming services. Further, Geist, has consistently referred to “digital locks” as being synonymous with TPMs and the digital lock rules as being legislative measures prohibiting acts of circumvention or providing tools or services to circumvent TPMs.” See endnote 8 to that blog post.

[8] Trade Secrets: the other IP right, WIPO Magazine, June 2013.

[9] See Report of the European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs on Trade Secrets, 17/12/2015.

[10] The Senate Report recommending the Bill describes the challenges as follows:

Trade secrets are a form of intellectual property that allow for the legal protection of commercially valuable, proprietary information and make up an increasingly important part of American companies’ intellectual property portfolios. Comprising all types of financial, scientific, technical, engineering, or other forms of information, trade secrets are an integral part of the operation, competitive advantage, and financial success of many U.S.-based companies.

The growing importance of trade secrets as a form of intellectual property makes their theft a particularly economically damaging crime. In a recent report, the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated that annual losses to the American economy caused by trade secret theft are over $300 billion, comparable to the current annual level of U.S. exports to Asia. This same report found that trade secret theft has led to the loss of 2.1 million American jobs each year and that the illegal theft of intellectual property is undermining the means and incentive for entrepreneurs to innovate. This in turn is slowing the development of new inventions and industries that could raise the prosperity and quality of life for everyone. In another study, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and the Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade found that the annual cost of trade secret theft may be as high as $480 billion.

Protecting trade secrets has become increasingly difficult given ever-evolving technological advancements. Thieves are using increasingly sophisticated methods to steal trade secrets and the growing use of technology and cyberspace has made trade secret theft detection particularly difficult. The growing problem of trade secret theft has been acknowledged by industry, Congress, and the administration — with Attorney General Eric Holder stating during a White House conference “There are only two categories of companies affected by trade-secret theft: those that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t know yet.”

[11] Professor Hollander did not attempt to quantify the economic costs of a term extension. His study was a qualitative one. He states the object of his study as follows: “While the principles underlying the optimal blend of scope and duration of protection are well understood, a lack of data makes it impossible to determine what that combination is. For that reason, this report makes no claims in regard to the optimality of a particular protection term. It provides only a qualitative assessment of likely effects of term extension on creative effort, prices, dissemination of works, and the external balance of royalty flows.”

[12] The paper was originally submitted to the New Zealand committee studying the TPP. See Dr. George Barker 2016 “Copyright Term Extension and the Effect on the NZ Economy,” Submission to the New Zealand House of Representatives Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, March 17, 2016; also his slides presented to the committee. For a summary of the study, see Hugh Stephens, The TPP and Copyright Term Extension: What is the true cost to Canada?

[13] See Minister Moore’s Speech on C-32, http://www.barrysookman.com/2010/06/23/minister-moore%E2%80%99s-speech-on-c-32/.

Fix the value gap – a reply to Michael Geist

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Here is an Op-ed of mine that ran earlier today in the Hill Times. The post below includes endnotes not in that article.

In his Hill Times Op-ed (Canadian copyright reform requires a fix on the fair dealing gap, Dec. 5, 2016) Michael Geist takes issue with the need to address the “value gap” that is hurting Canadian artists, writers, and other members of the creative class. He argues instead that Canada faces a need to address a “fair dealing gap” in our copyright laws. There is no such need and his arguments don’t withstand scrutiny.

Over 2000 Canadian creators have signed a joint letter to Heritage Minister Joly as part of a Focus On Creators coalition campaign lamenting a condition that has come to be recognized widely as a “value gap” and demanding that it be addressed.[1]

The creators are concerned about what was recently described by Jonathan Taplin in an article in the New York Times as the “enormous reallocation of revenue” which “has taken place, with economic value moving from creators of content to owners of monopoly platforms” such as Google and Facebook which have “built their advertising businesses as ‘free riders’ on content made by others”.

Geist did not deny that there is a value gap. However, he summarily concluded that “the ’value gap’ has nothing to do with legislative change” (emphasis added). This is clearly wrong. Online providers of services such as YouTube and Facebook would unquestionably be liable for substantial copyright infringements but for the safe harbours established around the world including in the U.S. under the DMCA. These legislative exceptions – which were pushed for by technology companies precisely to limit their liabilities – have enabled technology companies to avoid paying licensing fees (or fair market value fees) for which they would otherwise have been liable.[2]

Calls for the value gap to be addressed are coming from many quarters internationally. The U.S., for example, has been holding Congressional hearings on whether the safe harbours in the DMCA need to be changed. The drafters of the DMCA safe harbours law did not anticipate that technology platforms would build their businesses free riding on unlicensed content or the overly broad interpretation the U.S. courts have given the safe harbours that enabled this to happen.

In the EU, the European Commission has a Proposal for a Directive on Copyright. It includes provisions to make hosting providers like YouTube pay their fair share of royalties for music they make available. There is also a proposal for a new right for press publishers to authorize the uses of their publications to facilitate online licensing. The European Commission made it clear that rightsholders under current law “face difficulties when seeking to license their rights and be remunerated for the online distribution of their works”. It “is therefore necessary to guarantee that authors and rightholders receive a fair share of the value that is generated by the use of their works and other subject-matter.”

Calls to address the Value Gap in Canada came recently in a speech by Music Canada President Graham Henderson entitled “The Broken Promise of a Golden Age”. Geist inaccurately claimed that this speech criticized the WIPO Internet Treaties. However, there was no claim that the treaties or their implementation in Canada was unbalanced. The speech explained that the problem was with the quid pro quo for implementing the treaties. It started in the U.S. where technology companies insisted on the enactment of safe harbours from liability in return for implementation of the WIPO Treaties. This became a template implemented around the world – including in Canada – and “led to an unfair balance favouring technology companies” which in turn resulted in a “value gap” – a gross mismatch between the volume of content enjoyed by consumers and the revenues being returned to the creative community.

Geist claims that “the Canadian and U.S. digital copyright experiences…are very different”. He says “Canada did not implement the U.S. DMCA notice-and-takedown system nor grant safe harbours from liability in 1998.” “Rather, it ultimately gave the industry what it asked for”.

It is true that we didn’t modernize our copyright laws until 2012. But, when we did, the 2012 amendments included the same categories of safe harbours for network providers, hosting providers and search engines as exist under the DMCA, although the wording and conditions associated with each differ. The amendments resulted in the creation of new, broad exceptions, some without precedent anywhere.

Geist doesn’t say what “industry” got what “it asked for” in Canada. But, contrary to what Geist asserts, artists, writers, performers, publishers, copyright collectives and others in the creative class consistently opposed the broad exceptions enacted in 2012 as part of the quid pro quo for implementing the rights needed to ratify the treaties.

Geist used his inaccurate claim about imbalances in the treaties to argue for a change in Canada’s copyright protection for technological protection measures (TPMs), measures that were enacted in order to ratify the treaties and to support innovative digital business models. Geist says they are “among the most restrictive in the world and badly undermine the traditional copyright balance in the digital world”. He says there is a need for a fair dealing exception to address an imbalance.

Geist is wrong. The anti-circumvention prohibitions in our copyright law for TPMs are in line with those of our trading partners. In fact, they are less protective than the laws in many other countries, including the Member States of the European Union. Under EU law, Member States must prohibit the circumvention of access and copy control TPMs. Our law only prohibits circumvention of access control TPMs. Thus, it is permissible in Canada to circumvent a copy control TPM for fair dealing purposes, contrary to what Michael Geist suggests.[3]

Geist also neglects to point out that Canadian law provides two safeguards unique in international law to ensure balance in our TPM laws. First, it permits the government to establish exceptions by regulation where a TPM could adversely affect the use of a work including where a TPM could adversely affect a fair dealing. Second, the government has the power by regulation to require the owner of a copyright to provide access to a work to a person who is entitled to the benefit of an exception where the copyright owner is not making it possible to exercise the exception.

These powers under our copyright laws are broader and more flexible than what exists anywhere else in the world. Thus, even if there was a problem, there would be no need for any legislative change to address it.

There is no need to re-open the copyright TPM provisions. There is a need, however, to address the value gap.

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[1] The joint letter stated, in part:

The carefully designed laws and regulations of the 1990s were intended to ensure that both Canadian creators and technological innovators would benefit from digital developments. We hoped that new technology would enrich the cultural experiences for artists and consumers alike. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Instead, our work is increasingly used to monetize technology without adequately remunerating its creators. Income and profit from digital use of our work flow away from the creative class to a concentrated technology industry. Allowing this trend to continue will result in dramatically fewer Canadians being able to afford to “tell Canadian stories,” much less earn a reasonable living from doing so.

[2] See, Daniel Adrian Sanchez, Is YouTube Really Shortchanging Artists? A Look at Some Actual Data., ICMP The Value Gap, Luiz Augusto Buff, YouTube’s Value Gap, Jonathan Taplin, Forget AT&T. The Real Monopolies Are Google and Facebook, Rebecca Blake, The DMCA Notice: “Take Down” is Letting Down Artists, PlagiarismToday, Take Down and Stay Down – Rethinking the DMCA; European Commission Staff Working Documents – Impact Assessment (On the music industry problem: “Additional uncertainty arises from the question of whether specific service providers that store and give access to content uploaded by a third party can benefit from the hosting service provider status provided under the Directive 2000/31/EC437 (E-Commerce Directive-“ECD”). It is up to the courts to assess on a case by case basis whether a given service qualifies as a mere technical, automatic and passive hosting service provider. National courts have often found that user uploaded content services were covered by Article 14 ECD. However, in a number of recent cases, national courts have deemed such services to go beyond Article 14 ECD, highlighting the importance of protected content for the business models and the revenues of user uploaded content services. Consequences: The situation above has led to the situation where rightholders are confronted with large use of their content on user uploaded content services, have no or limited control over the use of their content, and fail (or have difficulties) to enter into agreements for the use of their content and obtain a remuneration.” On the problem of press publishers: “Press publishers have attempted to conclude licences with online service providers for uses of their content online, and sought to participate in the advertising revenues generated by their content on third parties’ websites. However, they have generally not managed to do so, despite the fact that these services often engage in copyright-relevant acts.”) On the problem for publishers, see, also, Hugh Stephens, The EU Digital Single Market and Publisher’s Rights: Protecting the Public Interest (“in many cases the bulk of online ad revenues are not going to those who generate the content but rather to commercial content aggregators who use snippets of content—headlines, key paragraphs, photos and images—lifted from news publications and organized into categories to attract readers.”); AAP Letter to President Elect Donald Trump (“Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which Congress enacted in 1998 to encourage online availability of popular copyrighted works while promoting a balance of interests and cooperation between copyright owners and Internet service providers in dealing with online infringement of such works, wildly succeeded in encouraging such availability. However, the relevant DMCA provisions do not achieve that intended balance and cooperation due to numerous instances of judicial misapplication and the unanticipated appearance of service provider business models that foster, exploit and profit from online infringement by their users while offering only token compliance with the law.”) Piracy of copyright materials is also a major factor that contributes to widespread downloading and streaming of infringing content without compensation to copyright holders. See, for example, David Price, Sizing the Piracy Universe, NetNames Envisional, Sept.2013.

The practise of infringement is tenacious and persistent. Despite some discrete instances of success in limiting infringement, the piracy universe not only persists in attracting more users year on year but hungrily consumes increasing amounts of bandwidth.

The free and simple availability of copyrighted content through piracy ecosystems continues to drive the popularity of hundreds of web sites, the actions of hundreds of millions of internet users worldwide, and the consumption of thousands of petabytes of internet bandwidth. Users of piracy ecosystems, the number of internet users who regularly obtain infringing content, and the amount of bandwidth consumed by infringing uses of content all increased significantly between 2010 and 2013.

See also, Barry Sookman, Is unauthorized online copying theft and does it hurt creators?, Barry Sookman, Canada: online piracy a problem hurting artists, creators and the economy, Barry Sookman, IIC estimates global economic and social impacts of counterfeiting and piracy.

[3] Barry Sookman, An FAQ on TPMs, Copyright and Bill C-32, December 14, 2010, Barry Sookman Change and the Copyright Modernization Act, November 7, 2012.

Globe and Mail editorial attacks on Canadian creators and broadcasters: what’s up with the Globe?

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There was a time you could count on The Globe and Mail to support the Canadian cultural industries and to favour legal frameworks designed to strengthen them. You could also count on the Globe not to be soft on content theft by commercial pirates that harm Canadian businesses and impede their ability to innovate. Recently, however, the Globe has taken one-sided positions opposite the creative community. Worse, it has taken these positions relying on inadequate research and supporting them with inaccurate factual assertions, in some cases by relying on writings of anti-copyright activist Michael Geist.

A case in point is the Globe editorial: A bad idea for ‘fixing’ Canada’s internet rules, (Oct 1, 2017). This editorial was critical of proposals to counter streaming piracy outlined by Bell before the Standing Committee on International Trade on NAFTA on September 27, 2017.

The first proposal to fight piracy was to empower the CRTC to make orders requiring ISPs to block pirate websites.

The Bell representative first outlined the problem broadcasters and distributors have with the Kodi box Internet streaming problem.

U.S. interests have long complained that widespread online copyright infringement here in Canada is limiting the growth of the digital economy. In fact, many of the most prominent global players in the piracy ecosystem operate out of Canada as a relative safe harbour. Canadians made 1.88 billion visits to piracy sites last year…

Set-top boxes are being sold in any electronics store on virtually every corner in a city where you can buy something called a Kodi box that comes preloaded with content we and Rogers own the copyright in. You can buy that for $50 and you can watch live TV for free.

Bell then outlined a proposal to have an administrative agency blacklist certain sites. The blocking orders would be made by the CRTC. See, Barry Sookman, Website blocking proposal good policy. The sites were described in Bell’s testimony as “digital pirates”, “pirated websites”, and “a blacklist of egregious piracy sites”.

The proposal was immediately criticized by Michael Geist in a blog post, Bell Calls for CRTC-Backed Website Blocking System and Complete Criminalization of Copyright in NAFTA. The Globe followed suit adopting his criticisms claiming that “A small handful of companies connect Canadians to the Internet, and one of them would like Ottawa to help control and restrict that access” and further that the proposal “adds up to a frontal attack on online freedom”.

As I pointed out in a prior blog post, website blocking of pirate sites is a tried and true way of addressing internet piracy among many of Canada’s trading partners. Further, the courts which have addressed ISP blocking have found that such orders do not violate freedom of expression values. In short, orders that target Internet pirates cannot be considered as a “frontal [or any other kind of] attack on online freedom”.

The editorial went even further suggesting that states that have site blocking “tend to be authoritarian”.[i] While some states that use web site blocking to censor political speech may be authoritarian, it is factually wrong to assert that states that use it “tend to be authoritarian”. Website blocking is a legitimate tool used by many free and democratic countries that support an open Internet to block a variety of websites that disseminate illegal content such as child pornography, malware, investment fraud, terrorism, personal information, counterfeiting, and copyright infringement. It can hardly be argued that countries that use website blocking to protect members of the public such as England, France, Singapore, Australia, Portugal, Italy, and the Province of Quebec (gambling) are authoritarian. See, Nigel Cory, “How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without “Breaking the Internet”, ITIF, August 2016.

It is unfortunate that the Globe would outright reject what is perhaps the only way to restrict access to foreign pirate websites while ignoring the existential threat to creators, broadcasters, and distributors posed by online streaming including streaming to Kodi boxes and other Internet streaming devices (ISDs).

The second proposal Bell made was to target Internet piracy by criminalizing copyright infringement for commercial purposes. On this Bell said “Canada should also create a criminal provision for any infringement of copyright, including facilitating and enabling piracy where it’s undertaken for a commercial purpose.”

The context of the proposal was clearly for a criminal remedy to address commercial scale Internet piracy. Indeed, Article 1717 of NAFTA already requires that Canada “shall provide criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of… copyright piracy on a commercial scale.” Article 61 of TRIPS has a similar provision. Article 1877 of the TPP would also have required member countries to “provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied at least in cases of …copyright or related rights piracy on a commercial scale.”[ii]

The issue is that while Canada has some criminal rules against copyright infringements in some commercial situations, they are framed in the context of the older practice of piracy based on certain forms illegal copying, and not well-suited for modern piracy on a commercial scale that takes place through streaming. In recognition of this problem and the problems faced by the creative community in the U.K. by modern commercial forms of piracy – which the U.K. takes seriously – the U.K. government recently enacted the Digital Economy Act 2017 to, among other things, modernize its criminal copyright enforcement provisions to include communicating (or making available) a work to the public for the purpose of gain or where the person “knows or has reason to believe that communicating the work to the public will cause loss to the owner of the copyright, or will expose the owner of the copyright to a risk of loss”.

However, rather than siding with creators or suggesting how the proposal might be improved to appropriately target modern commercial pirate services, the Globe summarily rejected the proposal. Moreover, it did so misleadingly and inaccurately describing the proposal by quoting directly from Michael Geist who, in his blog post title (quoted by the Globe) misleadingly and inaccurately called it “the complete criminalization of copyright.”

Another example is the Globe editorial: In 2018, the fight for net neutrality must continue December 25, 2017)

The editorial purports to deal with issues related to net neutrality, but again misses the mark. It once again adopts Michael Geist’s views including those expressed in a submission to a CRTC consultation.

Dealing with the proposal from Canadian broadcasters for a regime that would enable the CRTC to order ISPs to block pirate websites, the editorial asserts that

“the free flow of information will be interfered with – precisely what net neutrality aims to prevent. If piracy is the problem, we should rely on Canada’s robust laws against intellectual property theft”.

It is hard to understand why a legitimate paper like the Globe would assimilate concerns about the “free flow of information” with the distribution of pirated/illegal content. Further, this is not a net neutrality issue – none of the net neutrality regimes in place around the world prevent government from addressing illegal activity online. Thieves have no freedom of expression rights in the dissemination of such illegal content.

The further assertion that “If piracy is the problem, we should rely on Canada’s robust laws against intellectual property theft”, which again is taken uncritically from Geist, simply confuses the problem with an inapt solution. The sites that would be blocked by the proposal operate outside of Canada, or like the notorious “The Pirate Bay”, would never obey a Canadian court order. The only effective way of protecting domestic markets against these illicit foreign sites and services is with the use of blocking orders against ISPs or deindexing orders against search engines.

The Globe then endorses Geist’s proposal in the submission to the CRTC

“to drop the “walled garden” approach to regulation in favour of a consumer-oriented approach to maintain affordable internet access and other measures “that foster increased global competitiveness of Canadian services and creators.”

It based this endorsement, in part, on a statement it quoted from Geist’s submission:

As University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist summarized in a recent submission to the CRTC, “foreign financing now contributes more toward English-language television production than the licensing fees paid by private or public broadcasters, federal tax credits, Canadian distributors, and the Canadian Media Fund.”

The statement by Geist was attributed to a study published by the Canadian Media Producers Association (CMPA) in collaboration with the Association Québécoise de la production médiatique (AQPM), the Department of Canadian Heritage and Telefilm Canada.[iii] However, Geist misquoted the study and the Globe quoted Geist without fact checking him. The study, in fact, found that foreign financing accounted for only 18% towards English-language television production, with the balance from other sources.[iv] The private and public broadcasters accounted for 22%. Foreign financing of French language television production accounted for less than 1% of the financing.

The Globe editorial then proposed, also based on Geist’s submission, to do away with the long standing policy of simultaneous substitution, which it referred to as a “cash cow”. However, neither Geist nor the Globe referred to the important policy reasons supporting it. These were set out by the CRTC as follows

  • to protect the rights of broadcasters
    When broadcasters buy programs from American and Canadian producers or networks, they pay to have exclusive broadcast rights in certain markets. Signal substitution protects these rights.
  • to enable TV stations to draw enough advertising dollars
    TV services earn most of their revenue from advertising. The advertising rates they can charge depend on the size of their audiences. Without signal substitution, the audience for one show would be split across several stations. This would reduce the size of the audience for each station. With that smaller audience, the TV station couldn’t charge as much for advertising. Signal substitution means that local stations keep their local audiences and the advertising dollars that go with those audiences.
  • to keep advertising dollars in the Canadian market
    A lot of the time, an American signal is replaced with a Canadian one. By replacing American ads with Canadian ads, advertising money is generated in the Canadian market.

It is surprising that the Globe would not support proposals that would strengthen the Canadian broadcasting system and support the creative community in Canada. It is even more disappointing it would take the positions it took in its editorials without engaging in research (or in sufficient research) to properly understand the issues faced by the creative community and reasonable proposals to address them, or to do what every journalist is taught to do – to fact check sources, especially those with known biases.

________________________________

[i] The editorial stated “The principle rightly discourages governments and industry from blocking or favouring sites; states that ignore it tend to be authoritarian.”

[ii] Under the TPP, “In respect of wilful copyright or related rights piracy, “on a commercial scale” includes at least:

(a) acts carried out for commercial advantage or financial gain; and

(b) significant acts, not carried out for commercial advantage or financial gain, that have a substantial prejudicial impact on the interests of the copyright or related rights holder in relation to the marketplace.”

[iii] Profile 2016. Economic Report On The Screen-Based Media Production Industry In Canada, available at http://www.cmpa.ca/sites/default/files/documents/industry-information/profile/Profile%202016%20EN.pdf.

[iv] Ibid Exhibit 4-19 p. 55

Support for creators: pirate streaming and the value gap, my op-ed in the Globe

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Here is my full unedited op-ed published in today’s Globe and Mail.

The cultural industries in Canada are facing major challenges. A significant contributing cause is our outdated legal frameworks. They did not contemplate, and have not been updated to address, the new means of stealing content or uses of content by Internet platforms and others without permission or paying just compensation. These issues and proposals to address them deserve our attention. Two examples are illustrative.

The first involves Internet streaming piracy. Canadians have a plethora of ways to watch television and movie programming, including over-the-air broadcasts, cable, satellite, authorized IPTV services, and over-the-top services such as Netflix.

These legal services are being threatened by schemes that stream pirated versions of the very same content to illegal devices such as “fully loaded Kodi boxes”. These devices are designed and marketed to replace legal set top boxes sold by legitimate services, such as cable and satellite services.

The issue has become a pressing one for Canadian broadcasters and distributors, for members of the creative community, and for those who invest in the production and distribution of content, all of whom rely upon legal markets. Five years ago, few, if any, of your neighbours would have had one of these illegal devices in their home. Today, recent studies by Sandvine, a Waterloo Ontario based networking equipment company, have found that approximately 6% of all households in North America have a Kodi device configured to access pirated content and 7% have an illegal piracy subscription device.

One of the studies estimated that Kodi piracy alone costs Canadian and US broadcasters and other communication service providers up to five billion dollars a year.

The communications sector is calling for a new tool to combat this exploding problem – the ability to have egregious piracy sites added to a blacklist so that they will no longer be readily available in Canada. Orders would be made by the CRTC (which is given the express power to make blocking orders under the Telecommunications Act) and be subject to judicial oversight by the Federal Court of Appeal.

However, the proposal has been criticized, for example, by Ottawa professor and anti-copyright activist, Michael Geist, and the Internet activist organization, OpenMedia. The attacks claim hyperbolically that it is a “radical proposal”; that it is “sweeping Internet censorship” that will “result in chilling of expression online” and “put Canada’s robust Net Neutrality rules at risk”, and will, in any event, be ineffective.

Far from a “radical” proposal, website blocking of pirate sites is a common, internationally accepted tool to combat internet piracy. At least 27 other countries — including leading liberal open democracies and major Canadian trading partners such as the UK, Australia, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, South Korea, and Denmark – utilize website blocking. Numerous studies and court decisions have found it to be effective in combatting digital piracy.

As open democracies around the world have confronted toxic material on the internet, it has become evident that blacklisting clearly illegal content fosters, rather than hinders, an open internet that is safe for all participants. Website blocking is a legitimate tool used by democratic countries that support an open Internet to block websites that disseminate illegal content such as child pornography, malware, investment fraud, terrorism, personal information, counterfeiting, and copyright infringement. Courts that have reviewed site blocking have consistently found it compatible with fundamental freedom of expression values.

While net neutrality is clearly a hot topic in the U.S., in this discussion it is a canard. Simply put, this Canadian proposal does not raise a net neutrality issue by requiring ISPs to discriminate or favor any particular legal content or websites. None of the net neutrality regimes around the world prevent governments from addressing online illegal activity through such a mechanism, as a number of them already do.

Geist claims that website blocking is unnecessary in this country, because “Canada already has some of the toughest anti-piracy laws in the world.” This confuses the problem with an inapt solution. The sites that would be blocked by the proposal, like the notorious “Pirate Bay,” operate outside of Canada and would thumb their noses at a Canadian court order. The only effective way of protecting domestic markets against such illicit foreign sites and services is by disabling access to them in Canada, either through site blocking or search engine de-indexing.

The second example is the “value gap”. This term signifies the disparity between the value of creative content that is accessed and enjoyed by consumers, and the revenues returned to the people and businesses who create it. This gap is the focus of creative sectors in Canada and around the world seeking to modernize copyright and other laws to enable creators to receive fair compensation for the uses of their content.

Some critics, like Michael Geist (in an op-ed in the Globe (Dec 21, 2017)), dispute that there is a value gap. For example, he paints a rosy picture of the Canadian music industry, claiming it is “an industry earning record revenues from new technologies and the internet”.

But, according to a Music Canada study, the market value of music in Canada is still a fraction of what it once was, and equitable remuneration for access to music remains elusive. Further, “the music sector remains a long way from a return to robust growth and a solid business footing”.

This assessment is backed by an international study by the IFPI that found that a significant portion of music activity today takes place on services that pay little or nothing to music creators. The study found that YouTube remains the dominant player in global online music streaming, and the availability of free music on YouTube is one of the primary reasons music consumers don’t use a paid subscription streaming service. However, it pays only a fraction of the royalties other music streaming services pay, because it claims to qualify for copyright safe harbors as a passive intermediary– despite the fact that 80% of watch time on the service is curated by YouTube itself.

The value gap doesn’t just affect music. It also affects most of Canada’s leading cultural industries, including publishing, journalism, and television and film production. It affects the livelihoods of tens of thousands of creators who work in these industries, including artists, songwriters, writers, authors, performers, producers, and photographers.

These issues confronting the cultural industries and the practical proposals to solve them deserve the attention and support of Canadians.


Why the CRTC should endorse FairPlay’s website-blocking plan: a reply to Michael Geist

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The Hill Times published my op-ed on the FairPlay Canada website blocking proposal,  Why the CRTC should endorse FairPlay’s piracy site-blocking plan. The full unedited version, complete with endnote references is below.

Last week Fairplay Canada filed an application with the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), asking for a new tool to help Canadian creators to combat online theft of their content by illegal piracy websites. It proposed that the Canada’s telecom regulator create an independent agency to identify websites and services that are “blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engaged in piracy”. Following a fair procedural process, the agency could recommend that a site be blocked by ISPs. Then, if the CRTC agreed, that quasi-judicial administrative agency could use its lawful authority to order ISPs to block the site.

The coalition’s 25 representatives from all walks of Canada’s cultural community appropriately described the proposal as “a much needed solution to a large and growing problem that threatens the massive employment, economic, and cultural contributions of Canada’s film, television, and music industries.”

As expected, the proposal immediately came under fire by anti-copyright activist Michael Geist.[1] In criticizing the proposal he deployed the playbook that he uses to systematically oppose initiatives to protect creators of cultural materials;[2] namely, to deny there is any problem to be addressed, contend that even if there is problem the laws don’t need changing, and to engage in scaremongering[3], in this case, by claiming the proposal is “radical” and “dangerous”, will violate net neutrality principles, rights of freedom of expression, privacy rights, and is like the unpopular proposed U.S. anti-piracy law called SOPA.

The proposal to establish website blocking can hardly be considered “radical” or “dangerous”. Website blocking is a legitimate tool used by many free and democratic countries that support an open Internet including England, France, Portugal, and Italy to block a variety of websites that disseminate illegal content such as child pornography, malware, investment fraud, terrorism, personal information, counterfeiting, and copyright infringement.[4]

The jurisdiction to make such orders has been available throughout the EU since 2001 and has been used to block a variety of targets ranging from the Pirate Bay to servers that illegally stream soccer matches.[5] Australia recently established an express regime to permit orders to be made against ISPs to block pirate websites. In France, the anti-piracy agency Hadopi recently released a report calling for faster blocking of pirate sites and adoption of measures to counter illegal streaming platforms and their access through fully loaded Kodi boxes and other illicit streaming devices (ISDs).[6]

Each of Geist’s claims  about the proposal are examined below.

A copy of this blog can be downloaded at this link for ease of reading.

Piracy is a problem

Geist claims that piracy isn’t a problem in Canada. He made this type of argument before to oppose changes in copyright that would provide rights holders tools to go after enterprises engaged in the business of piracy. For example, he argued that peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing of music actually benefitted the music industry in an attempt to thwart legislative intervention to reform the Copyright Act. He continued to rely on a biased and flawed study during the copyright reform process leading up to Bill C-11 until it was authoritatively debunked with a showing that, unsurprisingly, P2P downloads reduced demand for the legal sales of CDs.[7]

Geist also opposed amending Canada’s laws to curtail counterfeiting, telling a Parliamentary Committee “there is likely to be limited economic impact in Canada from counterfeiting”. He was the only witness to take this view and his evidence was rejected by the Committee finding that “there is no doubt that counterfeiting and piracy cause economic harm to intellectual property owners, private companies and Canadian governments.”[8] Parliament eventually enacted the Combating Counterfeit Products Act, which brought Canadian border measures to, or closer to, international standards.

Geist now opposes the Fairplay proposal asserting that piracy is not a concern because Canada is “well below global averages when it comes to things like downloading music from unauthorized sites, stream ripping so-called from sites like YouTube.” Specifically, he says, because only 33% of Canadians engaged in digital music piracy in 2017 (which is up from 27% in 2016, and is a staggering 53% among 16-24 year olds) and because only 27% of music is stream ripped from sites like YouTube. But, why does he believe that this is an acceptable level of theft? Even if this represented the only losses due to illegal access in the music industry, what reasonable person would countenance a one-third market share loss due to theft?

For film and TV content, Geist seems to contend there is no piracy problem at all. He argues that declining revenues in traditional television packages are not “lost revenues” due to illegal streaming but rather that “the money is actually going” to paid Internet streaming services such as Netflix. He even favourably quotes from a report that film and TV piracy has been “made pointless” given unlimited viewing on Netflix. These claims do not stand up to even cursory scrutiny.

Netflix itself regards video piracy (which is predicted to cost over the top streaming services more than USD$50B between 2016 and 2022) as one of its biggest competitors.[9] Netlflix’s concerns about copyright piracy are backed by studies on video streaming that show that programs are accessed more frequently from illegal rather than from paid legal sources. For example, the 7th season of Game of Thrones had 1.03 billion illegal views, with more people watching the blockbuster series illegally rather than legally through HBO.[10]

Geist’s claims also ignore the studies that show the extent of piracy in Canada and the economic harm caused to the creative industries by it.

He disregards, for example, the report from anti-piracy analyst firm MUSO filed with the CRTC that “Canada is one of the highest consumers of global web streaming piracy”, making 1.6 billions trips to web streaming sites in 2016. Contrary to his claim, Canada is also well above the global average, being in 8th place globally in piracy visits, totalling 1.88 billion visits to all piracy sites in 2016.[11] This is significant because of the link between levels of piracy and loss of legitimate sales of copyright content.

A recent study by Sandvine estimated that approximately 6% of all households in North America currently have a fully loaded illicit streaming device called Kodi configured to access unlicensed content.[12] Another study, found that 6.5% of North American households are accessing illegal TV piracy subscription services. It estimated that this piracy costs Canadian and US broadcasters and other communication service providers up to five billion dollars a year.[13]

Studies on site blocking have not only shown that they reduce traffic to blocked web sites, they also show that piracy hurts sales of legitimate content and services by showing that website blocking increases access to content through legitimate services. For example, a study conducted by Carnegie Mellon University’s Brett Danaher of the blocking of only 53 piracy websites in the UK showed it caused a 6% increase in visits to paid legal streaming sites like Netflix and a 10% increase in videos viewed on legal ad supported streaming sites like BBC.[14]

Geist says that the piracy issue is “fundamentally” a “business model” issue. He stated in an interview with the CBC, “fundamentally, it’s about business models that will solve these issues”. Yet, he acknowledges that Canadians have a wide variety of choices to access content legally including a plethora of legal streaming services such a Netflix.

The problem is not a lack of business models. Canadian businesses have and are innovating to bring exciting copyright content to Canadians. The fundamental question is why the cultural industries should have to compete with business models built on content theft. We do not expect car part makers, for example, to have to compete with chop shop criminals who steal cars and sell spare parts. Nor do we consider it appropriate to require legitimate makers of any products to drop their prices or to otherwise change their business models to compete with sellers of counterfeit or stolen goods. In both cases, we expect fair marketplace rules that outlaw theft. One may therefore ask, what moral compass underpins Geist’s premise that the legal framework for copyright should be structured to force creators alone to compete with content thieves?

Geist’s argument that the issue is one of business models also flies in the face of basic economics. When piracy sites steal content and offer unlicensed streaming services, their costs of production will always be significantly less than for legal services that make investments in creating and distributing content – and in compensating the people employed in and that make investments in creating and distributing the content. Pirate operators do not. Accordingly, the price for pirate content will invariably be less than for legal products and services. Moreover, as the supply of legal services cannot be provided at the price of pirated services, the production and supply of legitimate content will also invariably over time not be able to meet the demand at that price. The solution is not to require legitimate copyright industries to suffer losses or to go out of business. Business model changes alone will not solve the piracy problem. Only business models supported by effective anti-piracy laws which guard against unfair competition will.

In a blog post devoted to the issue, Geist also argues based on a report by the Canadian Media Production Association (CMPA) that “the Canadian industry is achieving record growth” and that the website blocking proposal is a “solution in search of a problem”.[15] However, this “sky is rising” argument, which he frequently uses in his anti-copyright advocacy, completely ignores the counterfactual, namely, what would the sectors supported by copyright look like in the absence of piracy and with effective anti-piracy laws such as site blocking.[16] Research in the film and tv sector on this question in Australia showed that a legal framework that did not adequately protect copyrights harmed the Australian community by causing slower growth in the copyright industries, fewer jobs, and a decrease in film and video production.[17]

Geist’s “the sky is rising” and “piracy isn’t a problem” arguments shows a basic lack of respect for the thousands of Canadians who have lined up to support the FairPlay proposal. What defies common sense is that Geist, an academic, is telling all of the actors, producers, artists, studios, cinema owners, ISPs, media companies, and broadcasters of this country including the unions, guilds and associations representing Canadians that work in the film, television, and music industries, independent production and media companies – the people who actually know from industry experience what the effects of online piracy are – and who support the FairPlay proposal, that they don’t know what they are talking about and that they are wasting their time and resources pursuing a solution to a non-existent problem.

Geist’s “sky is rising” argument, distilled to its essence, is that it is bad public policy to prevent unfair competition from harming industries if they are growing. It is tantamount to a claim that the banking industry is not affected by cyber-crime if the overall banking industry revenues increase or do not steadily decline. By his logic, we shouldn’t have laws protecting profitable businesses from online scams, fraud, phishing, and ransomware by cyber thieves or laws that prevent theft from banks, or at least laws that prevent theft short of bankrupting them. This would be a dangerous and radical reformulation of public policy principles.

Copyright is said to have two fundamental goals, one of which is to obtain a “just reward for the creator”.[18] A moral basis for this goal of copyright was suggested long ago by the Privy Council as resting on the 8th commandment ‘Thou shalt not steal’”.[19] Based on Geist’s arguments that as long a piracy is “below global averages” or doesn’t affect what appear to be otherwise financially successful persons, I suppose the 8th commandment according to Geist should be reformulated to say:

8th Commandment according to Geist: “Thou shall not steal, unless your theft is below global averages or is from a person who has enough to steal from”.

Web blocking must be part of Canada’s anti-piracy tools

Geist says that site blocking isn’t needed because Canada has “some of the world’s toughest anti-piracy laws”. He used the same argument to oppose a law to help the cultural industries take down the notorious file sharing site isoHunt. Before any amendment had been proposed, he argued that Canada’s laws were too weak to shut down the site. Then, when during the copyright reform process the Government planned to amend the Act to add an enablement cause of action to permit rights holders to go after sites like isoHunt that were enabling mass piracy, he changed his view arguing an amendment wasn’t needed because Canada already had robust anti-piracy laws that would be effective.[20]

He also says that Canada is one of the only countries in the world to have anti-piracy laws that allow companies to go after piracy websites.[21] That is simply untrue.

However, whatever one might think about the efficacy of our laws against Canadian based pirate site operators, site blocking is needed to protect our domestic market against foreign piracy sites. As anyone with even the slightest experience in dealing with online piracy knows, domestic anti-piracy laws without an effective blocking regime provide scant to no relief against foreign pirate operators. Court orders are whac-a-mole instruments, unenforceable against them.[22]

Geist himself supported website blocking of foreign based websites that provided access to child pornography based on a block list to be created by Cybertip.ca because of the hundreds of websites that were beyond the reach of domestic law enforcement.[23] That is also why many other liberal democratic countries like the UK, France, and Australia rely on site blocking to protect their domestic cultural industries.

The FairPlay proposal has due process and judicial oversight

Geist says the proposal is “sorely lacking in due process” and judicial oversight. But, it’s hard to imagine a process that is more procedurally fair. The Internet Piracy Review Agency (IPRA) would consider claims using criteria established by the CRTC, give notice to alleged content thieves, review evidence, and permit a hearing if desired. The CRTC would review recommendations and decide whether an order should be made.

Further, any decision to issue a blocking order would be made by the CRTC, a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal that already makes orders under the Do Not Call and anti-spam (CASL) regimes, both regimes that Geist staunchly supports, as well as for the broadcast and telecom industries more generally. The CRTC also enforces Canada’s net neutrality laws, all with the same court oversight as the proposed regime.

The proposal is consistent with net neutrality principles

Geist claims the proposal is a setback for net neutrality and “is inconsistent with the current communications law framework”. However, blocking illegal materials on the Internet has nothing to do with this important principle that all members of the FairPlay coalition endorse.

The term “net neutrality” has no precise universally accepted meaning or scope. However, there is a consensus on the general concepts that the term reflects. For example, in the U.S., it is described at a high level as prohibiting “blocking”, “throttling”, and “paid prioritization” by ISPs.[24] In the European Union, it is understood to be “rules to safeguard equal and non-discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services and related end-users’ rights”.[25]

In Canada, the CRTC considers it as a policy requiring that “all traffic on the Internet should be given equal treatment by Internet providers with little to no manipulation, interference, prioritization, discrimination or preference given.”[26]

Net neutrality is not however, as Geist simply asserts without reference to any sources on net neutrality, an absolute principle and the high level statements about it don’t encompass the whole principle. Importantly, it co-exists, like most laws including those related to freedom of expression, with other legal frameworks. Net neutrality may prevent ISPs from unilaterally interfering with legal online content, but does not restrict the CRTC from making orders to prevent the dissemination of unlawful content.

For example, in the U.S., the FCC limited the “no blocking” rule to only “lawful” content, applications and services. To make it clear that open Internet protections can and must coexist with these other legal frameworks, it adopted the express rule that the prohibitions did not prohibit “reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or other unlawful activity”.[27] The net neutrality principles in the European Union are also expressly “without prejudice to Union law, or national law that complies with Union law, related to the lawfulness of the content, applications or services”.[28]

In Canada, there is no all-encompassing Commission decision or regulatory framework on the broad concept of net neutrality. Net neutrality has been described by the Commission as a “general concept” “that all traffic on the Internet should be given equal treatment by ISPs. In other words, there should be no manipulation, preference, or discrimination, either through technical or economic means.”[29]

Net neutrality, as ISED Minister Bains correctly stated in commenting on the proposal requires that “all legal content must be treated equally by internet service providers”.[30] This view is confirmed by decisions of the CRTC that illegal and other forms of offensive content can be blocked by ISPs and carriers. The CRTC’s position, however, is that its approval is required before an ISP can engage in content blocking by virtue of Section 36 of the Telecommunications Act.[31]

In the decision Geist referred to in a blog post involving blocking unlicensed online gambling sites, the CRTC confirmed it had the authority to permit site blocking by ISPs with no suggestion that this would violate any “net neutrality” rule. It did not, as Geist asserted incorrectly, state that it would only permit such site blocking in “exceptional circumstances”.[32] The CRTC said in a different decision that it would only permit blocking of legal content for traffic management purposes in exceptional circumstances. The CRTC also stated that traffic management policies to protect users from network threats such as the distribution of illicit materials were unlikely to trigger complaints or concerns under the Act and are a necessary part of an ISP’s network operations.[33]

In another decision addressing whether carriers are precluded from offering universal call blocking or opt-in filtering services, the Commission went out of its way to emphasize that carriers could do so when implemented in a manner consistent with the Commission’s determinations. The Commission went even further, stating that it intended to approve universal blocking for the purposes of preventing nuisance calls that contain blatantly illegitimate caller ID from reaching Canadians.[34]

This view of net neutrality was aptly summarized by technology lawyer Mark Hayes in a recent article commenting on this issue:

In general terms, net neutrality is a laudable concept since it ensures that ISPs are unable to discriminate among (and charge differing amounts for) packets of specific content on their networks. However, broad statements about net neutrality often gloss over the nuanced approach that is required when approaching the regulation of ISPs and Internet content, and it has to be recognized that there are situations in which ISPs need to manage or control content on their networks and that such situations are not as nefarious as some commentators may suggest.

The first category of permissible content discrimination involves the technical operation of Internet networks by ISPs….

Secondly, ISPs may be required to control content on their network for legal reasons. For example, ISPs will be required to abide by court orders, which may require ISPs to block access to certain websites. A simplistic mantra of protecting net neutrality should not be permitted to allow the dissemination of websites which infringe intellectual property rights or other rights.[35]

The proposal is privacy enhancing

Geist claims the proposal represents “a set-back for privacy”. However, his only reference to privacy is the mention of the prior Conservative government’s electronic surveillance legislation which was withdrawn after opposition to it. Nothing about the proposal involves electronic surveillance of individuals or is remotely similar to the former government’s plans for combatting child pornography. However, Geist claims that the FairPlay proposal  “could have similarly harmful effects on the Internet”. This suggestion is untrue and misleading as Hugh Stephens aptly pointed out in the recent blog post, The New Canadian Content Coalition: Hang Together or Hang Separately:

As Michael Geist notes, the Toews initiative was rightly criticized as government overreach and an invasion of privacy and was quickly withdrawn, but what the connection is between that episode and today’s proposal is, frankly, a mystery to me. No-one is suggesting any government snooping or knowledge over what individual consumers are doing in cyberspace. If the Coalition proposal is accepted, all that would happen is that a request by a consumer for access to a designated infringing website would be denied by the user’s ISP using an automatic process to disable the link. It is disingenuous and misleading to argue that there would be any surveillance or invasion of privacy or that there is any link between the FairPlay Canada proposal and the past misguided initiative of the Harper government.

In fact, the proposal is a pro-privacy one. The proposal does not involve any collection of personal information of individuals engaged in illegal file sharing. In fact, it would protect privacy. Online pirates often collect IP addresses and other personal information about users which they use for nefarious purposes. The proposal would reduce how often this happens to Canadians.

Further, Canadian ISPs are being bombarded with court motions for disclosures of subscriber information (Norwich orders) by a cottage industry of third tier copyright trolls. Blocking orders would reduce piracy and thereby help to stop these proceedings targeting users, something Geist also advocated for.

The proposal is consistent with freedom of expression values

Geist asserts that the proposal would violate Charter rights to freedom of expression. He says the proposal is “anathema” to “the sorts of values that Canadians have when it comes to freedom of expression”. Yet, this law professor fails to identify anything to support this claim.

Canadian courts have repeatedly held that copyright infringers do not engage in freedom of speech when they distribute pirate materials.[36] The Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed this in the Google v Equustek case, which Geist conveniently ignores, stating that “We have not, to date, accepted that freedom of expression requires the facilitation of the unlawful sale of goods.”[37]

EU courts, which Geist also ignores, have found blocking orders to be effective without over blocking and to be consistent with freedom of speech rights.[38]

Further, as Neil Turkewitz, stated in responding to the assertion by the Internet activist organization OpenMedia that the FairPlay proposal is a form of censorship

“Truth is, site blocking of pirate sites undertaken in a careful and deliberative manner doesn’t undermine freedom, it expands it. Unless one champions a version of “freedom” that includes freedom to steal.”[39]

Geist argues that the proposal is a slippery slope because of “the likelihood that it will quickly expand beyond sites that “blatantly, overwhelmingly or structurally” engage in infringing or enabling or facilitating the infringement of copyright”. This strawman argument can be used against any good law that targets illegal activities. Geist made the same spurious argument against amending Canada’s copyright law to enable rights holders to take down the notorious isoHunt piracy site claiming it could also be used to take down YouTube. This fantastical claim was rejected by Parliament which enacted the law.[40]

However, the slippery slope – and “domestic laws are adequate to stop foreign sites from making illegal content available to Canadians without site blocking”, “freedom of speech”, “net neutrality”, “site blocking is inconsistent with the current communications law framework”, “privacy”, and “judicial oversight” – canards levelled against the FairPlay proposal did not stop Geist from supporting website blocking of foreign child pornography sites without court or administrative tribunal orders.[41]

FairPlay is a reasonable proposal that should be supported

Geist compares the FairPlay proposal to the U.S. “controversial legislation known as the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)” and says the CRTC and the federal government “would be well advised to swiftly dismiss the ill-advised and dangerous Canadian site blocking proposal.”

This is not the first time Geist has tried to use SOPA and demagoguery to try and sabotage a proposal to provide the creative community with rights they need to combat 21st century piracy. He made the same argument to try and demonize the Copyright Modernization Act calling it the “Canadian version of SOPA” in an opportunist effort to leverage anti-SOPA public opinion, something Parliament also rejected.[42]

However, as Geist surely knows, SOPA is totally different from the FairPlay proposal both procedurally and substantively[43] and its demise had more to do with inaccurate information spread through social media than its substance.[44] SOPA had no precedent globally, while the proposal is similar to well-established regimes adopted by Canada’s peers.

We should not be surprised that Geist opposes the FairPlay proposal. He does not believe in copyright and will find any excuse to oppose it and use his activist playbook to undermine meaningful reforms to solve challenges faced by the cultural industries based on copyright. In a speech given in June 2010 about Bill C-32 (later enacted as Bill C-11) Heritage Minister James Moore, referring to Geist, warned against being fooled by opponents of copyright reform who “don’t believe in copyright”, who “pretend” to be experts in copyright, but are misleading the public about it.[45]  The Minister’s insights are fully applicable to assessing Geist’s arguments opposing the proposal:

“…There’s people out there who don’t believe in copyright at all. They just say well Bill C-61, the old copyright legislation, we disagree with these specific revisions. Well, Bill C-32 we have these specific amendments. Don’t fool yourself. These voices that are out there, there’s people out there who pretend to experts that the media cites all the time, they don’t believe in any copyright reform whatsoever. They will find any excuse to oppose this bill to drum up fear to mislead to misdirect and to push people in the wrong direction and to undermine what has been a meaningful comprehensive year-long effort to get something right…

We need to amend our legislation and those people out there who try to pretend that they’re copyright experts and they want to amend copyright in a meaningful way. Don’t be fooled by some of these people. They don’t believe in any copyright. They don’t believe in individuals’ rights to protect their own creations and when they speak, they need to be confronted. If it’s on Facebook, if it’s on Twitter or if it’s on a talk show, if it’s in a newspaper, confront them and tell them they are wrong… We need to protect those investments, protect those jobs and make sure that those voices who try to find technical nonsensical fear-mongering reasons to oppose copyright reform, are confronted every step of the way and they are defeated. And when we do that, this bill will pass and Canada will be better for it.”

FairPlay has made a moderate, responsible proposal to address a pressing problem. It should be given due consideration based on the facts and not contrived arguments designed to oppose it.

______________________________

[1]      Michael Geist, “Bell Leads on Radical Proposal for CRTC-Backed Mandatory Website Blocking System”, Dec. 4, 2017, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/12/bell-leads-radical-proposal-crtc-backed-mandatory-website-blocking-system/; Michael Geist, “Why the CRTC should reject FairPlay’s dangerous website-blocking plan”, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/why-the-crtc-should-reject-fairplays-dangerous-website-blocking-plan/article37818403/; Michael Geist, “No Panic: Canadian TV and Film Production Posts Biggest Year Ever Raising Doubts About the Need for Site Blocking and Netflix Regulation”, Feb. 6, 2018, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/02/no-panic-canadian-tv-film-production-posts-biggest-year-ever-raising-doubts-need-site-blocking-netflix-regulation/; CBC As it Happens, Transcript of Interview with Michael Geist, Feb 2, 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-friday-edition-1.4516793/february-02-2018-episode-transcript-1.4520972; Jordon Pearson, “Does Canada Even Have a Huge Piracy Problem?”, Motherboard, Feb 2, 2018,https://motherboard.vice.com‌/en_us/article/9kz5ba/does-canada-even-have-a-huge-piracy-problem-fairplay-website-blocking?source=techstories.org (e-mail commentary from Michael Geist).

[2]      Barry Sookman, “Michael Geist: A question of values”, March 12, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/03/12/a-question-of-values/#comments.

[3]      Scaremongering” means “a person who spreads stories that cause public fear”. Cambridge Dictionaries Online.

[4]      Nigel Cory, “How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without “Breaking the Internet”, ITIF, August 2016, http://www2.itif.org/2016-website-blocking.pdf.

[5]      See, Barry Sookman, “Blocking orders against ISPs legal in the EU: UPC Telekabel Wien”, Mar. 30, 2014, http://www.barrysookman.com/2014/03/30/blocking-orders-against-isps-legal-in-the-eu-upc-telekabel-wien/; Barry Sookman, “Keeping The Pirate Bays at Bay: using blocking orders to curtail infringements”, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/02/22/keeping-the-pirate-bays-at-bay/; The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors, [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch) (13 March 2017).

[6]      Haute Autorité Pour La Diffusion Des Ouevres et la Protection Des Droits Sur Internet (HADOPI), Hadopi Activity Report 2016-2017, https://www.hadopi.fr/sites/default/rapportannuel/HADOPI-Rapport-d-activite-2016-2017.pdf.

[7]      Barry Sookman, “The Andersen P2P file sharing study on the purchase of music CDs in Canada”, August 20th, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/08/20/the-andersen-p2p-file-sharing-study-on-the-purchase-of-music-cds-in-canada/.

[8]      See, Barry Sookman, “OECD counterfeiting report misinterpreted to support myth of Canada as a low piracy country”, Nov. 24, 2009, http://www.barrysookman.com/2009/11/24/oecd-counterfeiting-report-misinterpreted-to-support-myth-of-canada-as-a-low-piracy-country/; House of Commons Report, 39th Parliament, 1st Session, May 2007, http://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/39-1/SECU/report-10/page-ToC.

[9]      Stewart Clarke, “Piracy Set to Cost Streaming Players More Than $50 Billion, Study Says”, Variety, Oct. 30, 2017, http://variety.com/2017/tv/news/piracy-cost-streaming-players-over-50-billion-1202602184/; Netflix, “Netflix’s View: internet entertainment is replacing linear TV”, Jan. 22, 2018, https://ir.netflix.com/netflixs-view-internet-tv-replacing-linear-tv.

[10]    Travis Andrews, “‘Game of Thrones’ was pirated more than a billion times – far more than it was watched legally”, Chicago Tribune, Sep. 8, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/entertainment/tv/ct-game-of-thrones-piracy-20170908-story.html.

[11]    MUSO, Global TV Piracy Insight Report 2017: Canada Country Level Report, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a6cf478edaed87d3b78d1c6/t/5a6f607a4192024166d52106/1517248641536/FairPlay+Canada+2018-01-29+Exhibit+1.pdf

[12]    Sandvine, “Global Internet Phenomena Spotlight: The ‘Fully-Loaded’ Kodi Ecosystem”, May 4, 2017, https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/archive/2017-global-internet-phenomena-spotlight-kodi.pdf.

[13]    Sandvine, “2017 Global Internet Phenomena: Spotlight: Subscription Television Piracy”, October 27, 2017, https://www.sandvine.com/hubfs/downloads/archive/2017-global-internet-phenomena-spotlight-subscription-television-piracy.pdf

[14]    Brett Danaher, “Website Blocking Revisited: The Effect of the UK November 2014 Blocks on Consumer Behavior”, April 19, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766795.

[15]    He says “The latest report tells a remarkable success story. Far from the doom and gloom, the Canadian industry is achieving record growth, suggesting that website blocking and new Internet regulations are ill-advised solutions in search a problem.”

[16]    Counterfactual reasoning is a method for evaluating claims of causation by exploring what might have happened had the causal event not occurred. Such reasoning is a common test of the validity of claims in the social sciences and in historical studies. Oxford University press, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1O104-counterfactualreasoning.html.

[17]    George Barker, “Diminished Creative Industry Growth in Australia in the Digital Age”, Feb. 10, 2017, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2915246.

[18]    Rogers Communications Inc. v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, [2012] 2 SCR 283, Copyright is said to have two goals, to “promote the public interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just reward for the creator”.

[19]    MacMillan & Co. Ltd. v. Cooper (1923), 40 T.L.R. 186, “The moral basis of copyright rests on the 8th commandment ‘Thou shalt not steal’”. See also, Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 All E.R. 465 “Copyright “protects property. It is no more interference with trade than is the law against larceny. Free trade does not require that one man should be allowed to appropriate without payment the fruits of another’s labour”. See also, Barry Sookman, “Margaret Atwood at the Parliamentary Committee on Bill C-32”, Mar. 18, 2011, http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/03/18/margaret-atwood-at-the-parliamentary-committee-on-bill-c-32/. Copyright infringement is not “theft” under the Criminal Code and the term is used here in the sense conveyed by Margaret Atwood, as supported by usage by a long lineage of law Lords.

[20]    Barry Sookman, “Are Canada’s copyright laws friendly or unfriendly towards wealth destroyers according to Prof. Geist?”, March 9th, 2011, http://www.barrysookman.com/2011/03/09/are-canadas-laws-friendly-to-wealth-destroyers/

[21]    In the As it Happens interview, he stated “First, we ought to recognize that we have some of the toughest anti-piracy laws in the world. We established some of those rules just a few years ago, which were unique around the globe, that allow those same companies to go after piracy websites. We’re one of the only countries in the world to have that.”

[22]    Hugh Stephens, “Why the Time has come to Block Offshore Pirate websites in Canada”, Inside Policy, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/time-come-block-offshore-pirate-websites-canada-hugh-stephens-inside-policy/, “The Globe and Mail weighed in its editorial page, conflating “site blocking” with “net neutrality,” and urging that copyright infringement be handled by “Canada’s robust laws against intellectual property theft.” But that is precisely the problem. These sites are not set up just down the street within reach of Canadian courts. They have deliberately established themselves in legal “no go” zones, somewhere in cyberspace in jurisdictions with no interest or capability in enforcing intellectual property laws. It is pointless to bring legal proceedings against them in Canada because they don’t operate in Canada. Also, Hugh Stephens, “Canada and New Zealand: Both Wrestling with Offshore Piracy and Both Seeking an Effective Solution”, Feb. 4, 2018, https://hughstephensblog.net/2018/02/04/canada-and-new-zealand-both-wrestling-with-offshore-piracy-and-both-seeking-an-effective-solution/.

[23]    Michael Geist, “Child Pornography Blocking Plan a Risk Worth Taking”, December 4, 2006, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2006/12/project-cleanfeed-column/.

[24]    See also, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Guide: Open Internet, June 14, 2016, https://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/openinternet.pdf, How do FCC rules protect the open internet? The FCC’s open internet rules protect and maintain open, uninhibited access to lawful online content. The rules specifically prohibit:

  • Blocking: Broadband providers may not block access to lawful content, applications, services or non-harmful devices
  • Throttling: Broadband providers may not deliberately target some lawful internet traffic to be delivered to users more slowly than other traffic.
  • Paid prioritization: Broadband providers may not favor some internet traffic in exchange for consideration of any kind. ISPs are also banned from prioritizing content and services of their affiliates.

[25]    EU Regulation 2015/2120, Nov. 25, 2015, Recital 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015R2120&from=en

[26]    CRTC, “Strengthening net neutrality in Canada”, Jan. 26, 2018, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/internet/diff.htm

[27]    FCC, Final Rule: Preserving The Open Internet, Dec. 21, 2010, https://apps.fcc.gov/‌edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1.pdf Open Internet Principles “To provide greater clarity and certainty regarding the continued freedom and openness of the Internet, we adopt three basic rules that are grounded in broadly accepted Internet norms, as well as our own prior decisions’’…ii. No blocking. Fixed broadband providers may not block lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices; mobile broadband providers may not block lawful websites, or block applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services”. “…open Internet rules protect only lawful content, and are not intended to inhibit efforts by broadband providers to address unlawful transfers of content.” “To make clear that open Internet protections can and must coexist with these other legal frameworks, we adopt the following… Nothing in this part prohibits reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or other unlawful activity”. See also, FCC, Policy Statement: FCC-05-151A1, Sept. 23, 2005, https://www.scribd.com/‌document/29639687/FCC-05-151A1 “As a result, the Commission has jurisdiction necessary to ensure that providers of telecommunications for Internet access or Internet Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) services are operated in a neutral manner. Moreover, to ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable, and accessible to all consumers, the Commission adopts the following principles:

  • To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice.
  • To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement.
  • To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network.
  • To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers. (emphasis added)

[28]    EU Regulation 2015/2120, Nov. 25, 2015, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/‌?uri=CELEX:32015R2120&from=en re open Internet access “Article 3 “Safeguarding of open internet access”: Para. 1 “This paragraph is without prejudice to Union law, or national law that complies with Union law, related to the lawfulness of the content, applications or services.” ““Providers of internet access services shall not engage in traffic management measures except as necessary… in order to: comply with Union legislative acts, or national legislation that complies with Union law, to which the provider of internet access services is subject, or with measures that comply with Union law giving effect to such Union legislative acts or national legislation, including with orders by courts or public authorities vested with relevant powers”.

[29]    Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2017-104, April 20, 2017, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-104.htm.

[30]    Sameer Chhabra, “ISED minister responds to anti-piracy group, defends net neutrality”, MobileSyrup, Jan. 29, 2018, https://mobilesyrup.com/2018/01/29/ised-minister-responds-anti-piracy-group-defends-net-neutrality/ “Our government supports an open internet where Canadians have the ability to access the content of their choice in accordance to Canadian laws,” said Bains, in an emailed statement to MobileSyrup. “In other words, our Government believes that all legal content must be treated equally by internet service providers (ISPs). That’s why our government has a strong net neutrality framework in place through the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).” (emphasis added)

[31]    Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-479, Dec. 9, 2016, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2016/2016-479.htm

[32]    Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-479, Dec. 9, 2016, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2016/2016-479.htm “The Commission expressed the preliminary view that the Act prohibits the blocking by Canadian carriers of access by end-users to specific websites on the Internet without prior Commission approval, whether or not such blocking was the result of an Internet traffic management practice. Such blocking would only be approved where it would further the telecommunications policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Act. Accordingly, compliance with other legal or juridical requirements—whether municipal, provincial, or foreign—would not, in and of itself, justify the blocking of specific websites by Canadian carriers, in the absence of Commission approval under the Act.”

[33]    Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-657, Oct. 21, 2009, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-657.htm, Review of the Internet traffic management practices of Internet service providers ““Blocking as part of ITMP requires CRTC approval under s.36. “Canadian ISPs have used certain ITMPs for the purposes of network security and integrity…these ITMPs have been employed to protect users from network threats such as malicious software, spam, and distribution of illicit materials… such activities are unlikely to trigger complaints or concerns under the Act and are a necessary part of an ISP’s network operations.” (emphasis added) The CRTC expressly stated that blocking for the purpose of network security or network integrity was not covered by the policy.

[34]    Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2016-4427: Empowering Canadians to protect themselves from unwanted unsolicited and illegitimate telecommunications, Nov. 7, 2016, https://crtc.gc.ca‌/eng/archive/2016/2016-442.htm

[35]    Mark Hayes et al ,“Net neutrality: Ensuring free flow of information while protecting ISP networks” The Lawyer’s Daily, Jan. 10, 2018, https://www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/5634/net-neutrality-ensuring-free-flow-of-information-while-protecting-isp-networks. See, also, Mark Goldberg “Blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engaged in piracy”, Telecom Trends, Jan. 29, 2018, http://mhgoldberg.com/blog/?p=11875, When a draft of the FairPlay Canada application leaked in December, some erroneously described the plan as an attack on net neutrality, perhaps hoping to capitalize on the publicity associated with the FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom declaratory ruling.” “So it is pretty clear: the FairPlay Canada proposal has nothing to do with net neutrality. There is nothing in the proposal that will “kill the internet.” There is no slippery slope. There is no attack on charter rights of expression.” Hugh Stephens, “The New Canadian Content Coalition: Hang Together or Hang Separately”, Feb. 12, 2018, https://hughstephensblog.net/2018/02/12/the-new-canadian-content-coalition-hang-together-or-hang-separately/, “In short, net neutrality is a total red herring in this debate, designed to confuse the public.”

[36]    See, Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin–Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), [1997] 2 F.C. 306 (T.D.) ““The Charter does not confer the right to use private property – the Plaintiff’s copyright – in the service of freedom of expression.”; Canada v. James Lorimer & Co, [1984] 1 F.C. 1065 (C.A.) ““So little of its own thought, belief, opinion and expression is contained in the respondent’s infringing work that it is properly to be regarded as entirely an appropriation of the thought, belief, opinion and expression of the author of the infringed work.”

[37]    Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., 2017 SCC 24.

[38]    Cartier International AG & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) (17 October 2014) ““As for the freedom of internet users to receive information, this plainly does not extend to a right to engage in trade mark infringement, particularly where it involves counterfeit goods. Since the Target Websites appear to be exclusively engaged in infringing commercial activity, with no lawful component to their businesses, the operators have no right which requires protection. Thus the key consideration so far as this freedom is concerned is the impact of the orders on users of other, lawful websites. If the orders are properly targeted, and have sufficient safeguards built into them, then that should mean that such users are not affected.” Also, Barry Sookman, “Website blocking effective without over blocking: EUFA v British Telecommunications”, Dec. 31, 2017, http://www.barrysookman.com/2017/12/31/website-blocking-effective-without-over-blocking-eufa-v-british-telecommunications/; Barry Sookman, “Keeping The Pirate Bays at Bay: using blocking orders to curtail infringements”, Feb. 22, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/02/22/keeping-the-pirate-bays-at-bay/.

[39]    Neil Turkewitz, “OpenMedia: Flying Blind in Pursuit of an Open Society”, Feb. 7, 2018, https://medium.com/@nturkewitz_56674/openmedia-flying-blind-in-pursuit-of-an-open-society-a641005ea8a9.

[40]    Barry Sookman, “Reining in the rhetoric on copyright reform”, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/02/08/reining-in-the-rhetoric-on-copyright-reform/

[41]    Michael Geist, “Child Pornography Blocking Plan a Risk Worth Taking”, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2006/12/project-cleanfeed-column/

[42]    Barry Sookman,Reining in the rhetoric on copyright reform”, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/02/08/reining-in-the-rhetoric-on-copyright-reform/

[43]    For an overview of SOPA’s provisions, see, H.R.3261 – Stop Online Piracy Act, 112th Congress (2011-12), Summary: All Information, https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3261; Terry Hart, “Hey, what happened to Wikipedia? (An intro to SOPA)”, Jan. 18, 2012, http://www.copyhype.com/2012/01/hey-what-happened-to-wikipedia-an-intro-to-sopa/;  Terry Hart, “New remedies for existing liability”, Nov. 14, 2011, http://www.copyhype.com/2011/11/sopa-new-remedies-for-existing-liability/

[44]    See the references in Barry Sookman, “Reining in the rhetoric on copyright reform”, Feb. 8, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/02/08/reining-in-the-rhetoric-on-copyright-reform/

[45]    Barry Sookman, “Minister Moore’s Speech on C-32”, March 12, 2012, http://www.barrysookman

US court thumbs its nose at Supreme Court of Canada: Google v Equustek

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A court in the Northern District of California in Google LLC v. Equustek Solutions Inc.[1] issued a preliminary injunction on November 2, 2017 enjoining Equustek from enforcing the global de-indexing order it obtained against Google in a British Columbia court. Later that year, as Equustek did not defend the proceeding, the court issued a one page default judgment making the injunction permanent.[2]

The global de-indexing order made against Google was given great scrutiny by the British Columbia Supreme Court[3] and the Court of Appeal[4] before being affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc.[5]. It is, therefore, of great consequence and concern that the California court summarily decided that the order made against Google could not be enforced in the United States. Even more concerning is that Google has now applied to the courts in British Columbia to vary the order affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada based on this recent judgment of the California court.

There are very good reasons to believe the injunction issued by the US court (the “Google Order”), which was made in default of any appearance by Equustek, was wrongly decided.

First, it misconstrues the scope of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act [6](CDA). The CDA  does not apply to prevent the enforcement of court orders like the order affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada (the “Equustek Order”) that did not impose any liability on Google. The CDA is also only an affirmative defense; not a sword that can be used to obtain declaratory relief against a person that has made no claim against the provider.

Second, and more importantly, the Google Order abrogated a fundamental principle of international law by failing to subject the Equustek Order to traditional principles that govern the enforcement of foreign judgments demanded by principles of private international law and international comity. Civilized countries including Canada and the U.S. generally will show respect for orders made by each other’s’ courts as a matter of international comity. They do this by enforcing orders made by those courts unless certain vitiating factors are present. Examples include a failure of natural justice, fraud, lack of jurisdiction, or public policy.[7] The California court – as a matter of basic respect for our courts – should have scrutinized the Equustek Order and made a determination whether to enforce it in accordance with established principles. By not doing this the California court not only made a major mistake in rendering its decision. It thereby also thumbed its nose at our highest court and created what should be viewed as an international incident.

The decision sets an unfortunate precedent. Google and other large U.S. social media companies operate global platforms. While their operations are global, they often seek, as in this case, to have only the laws of the U.S. apply to their businesses.[8] They want all the benefits of carrying on business in Canada and around the world, but want to insulate themselves from liability under local laws. This is especially problematic given the increasing dominance and global reach of these large enterprises in the face of the expanding attempts of local courts and local laws to impose responsibilities on these social media giants to protect their citizens. This is something that Canada should seek to address in the new NAFTA chapter on e-commerce.

Background to the Equustek Order

The Equustek Order arose from a lower court decision that ordered Google to block websites that were used to sell goods that violated the trade secrets of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs obtained a default order against the defendants. But, the defendants continued to sell the offending goods over the Internet. The plaintiffs, unable to enforce their order, asked for Google’s help in blocking the websites. Google voluntarily de-indexed specific URL’s requested by the plaintiffs, but this “whac-a-mole” process was ineffective. When Google refused to de-index the offending websites from its search results, the plaintiffs brought a motion against Google for interim relief requiring Google to de-index the websites from all of its search engines worldwide.

Over Google’s objections, in Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack[9] Madam Justice Fenlon of the British Columbia Supreme Court granted the injunction. Google subsequently applied for leave to appeal the decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal and for an order staying the enforcement of the order. In Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc.,[10] the court granted Google leave to appeal the decision but refused Google’s application to stay enforcement of the injunction order. Google’s appeal was later dismissed by the Court of Appeal in Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc.[11].

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a seven to two majority decision written by Justice Abella, affirmed the decisions of the courts below. Google had argued that the courts had no jurisdiction to make orders against it as a non-party to the litigation. It argued that any order against it should have been limited to the google.ca search engine. It also contended that the worldwide order would violate the principle of comity and rights of freedom of expression. The Supreme Court, like the courts below, rejected each of these arguments and found that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction against Google.

The Google Order

After losing in the Supreme Court of Canada, Google brought an action against Equustek and others to prevent enforcement of the Equustek Order. Google moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the order even though Equustek never threatened to enforce the order in the US. The preliminary injunction (Google Order) was granted by District Court Judge Edward Davila.

Google argued that the Canadian order was unenforceable in the U.S. because it directly conflicted with the First Amendment, disregarded the CDA’s immunity for interactive service providers, and violated principles of international comity. The court granted the injunction solely relying on the provisions of the CDA. It made no findings on the other possible basis for granting the Google Order including whether any of Google’s First Amendment rights, if any, would be violated by an attempt to enforce the Equustek Order in the U.S..

Section 230 of the CDA states the following:

Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.

(2) Civil liability

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of–

(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or

(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).

The CDA also expressly states thatNothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property” and that “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.[12]

The California court’s reasons for finding that Google had a likelihood of success on the merits was expressed as follows:

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act “immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties…

To qualify for Section 230 immunity, Google must show that (1) it is a “provider or user of an interactive computer service,” (2) the information in question was “provided by another information content provider,” and (3) the Canadian order would hold it liable as the “publisher or speaker” of that information…

The court held that Google met the first two elements of the test. The court held that the third element was met for the following reason.

Third, the Canadian order would hold Google liable as the “publisher or speaker” of the information on Datalink’s websites. The Supreme Court of Canada ordered Google to “de-index the Datalink websites” from its global search results because, in the Court’s view, Google is “the determinative player in allowing the harm to occur” to Equustek. Compl. Ex. B ¶¶ 49, 53. The Ninth Circuit has held that, regardless of the underlying cause of action, a claim treats an intermediary as a publisher when it requires the intermediary to remove third-party content. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009). The Barnes panel held that “removing content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.” Id. at 1103. The Canadian order treats Google as a publisher because the order would impose liability for failing to remove third-party content from its search results.

The District Court also held that the balance of convenience and public interest merited granting the preliminary injunction.

Google is harmed because the Canadian order restricts activity that Section 230 protects. In addition, the balance of equities favors Google because the injunction would deprive it of the benefits of U.S. federal law…

An injunction would also serve the public interest. Congress recognized that free speech on the internet would be severely restricted if websites were to face tort liability for hosting user-generated content. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. It responded by enacting Section 230, which grants broad immunity to online intermediaries. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003)(“Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet.”); 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3), (b)(2), (b)(3) (“The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity . . . It is the policy of the United States . . . to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media [and] to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”).

The Canadian order would eliminate Section 230 immunity for service providers that link to third-party websites. By forcing intermediaries to remove links to third-party material, the Canadian order undermines the policy goals of Section 230 and threatens free speech on the global internet.

As can be seen from the above, the court never examined the nature of the alleged speech that Google was prohibited from linking to nor did the court come to the conclusion that the prohinbtion would have violated the First Amendment rights of Google or any other person.

There are two good reasons for believing the Google Order is flawed:

  • It misconstrues the scope of s230 of the CDA. The CDAdoes not apply to prevent the enforcement of court orders like the Equustek Order that impose no liability on the provider. It is also only an affirmative defense; not a sword that can be used to obtain declaratory relief against a person that has made no claim against the provider.
  • More fundamentally, it is inconsistent with well-established U.S. principles governing enforcement of foreign orders and the principle of private international law including the principle of international comity.

The CDA does not provide a basis for refusing to enforce the Equustek Order

The only case relied upon by the California court for the legal proposition that the CDA gave Google immunity from the Equustek Order is Barnes v Yahoo. But, that case was a much different case. In Barnes, the plaintiff brought an action in state court against Yahoo for its failure to remove indecent profiles of the plaintiff posted on Yahoo’s website by the plaintiff’s former boyfriend. The complaint against Yahoo was premised on the negligent provision or non-provision of services which Yahoo undertook to provide, a form of negligence referred to as “negligent undertaking.” Barnes’ claim also sounded in breach of contract.

The court found that Yahoo could rely on the CDA. However, the opinion rejected the contention that Section 230 of the CDA grants a general immunity against liability deriving from third party content.

Section 230(c) Looking at the text, it appears clear that neither this subsection nor any other declares a general immunity from liability deriving from third-party content, as Yahoo argues it does. “Subsection (c)(1) does not mention ‘immunity’ or any synonym.” Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir.2008). Our recent en banc decision in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, rested not on broad statements of immunity but rather on a careful exegesis of the statutory language. 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc) (noting that to “provid[e] immunity every time a website uses data initially obtained from third parties would eviscerate [the statute]”).

After canvassing the text of the Section, the court further held that the CDA only provides immunity from causes of action that create liability for claims that arise from the provider being a publisher of information.

Following this approach, one notices that subsection (c)(1), which after all is captioned “Treatment of publisher or speaker,” precludes liability only by means of a definition. “No provider or user of an interactive computer service,” it says, “shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added). Subsection 230(e)(3) makes explicit the relevance of this definition, for it cautions that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Bringing these two subsections together, it appears that subsection (c)(1) only protects from liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content provider.

Thus, what matters is not the name of the cause of action—defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of emotional distress—what matters is whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the “publisher or speaker” of content provided by another. To put it another way, courts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a “publisher or speaker.” If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–02 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009) (emphasis added)

The California court failed to consider whether compliance with a court order, whether from a State court or a court of another country, was a cause of action that created any liability for Google arising from its search engine activities. There are good reasons for thinking it does not. A decision directly on point is Hassell v Bird [13] a decision of a California court of Appeal that distinguished the Barnes case precisely on this key point.

In Hassell v Bird, Hassell obtained a judgment holding Bird liable for defamation and requiring her to remove defamatory reviews she posted about Hassell on Yelp.com, a Web site owned Yelp. The judgment contained an order requiring Yelp to remove Bird’s defamatory reviews from its Web site. Yelp, who was not a party in the defamation action, filed a motion to vacate the judgment relying, in part, on the CDA. The court held that the CDA did not apply as the removal order did not create any liability on Yelp. Further, it distinguished the Barnes and other like cases from removal order cases like those in issue in Hassell.

Yelp argues the authority summarized above establishes that the removal order is void. We disagree. The removal order does not violate 47 United States Code section 230 because it does not impose any liability on Yelp. In this defamation action, Hassell filed their complaint against Bird, not Yelp; obtained a default judgment against Bird, not Yelp; and was awarded damages and injunctive relief against Bird, not Yelp.

These circumstances distinguish the present case from Yelp’s authority, all cases in which causes of action or lawsuits against Internet service providers were dismissed pursuant to 47 United States Code section 230. (See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir.2009) 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 [CDA “protects an internet service provider from suit” for failing to remove material from its Web site that was harmful to the plaintiff];…

Neither party cites any authority that applies 47 United States Code section 230 to restrict a court from directing an Internet service provider to comply with a judgment which enjoins the originator of defamatory statements posted on the service provider’s Web site. We note, however, that section 230 explicitly provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.” (§ 230(e)(3).) As discussed above, California law authorizes a trial court to issue an injunction preventing the repetition of statements that have been adjudged to be defamatory by the trier of fact. (Balboa Island, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1160, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 320, 156 P.3d 339.) California law also empowers the court to enforce its judgment by ordering that an injunction run to a non-party through whom the enjoined party may act. (Planned Parenthood, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at pp. 352–353, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 46.) It appears to us that these state law procedures are not inconsistent with section 230 because they do not impose any liability on Yelp, either as a speaker or a publisher of third party speech…

Yelp argues that cases extending CDA immunity to claims for injunctive relief that are alleged directly against an interactive service provider in a tort action must apply with equal force to an injunction that binds a non-party. Otherwise, Yelp argues, “a plaintiff who wants to enjoin an interactive computer service can nullify its immunity under the CDA by suing the creator of the third-party content and then obtaining an injunction binding the interactive computer service….” This argument ignores the fact that protection against third party liability is the foundation of CDA immunity. As we have pointed out, Hassell did not allege any cause of action seeking to hold Yelp liable for Bird’s tort. The removal order simply sought to control the perpetuation of judicially declared defamatory statements. For this reason, Yelp seriously understates the significance of the fact that Hassell obtained a judgment that establishes that three reviews Bird posted on Yelp.com are defamatory as a matter of law, and which includes an injunction enjoining Bird from repeating those three reviews on Yelp.com. Indeed, that injunction is a key distinction between this case and the CDA cases Yelp has cited, all of which involved allegations of defamatory conduct by a third party, and not a judicial determination that defamatory statements had, in fact, been made by such third party on the Internet service provider’s Web site.

The Hassel court also rejected Yelp’s contention that the possible threat of a contempt of court sanction was a form of liability for which it could claim immunity under the CDA.

…Violating the injunction or the removal order associated with it could potentially trigger a different type of liability that implicates the contempt power of the court. Generally speaking, “a non-party to an injunction is subject to the contempt power of the court when, with knowledge of the injunction, the non-party violates its terms with or for those who are restrained.” (People v. Conrad, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 903, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, italics omitted.)

Yelp does not cite any authority which addresses the question whether 47 United States Code section 230 would immunize Yelp from being sanctioned for contempt. In our opinion, sanctioning Yelp for violating a court order would not implicate section 230 at all; it would not impose liability on Yelp as a publisher or distributor of third party content. A “contempt proceeding is not a civil action but is of a criminal nature even though its purpose is to impose punishment for violation of an order made in a civil action. [Citation.]” (Freeman v. Superior Court (1955) 44 Cal.2d 533, 536, 282 P.2d 857.) The cases we have found in which Internet service providers were named in contempt proceedings are consistent with this conclusion. (See, e.g., Blockowicz v. Williams (7th Cir.2010) 630 F.3d 563; Arista Records, LLC v. Vita Tkach (S.D.N.Y.2015) 122 F.Supp.3d 32.)

The Hassell court is not the only decision that the Google Order conflicts with. A court from the Southern District of California, in Doe PUBLIUS v BOYER–VINE,[14] recently held that Section 230 of the CDA only applies as an affirmative defense to a liability claim. Following the decision in both Hassel and another case in which Google was involved, Google, Inc. v. Hood [15] the court dismissed a declaratory action brought by an operator of a web site for an order that he did not need to comply with a demand letter from the State Legislature to remove personal information posted on the web site about State Senators and Assembly members. The letter was a written demand under Section 6254.21(c) of the Government Code. The declaratory relief requested was refused. The letter did not by itself create any liability and even if it did a court does not have jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment claim that a threatened lawsuit would violate § 230.

…Section 230 therefore “precludes liability that treats a website as the publisher or speaker of information users provide on the website. In general, this section protects websites from liability for material posted on the website by someone else.” Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016). More specifically, § 230 immunity applies when “(1) the defendant [is] a provider or user of an interactive computer service; (2) the cause of action treat[s] the defendant as a publisher or speaker of information; and (3) the information at issue [is] provided by another information content provider.” Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1362 (2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted)…

Hoskins’s claim is premised on the assumption that the Office’s takedown request violates his § 230 immunity…

Though not on all fours with the facts of this case, Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 225-26 (5th Cir. 2016), guides the Court’s analysis here as the only analogous case the Court can find. Hood involved Google’s declaratory judgment challenge to a state attorney general’s administrative subpoena that “sought information on Google’s platforms, advertising practices, and knowledge of and efforts to police `dangerous’ or `illegal’ content.” Id. at 218. The subpoena stated that if Google refused to comply, the attorney general “`may apply to’ a state court `for an order compelling compliance.’” Id.

Before responding to the subpoena or seeking relief in state court, Google filed a declaratory judgment case in federal court. Id. at 219. Google alleged, among other things, that the attorney general’s investigation violated its § 230 immunity, and that any further proceedings to enforce the subpoena would likewise violate that immunity. Id. at 219-20. The attorney general moved to dismiss the case on numerous grounds, including that Google’s claims were not ripe for adjudication. See Google, Inc. v. Hood, 96 F. Supp. 3d 584, 592 (S.D. Miss. 2015),rev’d,822 F.3d 212. The district court disagreed, and found that the claims were ripe because “Google is not required to expose itself to civil or criminal liability before bringing a declaratory action to establish its rights under federal law, particularly where the exercise of those rights have been threatened or violated.” Id. at 594 (citing MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128-29).

The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the “administrative subpoena was not ripe for adjudication.” Hood, 822 F.3d at 224. The court so held because (1) the subpoena was “non-self-executing,” meaning that Google could not be sanctioned for not complying with it; (2) the attorney general could, but did not file a state court action to enforce Google’s compliance; and (3) if the attorney general did file such a suit, Google could raise its claimed § 230 immunity as a defense. See id. at 224-26; see also id. at 227 n.12 (“[W]e do not suggest that section 230 of the CDA would not apply if Hood were to eventually bring an enforcement action, or cannot be applied at the motion-to-dismiss stage.”). For these reasons, the Fifth Circuit held that Google’s “pre-enforcement challenge” was unripe. Id. at 226.

This is consistent with the Court’s understanding that § 230 immunity is an affirmative defense. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 2003); Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1109. As the Ninth Circuit explained, § 230(c)(1) “only protects from liability (1) a provider or user of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat, under a . . . cause of action, as a publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another information content provider.” Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added)…

As § 6254.21(c) and the demand letter make clear, the only liability Hoskins faced was a potential lawsuit and attorney’s fees and costs if he failed to comply with the Office’s request. Despite extensive research, the Court cannot find any authority that suggests the Office’s letter even triggers Hoskins’s purported § 230 immunity, much less violates it, as the letter is not a “cause of action,” and did not impose any kind of “liability” on Hoskins—even if he ignored it. See Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099; Hassell, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 1363 (“The [court’s] removal order does not violate section 230 because it does not impose any liability on Yelp.”)… Likewise, the Court is unaware of any authority that suggests the Court has jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment claim that a threatened lawsuit would violate § 230. Hood, the only case with similar circumstances the Court can locate, suggests otherwise. Accordingly, the Court finds that Hoskins’s claim that Defendant “violated Hoskins’ rights under Section 230,” FAC at ¶ 55, is not ripe for review. Hoskins is therefore not likely to succeed on the merits of his § 230 claim.

Another District Court in Qatar Investment & Projects Development Holding Company W.L.L. v John Doe [16] made a similar order to the order issued in Hassel v Bird.  In granting a preliminary injunction to restrain the publication of defamatory material, the court also made removal orders against the non-parties Automattic (the company that hosts WordPress blogs), Twitter and Tumbler to remove any offending text or photos of which they received notice from the plaintiffs.[17]

The decision violates principles of international comity

What is especially troubling about the decision is that it completely by-passed the customary conflicts of laws principles generally applied by courts, including US courts, in determining whether, as a matter of comity, a foreign judgment should be enforced.

In Canada, for example, foreign judgments including even foreign injunctions can be enforced. [18]   In Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje,[19] the Supreme Court of Canada explained that the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is based on comity, a respect for the actions taken in the foreign state.

… it must be remembered that the notion of comity has consistently been found to underlie Canadian recognition and enforcement law. In Morguard, this Court stated that comity refers to “the deference and respect due by other states to the actions of a state legitimately taken within its territory”, as well as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws”: pp. 1095-96, quoting with approval the U.S. Supreme Court’s foundational articulation of the concept of comity in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), at pp. 163-64…

…in Van Breda, LeBel J. emphasized that the goal of modern conflicts systems rests on the principle of comity, which, although a flexible concept, calls for the promotion of order and fairness, an attitude of respect and deference to other states, and a degree of stability and predictability in order to facilitate reciprocity: para. 74. This is true of all areas of private international law, including that of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

Canadian courts do not enforce all foreign judgments. A foreign judgment will not be enforced based on fraud, denial of natural justice, or on public policy grounds. The public policy defense prevents the enforcement of a foreign judgment which is contrary to the Canadian concept of justice. It turns on whether the foreign law is contrary to Canadian views of basic morality. This defense was described by the Supreme Court in Beals v. Saldanha,[20] as follows:

The third and final defence is that of public policy. As stated in Castel and Walker, supra, at p. 14-28:

…the traditional public policy defence appears to be directed at the concept of repugnant laws and not repugnant facts.

How is this defence of assistance to a defendant seeking to block the enforcement of a foreign judgment? It would, for example, prohibit the enforcement of a foreign judgment that is founded on a law contrary to the fundamental morality of the Canadian legal system. Similarly, the public policy defence guards against the enforcement of a judgment rendered by a foreign court proven to be corrupt or biased…

The use of the defence of public policy to challenge the enforcement of a foreign judgment involves impeachment of that judgment by condemning the foreign law on which the judgment is based. It is not a remedy to be used lightly. The expansion of this defence to include perceived injustices that do not offend our sense of morality is unwarranted. The defence of public policy should continue to have a narrow application.

In the US in international diversity cases enforceability of judgments of courts of other countries is generally governed by the law of the state in which enforcement is sought.[21] In considering whether to enforce foreign judgments, California (and many other U.S. States) look to general principles of comity followed by those courts which apply the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.

The general principle of enforceability under the Third Restatement is that an American court will not enforce a judgment if the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the State where recognition is sought. Enforcement will, however, usually be accorded a judgment of a foreign court, except in situations where the original claim is repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought. The foreign laws need not be identical to those in the U.S., they must be repugnant to U.S. laws or policies. Under the repugnancy standard, American courts sometimes enforce judgments that even conflict with American public policy or are based on foreign law that differs substantially from American state or federal law.[22]

It is troubling that the Google court did not subject the enforcement of the Equustek Order to the U.S. repugnancy standard. Under that analysis the court could have taken into consideration a number of similarities (rather than any repugnancy) between U.S. and Canadian law in the circumstances before the court such as the following.

U.S. courts, like the court in Equustek, also grant world-wide injunctions in trade secret misappropriation cases.[23] Such orders are not repugnant to U.S. law.

The CDA has a carve out that covers intellectual property claims.[24] The carve out applies to U.S. federal intellectual property laws which would include the U.S. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.[25] This law provides for relief for foreign trade secret misappropriation claims, like the one in issue in the Equustek case. Some cases, but not all, have held that the CDA exemption for intellectual property law claims also applies to state claims.[26] Both Canada and the U.S. and other members of the WTO GATT TRIPS Agreement are required to protect trade secrets and to provide for effective remedies against trade secret misappropriation.[27] Article 1711 of NAFTA also requires the contracting parties to protect trade secrets.[28] Based on the forgoing, it hardly seems repugnant to enforce an order based on trade secret misappropriation under Canadian law. In fact, it might have been argued that the CDA carve out for intellectual property claimst applies to trade secret misappropriation claims under the laws of Canada.

U.S. law provides somewhat analogous mechanisms for courts to grant injunctions against intermediaries to aid in enforcing court judgments. For example, in Hassel v Bird [29]Yelp argued that the court had no jurisdiction to make a removal order against it, a non-party, and was not aiding or abetting Bird in publishing the content adjudged to be defamatory. The District Court disagreed and made the order. The order was affirmed by the Court of Appeal which confirmed that courts “have the power to fashion an injunctive decree so that the enjoined party may not nullify it by carrying out the prohibited acts with or through a nonparty to the original proceeding.”

…an injunction can properly run to classes of persons with or through whom the enjoined party may act…

These settled principles undermine Yelp’s theory that the trial court was without any authority to include a provision in the Bird judgment which ordered Yelp to effectuate the injunction against Bird by deleting her defamatory reviews. As Judge Goldsmith observed in the order denying Yelp’s motion to vacate, our Supreme Court has explicitly confirmed that injunctions can be applied to nonparties in appropriate circumstances. (Ross, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 906.) “`In matters of injunction … it has been a common practice to make the injunction run also to classes of persons through whom the enjoined person may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders, abettors, etc., though not parties to the action, and this practice has always been upheld by the courts, and any of such parties violating its terms with notice thereof are held guilty of contempt for disobedience of the judgment….

Yelp argues in the alternative that, even if the injunction against Bird could properly be enforced against a nonparty like Yelp, the evidence in this case does not “support the theory that Yelp was somehow `aiding and abetting’ Bird’s violation of the injunction.” This issue was a major dispute below. But as we have already discussed, it has no bearing on the question whether the trial court was without power to issue the removal order in the first instance. The authority summarized above establishes that a trial court does have the power to fashion an injunctive decree so that the enjoined party may not nullify it by carrying out the prohibited acts with or through a nonparty to the original proceeding.

This jurisdiction to make orders against third parties in the United States is also enabled under the All Writs Act which provides:

The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.[30]

The limits of this open-ended authority has never been precisely defined.[31] However, the Act has been interpreted to permit a court to issue commands “as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained” including the power to issue injunctions.[32]

The statute confers on all federal courts the authority to issue orders where three requirements are satisfied: issuance of the writ must be “in aid of” the issuing court’s jurisdiction; the type of writ requested must be “necessary or appropriate” to provide such aid to the issuing court’s jurisdiction; and the issuance of the writ must be “agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”[33] The broad jurisdiction of this Act has been used my Microsoft to enlist the assistance of third party “innocent” Internet service providers to take down botnets.[34]

Under U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)(C), a court also may enjoin any “persons who are in active concert or participation with” a party. This rule is derived from the common-law doctrine that an injunction not only binds the parties defendants but also those identified with them in interest, in “privity” with them, represented by them or subject to their control. The defendants may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors, although they were not parties to the original proceeding.[35]

The interpretation of “active concert or participation” has engendered two lines of cases in which parties not named in an injunction are bound thereby. First, an injunction may bind nonparties who are successors in interest to parties named in the injunction with respect to the subject matter of the injunction. Second, parties otherwise without an injunction’s coverage may subject themselves to its proscriptions should they aid or abet the named parties in a concerted attempt to subvert those proscriptions. These constructions of the “active concert or participation” language of Rule 65(d) recognize that the objectives of an injunction may be thwarted by the conduct of parties not specifically named in its text.[36]

This rule has been applied in numerous cases against third party intermediaries to compel them to comply with court orders.

  • An example is Arista Records, LLC v. Tkach,[37] where cloudfare was ordered to cease providing domain name services to grooveshark.
  • Another example is China Central Television v. Create New Technology (HK) Limited,[38] where a court, in granting preliminary injunctive relief to restrain the sale of the Internet streaming devices, TVpad, and related applications, also ordered server and file hosting companies with notice of the order from providing hosting services to the defendants in connection with the enjoined activities.[39]
  • At the time the Google Order was rendered a Magistrate Judge in American Chemical Society v Sci-HUB[40] had recommended enjoining a web site from making available copyright infringing copies of scientific publications after the site refused to shut down (even after it had been ordered to shut down by a prior court order). The Magistrate also recommended making an order against search engines, ISPs, and domain name registrars who had notice of the order to cease facilitating access to the website that made available infringing books and articles. That recommendation led to an order in American Chemical Society v Sci-HUB[41] whereby a District Court, in granting the injunction, made an order and also granted an injunction enjoining “any person or entity in active concert or participation with Defendant Sci-Hub and with notice of the injunction, including any Internet search engines, web hosting and Internet service providers, domain name registrars, and domain name registries, cease facilitating access to any or all domain names and websites through which Defendant Sci-Hub engages in unlawful access to, use, reproduction, and distribution of the” plaintiff’s trade-marks and copyright publications.” There were no territorial limitations in the order. The order was made even after the Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA) filed an amicus brief in the lawsuit, asking that ISP and search engine blocking be removed order. The court refused to remove this relief from the order.[42]

The orders made in the Rule 65 cases have world-wide effects of removing or de-listing online locations from the Internet.

There is a question about whether the requirement in the Rule 65 orders – that they apply only to “persons who are in active concert or participation with” the defendants – makes them applicable against any ISP or search engine writ large with notice of the order.[43]  However, in light of this Federal rule and its application in numerous cases, and the long standing jurisdiction exercised by the courts to fashion an injunctive decree to prevent the enjoined party from nullifying orders of the court including under the All Writs Act, it is quite arguable that the Equustek Order was either consistent with or at least not repugnant to U.S. law or policy.

Of course, all of the criticisms made here about the Google Order are not intended as any criticism of Judge Davila. The preliminary injunction motion was not defended by Equustek and all Judge Davila had to inform his decision was what Google and its friendly and usual Amici (Electronic Frontier Foundation and Wkipedia) put before him. The decision in the Hassel case was directly relevant to the issue before the California court. Yet, Google did not refer to the case in its factum even though it was aware of it including because Equustek had relied on it in its written Memorandum of Argument in the Canadian Supreme Court case.[44] The judge also did not have the benefit of the decisions in the Google v Hood or Doe PUBLIUS v BOYER–VINE cases. The judge also did not have the benefit of arguments that the CDA defense had to be subjected to a public policy analysis under applicable principles of comity. Nor were the cases against intermediaries under U.S. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2)(C) or the All Writs Act put before him.

The court also did not consider whether it had any personal jurisdiction over Equustek or whether the case was even ripe for consideration given Equustek had publicly stated it did not intend to enforce the Equustek Order in the U.S. Given how central those issues were in the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in the Yahoo II case, had these issues been considered by the court, it might have dismissed or considered dismissing the motion on those grounds also.

Judge Davila might well have wanted these authorities and arguments to be brought to his attention, especially as the motion was being sought without Equustek being before the court.

Troubling Implications of the Google Order

The decision sets an unfortunate precedent. Google and other major online providers operate global platforms. While their businesses are global, they often seek, as in this case, to have only the laws of the U.S. apply to their businesses. They want all the benefits of carrying on business in Canada and around the world, but want to insulate themselves from local liability – in this case arguing that their foreign responsibilities to abide by a Canadian court order are trumped by a U.S. law (the CDA) that does not apply in Canada.

This type of immunity is especially troubling because injunctions against these intermediaries to de-index illegal content or to take down web sites that disseminate illegal materials are becoming more and more common and represent an essential enforcement tool online. For example;

  • In a recent Australian case, X v Twitter Inc,[45] a court granted a global takedown order against Twitter to prevent publication of information that was being published by a third party in breach of confidence. Twitter refused to appear, perhaps because it wanted to be in a better position to oppose enforcement of an order against it in the U.S.
  • Facebook has been ordered by courts in Ireland to remove pages that violate the privacy rights of individuals or that constitute harassment. For example, in CG v Facebook Ireland Limited[46] an injunction was granted ordering Facebook to remove a site posted on Facebook that was used to harass an individual and which involved the misuse of private information.
  • Very recently in Autorité des marchés financiers v. PlexCorps,[47] the Quebec Financial Markets Administrative Tribunal, relying on Equustek, ordered Facebook to shut down the Facebook accounts of Plexcorps and Plexcoin because they were soliciting and canvassing investors, in Quebec or from Quebec to outside Quebec in contravention of Quebec’s securities laws.
  • Recently, in Douez v. Facebook, Inc.,[48] the Supreme Court of Canada refused to enforce Facebook’s exclusive venue clause in its terms of service to permit privacy claims against Facebook to be adjudicated in the Province of British Columbia. If the privacy claim is successful, there will be another order of a Canadian court to enforce against Facebook.
  • De-indexing orders have been against search engines including Google in the European Union to protect privacy rights of individuals including in the Max Mosley cases in France and Germany[49] and in the “right to be forgotten” case, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González,[50]; a de-indexing order was also made against search engines in the French copyright case, APC v. Auchan Telecom.[51]
  • Google has also been ordered numerous times internationally to take down defamatory content from its blogging platform. Most recently, the Columbia Constitutional Court ordered Google to completely remove from the Internet a website hosted on Blogger.com.[52]
  • Google has also been found to be liable for publishing defamatory materials in its search results on many occasions, most recently in Google Inc. v Duffy.[53]

The Google Order raises the issue as whether large U.S. social media companies like Google will attempt to leverage the success in this case to oppose enforcement of future orders against them, such as the types of orders summarized above. There are also evolving problems with information that is published or otherwise made accessible through these platforms that are raising concerns. For example, Canada might well seek to regulate misleading online paid for advertisements or “fake news” in elections or other specific contexts. This is currently being considered in the U.S.  Or Canada may want to take action to combat propaganda[54] allegedly spread by, for example, state-run news agencies such as Russia Today and Sputnik.

Giving these large global multinational companies – these “NetStates[55] –  broad immunities from the laws of foreign countries would be a major set-back around the world that could imperil global enforcement of local rights. Private international law rules should not permit Google and other large social media companies to do business on a global scale around the world and to seek to defy orders against them locally.

Private international law should also not, effectively, export to other countries through orders like the Google Order the flawed cyber-utopian vision of Internet freedoms without responsibilities that is reflected in the CDA. Many individuals in the U.S. have found themselves powerless to remove online content that is defamatory or which violates other rights they have. The CDA enables online service providers to publish illegal materials with impunity even when they exercise editorial control over third party content or fail to respond to takedown notices. It is even being used as a shield by those who intentionally profit from prostitution and crimes against children.[56]  As Neil Turkewitz recently put it “in order to achieve the kind of flowering of diverse human creativity and expression at the foundation of the cyber-utopian vision, we need to address misconduct regardless of the modality employed to effect it.”[57]

The CDA should not be used to shield large social media companies from complying with their international responsibilities justified on the misconceived notion that the Internet can only flourish when Internet giants have no legal responsibility for disseminating, or facilitating the dissemination of, illegal content.

The problem posed by the Google Order should be addressed in Canada’s NAFTA negotiations. Google and the other social media titans successfully pushed for a new e-commerce Chapter in the TPP. That would have preserved their business model of locating and maintaining their servers and customer data in the U.S. I supported the inclusion of that Chapter in the TPP.[58] The U.S. is now pushing for a similar Chapter in an updated NAFTA. Further, one of USTR’s objectives is to export the CDA to Canada and Mexico. According to the U.S. Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation,[59] the U.S. is seeking to “Establish rules that limit non-IPR civil liability of online platforms for third party content, subject to NAFTA countries’ rights to adopt non-discriminatory measures for legitimate public policy objectives.”

In view of the position Google has taken in opposing the enforceability of the Equustek Order, Canada should not only resist attempts to export the CDA (with all of its flaws) to Canada, it should also only agree to a new Chapter on e-commerce on the condition that there is a reciprocal enforcement of judgments commitment that respects legitimate international comity concerns each country has in ensuring that orders made by its courts will be recognized in the other jurisdictions.

Canadian courts asked to enforce a US judgment against a Canadian social media service will generally enforce the order unless it violates public policy here, a defense that is narrow. However, the situation under the recent Google case is quite different. A Canadian decision is given no respect at all if the order can be seen to be covered by the CDA. U.S. social media companies should not have blanket immunities under the CDA that automatically immunizes them from Canadian court orders and Canada should use NAFTA to reach a more balanced compromise.

Michael Geist [60] attempted to defend the Google Order stating:

As I noted several months ago, the U.S. case is precisely what critics of the Supreme Court ruling feared with the prospect of conflicting rulings, protracted litigation, and legal uncertainty becoming a reality. By upholding global takedowns without fully grappling with the implications, the Supreme Court effectively invited other courts to issue conflicting decisions without guidance on how to best resolve the issue.

But, the problem Geist refers to was not the result of the Supreme Court’s order in Equustek. It was the result of Google doing business on a global scale that subjected it to Canadian law and a failure of the U.S. court to properly apply well established rules of comity required by private international law. The U.S. District Court should not have simply thumbed its nose at a decision of our Supreme Court. By doing so it created what should be seen as an international incident that needs to be addressed.

What will happen next

It remains to be seen whether Google’s strategy of getting the declaratory relief it sought will have any effect on its efforts to enforce the Equustek Order against it in Canada such as through contempt proceedings. The Supreme Court noted in the case that

“If Google has evidence that complying with such an injunction would require it to violate the laws of another jurisdiction, including interfering with freedom of expression, it is always free to apply to the British Columbia courts to vary the interlocutory order accordingly. To date, Google has made no such application.”

After obtaining a permanent injunction in California prohibiting Equustek from enforcing the order against it in the United States, Google applied to the British Columbia court that made the original order against Google to vary the Equustek Order. It relies, in part, on the Google Order. However, the Google Order did not address Google’s First Amendment arguments, nor did it find that the enforcement of the Equustek Order in the U.S. would require it to violate any laws including those in the United States. All that was decided was that the Canadian order could not be enforced against Google in the United States based on Section 230 of the CDA. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether Google will be able to end run and thumb its nose at orders of Canadian courts by resorting to its home courts to insulate it even though it does extensive business in Canada and takes advantage of Canadian laws.

* Last updated Feb. 18, 2018. Accepted for publication in Intellectual Property Journal. First published @ barrysookman.com

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[1]           Case No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD, 2017 WL 5000834 (N.D.Cal. Nov 2, 2017)

[2]           Google LLC v. Equustek Solutions Inc., Case No. 5:17-cv-04207-EJD (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2017). Since no reasons were given for granting the permanent injunction, the order which is the subject of this article is the preliminary injunction order. However, reasons criticizing that order are equally applicable to the final injunction.

[3]           Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack,  2014 BCSC 1063

[4]           Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc.,  2014 BCCA

[5]           2017 SCC 34, summarized, Barry Sookman, Google v Equustek: worldwide de-indexing order against Google upheld by Supreme Court, June 28, available at http://www.barrysookman.com/2017/06/28/worldwide-de-indexing-order-against-google-upheld-by-supreme-court-of-canada/.

[6]           47 U.S.C. § 230

[7]           See the authorities infra discussed under the heading “The decision violates principles of international comity”.

[8]           O’Reilly C., “Finding jurisdiction to regulate Google and the Internet“, European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2011; Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, C-131/12 [2014], CURIA ; Galloway v Frazer & Ors [2016] NIQB 7 (27 January 2016), NGK v Google Inc. & Anor [2017] NIQB 74 (31 October 2017); Google Inc v Vidal-Hall & Ors [2015] EWCA Civ 311 (27 March 2015); X v Twitter Inc, [2017] NSWSC 1300 (28 September 2017).

[9]           2014 BCSC 1063

[10]         2014 BCCA 295

[11]         2015 BCCA 265

[12]         § 230(e)(1) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of [selected obscenity statutes] or any other Federal criminal statute.”); § 230(e)(2) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”).

[13]         247 Cal.App.4th 1336 (Cal.C.A. June 7, 2016), Review Granted September 21, 2016,

[14]         237 F.Supp.3d 997 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 27, 2017)

[15]         822 F.3d 212, (5th Cir. 2016)

[16]         17 cv-553-jdp (W.D.Wisc. Oct. 24, 2917)

[17]         See, Eurene Volokh, Qatar prince, anti-Islam site, defamation law and WordPress: The future of libel litigation?

[18]         Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., [2006] 2 SCR 612

[19]         [2015] 3 SCR 69

[20]         [2003] 3 SCR 416

[21]         Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme. 433 F.3d 1199, 1212 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (per curiam) (“Yahoo! II“) (plurality opinion.)

[22]         Yahoo II at 1212-1215.

[23]         See, Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. McCain Foods, Ltd., 941 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1991).

[24]         Supra, footnote 12

[25]         Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 (DTSA) (Pub.L. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376, enacted May 11, 2016, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836, et seq.).

[26]         Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.Hamp.2008); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc. 603 F.Supp.2d 690 (S.D.N.Y.2009)

[27]         WTO GATT TRIPS Agreement states “In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair competition as provided in Article 10bis of the Paris Convention (1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accordance with paragraph 2…”“Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices”.

[28]         “Each Party shall provide the legal means for any person to prevent trade secrets from being disclosed to, acquired by, or used by others without the consent of the person lawfully in control of the information in a manner contrary to honest commercial practices”.

[29]         247 Cal.App.4th 1336 (Cal.C.A. June 7, 2016), Review Granted September 21, 2016,

[30]         28 U. S. C. § 1651 (a)

[31]         16B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4005 (3d ed. 2017

[32]         United States v. New York Tel. Co.434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977)

[33]         In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 341 (E.D.N.Y.2016); United States v. Hall, 583 F. Supp. 717 (E.D.Vir.1984)

[34]         Microsoft Corp v. Does 1-8, No. A13CV1014 SS (W.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013), Microsoft v. John Does 1-27, Case No. 1:10-cv-00156 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“Waledec” botnet); Microsoft v. John Does 1-11, Case No. 2:11-cv-00222 (W.D. Was. 2011) (“Rustock” botnet); Microsoft v. Piatti, Case No. 1:11-cv-1017 (E.D. Va. 2011) (“Kelihos” botnet); Microsoft v. John Does 1-39, Case No. 12-cv-1335 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Zeus” botnet); Microsoft v. Peng Yong, Case No. 1:12-cv-1004-GBL (E.D. Va. 2012) (“Nitol” botnet); Microsoft v. John Does 1-18, Case No. 1:13-cv-139-LMB (E.D. Va.) (“Bamital” botnet); Microsoft v. John Does 1-82, Case No. 3:13-cv-00319 (W.D.N.C.) (“Citadel” botnets).

[35]         Regal Knitwear is Regal Knitwear v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945)

[36]         Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV INDUSTRIES, 91 F. 3d 914 (7th.Cir.1996)

[37]         S.D.N.Y., (June 3, 2015)

[38]         2015 WL 3649187 (C.D. Cal. Jun 11, 2015)

[39]         Other cases include Hermes v. Doe, (SDNY April 30, 2012); Chanel Inc. v. Does (D. Nev., Nov. 14, 2011); ABS-CBN Corporation v Ashby, Case (Dist. Or. Aug. 8, 2014); Richemont International SA v Chen, Case (SDNY Jan. 4, 2013), ABS-CBN Corporation v Cinesilip.net 2017 WL 1628900 (S.D.Fla. May 1, 2017), ABS-CBN Corporation v Moveonline.io Case No. 17-CV-61803-Bloomo/Valle (S.D. FLO. Sept. 20, 2017).

[40]         (Civ. Action No 1:1 7cv0726 (LMB/JFA) (E.D. Vir. Sept. 28, 2017)

[41]         (Civ. Action No 1:1 7cv0726 (LMB/JFA) (E.D. Vir. Nov. 3, 2017)

[42]         See, Dalmeet Singh Chawla, Court demands that search engines and internet service providers block Sci-Hub.

[43]         See, Blockowicz v. Williams 630 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2010)

[44]          The Hassel decision is under review by the California Supreme Court. Under Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115 e) the decision has no binding or precedential effect. However, under this rule the decision could still have been cited for its potential persuasive value.

[45]         [2017] NSWSC 1300 (28 September 2017)

[46]         [2016] NICA 42 (21 December, 2016)

[47]         2017 QCTMF 88

[48]         2017 SCC 33

[49]         See, Barry Sookman Internet justice: Mosley v Google

[50]         C-131/12 [2014], CURIA

[51]         11/60013, Judgment (28 November 2013) (Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris)

[52]         See, Fierro Calcedo v Google Inc (Judgment T-063A/17).

[53]        [2017] SASCFC 130 (4 October 2017), summarized, Barry Sookman, Is Google a publisher according to Google? The Google v Equustek and Duffy cases, Oct 10, 2017, available @ http://www.barrysookman.com/2017/10/10/is-google-a-publisher-according-to-google-the-google-v-equustek-and-duffy-cases/

[54]        Alex Hern, Google plans to to ‘de-rank’ Russia Today and Sputnik to combat misinformation, The Guardian, Tue 21 Nov 2017at https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/nov/21/google-de-rank-russia-today-sputnik-combat-misinformation-alphabet-chief-executive-eric-schmidt?utm_content=buffer6a368&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

[55]        Alexis Wichowski, Net States Rule The World; We Need to Recognize Their Power, Wired, 11.04.17 at https://www.wired.com/story/net-states-rule-the-world-we-need-to-recognize-their-power/

[56]         See, Mary Leary, In bid to amend Communications Decency Act, Congress must side with trafficking victims, Andrew Bolson, The Internet Has Grown Up, Why Hasn’t the Law? Reexamining Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, Ed Klaris et al, United States: Congress to Weaken Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act?; George Pike Scrutiny of Google and Facebook Increases on Both Sides of the Atlantic. Canadian and Commonwealth courts take a much more balanced position in dealing with intermediary liability. They generally only hold true online intermediaries liable for publication of tortious or other illegal material when they cease to be passive intermediaries such as when they continue to host defamatory content after receiving notice that the content is defamatory. See Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 SCR 427 and Crookes v. Newton 2011 SCC 4, describing the attributes of passive instrumental intermediaries. In the U.K., see, Gavin Sutter, The UK’s Broad Rejection of the §230 Model, The Recorder.

[57]         See, Neil Turkewitz There is no internet freedom without responsibility.

[58]         See, TPP, copyright, e-commerce and digital policy: a reply to Michael Geist, My appearance before the Trade Committee on the TPP.

[59]         Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive office of the President, Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation, November 2017 at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/Nov%20Objectives%20Update.pdf?utm_content=buffer78d43&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

[60]         Michael Geist, U.S. Judge Rules Canadian Court Order “Threatens Free Speech on the Global Internet”, at http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/11/googleequustekinjunction/

Fact checking Michael Geist’s criticisms of the FairPlay site blocking proposal

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The FairPlay coalition comprising more than 25 organizations representing hundreds of thousands of members of Canada’s creative community made a reasonable proposal to the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), Canada’s telecommunications and broadcast regulator, to address the scourge of online copyright infringement.[1]  The proposal, which involves website blocking, was immediately attacked by anti-copyright activist Michael Geist (“Geist”) in a series of articles and interviews.  As I showed in a prior lengthy blog post,[2] his criticisms were unfounded and overblown.

Geist has renewed his attack on the proposal in new series of articles that expand upon his previous and other themes.[3]  His criticisms do not withstand scrutiny.  They are based on inaccurate and misleading facts and arguments, unsubstantiated and incorrect assertions about international norms and Canadian and international law.  He makes selective and misleading use of references and quotations and relies on cases that have been overturned or superseded by subsequent courts.

This article examines his claims and the references he uses to support them.  I start with a short summary and FAQ and then provide a detailed comprehensive review and analysis of his claims. For those who want to read a hard copy of this article, you can download it from this link.

Part 1: Summary and FAQ

Is the proposal “radical”; is site blocking is quite rare?

Geist says the proposal is radical and that site blocking is rare. He is wrong.

Website blocking is hardly rare.  It is one of the leading anti-piracy mechanisms of recent years.

It is also hardly “radical”.  It is available in at many countries including liberal democratic countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK, Mexico, Australia, and Singapore.

Further, courts and government agencies from around the world have rejected the arguments that Geist makes against the proposal.  The numerous decisions and the practices around the world show that his claims that website blocking for copyright purposes will result in over-blocking, will not be effective, may violate human rights or net neutrality principles, and that orders must be made by courts and not government agencies, are not correct.

Would Canada be a “virtual outlier” and is the proposal “fatally flawed” because the CRTC and not courts will make the blocking orders?

Not at all; the information provided by Geist is inaccurate.

Geist’s claim that there is effectively only one country that allows administrative agencies to permit website blocking for copyright purposes is wrong.  There are at least 7 countries which empower government agencies to make orders requiring website blocking for copyright purposes.

Moreover, the CRTC has all of the powers it requires to ensure a fair hearing for sites that may be blocked and its decisions are subject to ample judicial oversight.

The CRTC has the relevant powers of a court of superior jurisdiction and already makes decisions that affect the fundamental freedoms of Canadians.  This includes when regulating Canada’s communication system and enforcing the Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules, CASL, the National Do Not Call List (DNCL) and the VCR.

Canadian courts have repeatedly concluded that administrative bodies such as the CRTC may issue orders requiring a consideration of human rights or Charter values.  Administrative bodies in Canada can, and do, make decisions with important consequences that affect human rights.

Do human rights norms require courts to make blocking orders?

They do not.  Geist is “selective” in the sources he relies on to make this claim.

His claim is contradicted by a report to the United Nations on freedom and expression on the Internet that he and the Electronic Frontier Foundation previously lauded and that recognized that blocking orders can be made by courts or an independent body.

Geist’s claim is contradicted by the Guideline published by the Council of Europe related to the use of blocking to protect freedom of expression in the EU under the European Convention on Human Rights.

His claim is contradicted by international norms as many countries including Italy, Mexico, South Korea, France, and others permit blocking orders to be made by government agencies for copyright or other purposes.

Would the proposal violate net neutrality rules?

It would not and Geist provides no credible argument that this would be the case.

Geist says that “net neutrality is the right for users to access content and applications of their choice, blocking content is prima facie a net neutrality violation.”

It is not. He is also wrong when he says the “no blocking” principle prevents courts or other lawful authorities from taking measures to protect the public from online illegal threats and menaces.  If such a rule existed, it would be both surprising and dangerous.  It would create the incongruity that what is unlawful and can be enjoined offline cannot be enjoined online.  Such a radical view of net neutrality would undermine the rule of law on the Internet and accountability and responsibility in Internet Governance.

Canada’s major trading partners including the United States and the European Union recognize that net neutrality rules do not prevent courts or government agencies from ordering the removal of illegal content from the Internet.

In the U.S. the net neutrality rules expressly exclude illegal materials.  In the EU, the rules expressly permit orders of courts and public bodies to make blocking orders.  In fact, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Poland use government agencies to make such orders.

Canada’s Telecommunications Act, as interpreted by the CRTC, gives the CRTC the express authority to approve blocking orders.  It is wrong to claim that if the CRTC makes an order requiring ISPs block foreign piracy sites that such an order would violate Canada’s net neutrality law.

Geist’s view of net neutrality is not consistent with the Canadian government’s understanding of Canada’s net neutrality framework as well.  Referring to the proposal, Minister Bains confirmed the “Government supports an open Internet where Canadians have the ability to access the content of their choice in accordance to Canadian laws… In other words, our Government believes that all legal content must be treated equally by internet service providers.”

The CRTC has said in past decisions it would make blocking orders if making the order would be consistent with the objectives of the Telecommunications Act. This is precisely what the coalition is asking the Commission to do.

Is website blocking effective?

Yes; many studies and court decisions have found this to be the case.

Geist is again “selective” in the reports he cites and on the parts of the reports he refers to when he argues web site blocking is not effective. Studies in the UK (several), Australia (2), South Korea, and Portugal have all found website blocking to be an effective means of reducing piracy.

Geist failed to refer to the leading academic study on site blocking (Prof. Danaher 2016) which found site blocking to be effective in reducing visits to the blocked piracy sites, to other piracy sites not blocked, and in increasing visits to legal sites.

Geist also ignores the plethora of decisions throughout the EU and elsewhere that made express findings that site blocking is an effective remedy against online copyright piracy.  Instead he relies on a single decision of a Danish court that was reversed on appeal precisely on this point.

Would the proposal inevitably lead to widespread over-blocking of legal content?

Geist presents no credible reason why this would occur and cases in other countries have concluded that site blocking can be safely carried out without over-blocking.

Geist merely lists instances of reported over-blocking in random cases and concludes it will necessarily occur when blocking orders are made by the CRTC.  He gives no explanation as to why over-blocking cannot be avoided. In fact, the potential causes are well known and can be addressed.

Moreover, while purporting to be concerned about over-blocking, Geist completely neglects and appears to be unconcerned about under-blocking—that is, the ready access to infringing materials made available on a mass scale by those who have built business models profiting from it.  He advances a test of the status quo – everything is fine with no over-blocking – with rampant unchecked piracy over the inadvertent, occasional, avoidable, and reversible potential cases of over-blocking.

Geist also ignores the numerous international decisions that have rejected claims that such orders result in over-blocking and where decision makers take steps to mitigate such risks.  These courts and government agencies are as concerned as the CRTC would be to avoid over-blocking and to prevent the damaging consequences of under-blocking.

Would the proposal violate freedom of expression rights?

It would not.  There is substantial jurisprudence in Europe and elsewhere that find blocking orders to be fully compatible with human rights including freedom of expression rights.

The proposal targets only sites that blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engage in piracy.  Legitimate websites are not targeted by the proposal.

All members of the coalition depend on Canada maintaining strong laws that protect freedom of expression on the Internet.  But, contrary to Geist’s implications, freedom of expression is not absolute either on or off the Internet.  It does not extend to permit pirate sites or their users to shield illegal actions under a banner of freedom of expression.

Countries around the world with strong freedom of expression rights guarantees have made blocking orders for copyright purposes.

Geist claims to have reviewed “many of the site blocking cases from around the world”.  Yet he completely ignores the significant body of caselaw from around the world that has found website blocking orders to be proportionate and not to violate fundamental values including constitutionally protected rights of freedom of expression.

He ignored a contrary decision from the Court of Justice of the European Union and from courts in Argentina, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, and the UK, among others.  He preferred instead to rely on an outdated secondary source that references decisions in Germany and the Netherlands that were reversed or superseded by later developments and several blocking orders issued in each of Germany and the Netherlands.  These authorities found blocking orders to be consistent with fundamental human rights.

Would the proposal increase privacy risks for Canadians?

It would not.  If anything, It would lessen any privacy risks.

Geist gives several reasons for his assertion that the proposal would increase privacy risks for Canadians.  None of them stand up to scrutiny.

He says it will lead to blocking VPNs used to illegally access U.S. Netflix.  There is no reason to assume this will happen or to attribute that to the proposal.

He says personal information will be collected for rights holders to get and implement blocking orders. This ignores the fact that one of the benefits of blocking orders is that they are directly targeted at the pirate sites and not individual users.  The information needed to obtain a blocking order is publicly available on the pirate site and through Alexa data and does not need to include any subscriber personal information.

In addition, the proposal does not raise any incremental privacy issues that would not arise in legal proceedings against piracy sites.

Geist also fails to consider that the type of pirate websites targeted are known for harvesting and misusing personal information and hijacking users’ computers.

Would the proposal inevitably result in blocking for other purposes?

Geist offers no evidence in support of this claim and he ignores the fact that the proposal calls for blocking of only “websites and services that are blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engaged in piracy.”  The proposal does not seek the CRTC’s authority to block web sites for any other purpose.

If the CRTC or Parliament later chose to adopt a separate, highly targeted blocking regime to deal with sites that are clearly devoted to dissemination of illegal content (as has existed for years for child pornography), that would not be a reason to oppose the FairPlay proposal.  Other liberal democratic countries already engage in website blocking to protect members of the public from a variety of illegal activities such as hate speech, child abuse materials including child pornography, prostitution, speech inciting violence, and terrorism.

Geist also tries to conflate blocking illegal pirate sites to content regulation.  That is no more true than arguing that when courts grant injunctions prohibiting the dissemination of materials that are defamatory, in violation of child pornography or pornography laws, infringe copyrights, or are otherwise illegal – which courts do all the time – they are engaging in “content regulation”.

We need to recognize that what is illegal offline is illegal online.  Effective remedies need to be available in both situations to protect the public.

Does Canada have robust laws so that more legal tools to target offshore pirate sites?

Website blocking is the most effective means of dealing with online piracy from foreign sites. Other laws would either be completely ineffective or much less effective than site blocking.

Geist claims Canada “has some of the world’s toughest anti-piracy provisions” and doesn’t need any new laws to target online piracy.

Although Geist makes references to anti-piracy laws that exist in Canada, he makes no attempt to show whether or how they could be useful in combatting the threats the FairPlay proposal is designed to counter.  Many of his claims would be misleading to the average person who would not understand the lack of connection between an existing cause of action and one that had some relevance to countering online piracy.

It is not true that merely because Canada has some laws that are in line with those of our major trading partners, such as measures to counter trafficking in anti-circumvention devices, a contributory infringement (enablement) cause of action, and measures that may be able to target individuals selling fully loaded Kodi boxes or other ISDs, that these same laws would be effective against foreign online pirate sites.

Direct enforceable remedies against operators of pirate sites is frequently impossible.  The Pirate Bay has been blocked around the world and its originators were jailed by a Swedish court.  Yet, it still continues to defy and evade legal measures to shut it down.

Geist also misleadingly points to the possibility of high damages awards against the operators of piracy sites, neglecting the fact that the availability of such awards is meaningless unless the award can be enforced.

Genuine efforts to stem online piracy require a mixture of complementary and appropriate measures including web site blocking.  That is why throughout the European Union and in other countries around the world orders against ISPs are used to block the sources of illegal content that facilitate infringements on a mass scale.

Why this matters?

The FairPlay proposal represents a well thought out approach to dealing with Internet piracy in the Canadian context. Yet, Geist has attempted to demonize it using, what appears to be, every contrived argument he can think of.

Geist postulates a radical net neutrality Internet Governance framework where courts and government agencies are powerless to intervene to halt illegal activities over the Internet.  He takes a similarly unbalanced position in claiming that intervening to stop online theft is unnecessary by ignoring or discounting the well documented harms caused by illegal piracy sites, the evidence that blocking orders are effective without any real risks of over-blocking and do not breach fundamental freedom of speech rights or net neutrality principles.

What is especially troubling is that he tells average Canadians – people who would have no reason to disbelieve a Canada Research Chair – that the proposal is radical, breaks net neutrality rules, may violate their fundamental freedom of speech and privacy rights, will result in blocking access to U.S. Netflix, content blocking by the CRTC, and will lead to who knows what else.  This is fearmongering, plain and simple.

Unfortunately, but quite predictably, his unfounded attacks are being relied upon by others including OpenMedia to oppose the proposal using exaggerated and inflammatory arguments.  The result of all of this is that a large number of the submissions to the CRTC have been influenced directly or indirectly by Geist’s misleading diatribes against the proposal.

We, as Canadians, have an important interest in ensuring that debates on important issues do not get subverted by misinformation.  I therefore encourage those who want to have a more complete understanding of the issues to read this article in full.

The FairPlay proposal should be assessed on its merits based on a careful analysis of the facts and evidence.  We should not allow widely circulated misinformation to be a factor governing decisions about important matters of public policy including the proposal.

What follows is a detailed analysis of Geist’s criticisms of the proposal in his recent series of blog posts.[4]

Part 2: Detailed review and analysis of Geist’s claims

Geist claim: site blocking is quite rare; the proposal is “radical”

Geist claims that “website blocking for copyright purposes is still quite rare”. He also calls the proposal “radical”.  Neither claim is accurate.

The term “rare” means “not occurring or found very often”. The term “quite” means “to the greatest degree”.[5] You might infer this means almost never.  His claim is not accurate by any sense of the terms.  According to TorrentFreak, an online publication dealing with illegal filesharing and anti-piracy litigation:

Website blocking has become one of the leading anti-piracy mechanisms of recent years.

It is particularly prevalent across Europe, where thousands of sites are blocked by ISPs following court orders.[6]

Blocking pirate sites is also not “radical”.  Site blocking (or other online location blocking) for copyright purposes is widely available in liberal democratic countries.  It is available, for example, in EU/EEA member states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, UK, and the legal basis also exists in the other member states of the European Union based on Article 8(3) of the Infosoc Directive),[7] South America/Latin America (Mexico, Argentina), and Eurasia and Australasia (Australia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Turkey, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand).[8]  Secondary sources also suggest it may be available in Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Saudi Arabia.[9] In some cases countries have specific laws that establish a regime for the blocking.  In other cases it is available under generally applicable civil law, constitutional law, or administrative law rules.[10] Japan is also considering site blocking to protect Manga and anime, important content in Japan.[11]

Further, as summarized below, courts and government agencies from around the world have canvassed the issues raised by Geist and have found it appropriate to make, and have made, blocking orders. Examples of such cases in the English language include those from United Kingdom[12], Ireland,[13] Australia,[14] and from the Court of Justice of the European Union.[15]  There are many cases from other countries as well. [16]  As further summarized below, the overwhelming findings in the decisions around the world is that blocking order remedies are a necessary tool to address Internet piracy, do not result in over-blocking, are effective, and will not violate fundamental rights.

Geist also claims that in “those countries that have had it, the most common blocking case involves a court action targeting the Pirate Bay”.  It is true that The Pirate Bay domains have been blocked more than any other websites.  However, site blocking orders are commonly made in waves that target many sites and services other than The Pirate Bay.

Many other notorious piracy sites have been blocked in one or more countries internationally, including Movie4k.to, EZTV, Kickass.to, Torrentz, Torrent Hound, Putlocker, PopcornTime, and PrimeWire, among many others.  For example, Kickass.to, PrimeWire, and Rar BG are blocked in each of the UK, Ireland, Australia, and Portugal.

The scope of the websites blocked internationally was commented on in the 2016 ITIF report, which notes:[17]

A Motion Picture Association of America report from September 2015 stated that European ISPs block more than 500 websites—238 in Italy, 135 in the United Kingdom, 41 in Denmark, 24 in Spain, 18 in France, 15 in Portugal, 13 in Belgium, 7 in Norway, and smaller totals for other countries. The actual figure is likely much higher, as some countries, such as the United Kingdom, do not release specific details on which websites are being blocked, in order to not alert website operators.  Furthermore, countries have recently added more sites: Portugal added over 240 between December 2015 and April 2016.

All of the above shows that website blocking is not radical or rare (much less “quite rare”).  In fact, it has become an essential tool for combatting internet piracy that has been thoroughly vetted and found to be a balanced and proportionate remedy around the world.

Geist claim: Other countries don’t empower government agencies to make blocking orders

Geist claims that only one country, Italy, has a site blocking regime that permits site blocking by order of a government agency.  He says over and over again that Canada would be “an outlier with virtually every country that has permitted site blocking” doing so through court orders.  He repeatedly says this is a “fatal flaw” in the proposal.  His information, which he claims is “unequivocal”, is not accurate.

At least 7 countries that have web site blocking empower government agencies[18] to do so including Italy, Greece, Portugal, Malaysia, Mexico, South Korea, and Indonesia.[19]  Here is some background on some of them.

Italy:  Italy allows the blocking of access to copyright infringing websites through administrative order. Italian courts have held that this regime is consistent with EU law and with the Italian constitution.[20]

Portugal:  Geist disregards Portugal on the basis that it is a “voluntary” regime. However, the ISPs in Portugal do not block websites without orders.  There is an MOU in Portugal between rights holders, the competent government body for cultural affairs (IGAC) and the ISPs.  Under the MOU rights holders can make complaints in respect of predominantly copyright infringing sites and the IGAC then issues orders requiring ISPs to block sites.  Accordingly, the legal authority to block the sites is premised on the order of the IGAC.  This reflects the recognition in the EU that piracy is a problem and needs to be addressed through blocking.

Greece:  Greece has established a 3-member administrative authority called the Greek Copyright Organisation (OPI).  It is composed of the President of OPI, a representative from the Greek Data Protection Authority and a representative from the Greek Telecommunications & Post Commission.  The Commission has the power to receive complaints and issue decisions which can include orders to take down sites hosted in Greece or blocking orders against foreign sites.  Blocking access to illegal content is seen as the most appropriate and effective technical means of combatting piracy of copyright content and the means used may include IP address or domain name server (DNS) blocking.[21]

South Korea:  The South Korean “Korean Communications Standards Commission” has authorized blocking of websites hosting copyright-infringing materials.[22] Geist excludes South Korea on the grounds that it uses “uses censors to block access to thousands of web pages”.  However, there is no good basis to exclude South Korea from the list of countries that block websites for copyright purposes using a government agency.

Mexico:  The Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI) has the authority to issue orders requiring that ISPs block websites.  Geist claims that the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that blocking is disproportionate.  The Supreme Court decision at issue held that IMPI could block specific incidents of copyright infringement at mymusic.com but not the entire website as there was legal content also available at the site.  The Mexican Supreme Court subsequently clarified that blocking an entire website is permissible if the “totality” – meaning substantial majority – of conduct is infringing. [23]

Geist further fails to acknowledge that government agencies around the world are also given authority to block websites for other purposes.  For example, France has laws allowing blocking of suspected child pornography and terrorism websites without a court order. [24]   Australia allows certain government agencies to block certain non-copyright content without court orders.[25]  Although Geist says that New Zealand “does not have site blocking at all”, the Department of Internal Affairs maintains a filter blocking access to child pornography.[26]  In Sweden, police administer a list of sites known to provide access to child pornography.  Major ISPs use DNS filters to block access to these sites.[27]  In Finland, the National Bureau of Investigation maintains a list of websites containing child pornography.  ISPs voluntarily block access to these websites.[28] Poland and Slovakia have  blocking to restrict access to unlicensed gambling sites.[29]

Geist also claims that telecom companies from around the world oppose efforts of rights holders to obtain blocking orders.  However, increasingly, ISPs do not oppose such orders knowing that courts will grant them and because they benefit from and recognize the responsibility to act cooperatively to address Internet piracy.  For example, in Portugal, ISPs do not oppose orders made by the regulator under the MOU that exists in that country.  ISPs in other countries frequently also do not oppose such orders.  In Belgium, for example, ISPs and rights holders have started to make joint applications to courts for blocking orders.  According to a recent article about a Belgium application:[30]

“The case has been running for a year already but during a hearing before the Commercial Court of Brussels this week, Benoît Michaux, lawyer for the Belgian Entertainment Association, explained the new approach. ‘The European legislator has put in place a mechanism that allows a national judge to request injunctions to order the providers to block access to the websites in question’, Michaux said.  After being presented to the Court, the list of sites and domains will be assessed to determine whether they’re acting illegally.  Michaux said that the parties have settled on a common approach and have been able to identify ‘reasonable measures’ that can be ordered by the Court that are consistent with case law of the European Court of Justice. ‘his joint request is a little unusual, things are changing, there is a certain maturation of minds, we realize, from all sides, that we must tackle the problem of piracy by blocking measures.  There is a common vision on what to do and how to handle piracy,’ he said.”

It is also now common for blocking orders to be unopposed in the UK and such orders have also gone unopposed in Ireland.[31]  For example, in the Irish Twentieth Century Fox, v Eircom case,[32] the rightholders and ISPs reached a detailed agreement on the sites to be blocked, the  technical blocking measures to be adopted by each ISP, the protocol for determining what new IP addresses, domain names, and URLs could be added to block the target piracy sites, and to vary the order to address unanticipated difficulties and changes in circumstances.  Following a request from the Danish Ministry of Culture and as part of a number of measures introduced to reduce the scope of rights infringements on the Internet, the members of the Telecommunications Industry Association in Denmark adopted an industry code of conduct under which ISPs voluntarily block a site if another ISP has been ordered to blocked it.[33]

Geist claim: blocking orders must be made by courts

Geist argues that the FairPlay proposal is ‘fatally flawed” because the blocking orders would not be made by a court.  His argument in his primary post on this issue (that Canada would be a virtual outlier if it adopted this process) rests almost entirely on his (incorrect) information about the number of counties that rely on government agencies to make blocking orders around the world.[34]

It is telling that his “court versus government agency” criticism is made on an “outlier argument”. In the past, he has argued against Canada adopting international norms related to copyright, instead arguing for “made in Canada” solutions, or relying on outlier countries as models for Canadian copyright reforms.  For example, during the copyright reform process he argued that Canada should not adopt a notice and takedown system, even though that is the international standard.  He argued for notice and notice, even though no other country had adopted that instead of notice and take-down.  He argued that Canada should adopt watered down prohibitions against circumventing technological measures that no other country had adopted and relied on the laws in Switzerland that are regarded as being an international outlier.  Further, he argued for a new user generated content (UGC) exception to copyright infringement that no other country in the world has.[35]  More recently, he appeared before a Senate Committee and defended Canada’s “more innovative provisions” and argued we should try and export them internationally.[36]

In any event, his argument that site blocking orders must be made by court orders as a matter of Canadian law is simply wrong.  It is, as I show below, also not supported by international norms or human rights concerns.

Geist’s claim entirely fails to take into account the Canadian telecommunications framework, the status of the CRTC as having the powers of a court of superior jurisdiction, that blocking orders are subject to appeals and judicial reviews, and the well-established caselaw in Canada that confirms that decisions affecting fundamental freedoms can be lawfully made by government agencies.

Geist contends that the proposal is flawed without even considering the provisions of the Telecommunications Act.  As Geist admits, Section 36 of the Act, has been interpreted by CRTC to give it the authority to approve website blocking.  That provision is complimented by other provisions of the Act that give it the jurisdiction to order ISPs to block websites.[37]  Section 36 states:

Except where the Commission approves otherwise, a Canadian carrier shall not control the content or influence the meaning or purpose of telecommunications carried by it for the public.

This section has been interpreted by the CRTC as exclusively providing it with the power to approve blocking orders against ISPs.[38]

Although Geist argues that only courts can make blocking orders because they might affect freedom of speech rights, he fails to consider that Parliament has conferred on the CRTC the powers of courts needed to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.

The CRTC is a tribunal within the Government of Canada that is responsible for regulating and supervising Canada’s communication system in the public interest.  It operates under a number of legislative authorities and Acts of Parliament.  These include the Broadcasting Act, the Telecommunications Act, Canada’s Anti-Spam Legislation (CASL) and the Canada Elections Act which includes provisions establishing the Voter Contact Registry (VCR).  The Commission’s mandate includes promoting compliance with and enforcing legislation, regulations and rules such as the Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules, CASL, the National Do Not Call List (DNCL) and the VCR.[39]

The CRTC has quasi-judicial powers of a superior court with respect to matters that would be relevant to its capabilities to balance the interests of promoting the objectives of the telecommunications system through blocking pirate websites and online rights of freedom of expression.  For example, the Commission has the jurisdiction to make findings on questions of law and fact.  It also has all of the judicial powers of a superior court with respect to the attendance and examination of witnesses; the production and examination of any document; the enforcement of its decisions; the entry on and inspection of property; and the doing of anything else necessary for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties.  It has the power to make orders respecting any matter within the jurisdiction of the Commission.  Further, a decision of the Commission may be made an order of the Federal Court or of a superior court of a province and may be enforced in the same manner as an order of that court as if it had been an order of that court on the date of the decision.  The Commission may also enforce any of its decisions whether or not the decision has been made an order of a court.[40]

There is also judicial oversight of the decisions of the Commission.  There are direct appeals to the Federal Court of Appeal from a decision of the Commission on any question of law or of jurisdiction.[41]  Decisions of the CRTC are also subject to judicial review by the Federal Court of Appeal under s. 28(1) of the Federal Courts Act. [42]

Geist’s argument against the CRTC issuing blocking orders does not, however, appear to be tied to the capabilities, or lack thereof, of the Commission.  Rather, his argument appears more bluntly to be that only courts can make orders that affect the fundamental freedom of speech rights of Canadians.  However, this argument is incorrect as a matter of law.

Canadian courts have authoritatively and repeatedly concluded that administrative bodies may issue orders requiring a consideration of human rights or Charter values and have even gone so far as to express the opinion that they are often better qualified to make these determinations because of their domain expertise.  The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 SCR 395 is instructive:[43]

An administrative decision-maker exercising a discretionary power under his or her home statute, has, by virtue of expertise and specialization, particular familiarity with the competing considerations at play in weighing Charter values.  As the Court explained in Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, 1990 CanLII 63 (SCC), [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570, adopting the observations of Prof. Danielle Pinard:

[translation] . . . administrative tribunals have the skills, expertise and knowledge in a particular area which can with advantage be used to ensure the primacy of the Constitution.  Their privileged situation as regards the appreciation of the relevant facts enables them to develop a functional approach to rights and freedoms as well as to general constitutional precepts.

(p. 605, citing “Le pouvoir des tribunaux administratifs québécois de refuser de donner effet à des textes qu’ils jugent inconstitutionnels” (1987-88), McGill L.J. 170, at pp. 173-74.)

This case, among others, reflected the increasing recognition by this Court of the distinct advantage that administrative bodies have in applying the Charter to a specific set of facts and in the context of their enabling legislation (see Conway, at paras. 79-80).  As Major J. noted in dissent in Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), 1996 CanLII 254 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75, tailoring the Charter to a specific situation “is more suited to a tribunal’s special role in determining rights on a case by case basis in the tribunal’s area of expertise” (para. 64; see also C.U.P.E., at pp. 235-36).

Administrative bodies in Canada can, and do, make decisions with important consequences on human rights including decisions on deportations and refugee applications,[44] and determinations that human rights have or have not been violated.[45]

The CRTC makes decisions that affect or limit freedom of speech rights of Canadians.  A recent case in point is Canada’s Anti-Spam Law (CASL).  CASL significantly impairs the freedoms of speech of Canadians, arguably to a much greater degree than blocking orders against websites that blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engage in piracy ever could.[46] It is enforced by the CRTC which has the powers to order payment of significant administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) and to issue injunctions restraining the transmission of commercial electronic messages that contain speech protected by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Recently, CASL was challenged on, inter alia, freedom of speech grounds.  Geist, a staunch defender of CASL,[47] filed a report supporting the anti-spam regime.  Yet, while he now argues that the CRTC cannot make orders that affect freedoms of speech of Canadians, when defending CASL in legal proceedings to attack its constitutionality, he did not claim that the CASL regime was fatally flawed because the CRTC was given the authority to make critical decisions affecting the freedoms of speech of Canadians.  The CRTC concluded that while CASL did infringe the freedom of speech Charter rights of Canadians, the restrictions were reasonable and were thus constitutional.[48]

If Geist is right that the CRTC does not have the authority to make orders affecting the freedom of speech of Canadians, then it is likely that CASL and other regimes administered by the CRTC such as the regulation of broadcasting and broadcasting undertakings under the Broadcasting Act, the Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules and the National Do Not Call List would be subject to the same frailty and would similarly be ‘”fatally flawed”.

Geist also does not take into account that government agencies are given powers by legislative choice because of a specialization they have or can develop with respect to the imperatives and nuances of legislative regimes and because of the efficiencies they can bring relative to courts in specialized matters.[49]  Such expertise would be useful in the establishment of an efficient blocking regime.

Geist claim: Human rights norms require courts to make blocking orders

Geist says the proposal is fatally flawed because freedom of expression on the Internet can only be limited by “a judicial determination”.  His claim cannot be supported by any international laws or norms.  In fact, the evidence around the world, including the sources he relies on, show the opposite is true.

Geist refers to no Canadian law to support his claim, nor does he rely on any treaty or other legally binding enactment on Canada.  Rather, his argument, appears, in essence, to be that international norms require courts and not government agencies to make website blocking orders.  However, to the extent that international norms on this issue form part of Canadian law, the overwhelming practice internationally is that blocking orders can be made if authorized by an order of a court or other lawful public authority.[50]

Geist tries to make his case by relying on a one page joint declaration of Mr. LaRue, the former UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression and the IACHR-OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression made in January 2012.  Geist states: [51]

…[the] coalition proposal is inconsistent with international standards given the absence of a court order for such an “extreme measure.”

The 2012 declaration from LaRue and the IACHR-OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression states:

all restrictions on freedom of expression, including those that affect speech on the Internet, should be clearly and precisely established by law, proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, and based on a judicial determination in adversarial proceedings. In this regard, legislation regulating the Internet should not contain vague and sweeping definitions or disproportionately affect legitimate websites and services.

However, Geist does not refer to the much more comprehensive, 22 page, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Frank La Rue to the United Nations General Assembly on the same topic that was published in May 2011.[52]  Here Mr. LaRue, in the report to the UN, clearly states that a court order is not required:

[69] … Any legislation restricting the right to freedom of expression must be applied by a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.

[70] …Any determination on what content should be blocked must be undertaken by a competent judicial authority or a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences. (emphasis added) [53]

Geist was aware of this much more thorough report yet chose not to refer to it. He published several articles on it calling it “an important new report that examines freedom of expression on the Internet” and said that “many governments – including Canada – were quick to laud it”.  He also relied on the report during the copyright reform process to oppose providing rights holders with effective means to combat illegal content on the Internet including a notice and takedown copyright regime and a graduated response regime.[54]  However, although clearly relevant, he chose not to refer to it here.

Even the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) (of which Geist is an Advisory Board member)[55] has accepted that website blocking determinations may be made by non-judicial bodies, as indicated by the EFF’s submission to the European Court of Human Rights which, relying on the May 2011 report to the UN, stated:

(ii) Any determination of what content should be blocked must be undertaken by a competent judicial authority or a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted influences[56]

Blocking should only be ordered by a court or other independent and impartial adjudicatory body[57] (emphasis added)

There is no question that the CRTC fulfills these requirements. Its independence has been repeatedly recognized by Canadian courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada,.[58]

Geist also cites a review by Stanford University students (a student policy lab practicum) of website blocking in the context of human rights: [59]

OAS countries would likely violate their human rights obligations if they held intermediaries liable for failing to block entire sites or services in cases where no court order has been issued, as this might characterize an indirect interference on freedom of expression, prohibited by Article 13, 3 of the ACHR.

For the above proposition, the Stanford students cite the Manila Principles, a set of guidelines produced by non-governmental activist organizations, such as the EFF, Article 19, and OpenMedia.[60]

Geist, however, quotes selectively from the student paper. Elsewhere, the paper acknowledged that “site and service blocking” can be issued by administrative orders:

“SSB can be imposed based on judicial orders, administrative orders, or private requests.“[61]

The Stanford paper also quotes from the Council of Europe, Joint Declaration On Freedom Of Expression And “Fake News,” Disinformation And Propaganda which states that Internet intermediaries should not be liable for third party content unless they refused to obey an order of a court or other body with legal authority:[62]

Intermediaries should never be liable for any third-party content relating to those services unless they specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey an order adopted in accordance with due process guarantees by an independent, impartial, authoritative oversight body (such as a court) to remove it and they have the technical capacity to do that.[63]

Moreover, Geist’s assertion that any limitation on freedom of expression on the Internet must be made by court order is flatly contradicted by international norms as many countries including Italy, Portugal, Greece, Mexico, South Korea, Australia, France, Finland, and others permit blocking orders to be made by government agencies for copyright or other purposes as summarized above.[64]

In fact, this practice is referred to in the Council of Europe’s Comparative Study on Blocking, Filtering and Take-Down of Illegal Internet Content.  Geist quotes from the study as follows:[65]

It is recalled that the courts of law are the guarantors of justice which have a fundamental role to play in a state governed by the rule of law.  In the absence of a valid legal basis the issuing of blocking orders and decisions by public or private institutions other than courts of law is therefore inherently problematic from a human rights perspective.  Even provided that a legal basis exists for blocking access to websites, any interference must be proportionate to the legitimate objective pursued.

This passage is only one part of a much longer treatment of the issue. Geist does not quote the Council of Europe’s further statement that:[66]

In most states, it is courts of law which retain ultimate authority for ordering the removal and blocking of Internet content said to breach such privacy rights.  This is the case for countries which operate specific rules on the removal and blocking of Internet material as well as those with no targeted legal framework, where individuals must generally rely on injunctive relief from judges under general laws.  However, in countries such as France, Russia and Turkey, one finds administrative authorities with considerable powers to request the removal of material which breaches privacy rights, particularly in the field of data protection.  These may even have the right, in certain circumstances, to order an Internet intermediary to remove or block access to offending material without prior judicial authority. (emphasis added)

Geist’s claim that there is an international norm that website blocking can only be made by courts is also plainly contradicted by the Guideline published by the Council of Europe related to the use of Internet filters and blocking to protect freedom of expression in the EU under the European Convention on Human Rights.[67] The Guideline requires that member states:

ii. guarantee that nationwide general blocking or filtering measures are only introduced by the state if the conditions of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the European Convention on Human Rights are fulfilled.  Such action by the state should only be taken if the filtering concerns specific and clearly identifiable content, a competent national authority has taken a decision on its illegality and the decision can be reviewed by an independent and impartial tribunal or regulatory body, in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; [68] (emphasis added)

Based on the forgoing, Geist’s claims that the FairPlay proposal is fatally flawed for violating human rights norms because it is premised on the CRTC making the applicable orders is not correct.  In fact, the forgoing shows the opposite to be true.

Geist claim: the proposal will violate Canadian net neutrality rules

Geist says that “the most audacious” assurance made by the FairPlay coalition is that “site blocking does not raise net neutrality issues”.  Not only does Geist fail to establish this claim, but even a cursory review of his reasons show that the opposite is true.

Geist begins his argument by stating, “that the starting principle for net neutrality is the right for users to access content and applications of their choice, blocking content is prima facie a net neutrality violation.”  But, as I showed in my prior post through international examples, the principle is not absolute and the “no blocking” principle does not prevent courts or other public bodies from blocking illegal content.  This was recently confirmed in a statement by Minister Bains when commenting on the proposal:

Our government supports an open internet where Canadians have the ability to access the content of their choice in accordance to Canadian laws,” said Bains, in an emailed statement to MobileSyrup.  “In other words, our Government believes that all legal content must be treated equally by internet service providers (ISPs).  That’s why our government has a strong net neutrality framework in place through the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).”[69]  (emphasis added)

Geist never explains the source of his purported rule that net neutrality prevents courts or other lawful authorities from taking measures to protect the public from online illegal threats and menaces.  Indeed, if such a rule existed, it would be both surprising and dangerous.  It would create the incongruity that what is unlawful and can be enjoined offline cannot be enjoined online.  Such a radical view of net neutrality would undermine the rule of law on the Internet and responsibility and accountability in Internet Governance.  What we need is an Internet governance ecosystem that encourages freedom, responsibility, accountability and transparency, not one premised on protecting Internet criminals. [70]

Geist doesn’t argue that there is any international law or treaty that prevents governments from protecting the public online because of net neutrality.  Accordingly, if such a rule exists internationally, it must be premised on an international norm.  Leaving aside just how difficult it is to establish the existence of an international norm – it can’t be established by pointing to the law of one or even several countries – Geist doesn’t come close to citing anything that supports the existence of such a norm.[71]

In fact, Geist’s own arguments on the FairPlay proposal show the opposite is true.  As summarized above, Geist argued that human rights norms require website blocking to be mandated by court orders.  In support of this claim he referred to the 2012 joint declaration which expressly recognizes that blocking orders may be made, although because of the brevity of the document it didn’t elaborate on the issue of which bodies could make the orders as the much longer 2011 report to the UN did.  The  Stanford student project and the report from the Council of Europe documents both cite numerous examples of website blocking around the world.  Further, Geist admits that over 22 countries engage in website blocking for copyright purposes.  The number that block for copyright and other purposes is even higher.  But, it is hard to imagine that all of this legally authorized blocking could co-exist with an internationally recognized norm that prohibits this.

Further, as described above, many jurisdictions authorize web site blocking for copyright purposes using government agencies including Greece, Italy, and Portugal in the EU and South Korea, and others permit it for other purposes.  These facts show, as I argued in my prior blog post responding to Geist, that net neutrality norms or principles are not absolute.  Rather, they co-exist with – and do not trump – laws that permit website blocking by court or government agencies.

Geist tries to make his argument referring to the laws of a few countries.  Even assuming that the laws of a few countries could establish an international norm when the practices around the world contradict it, Geist’s examples contradict the existence of the norm he alleges to exist.

Geist admits that the United States is an example of a country with a net neutrality law that does “indeed limit its applicability to ‘lawful content’”.  He contends, however, that “that rule has now been suspended”, suggesting that this would undermine the precedent.

The FCC did not, however, vote to suspend or repudiate the core principles of net neutrality.  Rather, it voted to reverse the 2015 Wheeler Order that Internet services were subject to “Title II” regulation under the U.S. Communications Act.[72]  The recent 2017 FCC’s Restoring Internet Freedom order actually re-affirmed the policy that had been in effect in the United States since 2005 that the no blocking rule only applied to lawful content.  The transparency (mandatory disclosure rule) adopted as part of the 2017 order only applies to “lawful content”.  Further, in the 2017 order the FCC expressly re-affirmed its policy with respect to the “Four Freedoms” originally adopted as policy statement in FCC 05-151.  These were repeated in footnote 773 and are

the freedoms for consumers to (1) “access the lawful Internet content of their choice”; (2) “run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement”; (3) “connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network”; and (4) “enjoy competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers.” [73] (emphasis added)

The newly enacted net neutrality law in Washington State continues to limit the rule to “lawful content”, further evidencing that the U.S. contradicts the claim to any such internationally accepted norm.[74]

Geist also points to India’s net neutrality recommendations published by TRAI, India’s telecom regulator. He says that “TRAI established a limited exception for blocking unlawful content with no exception for piracy”.  India, even according to Geist therefore, is an example of another country that counters his claim that there is a norm that blocking websites is prima facie a net neutrality violation.  It goes farther as it also evidences that blocking by government orders does not violate an international net neutrality norm.

However, TRAI’s recommendations do not appear to be worded to exclude piracy.  TRAI reviewed Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 which expressly permits blocking by order of a designated government authority.  That provision had been found to be constitutionally valid by the Supreme Court of India and has been used to block copyright pirate sites.[75]  After review of the decision of the Supreme Court, TRAI concluded:

Accordingly, the Authority finds that any action taken by a TSP to implement any order of a court or direction issued by the Government, in accordance with law, or action taken in pursuance of any international treaty must be regarded as a valid exemption. (emphasis added).

Geist does not refer to the actual final recommendations of TRAI which appears to have created a broad exception for blocking any content (the wording appears to include infringing copyright content) through “Implementation of any order of a court or direction issued by the Government, in accordance with law”.[76]

Geist also refers to Europe’s net neutrality regulation.[77]  He admits that the regulation permits website blocking of illegal content.  EU’s law therefore also rebuts his argument that website blocking of illegal content is a prima facie violation of some international net neutrality norm.

He argues, however, that the regulation does not permit blocking by government agencies based on the wording of Article 3(3)(a) which states the following:

Providers of internet access services shall not engage in traffic management measures going beyond those set out in the second subparagraph, and in particular shall not block, slow down, alter, restrict, interfere with, degrade or discriminate between specific content, applications or services, or specific categories thereof, except as necessary, and only for as long as necessary, in order to:

(a) comply with Union legislative acts, or national legislation that complies with Union law, to which the provider of internet access services is subject, or with measures that comply with Union law giving effect to such Union legislative acts or national legislation, including with orders by courts or public authorities vested with relevant powers; (emphasis added)

Geist does not explain how Italy, Portugal or Greece could have implemented website blocking using government agencies if he was right.  Nor does he explain how the clear wording of the regulation which excludes “comply with Union legislative acts, or national legislation” or “orders by courts or public authorities vested with relevant powers” means anything other than what it says.  The only support for Geist’s position is his reference to a report by BEREC on the outcome of a consultation saying:

In assessing how to interpret the provision, BEREC, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, commented in 2016 that “these issues would require an approach based on legislation, rather than being voluntary or self-regulatory.”  The emphasis on court orders or legislation – not voluntary or self-regulatory models – points to the need for due process that involves court or legislators.[78]

The portion of the report quoted by Geist responded to submissions made during the consultation advocating that ISPs should be able to block content that was illegal under EU law on a voluntary or self-regulatory basis. It did not address any suggestion that ISPs should not be required to block illegal content by orders of public authorities.[79]  Nevertheless, the regulation could be read to also permit blocking without any order on a voluntary basis based on the exception to “comply with Union legislative acts or national legislation”.

What is telling is that Geist does not refer to the final version of the BEREC Guidelines on the Implementation by National Regulators of European Net Neutrality Rules.[80]  The Guideline first quotes from Recital 13 of the EU regulation (also not referred to by Geist) which says:

Recital 13 First, situations may arise in which providers of internet access services are subject to Union legislative acts, or national legislation that complies with Union law (for example, related to the lawfulness of content, applications or services, or to public safety), including criminal law, requiring, for example, blocking of specific content, applications or services.  In addition, situations may arise in which those providers are subject to measures that comply with Union law, implementing or applying Union legislative acts or national legislation, such as measures of general application, court orders, decisions of public authorities vested with relevant powers, or other measures ensuring compliance with such Union legislative acts or national legislation (for example, obligations to comply with court orders or orders by public authorities requiring to block unlawful content).  (emphasis added).

The Guideline then repeated that an ISP could engage in blocking “for legal reasons, namely to comply with the legislation or measures by public authorities specified in that exception”.

Geist also claims that Canada’s net neutrality framework “was never limited in application to content that is ‘lawful’”.  This is also not accurate.

Section 36 of the Telecommunications Act, as interpreted by the CRTC gives the CRTC the express authority to approve blocking by carriers.[81] The CRTC ruled in the Quebec gambling decision that it would approve blocking illegal traffic “where it would further the telecommunications policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Act”.[82]  So interpreted, Canada’s net neutrality framework does not prevent blocking illegal traffic; it just requires CRTC approval to do so.

Geist cites the Commission’s Internet traffic management practices (ITMP) decision as authority for his position.[83]  That decision also clearly stated that the CRTC had the authority to approve blocking of content.  Thus, blocking orders are also not a prima facie violation of Canada’s net neutrality laws.

The Commission notes that the majority of parties are in agreement that actions by ISPs that result in outright blocking of access to content would be prohibited under section 36 unless prior approval was obtained from the Commission.  The Commission finds that where an ITMP would lead to blocking the delivery of content to an end-user, it cannot be implemented without prior Commission approval.

Accordingly, the real question is not whether blocking illegal content violates Canadian net neutrality principles.  It is what test will the CRTC apply in a case such as the FairPlay proposal.

Geist claims based on the ITMP decision that the CRTC would only make such an order in exceptional circumstances relying on the following passage from the decision:

Approval under section 36 would only be granted if it would further the telecommunications policy objectives set out in section 7 of the Act. Interpreted in light of these policy objectives, ITMPs that result in blocking Internet traffic would only be approved in exceptional circumstances, as they involve denying access to telecommunications services.

Geist, however, argues that when the CRTC referred to exceptional circumstances it intended that test also to apply to blocking illegal content.  However, that is questionable.  The reference to “exceptional circumstances” used in the ITMP decision was not used in the gambling decision, which suggests that the Commission’s view is that blocking of illegal conduct would not be subject to the “exceptional circumstances” standard.

The Commission ITMP decision stated:

The Commission notes that Canadian ISPs have used certain ITMPs for the purposes of network security and integrity.  Specifically, these ITMPs have been employed to protect users from network threats such as malicious software, spam, and distribution of illicit materials.  In the Commission’s view, such activities are unlikely to trigger complaints or concerns under the Act and are a necessary part of an ISP’s network operations.(emphasis added)

Geist says that the reference “to illicit materials” in the CRTC decision only “refers to network threats, not the content of the materials”.  That is one interpretation, but it is not the only one.

But, the real question is whether the ITMP decision should be read as Commission policy on Internet blocking of structurally infringing pirate sites. Blocking access to illegal content is not an “ITMP” per se and the “exceptional circumstances” test was developed for ITMPs.  That decision dealt only with Internet traffic management practices such as those pertaining to managing traffic to prevent or respond to network congestion, as well as economic approaches, which link rates for Internet service to end-user consumption.  The Commission was not considering its policy for blocking orders when developing the ITMP framework.

The Commission itself noted that the ITMP framework was not intended to apply to “ITMPs used only for the purpose of network security or in order to protect network integrity.[84]  The Commission also caveated its decision, noting that the ITMP framework was not intended to apply where the matter is “one of discrimination or preference”.[85]  It can also be cogently argued that the framework was not developed to address the issue now before the CRTC.

The categorical assertion by Geist that the CRTC has decided the very issue in this case is simply not a reasonable conclusion.

Geist claim: website blocking is not effective

Geist claims that web site blocking is ineffective as an anti-piracy solution. He says this despite his own endorsement of site blocking as an anti-child pornography solution.[86]

He refers to various studies, reports and cases, but many of those he cites actually support the conclusion that site blocking is an effective remedy.  Geist also skips over other leading studies and court decisions from other countries that are important to assessing the viability of using web site blocking to reduce online infringements facilitated by piracy sites.

Geist refers to a November 2015 UK study by Professor Brett Danaher which examined the efficacy of a 2012 site block of the Pirate Bay and further site blocks in the UK in 2013.  Geist says this study “found little impact when the Pirate Bay was blocked with authors concluding that effectiveness depended on far broader blocking efforts”.  The “far broader blocking efforts” examined in the study, which Geist doesn’t elucidate, was that the further blocking of 19 piracy sites lead to a strong decrease in piracy levels and increases in the usage of paid streaming sites. According to the study:

These data show that the blocking of The Pirate Bay, one of the largest BitTorrent sites in the UK caused was associated with only a small decrease in total piracy and caused no increase in the adoption of legal distribution services for digital movies and television…. The data suggest that former Pirate Bay users merely switched to unblocked “proxy” sites that mirrored the contents of The Pirate Bay or dispersed to other filesharing websites to consume media illegally.  As we will note later, paid legal streaming services were relatively nascent during this block.  However, our data suggest that when nineteen major piracy websites were simultaneously blocked in October-November 2013, the results were different.  Here we observed a strong decrease in total piracy levels as a result of these blocks and we also find that these blocks caused users of the blocked sites to increase their usage of paid legal streaming sites by 12%.  The lightest users of the blocked sites (and thus the users least affected by the blocks, other than the control group) increased their clicks on paid streaming sites by 3.5% while the heaviest users of the blocked sites increased their paid streaming clicks by 23.6%.  Thus, our results show website blocking may have a significant impact on legal consumption when multiple sites are blocked at once and when legal digital services are well-developed and convenient.[87]

Professor Danaher updated his study in 2016. Geist did not refer to the publicly available and widely known updated study.  This study is cited in almost all serious examinations of the effectiveness of web blocking on countering piracy.  It examined the efficacy of a single UK site blocking order in 2014 that blocked 53 websites.  The study found a 90% reduction in visits to those sites, a 22% decrease in total piracy, and a 6-10% increase in visits to legal streaming services.[88]

Geist also did not refer to a corroborating study by Incopro of blocks of 24 linking and P2P portal sites in the UK published in November 2014 and updated in March 2015.[89]  This study found that the blocking had both short and long term effectiveness in reducing usage of the blocked pirate websites.[90]

Geist also refers to a study published by Incopro in May 2017 on the effectiveness of site blocking in Australia.[91]  The study, as Geist points out, examined both the reduction in usage of the sites blocked but also examined usage of a list of 250 unauthorized sites.  He summarized the study findings saying:

Usage of the top 250 sites in Australia decreased by 4% (204,843) when comparing March 2017 to October 2016. Usage of the same sites reduced by 13% for the global (excluding Australia) group and by 10.8% for the global control group.

His summary ignores the findings in the study pertaining to the efficacy of blocks on the sites subject to the court orders or the explanation in the report for the relatively slower decline in usage of the top 250 unauthorized sites in Australia relative to global usage.  A key finding in the report was:

that the blocks are having the desired impact having decreased usage of those sites in the target region by 45.7% more than they have decreased in the global control.  Overall usage of the top 250 unauthorised sites has decreased by 4% in Australia and by 13% globally (excluding Australia).  It is expected that the reason for this difference is that site blocking in Australia is not yet widespread enough to have an impact upon overall usage of the top 250 sites in the country, due to only five main sites having been blocked. Of these sites, one remains relatively popular in the region, whilst three were shut down. (emphasis added)

Geist also claimed that the Australia study concluded that the declines were lower than global averages because “there may have been an increase in the usage of some unblocked sites as a result of the most popular site being blocked.”  While the study did suggest that there may have been an increase in the usage of unblocked sites as a result of popular sites being blocked, the study found that the reason may have been due to the fact that only 5 sites were blocked.  That explanation was confirmed in the subsequent Incopro study.

The Incopro study of site blocking in Australia was followed up by a second study published in February 2018.[92] This study was conducted following two further site blocking orders by Australian courts.  The study showed both a marked decrease in usage of the sites blocked as well as an overall decrease in usage of the top 250 film and TV pirate sites accessed in Australia.  The report found that site blocking in Australia resulted in a usage reduction of 53.4% to blocked sites when comparing usage before blocking took effect.  Usage decreased for each blocking wave implemented in the country.  The usage of the top 50 piracy sites in Australia decreased by 35.1%. This was 25.5% further than the 10.6% in the previous report.  The impact of the two August 2017 blocking injunctions was the driving force behind these changes.  Overall usage of the top 250 unauthorised sites decreased by 25.4% in Australia.[93]

Geist claimed that the second Australia Incopro study suffered “from technical shortcomings given the inability to actually track the impact of users shifting to VPNs in order to preserve their privacy and evade blocking efforts”. He does not mention that Incopro tracked the use of two kinds of proxies used to access the blocked sites: dedicated sites offering access or a mirror of a specific blocked site, and sites offering access to more than one blocked site from one place (‘multi-site proxies’).  It concluded that the use of those proxies was low.

Incopro explained that it did not track “VPN and proxy services…because they allow users to access any website of their choice” and because “it cannot be definitively concluded that they are being used to access unauthorised sites”.  Geist provides no evidence to suggest that had VPNs and proxy services been measured that the results of the study would have been materially different.  It is true that some individuals may have the technical expertise and be willing to expend the time and effort to bypass a site block using a proxy service.  However, the authorities have observed that many users will not have the expertise or be willing to expend the time or money to use them.[94]

Geist also did not refer to other well-known publicly available studies that also demonstrate that site blocking significantly reduces usage of blocked sites as well as overall usage of other piracy facilitating sites.

Geist did not refer to a 2016 study prepared by the MPA for the Korean Communications Standards Commission (KCSC) on the impact of three web blocking orders in South Korea.[95]  The effects of the traffic data was clear: visits to blocked sites declined on average 90% as of three months after a block.  Further, overall traffic to piracy sites (including unblocked sites) also declined.  Significance testing confirmed a 15% decrease in total piracy visits.

Geist also didn’t refer to the Incopro study that examined the effectiveness of the administrative site blocks implemented in Portugal published in May 2017.[96]  The study found that there was an overall 69.7% drop in usage to the sites affected by the first 8 administrative blocking waves ordered in the country.  The 65 blocked sites in the top 250 unauthorised sites in Portugal decreased in usage by a total of 56.6% even though they increased by 3.9% globally.  Overall usage of the top 250 unauthorised sites decreased by 9.3%, even though they increased by 30.8% for the global control group clearing showing that the blocks contributed to reducing overall usage of pirate sites in Portugal.

Geist also did not refer to or consider significant data published by the IFPI in its annual Digital Musical Reports on the positive effects of site blocking on usage of pirate sites.[97]

Geist referred to a 2015 Working Paper published, but not endorsed, by the European Commission. It tracked the effect of shutting down the popular German video streaming site Kino.to and found only short-lived reductions in piracy levels as users gravitated to other sources.[98] Geist did not, however, refer to the qualifications in the report including that the results might well have been different in markets where there are well developed alternatives (such as Canada).[99]

In fact, Prof. Danaher showed that the qualification referenced above to be accurate in a later study that analysed the impact of the US government’s shutdown of the major piracy site Megaupload.com on digital sales and rentals of movies.[100]  The study found that the closing of this major online piracy site increased digital media sales and that Internet movie piracy displaced digital film sales.  The study concluded that in the 18 weeks following the shutdown of MegaUpload, digital revenues for several movies were 6-10% higher across 12 countries, than they would have been if not for the shutdown.

Geist also relies on a decision of a Dutch appeals court made in January 2014 as an example of a decision which found website blocking to be ineffective.  But, he failed to point out that the decision was reversed on this point by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands.

The 2014 decision Geist referred to lifted an order made by a District Court in 2012 that required the Dutch ISPs Ziggo and XS4ALL to block The Pirate Bay in the Netherlands.  The District Court had found the order would have been effective and proportionate stating:

Finally Ziggo and XS4ALL alleged that the claimed orders are not proportionate, because they will not be effective.  Ziggo and XS4ALL allege that subscribers can and will easily circumvent the blockades, since there are several technical options to do so, such as for instance by using an anonymous web proxy provider or by virtual hosting.

In the view of the District Court the defense that a blockade is not effective and as a result disproportionate is unsuccessful.  Without any doubt there will be subscribers who will (know how to) circumvent the blockades, as Ziggo and XS4ALL allege.  However, this is not a sufficient ground to dismiss the claimed blockades. In any case the blockades will be an additional barrier.  This already appears from the circumstance that in Italy, witness the documents submitted by Brein as are not refuted, after the access to The Pirate Bay had been blocked, in several months the number of visitors of The Pirate Bay dropped from 140,000 to less than 10,000 unique visitors a day.  A similar trend can be seen with the blockade in Denmark, as Brein alleged without being refuted.[101]

The 2014 court of appeal decision Geist referred to, lifted the injunction on the basis that it was not proportionate because it was not effective.[102]  What Geist failed to mention is that the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands on two issues.[103]  First, whether the court below had erred in concluding that the order was ineffective and not proportionate; secondly, whether there was a legal basis to grant an injunction in the first place.

On the first issue, the Supreme Court reversed the 2014 decision that had found the order not to be proportionate finding the court had erred in law in its assessment of the effectiveness of the injunction.  According to the court:

The purpose of the action by Brein is to obtain an injunction against Ziggo is to block the access of their subscribers to TPB. The appeal court measured the effectiveness of the requested injunction against the pursued objective of Brein to completely cease (all possible) infringements of copyright of rightholders, committed with the use of the internet, or at least with use of (BitTorrent) websites.  In this regard the appeal court failed to recognise that even when certain measures cannot lead to complete cessation of all copyright infringements, they can still be consistent with the condition of proportionality as meant in article 52 (1) Charter.  It follows from paragraphs 62-63 of the ECJ judgment UPC Telekabel Wien after all, that the mere fact that a blocking can be circumvented, doesn’t make the blocking ineffective.  It is sufficient that the blocking – in so far as the blocking cannot prevent the infringements – at least makes the infringement difficult to achieve and seriously discourages internet users from committing the acts of infringement.

The judgment of the appeal court (in par 5.24) that a claim such as the one at hand could only be upheld if (all) other (relevant) BitTorrent-sites were involved in the proceedings, also demonstrates an incorrect interpretation of the law. Such a requirement finds no support in European and national legislation.  Without further substantiation, it cannot be seen why Brein doesn’t have a rightful interest in blocking one of those sites to start off with.  The judgment of the appeal court that the ‘ step-by-step’ approach advocated by Brein means the upholding of the claim would be in contradiction with the proportionality principle of article 52(1) Charter, is therefore incorrect.

Taking the above into consideration, the sections III.3-III.4 and III.10 of the plea in the main appeal succeed.

The Supreme Court referred the question as to whether there was a legal basis to make the blocking order to the European Court of Justice. Europe’s top court held that there was.[104]

Following that ruling the blocking order was re-instated in September 2017 pursuant to an interlocutory injunction by the Hague Court which found the measure to be effective and proportionate.[105]  According to the Dutch anti-piracy group BREIN, The Pirate Bay’s main domain suffered a 40 percent drop in Dutch traffic due to local ISPs blocking the torrent site following the blocking order of the Dutch court.[106]  The Supreme Court of the Netherlands must still decide whether to make the interlocutory order final.

Geist also doesn’t mention that following this decision another Dutch court made another blocking order against streaming servers making available illicit broadcasts of soccer matches, also finding such an order would be proportionate.[107]

While Geist referred to the overruled Dutch case to make his argument that site blocking is not effective, he did not refer to the many other cases on point that also addressed the issue even though he claims to have reviewed “many of the site blocking cases from around the world”.

The leading case on website blocking in the EU is the decision of the CJEU in the UPC Telekabel case.[108]  The court confirmed that blocking orders meet the EU efficacy requirement.  It also held they do not have to lead to a complete cessation of the infringements or that they cannot be circumvented.

As regards intellectual property, it should be pointed out at the outset that it is possible that the enforcement of an injunction such as that in the main proceedings will not lead to a complete cessation of the infringements of the intellectual property right of the persons concerned.

First, as has been stated, the addressee of such an injunction has the possibility of avoiding liability, and thus of not adopting some measures that may be achievable, if those measures are not capable of being considered reasonable.

Secondly, it is possible that a means of putting a complete end to the infringements of the intellectual property right does not exist or is not in practice achievable, as a result of which some measures taken might be capable of being circumvented in one way or another.

The Court notes that there is nothing whatsoever in the wording of Article 17(2) of the Charter to suggest that the right to intellectual property is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected (see, to that effect, Scarlet Extended, paragraph 43).

Nonetheless, the measures which are taken by the addressee of an injunction, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, when implementing that injunction must be sufficiently effective to ensure genuine protection of the fundamental right at issue, that is to say that they must have the effect of preventing unauthorized access to the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the subject-matter made available to them in breach of that fundamental right.

Consequently, even though the measures taken when implementing an injunction such as that at issue in the main proceedings are not capable of leading, in some circumstances, to a complete cessation of the infringements of the intellectual property right, they cannot however be considered to be incompatible with the requirement that a fair balance be found, in accordance with Article 52(1), in fine, of the Charter, between all applicable fundamental rights, provided that (i) they do not unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of lawfully accessing the information available and (ii) that they have the effect of preventing unauthorized access to protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services of the addressee of that injunction from accessing the subject-matter that has been made available to them in breach of the intellectual property right.

Other European cases have also found blocking orders to be effective and proportionate. In the Cartier case,[109]  Justice Arnold found that “blocking of targeted websites has proved reasonably effective in reducing use of those websites in the UK”.

In a case involving the Premier League,[110] Justice Arnold issued a blocking order against streaming servers.  To prevent over blocking, the court required blocking the IP address for FirstRow’s domain name (firstrow1.eu) and was satisfied that it would not result in over-blocking.  The court agreed with the evidence adduced by the applicant that even though the orders were “narrow and targeted ones” the order was likely to be reasonably effective.

In another case involving the Premier League[111] Justice Arnold ordered ISPs to block streaming servers to prevent access to scheduled soccer matches including by individuals using ISDs.  In his decision he re-iterated his opinion that such orders would substantially reduce infringements.  He said:

FAPL contends that the Order will be effective and dissuasive in that it will substantially reduce infringements of FAPL’s copyrights in the Works by UK consumers accessing the Target Servers.  This contention is supported by a number of factors.

First, past experience suggests that blocking causes a material reduction in the number of UK users who access blocked websites: see for example the evidence reviewed in my judgment in Cartier at [220]-[236].  The same may be expected to be true of blocked streaming servers.

Secondly, recent academic literature supports this conclusion.  For example, research by Brett Danaher, Michael Smith and Rahul Telang of the School of Information Systems, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University published in April 2016 (available via SSRN) concluded that blocking of 53 BitTorrent and online streaming websites as a result of orders of this Court in November 2014 reduced access to those sites by 90% from the UK, resulted in a decrease in overall piracy rates by 22% for users affected by the blocks, and increased consumption of legal content by between 6% (Netflix) and 10% (BBC and Channel 5).

Thirdly, as discussed above, blocking access to streaming servers is likely to be more effective than blocking websites which embed or link to streams from such servers both because streaming servers are the crucial link and because multiple websites typically embed or link to each server stream.

Fourthly, monitoring and blocking techniques employed by FAPL and the Defendants respectively have improved considerably since earlier blocking orders were made, in some instances because of improved automation and in other instances because of the investment of manual resources to carry out blocking at the relevant times.  This makes it feasible to identify and block Target Servers much more rapidly than before, leading to the prevention of an even greater proportion of potential infringements.

Fifthly, there is reason to hope that blocking access to the Target Servers will help to educate UK consumers that accessing infringing streams is not a lawful or reliable way to access Premier League content.

While there is always the prospect that some users and/or operators will circumvent blocking, there is no evidence to suggest that the likelihood of this occurring will be any greater in the present case than in other cases.

In the 1967 case,[112] a UK court made a blocking order against a series of BitTorrent sites.  The court accepted evidence that such orders had been effective in the past even if they could be circumvented by users:

I would add that the Claimants’ evidence on the present application includes additional support for the efficacy of such orders: using comScore data, the Claimants calculate that, on average, the number of UK visitors to Bittorrent websites which have been the subject of blocking orders has declined by 87%.  No doubt some of these users are using circumvention measures which are not reflected in the comScore data, but for the reasons given elsewhere it seems clear that not all users do this.

In a recent U.K. decision, Union Des Associations Européennes De Football v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors,[113]  Justice Arnold made an injunction order on behalf of UEFA, the governing body for the association of soccer in Europe, requiring the ISP defendants to block, or at least impede, access by their customers to streaming servers which deliver infringing live streams of UEFA competition matches to UK consumers.  In giving reasons for decision, Justice Arnold found the proposed order to be appropriate and proportionate. Dealing first with the need for the order to combat piracy he said:

First, the need for such orders has been emphasised by further evidence which has become available since then as to the scale of the problem of illicit streaming. By way of example, in a report entitled Cracking Down on Digital Piracy published by the Federation Against Copyright Theft in September 2017, the UK Intellectual Property Office was quoted as saying that it believed that, at a conservative estimate, a million set-top boxes with software added to them to facilitate illegal streaming had been sold in the UK in the last couple of years.

He then found that such orders had been effective and had achieved this without over-blocking.

Secondly, as noted in FAPL v BT II at [5], the evidence filed by FAPL in that case demonstrated that the order made in FAPL v BT I was very effective in achieving the blocking of access to the Target Servers during Premier League matches and that no evidence had been found of overblocking.  The evidence filed in support of the present application is that the order made in FAPL v BT II has also been very effective and there is still no evidence of overblocking.

A court in Australia came to the same conclusion that a proposed blocking order would be effective without a danger of over-blocking.

I accept the applicants’ submission that the orders sought would be effective at preventing a meaningful proportion of Australian users from infringing copyright via the online location in the future, without giving rise to a danger of “overblocking” legitimate websites.[114]

In Norway, a court recently granted a blocking order to prevent access to the streaming service Popcorn Time.  The court noted the attraction of this kind of illegal site, the adverse effects on rights holders, and that the blocking order would be effective.

Probably the harmful effects of Popcorn Time are greater than the damaging effects of the previously blocked websites because Popcorn Time is especially user-friendly and can be used without much more technical knowledge than that needed to use the legal services…

Popcorn Time is also distinct from the earlier the cases by its even greater usability. It is documented by a demonstration video that is attached to the application that the service works just like that of corresponding legal services.  It is welcoming and easy to use, and the Popcorn Time application combines several different software elements which the users otherwise would have had to download and learn to use separately.  Probably this is one of the reasons for the popularity of the service.  The rights holders have characterised the user experience at Popcorn Time as a “Netflix experience” and this is, in the court’s view, more or less right.

It is clear that so popular and user friendly pirate services have major adverse effects for the rights holders, and that their interests to a significant extent suggest that an order should be issued.  Loss of illegal services will hardly lead to all users being led over on legal alternatives, but experience indicates that blocking is an effective measure that reduces illegal use.  This is documented in exhibit 34 to the application.[115]

A government agency in Portugal allowed the blocking of The Pirate Bay.  In doing so it reviewed the efficacy of prior blocking orders in other jurisdictions finding them to be effective, including in increasing traffic to legitimate sites (Germany) and also noted the educational benefits of web site blocking orders:

Let us now see some other relevant considerations on the issue of effectiveness. In Belgium, in September 2011, the Court of Appeal of Antwerp ordered ISPs Belgacom and Telenet to block access to the website “The Pirate Bay” by blocking the domain name service. Data from “comScore” shows that this reduced the service audience by 84% between August and November 2011.  In Italy, ISPs were forced to block access to the website “The Pirate Bay” in February 2010 (at the time, the largest torrent site in Italy), which caused the use of the service to fall dramatically – it was still at 74% in 2012 (report date in quote).  In April 2011, the ISPs were also sentenced to block the website “btjunkie”, another important torrent site in Italy.  The use of the service fell by 80%.  In Denmark, the Supreme Court of Justice required ISPs to block access to the website “The Pirate Bay” in 2010.  Blocking measures were also introduced in 2011 in Austria and Finland, requiring ISPs to block access to “The Pirate Bay” or other similar websites.  In the United Kingdom, in October 2011, the Supreme Court ordered the ISP “BT” to block the unauthorised service “Newzbin2” 42.  Between January 2012 and July 2013, European countries where blocking orders were determined saw the use of the website “BitTorrent” fall 11%, while European countries where this has not occurred witnessed a rise in the “BitTorrent” use by 15%….

The effect was particularly pronounced in two countries, Italy and the United Kingdom, where the largest number of illegal services was blocked. In Italy, the “BitTorrent” traffic decreased 13% in 2013 and in the United Kingdom the same traffic decreased 20% compared to the same period…

From another perspective, the side effects of the blockings cannot also be disregarded, namely the moral and pedagogical effects on users, because the fact of having their access to the works blocked will give them greater awareness of the practice – or contribution thereto – of an illegal act.  Indeed, if such act is repeated freely over the years without being sanctioned and if the authorities do not take any action on the basis of the premise that it is not worth it, users will have a natural tendency to internalise the sense that the activity is legal or tolerated.  A study conducted in Germany shows that the enforcement measures have been gaining acceptance among the German population, in such a way that more and more Internet users end up changing their habits of illegal downloads or streaming from legal sources.  The same research shows that currently 97% of the study group realises that the download or upload of content of copyright protected works in file sharing networks is a violation of copyright law.  The research also shows that awareness within the German community has increased, which is one of the effects that copyright holders aim to achieve with enforcement measures.[116]

Decisions from Courts in Denmark,[117] Spain,[118] and Sweden[119] have also found that site blocking is effective.

Courts in Europe have also observed that even if some users may find ways of circumventing blocking measures, the number who do so are limited because of the time, expertise and potential costs associated with doing so.  The time and expertise acts as an impediment and the costs (such as those to subscribe to an infringing service), VPN or proxy, narrows the gap between legitimate and illegal services thus making illegal services less attractive.

In the Newzbin2 case for example,[120] a UK court made an order to block a site that enabled users to access significant infringing content that required paying a small fee. The court found the order was likely to be effective even though some users would be able to circumvent the blocks using technical measures.  According to the court:

First, it seems likely that circumvention will require many users to acquire additional expertise beyond that they presently possess. Even assuming that they all have the ability to acquire such expertise, it does not follow that they will all wish to expend the time and effort required.

Secondly, evidence filed by the Studios suggests that circumvention measures are likely to lead to slower performance and lower quality downloads, at least unless users are prepared to pay for a certain service provided by a different provider.  Again, it is not necessarily the case that all users will be prepared to do this.  This is not merely a question of money: there is also a potential security issue with using such services.

Thirdly, it is important not to overlook the question of economics. As I have explained above, Newzbin2 members have to pay a subscription to use it to access content.  They will also need to have a Usenet service.  For the reasons Mr Hutty himself explains, they will commonly need to use a paid service.  Thus they are not getting infringing content for free even as matters stand.  If, in addition to paying for (a) a Usenet service and (b) Newzbin2, the users have to pay for (c) an additional service for circumvention purposes, then the cost differential between using Newzbin2 and using a lawful service (such as a DVD rental service) will narrow still further.  This is particularly true for less active users.  The smaller the cost differential, the more likely it is that at least some users will be prepared to pay a little extra to obtain material from a legitimate service.[121]

Other courts have come to similar conclusions that the average Internet user will not try to circumvent blocking, including courts in Belgium,[122] France[123] and Finland.[124] .

Geist also referred to various other documents in support of his claim, none of which detract from the strong evidence above about the effectiveness of site blocking.

He cites the UK’s Ofcom’s paper that stated that “any injunction scheme operated under sections 17 and 18 of the DEA is unlikely to give rise to a sufficient level of actions to have a material impact on levels of copyright infringement.” This paper, however, was published in May 2010, well before the studies on the effectiveness of site blocking became available.[125]

He referred to a 2015 survey published by the Council of Europe on blocking, filtering, and takedown of illegal content across the EU.  The publication contained the statement Geist quoted that “blocking is not very effective in general.”  However, it did not refer to any study or authority on this point and appears to be a throw-away line in a study which did not endeavour to examine or discuss the effectiveness of website blocking.  It was also published before the studies on the effectiveness of site blocking.[126]

Geist also referred to some information gathered by a consultant about the extent of Internet piracy in Spain (that he characterized as a “study”).[127]  The document, which showed a decline of 4% in illegal usage of pirate content, did not purport to examine the effectiveness of website blocking or to compare the rates of piracy to any baseline which would enable any conclusions to be drawn.  The “Observatory” however emphasized the need to improve the processes used to combat piracy in Spain.  It also contained the results of a user survey which found that users believed that website blocking is the most effective means of countering illegal copyright piracy.[128]

Hugh Stephens recently published an article which critically reviewed Geist’s claims that site blocking was not effective.  He summed up his thinking saying:

Despite the fact there is conclusive evidence that site blocking is an effective weapon against offshore content-theft websites when applied consistently and against most of the major piracy sites, let’s revert to common sense and ask a few basic questions:

“If site blocking is as ineffective as Michael Geist claims, why would this Coalition, which includes most of the major ISPs in the country, ethnic and national broadcasters, major cinema chains, unions and sports entertainment companies, waste time and resources on what would be a quixotic journey?

Why all this effort from so many quarters if it is so obvious that site blocking doesn’t actually work?”

In other words, “What does Michael Geist know that everyone else doesn’t know?”[129]

Geist claim: The proposal will lead to widespread over-blocking of legal content

Geist claims that the proposal will inherently lead to substantial over-blocking of legal content. It is somewhat ironic that Geist claims site blocking will lead to substantial over-blocking given he also argues it is ineffective.  But, in any event, Geist doesn’t make out his case that the proposal will necessarily lead to any substantial over-blocking of legal sites.

To make his case, he lists reported circumstances in which blocking has led to instances of temporary over-blocking.  But, his conclusion that the proposal will inherently result in significant over-blocking cannot be supported by merely listing instances of reported over-blocking.  Any uses of a technology can result in some unintended glitches, as anyone who has used a computer or software application knows.  The probative questions, which Geist doesn’t try to answer, are how frequently does site blocking result in any significant over-blocking, why the over-blocking occurred, how serious and prolonged the over-blocking lasted, whether measures can be taken to reduce or eliminate instances of over-blocking, and whether the possibility that instances might occur is a sufficient reason to reject web site blocking as a solution to the piracy problem.

The probability that a given blocking scheme will result in over-blocking varies depending on the blocking technology used and how it is deployed.  The proposal does not specify how the blocks should be administered.  Therefore, the CRTC would have the discretion as to which types of blocking to specify, if it decided to be prescriptive as to the methods to be used.  The IPRA or the CRTC could, for example, seek assurances or impose conditions regarding the method of blocking to be employed or require assurances  that if ISPs  deploy IP address blocking steps are taken to ensure that non infringing sites would not be blocked.

Content blocks are generally administered by IP address, DNS (Domain Name System) or sub-domain names,[130] URL paths[131] (which are used in Canada[132] and the UK[133] to block child pornography), hybrid blocking (which employs a combination of techniques such as IP and DNS and is a standard used around the world)[134] or a hybrid of DNS and URL blocking (which was recommended by Ofcom[135]).

Many of the examples of over-blocking mentioned by Geist involved blocking by IP address with no hybrid measures or other mitigating approaches.  There is a known risk in using this method because websites often share IP addresses.  But, over-blocking occurs only where it is impossible to determine prior to blocking whether a given IP hosts multiple websites.

Experienced rightsholders usually check to see if a target site is suitable for blocking by IP address. Many pirate sites are an appropriate target because they have dedicated IP addresses.  In light of this known possible issue, evidence has been adduced in blocking cases on whether target sites share an IP address with other sites including in the UK and Australia to counter the risk of over-blocking.[136]  In the recent U.K. decision, Union Des Associations Européennes De Football v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors,[137] Justice Arnold made an order to block illegal streaming of soccer matches.  Before making the order, he reviewed two prior similar orders and found they had been effective without any evidence of over-blocking.

The issue also arose in an Austrian case in which it was argued that blocking an entire website using IP address blocking would lead to over-blocking.  The court rejected the argument based on evidence that the IP address of the site was not shared with another site.[138]

Blocking orders can also mandate specific measures to mitigate the risks of over-blocking.  For example, in the Twentieth Century Fox Film v Eircom Limited Trading case,[139] the copyright owners and ISPs reached a detailed agreement on a blocking order that was issued by an Irish court.  The order contained a protocol for adding new IP addresses, domain names, and URLs to block the target pirate sites.  The protocol set out relationship criteria with the target websites designed to prevent over-blocking such as that the “IP address must not be shared with other sites that are not related to the Target Websites”; the “domain name must not be shared with other sites that are not related to the Target Websites”; and that no “qualifying URL must be required to access the website, therefore the entire domain name must be dedicated to the site, not just part of the name space at that domain”.  There is no reason that the IPRA and CRTC could not develop comparable means of preventing over-blocking.

The risk of over-blocking by DNS is mostly restricted to circumstances where a top-level domain name hosts both infringing and non-infringing content (e.g. YouTube.com).  The issue would not arise with sites targeted by the proposal because the criteria are designed to only block whole pirate sites – the site as a whole must be “blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engaged in piracy.”[140] If only a sub-domain met this criterion, the top-level domain would not be eligible for blocking.

URL Blocking can be performed in conjunction with DNS or IP blocking, so that only traffic directed towards a targeted domain name or IP address is directed through the “pass through” device and filtered. URL blocking requires the installation of a “pass-through” device which examines traffic to determine whether it matches a given URL.  URL blocking is commonly understood to pose a low-risk of over-blocking.  The 2010 Ofcom study notes that “URL blocking can be highly granular against web URLs, with low levels of over-blocking when applied at the level of the URL.”[141]  Hybrid systems “have the advantages of IP blocking without the risks of over-blocking.”[142]

Most of the incidents of over-blocking identified by Geist are related to technically flawed blocking implementations, where the court did not identify the flaws in the proposal.  Arguably, a specialized tribunal like the CRTC with the assistance of a technically skilled body – with a much deeper understanding of the architecture of the Internet – could recommend what type of blocking would be appropriate or inappropriate.  The combination of a specialized regulator and a technically skilled body such as the IPRA likely best minimizes the risk of over-blocking as the process will allow for the IPRA to inquire into how sites will be blocked on a case by case basis and make appropriate recommendations to the CRTC about not only what is to be blocked but by what means.  Following the instance of the accidental over-blocking by the Australian securities regulator referred to by Geist, the  Australian Department of Communications and the Arts published guidelines for blocking by government agencies.  The guidelines recommend that “Agencies should have the requisite level of technical expertise to disrupt services under section 313(3), or procedures for drawing on the expertise of other agencies or external experts to do so.  This will help ensure that requests are effective, responsible, and able to be executed appropriately.”[143]

All of Geist’s claims about potential over-blocking must be assessed in a proper context.  While purporting to be concerned about over-blocking, Geist completely neglects and discounts concerns about under-blocking — that is, the ready access to infringing materials made available on a mass scale by those who have built business models profiting from their illegal dissemination of infringing content.[144]  He advances a test of the status quo – everything is fine with no over-blocking – with rampant unchecked piracy compared to examples of inadvertent, occasional, avoidable, and reversible over-blocking but with significant positive impacts of reducing online piracy.

Given the evidence on the effectiveness of site blocking and the attenuated risks of over-blocking, this issue is not a valid reason to oppose the proposal.

Geist claim: website blocking may violate human rights

Geist claims that the “website blocking plan… may also violate human rights norms” because “[w]ebsite blocking or other measures to limit access to the Internet raises obvious freedom of expression concerns”.  He suggests that blocking orders are disproportionate on human rights grounds because of impingements on rights of freedom of expression.[145]

Geist’s claims are not backed up by the authorities he cites, by the international practice, or the overwhelming jurisprudence contrary to his assertions which he ignores.

To make his claim, Geist refers to the Stanford student policy lab practicum which focused, in part, on the freedom of speech implications of site and service blocking (SSB) of predominantly legitimate sites.[146]  The paper described the sites and orders it mainly dealt with as follows:

Broad SSB orders can disable entire services and websites and applications that are used to transmit ideas and expression (such as social networks, messaging apps, or apps that provide access to media and journalistic content).  These orders may be issued to address pieces of unlawful content on a website or service, or serve as means to ensure enforcement of domestic regulations.  In both cases, these SSB orders can be considered a severe restriction on the free flow of information and raise a number of legal and policy concerns.

This report focuses on blocks that affect entire sites and services, and not on narrower blocks targeting only individual webpages, due to the greater threat they may pose to freedom of expression and other human rights. An example of a blocking measure that affected an entire service with important consequences for the freedom to receive and impart information is the recent blocking of LinkedIn by Russian authorities, which was followed by a later order mandating the removal of the application from mobile app stores.  The orders were grounded on the claim that the company failed to comply with a domestic data localization rules, which mandate that companies store users’ data within the Russian territory.  Similarly, in 2012 China blocked the entire New York Times website.  The practice of blocking a service or application because it does not comply with local rules (in opposition to blocking orders related to unlawful content) has been observed in other countries as well, including in the OAS region.  The major case in the region is, probably, the WhatsApp block in Brazil for failing to provide content of communications and other metadata to law enforcement during a local criminal investigation…(emphasis added)

Geist also refers to a 2011 joint declaration on freedom of expression and the Internet.[147]  The declaration includes general principles including that:

Freedom of expression applies to the Internet, as it does to all means of communication.  Restrictions on freedom of expression on the Internet are only acceptable if they comply with established international standards, including that they are provided for by law, and that they are necessary to protect an interest which is recognised under international law…

When assessing the proportionality of a restriction on freedom of expression on the Internet, the impact of that restriction on the ability of the Internet to deliver positive freedom of expression outcomes must be weighed against its benefits in terms of protecting other interests.

It also contained the statement quoted by Geist that:

Mandatory blocking of entire websites, IP addresses, ports, network protocols or types of uses (such as social networking) is an extreme measure – analogous to banning a newspaper or broadcaster – which can only be justified in accordance with international standards, for example where necessary to protect children against sexual abuse.

These general principles from the sources cited by Geist highlight the importance of freedom of expression and the obvious freedom of expression concerns of blocking entire websites devoted to legal speech.

The sources Geist relies upon also highlight that limits to freedom of expression on the Internet can be justified, are provided for by law, and protect a recognizable interest, just as is the case in the analog world.  Further, they underscore the principle that freedom of expression is not an absolute principle.  Rather, there is an express recognition that the principle must be balanced against other interests.

Geist, however, in claiming that the proposal may violate human rights makes no distinction between legitimate sites and those that overwhelmingly or structurally infringe copyright. He just refers to these quotations and implies that the same “extreme measure” concerns with these sites apply to piracy sites.  This is a serious flaw in his treatment of the issue because there are fundamentally different legal and policy considerations associated with blocking legal and piracy sites.

Courts around the world recognize that freedom of speech is an important value.  However, it is one that is not absolute.  This is expressly recognized in Canada under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms which does not provide absolute freedom to disseminate unlawful materials.[148]  Laws protecting copyright and which restrain the dissemination of copyright infringing materials have been found not to violate freedom of expression rights protected by the Charter.[149]  It is not a violation of free expression to block the importation of pirated DVDs and for the same reasons it should not be a violation of free expression to block the transmission of a website full of pirated streams or copies.

This holding is consistent with laws around the world.[150]  In the United States, for example, it is well established that laws that protect copyright do not violate First Amendment rights.  Rather, protection of copyright is viewed as promoting and nurturing speech and is an engine of free expression by establishing marketable rights that supply the economic incentive to create and disseminate creative content.[151]

Although copyright is an important economic right – the most important intellectual property right that protects the creative sector – it is also recognized as being a human right internationally.  It has been recognized as such, for example, in the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights[152] and the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[153] Courts in Quebec have also held that infringement of copyright may be a violation of the right of enjoyment of property protected under Articles 6 and 49 of the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms.[154]  In the Cinar v Robinson case,[155] the Supreme Court of Canada awarded punitive damages against several defendants finding that their infringing acts violated Robinson’s rights under Sections. 1, 4 and 6 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.

Freedom of expression values are also enshrined under European Union law including under Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights[156] and Article 10(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.[157]  The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has acknowledged that protection of copyright is a legitimate aim that can justify an interference with freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,[158] and national courts throughout the EU have followed this approach.[159]

A case in point involves the decision of the ECHR which ruled that jailing the founders of The Pirate Bay did not violate their rights of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.[160]  The court noted that freedom of expression was not an absolute right and that the protection of copyrights was a reasonable limitation in a democratic society.

The test of whether an interference was necessary in a democratic society cannot be applied in absolute terms. On the contrary, the Court must take into account various factors, such as the nature of the competing interests involved and the degree to which those interests require protection in the circumstances of the case.  In the present case, the Court is called upon to weigh, on the one hand, the interest of the applicants to facilitate the sharing of the information in question and, on the other, the interest in protecting the rights of the copyright-holders…

As to the weight afforded to the interest of protecting the copyright‑holders, the Court would stress that intellectual property benefits from the protection afforded by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see, for example, Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 72, ECHR 2007‑I). Moreover, it reiterates the principle that genuine, effective exercise of the rights protected by that provision does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of protection (see, for example, Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 134, ECHR 2004‑XII).  Thus, the respondent State had to balance two competing interests which were both protected by the Convention.  In such a case, the State benefits from a wide margin of appreciation (Ashby Donald and Others, cited above, § 40; compare also to the Committee of Minister’s recommendation, referred to above)…

Since the Swedish authorities were under an obligation to protect the plaintiffs’ property rights in accordance with the Copyright Act and the Convention, the Court finds that there were weighty reasons for the restriction of the applicants’ freedom of expression. Moreover, the Swedish courts advanced relevant and sufficient reasons to consider that the applicants’ activities within the commercially run TPB amounted to criminal conduct requiring appropriate punishment.  In this respect, the Court reiterates that the applicants were only convicted for materials which were copyright-protected…

In conclusion, having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, in particular the nature of the information contained in the shared material and the weighty reasons for the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression, the Court finds that the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

Some opponents of website blocking claim it is censorship. However, courts around the world disagree.[161]  Some examples illustrating this are set out below.

In Argentina, a blocking order was made against The Pirate Bay.  The court explained the rationale for making the order notwithstanding the constitutional protection of freedom of speech in Argentina.

“Freedom of speech is protected by the Constitution of Argentina and international treaties with constitutional hierarchy (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 19).  Moreover, Law No. 26,032 states that the search for, reception and propagation of information and ideas through the Internet is covered by the constitutional guaranty protecting freedom of speech.  However, it is the opinion of this Court that the admissibility of this action is in no way contrary to such directives.  If it were, freedom of speech (Argentine Constitution, Art. 32) should undoubtedly be granted precedence over copyright (Argentine Constitution, Art. 17), since the former is a constitutional guarantee closer to the democratic essence of our Fundamental Law (Supreme Court, Court Decisions: 248:291).”

“Affording the protection granted by the guarantee of freedom of speech to the byte exchange regime of P2P networks, with their exchanges of chunks and metadata among users, and the assistance of trackers in the infringement of copyrights, thus elevating it to the rank of information, would amount to denigrating one of the greatest achievements of free men, elevated to the status as citizens since 1789.

Moreover, it would legitimise a voracious instrument which financially weakens publishers and exploits the works and inspiration of independent writers, journalists or bloggers working in all branches of human knowledge or research, by means or the infringement of the terms established for the exchange of ideas and information, which are the pillars of the freedom of speech.” [162]

There have been numerous decisions in the EU which have made blocking orders after making specific findings that such orders are proportionate and do not violate fundamental freedom of expression values.  Under EU law, courts and regulators consider whether the relief is reasonably necessary,[163] reasonably effective,[164] proportionate[165] and the likelihood of freedom of expression impacts on lawful users of the Internet.

The leading case on website blocking in the EU is the decision of the CJEU in the UPC Telekabel (Kino.to) case.[166]  The court confirmed that website blocking was consistent with fundamental freedom of speech rights of Internet users as long as they are appropriately targeted at pirate sites and not broadly impacting other activity.

In this respect, the measures adopted by the internet service provider must be strictly targeted, in the sense that they must serve to bring an end to a third party’s infringement of copyright or of a related right but without thereby affecting internet users who are using the provider’s services in order to lawfully access information.  Failing that, the provider’s interference in the freedom of information of those users would be unjustified in the light of the objective pursued.

Courts in the EU recognize the public interest in preventing illegal conduct such as intellectual property infringement.  They also recognize that site operators whose primary aim is to violate the rights of others have no expressive right that requires protection, and that Internet users have no expressive interest in accessing pirated digital goods.  Nor are freedom of expression rights of Internet intermediaries violated by having to block or disable access to such sites. Blocking orders have almost invariably found not to be improper if they are targeted so that they don’t unnecessarily deprive users of lawful uses of information on sites.[167] This approach is consonant with Canadian Charter cases, which balance the values underlying freedom of expression with other values and do not provide absolute freedom to disseminate unlawful materials.[168]

Since Geist contends that blocking orders raise freedom of expression concerns, some of the leading authorities in the EU are summarized below. It should be recognized, however, that where blocking orders have been made, the courts had to consider all of the relevant factors before making the orders including proportionality and efficacy.

In Belgium, the Antwerp Court of Appeal, in a case regarding blocking of The Pirate Bay noted that “the ordering of the implementation of DNS blocking cannot be regarded as a restriction of freedom of expression or other fundamental rights in a manner that constitutes a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights.”[169]

In France, the Tribunal de Grandes Instances de Paris (TGI) issued a judgment requiring ISPs to block access to 16 unlicensed streaming sites.[170]  The court held that the injunction was compatible with fundamental freedom of expression rights.  The Court of Appeal confirmed the findings and reiterated that the measures to block websites by ISPs do not violate rights of freedom of expression and are compliant with the principle of proportionality.[171]

Following an application filed by the film industry a count in Norway, ordered the major ISPs to block access to The Pirate Bay as well as other sites.[172]  The court found that an order to block access to The Pirate Bay would not conflict with freedom of speech rights under Norway’s constitution or under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  The infringing materials lay far beyond the core of what the freedom of speech protects and only a very small portion of the content accessed through The Pirate Bay was legal.  Further, the works that were unlawfully available through The Pirate Bay were lawfully available elsewhere.

A Portuguese judgment in an action brought by Audiogest and GEDIPE (two Portuguese collective management associations) against Portuguese ISPs to block The Pirate Bay also dealt with freedom of expression rights in the blocking order context.  The decision cites articles 6, 7, 8, 11 and 52 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Council of the European Union guidelines on the conflict between freedom of expression and protecting copyright, stating that:

“any restriction must always take into account the [individual rights of freedom of expression and information], the necessity and the proportionality”.

“we cannot fail to take into account the fact the unlawfulness of the sharing and the violation of the rights of the holders of the respective rights exist, and we need a rule of law that guarantees that measures of protection of those rights are taken, although it is important that such measures are only the necessary ones and those that are less invasive as possible regarding the rights of third parties”.

“the blocking of the DNS only (domains and subdomains of the website ‘The Pirate Bay’) is shown as a much less invasive solution, and much less likely to cause damage or harm a third party, therefore being more balanced”.[173]

In the UK there are numerous decisions where blocking orders have been granted and in which the courts have found such orders to be consistent with fundamental values.  A leading case is Cartier,[174] a blocking case in relation to trademark infringing websites.  In this case Arnold J provided guidance on the issue of balancing fundamental rights related to freedom of expression and protecting intellectual property rights.

“Where two rights, or sets of rights, are in conflict, then the conflict must be resolved by applying the principle of proportionality to each and striking a balance between them.  For both reasons, it must be shown that the orders are proportionate…when assessing whether the orders are proportionate, the court is required to consider whether alternative measures are available which are less onerous.”

“As for the freedom of internet users to receive information, this plainly does not extend to a right to engage in trade mark infringement, particularly where it involves counterfeit goods.  Since the Target Websites appear to be exclusively engaged in infringing commercial activity, with no lawful component to their businesses, the operators have no right which requires protection.  Thus the key consideration so far as this freedom is concerned is the impact of the orders on users of other, lawful websites.  If the orders are properly targeted, and have sufficient safeguards built into them, then that should mean that such users are not affected.”

The Cartier ruling was appealed by the ISPs to the Court of Appeal and was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.[175]

As set out above, there are a plethora of decisions that have canvassed the issue of balancing freedom of expression values with the need to protect intellectual property rights. Geist claims to have reviewed “many of the site blocking cases from around the world”.  Yet, in criticizing the proposal he selectively only refers to authorities from three countries, Netherlands, Germany, and Greece saying:

Courts in other countries have ruled that blocking systems may be disproportionate (Greece, the Netherlands). The Council of Europe report notes that “lower German courts have refused to follow the ECJ’s lead because of the limited effectiveness of blocking measures, which might be a problem, on the level of human rights, in terms of proportionality and transfer of judicial power to ISPs.”  In light of the serious flaws with the Bell coalition website blocking proposal, a similar conclusion might well be reached in Canada.

Geist’s short paragraph suggests that blocking orders may not be available in the Netherlands or Germany on proportionality or freedom of expression grounds. Neither assertion is accurate.

I have already summarized the overruled 2014 Dutch decision Geist relies on. As I detailed above, in 2012 a Dutch District Court ordered that ISPs block The Pirate Bay finding such order to be proportionate.  In 2014 a Dutch appeal court reversed that decision on efficacy grounds.  In a decision not mentioned by Geist, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands overruled that decision. In September 2017 a blocking injunction was reissued on an interlocutory basis by a Dutch Court.

Geist refers again to the Netherlands arguing that website blocking may violate human rights. However, he fails to mention that the 2012 District Court decision had found the proposed blocking order to not violate freedom of speech rights, that this portion of the decision was not reversed on appeal and that the blocking order was subsequently re-instated.  On the issue of freedom of speech, the District Court stated the following:[176]

4.26.    The right owners have a right and interest in the protection of their copyrights and neighboring rights.  That the right owners incur damage by the free offer of illegal material through The Pirate Bay inter alia by the subscribers of the defendants, as Brein alleged while stating reasons, is evident in the view of the District Court. (…)

4.27.    As considered above in par. 4.9 about 90% to 95% of the 3.5 million torrents which are made available through The Pirate Bay concern illegal material.  When looking at what material is actually exchanged through The Pirate Bay, the rate of illegal material is even higher, because legal material is downloaded to a (much) lesser degree.  The examples of legal torrents which Ziggo and XS4ALL refer to, i.e. the movie made accessible to the public through The Pirate Bay ‘Die Beauty’ and a music album of ‘Sick of Sarah’ were in any case not at all exchanged at the moment of the TNO studies through The Pirate Bay, as Brein alleged without being refuted.  Furthermore Brein alleged without being refuted that torrents which refer to legal material are also provided on other websites (than The Pirate Bay).  Finally, Brein alleged that the legal content – other than torrents – which is posted on The Pirate Bay itself, is restricted to information about The Pirate Bay, a webpage with ‘legal issues’, a ‘blog’, ‘user conditions’, and a page of ‘downloads and doodles’ where for instance logos of The Pirate Bay can be downloaded.  Other links which are posted on the homepage of The Pirate Bay, i.e. ‘Cloud, Forum, TPB-t-shirts, Bayfiles, Baywords, BayImg, IPREDator, Follow TPB on’ refer to other websites.  The above is not contested by XS4ALL and Ziggo.  The percentage of legal material, at least legal traffic which would be blocked by a blockade of The Pirate Bay, is therefore marginal in the view of the District Court.

4.28.    Seen these circumstances the weighing of interests should be to the advantage of the right owners in the view of the District Court.  That the major part of the subscribers of Ziggo and XS4ALL (presently) do not share any files through The Pirate Bay and so do not infringe the rights of the right owners, whereas they are nevertheless harmed by a blockade, as Ziggo and XS4ALL rightly allege as such, does not result into a different opinion.  To the extent that such subscribers intended to start exchanging illegal material through The Pirate Bay and infringe upon doing so, this is not an interest to be respected by law.  To the extent that they intended to visit The Pirate Bay without infringing, their interest is limited, seen the marginal legal offer and the option to get access to such legal offer through other websites.  Such limited interest does not outbalance the protection of the parties adhered to Brein against the infringement of their rights which are extensive as to number through The Pirate Bay which can be avoided by allowing the blockade.  In this the District Court further takes into account that it concerns blocking the access to a website the operators of which were already ordered by the Amsterdam District Court to render said website – and therefore including the legal content provided on it – inaccessible (see the judgment of 16 June 2010)….

4.40.    The order should in any case also be considered necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of others in the sense of Article 10(2) ECHR.  In this respect one can confine oneself to a reference to the preceding examination of subsidiarity and proportionality, in particular the proportionality of the order in comparison with the interest of the subscribers (jur.gr. 4.23 et seq.).

Geist also doesn’t mention that the Court of The Hague recently made blocking order in another case also finding such an order would not violate fundamental freedoms under EU law.[177]

Geist’s post also suggested that in Germany website blocking was not available on proportionality grounds. At one time there was uncertainty as to whether German courts had the jurisdiction to make blocking orders against ISPs.  On 26 November 2015 the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) issued two decisions on website blocking confirming that the legal basis existed.[178] The court also held, the proposed order to be proportionate.

The German court also found that the blocking order did not violate any right of freedom of expression protected under Article 11(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 5(1) of the German Constitution.  The court noted that these fundamental rights required that Internet users should not be denied access to legitimate content by preventing over-blocking.  The court recognized that some structurally infringing sites might contain some legal content, but held that a website block would not violate fundamental rights if only a minimal amount of legitimate content would be affected.  Specifically the court said:

“The issue of legal content also being impacted (so-called “overblocking”) is firstly relevant if the blocking of an IP address also prevents access to other websites which have the same IP address (c.f. Sieber/Nolde, Sperrverfügungen im Internet, 2008, p. 50).  Secondly, the website at issue can contain both illegal and legal content. In the case at hand, according to the Claimants’ submissions, the IP address specified in the motion is linked to four websites which all belong to the “Goldesel” service so that no other websites, which could contain legal content, would be affected by an IP block.

Unless the provider of a business model aimed at rights infringements is supposed to be able to hide behind just a small quantity of legal content, it is obvious that a block cannot be only considered permissible if solely unlawful content is provided on a website (J.B. Nordemann in Fromm/Nordemann,Urheberrecht, 11th Ed., § 97 UrhG marg. no. 170; Leistner/Grisse, GRUR 2015, 105, 108).

In the scope of the balancing of fundamental rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union also formulated the criterion of strict targeting such that the blocking measures undertaken may “not unnecessarily” deprive Internet users of the possibility of legally accessing the information available (CJEU, GRUR 2014, 468 para. 63 – UPC Telekabel; c.f. Leistner/Grisse, GRUR 2015, 105, 108).  In the jurisdiction related to File-hosting, the Senate also found that it was not unreasonable to expect compliance with due diligence obligations, in the interests of effective protection of copyright, even if it could lead to a deletion of legal content in individual cases, provided the legal use of the service provider’s offering is thereby only limited to a small extent and the service provider’s business model is not thereby fundamentally called into question (German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Judgement of 12 July 2007 – I ZR 18/04, BGHZ 173, 188 para. 60 – Jugendgefährdende Medien bei eBay; BGHZ 194, 339 para. 45 – Alone in the Dark; BGH, GRUR 2013, 1030 para. 62 – File-Hosting-Dienst). Contrary to the opinion of the Appeal Court, the important factor is not the absolute number of legitimate pieces of content offered on the site at issue but the overall ratio of legal to illegal content.  Furthermore, it is important to ask whether the legal content represents an insignificant amount (c.f. Leistner/Grisse, GRUR 2015, 105, 108 et seq.).  The fact that the Claimants base their claims only on rights in 120 music tracks but that a block would, beyond this, also cover links on the contested website to copyright protected works of third parties, rights in which the Claimants are not authorised to assert, is meaningless in this context.

On the basis of the Claimants’ submissions cited by the Appeal Court, according to which legal content on the “Goldesel.to” website only accounts for a 4% share, the assumption of reasonableness of blocking measures does not fail due to the argument of legal content also being impacted.”

A subsequent German court followed this case in granting a blocking order against the KINOX.TO site.[179]  The court found that neither the pirate site nor any other person had any reasonable basis to claim that their fundamental rights of freedom of expression were violated.

The last country referred to by Geist is Greece.  Greece is the outlier in the EU, being, as far as I am aware, the only jurisdiction in which blocking orders are currently not available in the courts.  In light of Geist’s arguments about relying on “outliers” when it comes to the need for blocking orders to be made by courts, it would be ironic for him to argues that Greece is the example to follow.  Nevertheless, there has not been a blocking case in Greece since the CJEU decided the UPC Telekabel case in 2014, a decision that is binding on Greek courts.  Further, as described above, to enable copyright holders to obtain blocking orders, Greece has now implemented a new administrative site blocking regime.  As a result, Geist has not been able to point to a single country in the EU in which blocking orders cannot be obtained.

Geist claim: the proposal will lead to higher Internet access costs for all

Geist argues that the costs of implementing website blocking will result in higher Internet access costs for all consumers. However, the examples of technology costs he relies on are for different or additional technical capabilities or relate to a different context.  Further, Geist does not consider the counterfactual – the increased costs associated with not having the blocking regime. Nor does he consider the proportionality of any increased costs relative to the benefits of website blocking.

Geist argues that in 2005 the government had proposed providing a grace period to ISPs with small numbers of subscribers to implement the technologies needed to comply with lawful access requirements because the “costs would have an unreasonable adverse effect on the business of the service providers”.[180]  He doesn’t distinguish, however, between “lawful access” and “blocking” technologies.  The former is expensive as it requires developing the infrastructure to allow law enforcement to intercept Internet communications pursuant to a warrant.[181]

Geist also describes the costs incurred by a number of British ISPs in developing content blocking software.  For the most part, these systems did not relate solely to blocking copyright infringing websites but related to investing in blocking systems to enable them “to implement (a) the IWF blocking regime, (b) section 97A orders and (with the exception of EE) and (c) parental controls.[182]

Geist claims that “British Telecom spent over a million pounds on a DNS web-blocking system in 2012 and required more than two months of employee time on implementation.”  However, the website blocking system to which he refers, Nominum, is also used to provide parental controls.[183]

Geist claims “EE spent more than a million pounds on its web-blocking system and over 100,000 pounds every month for operations.”  This system also provides much more than the blocking of piracy websites.[184]

There was also evidence in other cases that Geist did not refer to. For example, there was evidence of blocking costs under Australia’s site blocking regime. In one case, the one-time set up costs of the ISPs were found to be, in the case of Telstra, (Aus) $10,261 and in the case of TPG, (Aus) $21,195.[185]  In another case, the cost for blocking each domain name was found to be (Aus) $50 per domain name.[186]

Geist’s claims about potential increases in Internet costs do not consider the counter-factual, namely, would consumer costs overall be higher or lower with a website blocking regime in place than without one?  If the focus of that analysis was strictly on a CRTC website blocking regime versus alternatives, it is by no means clear that blocking orders issued by courts would be any cheaper.  In fact, when you add in the extensive legal fees associated with court proceedings, ISPs legal fees could well dwarf the blocking costs, especially if each application had to be on a contested basis.  Moreover, rights holders would have much higher enforcement costs using the traditional court route, which would ultimately have to be passed on to consumers.  The Commission could, of course, order that these costs be borne by rights holders, but so could the courts.

The issue of consumers’ potential increase in Internet access fees, cannot be divorced however from the overall costs and economic effects associated with illegal file sharing.  Illegal IPTV streaming accounts for more Internet bandwidth than illegal Bittorrent file sharing.  These costs are directly or indirectly borne by consumers.  Further, although Geist denies or minimizes this, piracy results in losses to producers and distributers of content – and to everyone in the legal content ecosystem.  People who work in these industries are also consumers and earn less when legal markets are by-passed by illegal services.  Moreover, consumers who pay for legal content end up paying more to subsidize consumers who choose to access illicit content.

We should not forget that today nearly everyone is an Internet subscriber.  Viewed holistically, the proposal could actually decrease costs and/or increase welfare for consumers.

In the EU, before granting an injunction order, the courts examine whether such an order would be “proportionate”.  This involves examining whether the likely burden on the intermediary is justified by the efficacy of the remedy, the benefit to the claimant, and the burdens on the intermediary.[187]  Courts in the EU have overwhelmingly granted such orders, finding them to be proportionate.  Decisions from courts finding such orders be proportionate are referred to above.  Decisions in other countries contain similar findings including those from Finland,[188] Spain,[189] Norway,[190] Portugal,[191] and Sweden.[192]

Geist claim: the proposal would increase privacy risks

Geist gives several reasons for his assertion that the FairPlay proposal would increase privacy risks for Canadians: slippery slopes, ISPs will be more likely to track the activities of users, and getting and implementing blocking orders will entail collecting personal information.  He is incorrect on all accounts and especially wrong when the counter-factual methods of anti-piracy enforcement measures, and malware effects of using pirate sites are taken into account.

Geist asserts that the proposal will negatively impact privacy is the claim (addressed below) site blocking of pirate sites will lead to blocking of VPNs used to access U.S. Netflix.  There is no basis to assume this to be the case and it would certainly require another application to the Commission for a situation that is not at all comparable to the FairPlay proposal.

He also asserts that “the identification of piracy sites and usage by subscribers depends in part upon snooping into Internet users’ online activities”.  Geist claims that ISPs will “have incentives to track user activity by inspecting unencrypted communications to identify which sites are being visited.”

Far from increasing any privacy risks for Canadians, the proposal does the opposite. To establish that a site is a piracy site there is no need to collect any personal information of Canadians.  What is being targeted is the piracy site, not the infringing actions of individuals. While the evidentiary requirements will depend on the criteria that are established in public consultations for the IPRA to use, the most likely kind of evidence that would be needed to prove use of a piracy site would be Alexa (or like) traffic data.  There should be no need to prove that any specific Canadian used a site; only that many computers with IP addresses from Canada (which the copyright holders would not know) visited the piracy site.

However, even if there was a need for copyright holders to monitor the use of piracy sites, the only information that would be collected would be IP address (and perhaps port) information.  This is information that Canada not only allowed but specifically encouraged to be collected through its adoption of the notice-and-notice system, something that Geist strongly advocated for throughout the copyright reform process.  The IP addresses would only have to be used to lookup whether the users were from Canada using one of the many IP address lookup services available on the web.  No actual subscriber information would be required.  However, even if it did involve collecting such information it would not violate privacy rights of Canadians because of exemptions under Canada’s federal privacy law, PIPEDA.[193]

Moreover, even where personal subscriber information has been asked for in the context of Norwich orders, the policy of the courts has been to order disclosure.  Sexton J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal in the BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe case expressed the reasons as follows.[194]

Intellectual property laws originated in order to protect the promulgation of ideas. Copyright law provides incentives for innovators—artists, musicians, inventors, writers, performers and marketers—to create. It is designed to ensure that ideas are expressed and developed instead of remaining dormant.  Individuals need to be encouraged to develop their own talents and personal expression of artistic ideas, including music.  If they are robbed of the fruits of their efforts, their incentive to express their ideas in tangible form is diminished.

Modern technology such as the Internet has provided extraordinary benefits for society, which include faster and more efficient means of communication to wider audiences.  This technology must not be allowed to obliterate those personal property rights which society has deemed important.  Although privacy concerns must also be considered, it seems to me that they must yield to public concerns for the protection of intellectual property rights in situations where infringement threatens to erode those rights.

In Voltage Pictures LLC v. John Doe[195] the Federal Court addressed the position ISPs should take in Canada when faced with a motion to disclose subscriber information in an infringement case.  The court stated that normally, ISPs should facilitate the legitimate efforts of rights holders obtain subscriber information:

. . .it appears that Voltage has a strong prima facie case establishing piracy of its copyright product by the fact that TekSavvy’s subscribers are downloading its materials without any possible suggested colour of right.  Piracy of copyrighted materials on the Internet is a serious issue in North America.  The Court’s general policy therefore, should be to support measures that reasonably deter such illegal conduct, in which category I place Voltage’s litigation, as it appears to be brought on a bona fide basis to deter such activity.

. . .the policy in these types of motions should normally be to facilitate the plaintiff’s legitimate efforts to obtain the information from ISPs on the prima facie illegal activities of its subscribers.

An Irish case also considered whether the collection of IP address information in the course of anti-piracy investigations violated data protection legislation.  The court concluded that individuals involved in peer-to-peer file sharing do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that their interests are far outweighed by those of the copyright owners who are being damaged by online infringements.

An activity of swarm participation for peer-to-peer downloading does not legitimately carry the expectation of privacy.  It is flying in the face of common sense for the Data Protection Commissioner to equate participation in an open communication with all comers on the internet for the purpose of illegal downloading of copyright material with interception, with tapping or with listening.  Those concepts are rightly to be deprecated as illegal in circumstances of privacy.  That is not the situation here: there is no legitimate reposing of trust pursuant to contract or reasonable expectation that when a person goes on the internet with a view to uploading or downloading what does not belong to them.  That circumstance does not give rise to any constitutional entitlement or human right to remain immune from a music company also participating in that open forum to discover the economic damage that is being done to it and to creative artists.  The interest of music companies is proper and proportionate. It is beyond doubt that while each individual act of copying, in itself, does little damage the reproduction of that activity by millions repeated over time is industrial in scale.  The response of internet service providers of doing nothing perhaps reflects the greater economic strength of intermediaries as compared to creative people or recording companies.  There is also the immeasurable and disproportionate power of these peer-to-peer swarms which are increasingly rendering the entitlement to those on whom creativity depends to no consideration…

The law does not, however, set intellectual property rights at nought because of the involvement of the internet.[196]

Courts in the United States have also held that individuals engaged in peer-to-peer file sharing do not have any reasonable expectations of privacy.[197]  As one U.S. court put it “[I]f an individual subscriber opens his computer to permit others, through peer-to-peer file sharing, to download materials from that computer, it is hard to understand just what privacy expectation he or she has after essentially opening the computer to the world.”[198]

Geist also claims that the process of blocking sites may also raise privacy concerns.  He indicates this is more likely to be a problem if deep packet inspection is used, but properly notes that the specific method of blocking is not yet known.  He also doesn’t indicate how likely use of deep packet inspection would be, especially given that, internationally, site blocking for copyright purposes has relied mainly on IP address, DNS, URL or a hybrid of such methods.  In any event, the method of blocking the IPRA would recommend would be something that could be part of its consultation.

What is also important in considering Geist’s arguments is the counter-factual, namely would the proposal increase or decrease the privacy of Canadians compared to other remedies that are available?  When so considered the proposal is much better and at worst, no worse than the alternatives.

Personal actions against Canadians who use piracy sites requires the monitoring of individuals’ use of piracy sites, including monitoring what is downloaded or offered for uploading.  To pursue such actions rightsholders have to obtain, through Norwich orders, subscriber information, something the proposal does not require.

Geist suggests that prior to proceeding with the proposal, the coalition members should have gone to court to obtain blocking orders using the Equustek case as a precedent.  Even if one were to assume that this kind of proceeding does not require an underlying claim for infringement against individuals, it would at the very least require the collection of the same type of information as would be required in a proceeding brought before the CRTC.  Further, ISPs would also have to implement the blocking order which would not reduce in any way the potential, such as there may or may not be, to the use of personal information of Canadians.

Moreover, Geist fails to take into account the privacy violations experienced by Canadians in using these pirate sites. Many pirate sites contain or distribute malware that can expose users to identity theft, financial loss, and hackers taking control of their computers.[199]  In a recent study of the issue, the Technology Policy Institute concluded that using pirated materials increases a user’s risk of being infected with malware. According to the authors:[200]

For years, those of us who study the effects of piracy have focused on two main questions. First, does it hurt creators, by reducing demand for what they produce?  Here the answer is clearly yes: the vast majority of peer-reviewed studies have found that piracy hurts demand and overall firm profitability, and that anti-piracy measures can cause some consumers to return to legal channels.  Second, does piracy benefit consumers, by providing them access to products they wouldn’t have paid to consume?  This question is asked less frequently than the first, but the growing consensus answer seems to be no: several recent studies (for example, here and here) suggest that piracy can hurt consumers by reducing the incentives for producers to invest in and create new products.

However, while these questions have been studied widely, there’s another one worth asking: Does piracy also hurt consumers by exposing them to malware and other malicious software?

The problem is real. For users to access and download pirated content, someone has to make it available, and most of the sites that make pirated content available are in it for the money.  The people who run these sites typically make money by displaying advertisements—and, in some cases, by hosting or linking to content that contains malware.  Designed to gather data from users’ computers, or even to control them, malware can be very profitable, and as a result it’s a danger that users of pirated material regularly have to contend with.

But does using pirated materials increase a user’s risk of being infected with malware?…

To answer these questions, we conducted a study on a unique dataset of close to 250 users who form part of an IRB-approved panel within CMU’s Security Behavior Observatory project….

The results were clear. The more our users visited piracy sites, we found, the more often their machines got infected with malware…

Piracy, once again, turns out not to offer the free lunch that it appears to.

Geist claim: slippery slope; it will inevitably result in blocking for other IP purposes

Geist claims that the proposal will inevitably result in blocking sites other than those targeted by the proposal. For example, he says “it would not be surprising to find legitimate services streaming unlicensed content as the next target.”  He uses U.S. Netflix as an example as a site that might be targeted.[201]  Another is the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) that allow users to access out-of-market content such as U.S. Netflix.  It is hard to characterize this claim as anything other than unsubstantiated conjecture.  The proposal calls for blocking of only “websites and services that are blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engaged in piracy.”

The coalition recommended that the Commission establish criteria against which both it and the IPRA could evaluate whether a particular site is blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engaged in piracy.  The proposal provides examples of criteria that could be used in connection with determining whether a location on the Internet is blatantly, overwhelmingly, or structurally engaged in piracy:  (a) The extent, impact, and flagrancy of the website’s piracy activities;  (b) The disregard for copyright demonstrated by the website’s owners, pirate operators, or users;  (c) Whether the website is expressly or implicitly marketed or promoted in connection with potential infringing uses;  (d) The significance of any non-infringing uses, compared to the infringing uses;  (e) The effectiveness of any measures taken by the website to prevent infringements;  (f) Any other relevant finding against the website, related websites, or the website’s owners in Canada or any other jurisdiction by a court or administrative tribunal; and  (g) Any efforts by the website’s owners or members to evade legal action.

There is no good reason to believe that the 25 member coalition intends to target sites other than the type they propose, or to believe that even if they did, that the CRTC would agree to such a changed mandate.

Geist claim: more slippery slopes; the proposal will lead to blocking for other purposes

Geist warns that if the Commission was to order blocking for copyright, this would inevitably expand to block for other illegal content such as hate speech, online gambling and other regulated activities.

There is no reason to be concerned about targeted blocking to deal with sites that are clearly devoted to dissemination of other illegal content. Other liberal democratic countries including members of the European Union already engage in website blocking to protect members of the public from illegal activities such as from malware, investment fraud, hate speech, child abuse materials including child pornography, prostitution, speech inciting violence, online gambling, prohibiting dissemination of Nazi war memorabilia, and terrorism related content, trade-mark infringement, and copyright infringement, all without breaking the Internet.[202]

The use of website blocking as a tool to protect the public from illegal materials needs to be assessed with the emerging and important recognition that, for all its good, the Internet is increasingly used for all manner of crimes and to spread false information (fake news), and racist and hateful materials.[203]  There is also an increasing realization that what is illegal offline should also be illegal online,[204] and that Internet intermediaries, from ISPs, search engines, to social network platforms, must act responsibly and play a role in countering these threats. Recently, and even before the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica fiasco,[205] there has been a “sea change” on digital governance issues[206], with even the “inventors” of the Internet Sir Tim Berners-Lee[207] and Vint Cerf[208] calling attention to the problems.

Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed an anti-sex trafficking bill that could make websites liable for enabling sex traffickers, after the technology industry refused to implement voluntary measures.  The bill represents the growing techlash against large U.S. technology companies arising from their expansive power over people’s lives and the intense scrutiny over their role in Russian election meddling, the spread of online conspiracy theories, and addiction to social media.[209]

The European Commission earlier this month recommended a set of operational measures while it considers further legally binding regulatory measures for voluntary monitoring and takedowns (without court orders) of all forms of illegal content ranging from terrorist content, incitement to hatred and violence, child sexual abuse material, counterfeit products and copyright infringement.  These measures are not premised on the use of court orders because of the need to act quickly to deal with harms caused by illegal content.[210] In fact, member states in the EU permit blocking of content without court order to prevent access to content of substantial public concern.[211]

The Canadian Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC) also recently recommended in the Draft OPC Position on Online Reputation,[212] that search engines be required in appropriate circumstances to de-index online locations that make available personal information about individuals in order to protect their reputations.  The OPC recommended that this should done without the need for court orders and that if there was ultimate access to an independent arbiter in contested cases, search engines should provide the first level of review of a de-indexing request.  Doing so would arguably promote, rather than hinder, access to justice and the rule of law by providing a practical and expedient remedy for individuals.  According to the OPC:

In submissions, it was suggested that it is inappropriate for a private sector organization to make decisions balancing privacy rights against the right to expression…

While this is a legitimate concern we also note that organizations do regularly engage in such balancing to some extent – for instance, in establishing terms of service which may result in content, statements or even entire accounts being removed.  Search engines, in particular, already have in place mechanisms to consider de-indexing requests and remove content which is potentially harmful (e.g. credit card numbers; images of signatures) or illegal (e.g. copyright infringement) from their search results…

Some have suggested that de-indexing requests should only be considered by an oversight body or a court given the fundamental rights at stake.  While individuals and search engines should ultimately have access to review by an independent arbiter in contested cases, we consider it appropriate to have search engines providing the first level of review of a de-indexing request.  Indeed, having search engines initially assess de-indexing requests arguably promotes, rather than hinders, access to justice and the rule of law by providing a practical and expedient remedy for individuals.

The OPC also recommended that individuals should have a right of “erasure” and that web sites should voluntarily engage in source amendment/takedowns in appropriate circumstances.  A Parliamentary Committee reviewing Canada’s privacy legislation, PIPEDA, also recently recommended that Parliament consider amending PIPEDA to provide an express right of erasure and “right to be forgotten”.  Although the exact mechanisms to be used were not part of the proposals, the recommendations did not suggest that this had to be accomplished through court orders.[213]

The solutions to online illegal content and whether website blocking is appropriate in any given case, must as a matter of pragmatic reality, be based on an assessment of multiple factors.

We should not fear the use of an appropriate and targeted measure to counter illegal activity because it could also be used to counter other illegal activity.  If anything, recent events teach us that we must ensure responsibility and accountability in online activities and be prepared to take measures needed to protect the public.

Geist himself is a proponent of and has defended website blocking of foreign websites to address online child pornography.[214]  His rationale for distinguishing between that and blocking for copyright purposes, both before and after the FairPlay proposal, relies on the extent to which he views the dissemination of child pornography to be problematic (versus copyright infringement) and because he says:

the blocking of child pornography can be justified on the grounds that even accessing child pornography is a criminal offence.  Not so for viewing a streaming video, whether authorized or unauthorized.

I agree with Geist that child pornography should be blocked. Geist is wrong, however, that merely accessing child pornography is a criminal offense.  Under Section 163.1 of the Criminal Code it is an offense to access child pornography only where the person knowingly causes child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, himself or herself.  Further, there is an express exception where a person has “a legitimate purpose related to the administration of justice or to science, medicine, education or art; and does not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years”.

Geist is also wrong to suggest that merely accessing infringing copying content cannot be illegal.  For example, in the ITVBox.net case the Federal Court of Canada expressed the opinion that individuals that operate equipment to receive a programming signal that have been decoded in contravention of the Radio-Communication Act violate that Act.[215]  Doing so could be an offense under sections 9(1)(d) and 10(1)(b) of the Act.  Further, courts in the UK have found that persons that receive infringing copies of copyright content using an online file sharing site like The Pirate Bay can be jointly liable for the infringements.[216]

Geist’s attempt to justify website blocking only where based on mere access of content being illegal cannot be accepted as a justifiable basis for excluding the availability of blocking in other circumstances.  If it did, then according to Geist’s indefensible distinction, it would be wrong to block child porn websites in Canada, even though it is internationally accepted that this should be done and can be defended on multiple grounds.

Decisions as to whether there should be blocking orders related to other illegal conduct have to be assessed on a case by case basis. In my view, it is wrong to regard an expansion of website blocking to content other than copyright materials as prima facie bad policy.  Like child pornography, each situation must balance the proposed benefits and harms.

Geist claim: more slippery slopes, the proposal will turn the CRTC into a content regulatory authority

Geist tries to assimilate blocking illegal pirate sites to content regulation.  That is no more true than arguing that when courts grant injunctions prohibiting the dissemination of materials that are defamatory, in violation of child pornography or pornography laws, infringe copyrights, or are otherwise illegal -which courts do all the time – they are engaging in “content regulation”.

He cites a paragraph from the CRTC website that says “In Canada, services that broadcast over the Internet don’t need a licence from the CRTC, as we exempted them from this obligation. We do not intervene on content on the Internet.”  He says this “reflects how the CRTC sees itself and how it wants to be seen, that it does not licence or judge Internet content nor is it empowered by legislation to do so.”

The statement that the CRTC does not intervene on content on the Internet was simply based on the fact that the CRTC issued an exemption order under the Broadcasting Act for Internet services.  That order was issued in 1999 and updated in 2012.  But this does not mean the CRTC does not have the jurisdiction to rescind the exemption order, or to impose terms and conditions that relate to content on Internet services covered by that order.  In its 1999 policy, the CRTC clearly indicated that most Internet video services would fall under its regulatory jurisdiction, absent an exemption.  And subsection 9(4) of the Broadcasting Act specifically allows the CRTC to exempt persons from the requirements of the Act “on such terms and conditions as it deems appropriate.”

Geist also states that “the attempt to incorporate the Broadcasting Act into the argument runs counter to the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2012 ISP Reference, which leaves no doubt that ISPs simply do not fall under that Act when transmitting content”.

The Supreme Court did rule that ISPs could not be directly regulated under the Broadcasting Act in their conduit of information capacities for content broadcast by others.  But the jurisdiction to issue blocking orders being relied on in the proposal derives from the Telecommunications Act, not the Broadcasting Act.  And there is nothing in the judgment of the Supreme Court that precludes CRTC regulation of Internet program services under the Telecommunications Act or even under the Broadcasting Act if and when ISPs are broadcasting to Canadians.

Geist claim: Canada has robust laws and doesn’t need more legal tools to target offshore pirate sites

Geist claims Canada “has some of the world’s toughest anti-piracy provisions” and doesn’t need any new laws to target online piracy.  Although Geist makes references to copyright laws that exist in Canada, he makes no attempt to show whether or how they could be useful in combatting the threats the FairPlay proposal is designed to counter.  Many of his claims would be misleading to the average person who would not understand the lack of connection between an existing cause of action and one that had some relevance to countering online piracy.

Geist points to our anti-circumvention laws that target mod-chip sellers as an example of our tough anti-piracy laws.  However, it is misleading to suggest that this law has any applicability to combating online streaming piracy sites.  Although our TPM laws have been found to be adequate against sellers of mod-chips for video gaming devices, these laws provide no remedies against pirate online streaming, peer-to-peer file sharing, or download services.

He also points to Canada’s secondary infringement enablement provision. Here again, he fails to even argue how this cause of action would be effective against foreign pirate streaming sites.  It is quite conceivable that under the real and substantial connection test a court would find that the cause of action would apply to foreign services that primarily enable copyright infringement and that target Canadians with illegal streaming services.[217]  However, the operators of pirate streaming websites often hide their identities such as through domain privacy protection services and obtain hosting and other services from jurisdictions that are not friendly to rights holders.[218]  Direct enforceable remedies to make them cease their activities is frequently impossible.  For example, The Pirate Bay has been blocked by around the world and its originators were jailed by a Swedish court.[219]  Yet, it still continues to defy and evade legal measures to shut it down.[220]  It is misleading to suggest that enablement is also an effective remedy against foreign online piracy sites.

Geist also relies on Canada’s statutory damages regime.  However, here again he fails to show that this regime, which was substantially weakened by the 2012 copyright amendments, could pragmatically be enforced against a foreign online pirate site or that such sites would have the assets necessary to pay any damages awarded against them. This claim is also misleading.

Geist points to the ITVbox.net interlocutory injunction[221] against Kodi and other ISD distributors. He also refers to the Anton Piller order and interlocutory injunction in the TVAddons.net case against website operator Adam Lackman that made available software add-ons specifically adapted to enable users with ISDs to access illicit streaming sites.[222]  He argues the decisions demonstrate there is no need for the proposed blocking regime.[223]  He is wrong.

It is true that the Federal Court of Canada has on interlocutory motions granted injunctions against Canadian sellers of ISDs and a Canadian website operator who made add-ons available. In this regard, Canadian law has, so far, kept pace with those of our international peers where similar remedies have been granted.[224]

However, cases against such Canadian operators are, while very important, at best a whac-a-mole remedy.  They target local provider/enablers of infringements, but there are many other providers, and remedies against this low level of contributor provide no relief against the foreign pirate sites that are the source of the content being illegally consumed.  Geist doesn’t try to argue the contrary.

Laws that provide relief only against individuals that sell ISDs and who make available add-ons if they happen to be located in Canada would be as productive as anti-drug laws that only target street corner and small time drug pushers and which provide no legal means of targeting the cartels, organized crime, or large scale drug syndicates or of seizing drug shipments at the border.

Genuine efforts to stem online piracy, like laws that attempt to address other illegal activities, require a mixture of complementary and appropriate measures including web site blocking.  Website blocking has been recognized by courts as an effective way to combat internet piracy from foreign websites.[225]  That is why throughout the European Union, which also makes the sale of ISDs illegal,[226] orders against ISPs are used to block the sources of illegal content. This includes injunctions against illegal streaming servers of soccer matches in the United Kingdom on behalf of the Premier League [227] and on behalf of UEFA,[228] the governing body of soccer in Europe.

Geist states that “Canadian law already provides for injunctive relief in appropriate circumstances with the Supreme Court of Canada’s Equustek decision one of the more recent manifestations of courts issuing orders to non-parties in support of intellectual property rights” However, he acknowledges that there “is no guarantee that courts will issue such an injunction”.  Yet, he says that rights holders ought to pursue this remedy before going the CRTC route.

Leaving aside the procedural challenges of obtaining a court order against all Canadian ISPs in a court proceeding, such litigation would be time consuming and expensive to pursue, especially with the attendant risk of appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada.  Moreover, even if rights holders were to bring court proceedings for a blocking order and a court was disposed to make the order, rights holders could be met with Section 36 of the Telecommunications Act which has been interpreted by the CRTC as only conferring on it the power to make blocking orders against ISPs.  Thus, given the current regulatory regime in Canada there are also cogent reasons for going directly to the CRTC in the first instance.

Geist has a history of opposing copyright laws to combat intellectual property violations. An assessment of the position he now takes on the state of Canadian laws should be assessed on the merits (canvassed above).  It is also relevant, in this regard, to take into account his prior positions such as the following:

Geist opposed enacting the enablement cause of action to enable rights holders to shut down file sharing sites like isoHunt claiming our laws were adequate and that it would stifle innovation.[229]  Of course, he has since presented no evidence that they have stifled innovation.

Geist says in his FairPlay posts that the laws against ISDs used in the ITVBox.net decision can be used to fight online piracy, but when they were used in the ITVBox.net case he claimed that cracking down on them “Threatens to Chill Canadian Tech Innovation”.[230]  Again, despite making the claim more than two years ago he has presented no evidence that they have chilled innovation.

Before the Equustek decision was released he warned providing the remedy would turn the Internet into the wild west.[231]  When the Equustek decision was released, he claimed it went too far.[232]

At the time Canada was considering entering into the TPP (with the US) it contained an article which required criminal sanctions against digital pirates who carry on businesses directed at content theft by removing rights management information (RMI) that identifies the owner of the copyright in a work. He called this “troubling” and opposed it.[233]

As has happened repeatedly in the past, Geist’s alarmist claims about the FairPlay proposal will turn out to have been unwarranted.

In 2015 Australia enacted a specific site blocking regime to address online piracy facilitated by foreign websites. The Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the Bill which summarized the rationale for the enactment is apposite to the Canadian situation as well.[234]

Copyright protection provides an essential mechanism for ensuring the viability and success of creative industries by incentivising and rewarding creators.  Online copyright infringement poses a significant threat to these incentives and rewards, due to the ease in which copyright material can be copied and shared through digital means without authorisation.

Where online copyright infringement occurs on a large scale, copyright owners need an efficient mechanism to disrupt the business models of online locations operated outside Australia that distribute infringing copyright material to Australian consumers.  In addition, a consequence of fewer visitors at the particular online location may also impact the advertising revenue, which is often an integral element of the business models of these types of entities.

The Bill acknowledges the difficulties in taking direct enforcement action against entities operating outside Australia.  The proposed amendments are intended to create a no‑fault remedy against CSPs where they are in a position to address copyright infringement.

Why all this matters – Conclusion

The FairPlay proposal represents a well thought out approach to dealing with Internet piracy in the Canadian context. Yet, Geist has attempted to demonize it using, what appears to be, any contrived argument he can think of.  He also has, as I showed above and in my prior blog post, tried to support his arguments with inaccurate and misleading information and arguments and by proffering references that don’t support his claims.

Moreover, Geist postulates a radical net neutrality Internet Governance framework where courts and government agencies are powerless to intervene to halt illegal activities over the Internet.  He goes further than even Mr LaRue, the former Special Rapporteur at the UN for freedom of expression that recognized that courts and government agencies have a right to make blocking orders.  He takes a similarly unbalanced position in claiming that intervening to stop online theft is unnecessary by ignoring the well documented harms caused by illegal piracy sites,[235] the evidence, including findings by courts that have studied this, that blocking orders are effective without any real risks of over-blocking, and without breaching fundamental freedom of speech rights.

What is even more troubling is that he engages in fear mongering. He tells average Canadians – who have no reason not to believe a Canada Research Chair –  that the proposal is radical, breaks net neutrality rules, may violate their fundamental freedom of speech and privacy rights, will result in blocking access to U.S. Netflix, content blocking by the CRTC and will lead to who knows what else.  We should expect much more from a Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law.

Geist also knows that his blogs will be widely read and will be used by Internet activists and others to oppose the proposal and to provide similarly misleading information to the public to encourage them to oppose the proposal.  Unfortunately, but quite predictably, his unfounded attacks are being relied upon by others to oppose the proposal using exaggerated and inflammatory arguments.[236]

For example, OpenMedia has a “Don’t Censor Canada” website campaign encouraging Canadians to write interventions to the CRTC. It tells Canadians

“This dangerous and over-reaching proposal will lead to legitimate content and speech being censored, violating our right to free expression and the principles of Net Neutrality, which the federal government has consistently pledged support for.”

In its “Want to learn more?” section the first reference is to Geist’s blog posts stating” The Case Against the Bell Coalition’s Website Blocking Plan: Read this excellent series by University of Ottawa law professor Michael Geist”.[237]  The OpenMedia site contains a draft pre-written email to the CRTC which is premised on same inaccurate types of claims Geist has been advocating.[238]  OpenMedia also partnered with SumOfUs which has a pre-populated form e-mail which makes similar inaccurate claims about the proposal.[239]

The result of all of this it seems likely that a large number of the submissions to the CRTC have been influenced directly or indirectly by Geist’s misleading diatribes against the proposal.[240]

Greg O’Brien in an insightful article “COMMENTARY: 4,700 people can be wrong” published in Cartt.ca[241] noted how inaccurate and misinformed many of the submissions to the CRTC are.  He also adverted to the real problem we as Canadians have in ensuring that debates on important issues do not get subverted by misinformation.

Now, I haven’t read each submission, but every single one of the dozens I have read, are wrong.  What I see is a lengthy list of people who did not read the FairPlay proposal. So many of the submissions are plainly off topic, have confused facts, or are just blatantly false.

The FairPlay Canada Coalition proposal is not about censorship or network neutrality or freedom of expression or Bell telling everyone what to do.  It is about piracy, about foreign operators making money illegally off the backs of others.  It’s about theft. It’s about content makers preserving the freedom to determine how their intellectual property is sold and used – and it’s about protecting Canadians from malicious web sites which use IP they don’t own in order to attract users and then wreak havoc.

We live in a period where it’s incredibly difficult to truly communicate.  Oh, there are multiple ways for us all to be in touch so we think it’s never been easier to communicate – but ease of access for messages doesn’t mean the messages you mean to say are being understood.  Clear, honest communications, where people debate and stay on topic? I see less evidence of that daily.

We’ve all become skilled in obfuscation and avoidance and in changing the topic if we don’t want to debate an actual premise.  That habit has become so clear, again, since the launch of FairPlay Canada.

Geist tries to deflect his critics by claiming they “rely heavily on character attacks” and not on his arguments on the merits. Geist is accustomed to using Ad hominem arguments in support of causes he opposes including in his recent series opposing the proposal where such arguments take up a disproportionate part of his posts.  However, this Ad hominen argument, at least to the extent it is directed at my prior post, misses my essential claim.  My essential claim is that on the merits Geist’s arguments simply cannot be supported, as this and my prior blog post contend.  However, arguments that bring to the fore Geist’s long standing antagonism to copyright protection for the creative community and the types of arguments he habitually makes to counter effective copyright protection, provides additional context to evaluate his claims.  These are not an attack on his character.  In this regard, there is a major difference between Ad hominen attacks and those premised on similar facts.[242]

The proposal should be assessed on its merits based on a careful analysis of the facts and evidence.  We should not let widely circulated misinformation be a factor governing decisions about important matters of public policy.  If this type of misinformation campaigns are given effect to, we can only expect them to become even more brazen.

_____________________________________________

[1]     The research assistance of Simon Cameron is gratefully acknowledged.

[2]     Barry Sookman “Why the CRTC should endorse FairPlay’s website-blocking plan: a reply to Michael Geist”, Feb 12, 2018, http://www.barrysookman.com/2018/02/12/why-the-crtc-should-endorse-fairplays-website-blocking-plan-a-reply-to-michael-geist/. (Sookman Why the CRTC should endorse FairPlay’s website-blocking plan).

[3]     Geist’s blog post’s are listed and summarized in his post “The Case Against the Bell Coalition’s Website Blocking Plan, The Finale”, March 8, 2018, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/03/caseagainstsiteblockingfinale/. Also, his posts “Outlier: Why Bell’s Leadership on Website Blocking Places It at Odds With Telecom Companies Around the World” and “Outlier, Part 2: What is the CBC Doing Supporting Website Blocking?” on his website michaelgeist.ca.

[4]     This article doesn’t deal with arguments I have already dealt with extensively in my prior blog post since Geist make no new substantive arguments, namely, “Part 2: Weak Evidence on the State of Canadian Piracy” and “Part 3: Piracy Having Little Impact on Thriving Digital Services and TV Production”. The article also doesn’t deal expressly with
“Part 13: It is Inconsistent With the CRTC Policy Direction”, “Part 14: Failure To Further the Telecommunications Act Policy Objectives”, “Part 15: It Undermines the Telecommunications Act Policy Objectives”, as these issues are largely repetitions of his prior arguments under  new headings and because these are extensively addressed in the opinion filed along with the proposal which Geist does not attempt to counter.

[5]     Pocket Oxford English Dictionary 9th ed. (Oxford University Press) 2001

[6]     Ernesto, “Pirate Site Blockades Enter Germany With Kinox.to as First Target”, Feb 13, 2018, https://torrentfreak.com/pirate-site-blockades-enter-germany-with-kinox-to-as-first-target-180213/; also, Ernesto, “Blocking Pirate Sites Without a Trial is Allowed, Italian Court Rules” Torrentfreak, Apr. 3, 2017 available at https://torrentfreak.com/blocking-pirate-sites-without-a-trial-is-allowed-italian-court-rules-170403/.

[7]     “Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society”,  Official Journal L 167 , 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019, 22 May 2001, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0029:EN:HTML, “Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.”

[8]     Jo Oliver and Elena Blobel, “Website Blocking inunctions – A Decade of Development”, in Jacques de Werra (Ed) et asl, Droit d’auteur 4.0, Schulthess Verlag (2018) (“Oliver Website Blocking inunctions”) at 32-42, 52-53.  According to this article, website blocking in Mexico is limited to operators of targeted websites that have a physical address in Mexico. The same may be true in Brazil. See, also, Cory, Nigel, ITIF, How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without “Breaking the Internet”, August 2016, http://www2.itif.org/2016-website-blocking.pdf at p. 13,

[9]     Oliver Website Blocking inunctions”) at 52-53; Cory, ITIF, How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without “Breaking the Internet” at p. 13, Adam Snukal. New Copyright Law in Chile, ReedSmith April 27, 2010, https://www.adlawbyrequest.com/2010/04/articles/intellectual-property/new-copyright-law-in-chile; “22 sites blocked in Saudi Arabia over copyrights issues”, Gulf News, Saudi Arabia, April 3, 2014, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/22-sites-blocked-in-saudi-arabia-over-copyrights-issues-1.1313281.

[10]    Jo Oliver and Elena Blobel, “Website Blocking inunctions – A Decade of Development”, in Jacques de Werra (Ed) et asl, Droit d’auteur 4.0, Schulthess Verlag (2018) (“Oliver Website Blocking inunctions”) at 32-42, 52-53.  According to this article, website blocking in Mexico is limited to operators of targeted websites that have a physical address in Mexico. The same may be true in Brazil. See also, the decisions referred to below summarizing injunctions that have been granted around the world.

[11]    “Gov’t ponders site blocking to stop manga piracy” The Mainichi, March 20, 2018, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20180320/p2a/00m/0na/005000c.

[12]    Cartier International AG & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) (17 October 2014), (“Cartier”) aff’d [2016] EWCA Civ 658 (06 July 2016) (“Cartier CA”); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc, [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) (28 July 2011); Dramatico Entertainment Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch) (02 May 2012); EMI Records Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch) (28 February 2013); The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch) (16 July 2013); The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors, [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch) (13 March 2017); Paramount Home Entertainment & Anor v British Sky Broadcasting & Ors, [2014] EWHC 937 (Ch) (18 February 2014); Paramount Home Entertainment International Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2013] EWHC 3479 (Ch) (13 November 2013); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc, [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch) (26 October 2011); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation & Ors v Sky UK Ltd & Ors, [2015] EWHC 1082 (Ch) (28 April 2015).

[13]    EMI Records (Ireland) Liomited v Eircom PLC, Mr. Justice Charleton, 24th day of July, 2009; EMI Records Ireland Ltd & Ors v UPC Communications Ireland Ltd & Ors, [2013] IEHC 274 (12 June 2013); Sony Music Entertainment (Ireland) Limited v UPC Communications Ireland Limited, Commercial Court Record Number: 2013/ 178 COM, December 2, 2013; Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, v Eircom Limited Trading as EIR, Commercial 2017 No. 11701 P (2018 No. 6.Com), Justice McGovern Jan 15, 2018; Davinia Brennan “Court orders ISPs to block illegal streaming websites” A&L Goodbody, April 4, 2017, https://www.irelandip.com/2017/04/articles/copyright/court-orders-isps-block-illegal-streaming-websites/.

[14]    Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited, [2017] FCA 965 (18 August 2017); Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd, [2016] FCA 1503 (15 December 2016); Universal Music Australia Pty Limited v TPG Internet Pty Ltd, [2017] FCA 435 (28 April 2017); Foxtel Management Pty Limited v TPG Internet Pty Ltd, [2017] FCA 1041 (1 September 2017)

[15]    CJEU C-134/12 UPC Telekabel Wien.

[16]    Other European and foreign cases are referred to here. Quotations are from unofficial translations.

[17]    Cory, Nigel, ITIF, How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without “Breaking the Internet”, August 2016, http://www2.itif.org/2016-website-blocking.pdf

[18]    The term “government agency” or “administrative agency” is used in this paper to mean a body with lawful authority to make an order, other than a court, such a telecommunications or communications regulator like the Korean Communications Commission (KCC) or AGCOM, the Italian telecommunications regulator, administrative authorities such as Portugal’s government body for cultural affairs (IGAC) and the Greek Copyright Organization (OPI), and ministries and government departments.

[19]    Oliver Website Blocking Injunctions. Geist excludes Indonesia and Malaysia – he is critical of the site blocking they do. He also excludes Portugal.

[20]    Kluwer Copyright Blog, “Italian Public enforcement on online copyright infringements: AGCOM Regulation held valid by the Regional Administrative Court of Lazio (but there is still room for the CJEU)”, June 16, 2017 http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/06/16/italian-public-enforcement-online-copyright-infringements-agcom-regulation-held-valid-regional-administrative-court-lazio-still-room-cjeu/.

[21]    The IPKat, “Greece: new notice and take down administrative mechanism for online copyright cases now in force”, March 5, 2018, http://ipkitten.blogspot.ca/2018/03/greece-new-notice-and-take-down.html; also, for the process, http://www.opi.gr/index.php/en/committee/request-committee.

[22]    MPA, “MPA Study on Site Blocking Impact in South Korea (2016)”, http://www.mpa-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/MPAA_Impact_of_Site_Blocking_in_South_Korea_2016.pdf

[23]    Luis Schmidt, “Most Counts as Total When Blocking Websites in Mexico”,November 9, 2017 http://www.mondaq.com/mexico/x/644646/Copyright/Most+Counts+As+Total+When+Blocking+Websites+In+Mexico >

[24]    The Verge, “France can now block suspected terrorism websites without a court order”. February 9, 2015, https://www.theverge.com/2015/2/9/8003907/france-terrorist-child-pornography-website-law-censorship.

[25]    Computer World, “Government releases guidelines for website-blocking power”, July 17, 2017, https://www.computerworld.com.au/article/621872/government-releases-guidelines-website-blocking-power/.

[26]    Tech Liberty NZ, “Media release: NZ government now filtering Internet”, March 11, 2010, http://techliberty.org.nz/media-release-nz-government-now-filtering-Internet/.

[27]    Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, “Freedom of Expression on the Internet”, December 15, 2011, https://www.osce.org/fom/80723.

[28]    See, TechDirt, “Finnish Court OKs Censorship Of Anti-Censorship Site”, August 30, 2013, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130829/11135624352/finnish-court-oks-censorship-anti-censorship-site.shtml.

[29]   “Polish blacklist of gambling websites” DLA Piper, Apr. 3, 2017, https://blogs.dlapiper.com/mediaandsport/2017/04/polish-blacklist-of-gambling-websites/; CMS Cameron McKenna Nabarro Olswang LLP, “Slovakia cracks down on online gambling”, Aug. 23, 2017, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b1eb402a-058f-4405-9007-b1d63c494a42.

[30]   Andy,“Rightsholders & Belgian ISPs Cooperate to Block 450 ‘Pirate’ Domains, Torrentfreak, March 3, 2018, https://torrentfreak.com/rightsholders-belgian-isps-cooperate-to-block-450-pirate-domains-180303/.

[31]   EMI Records Ireland Ltd & Ors v UPC Communications Ireland Ltd & Ors, [2013] IEHC 274 (12 June 2013); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, v Eircom Limited Trading as EIR, Commercial, 2017 No. 11701 P (2018 No. 6.Com), Justice McGovern, Jan. 15, 2018.

[32]   ibid

[33]   “Telecommunications Industry Association in Denmark: Code of Conduct for handling decisions by the courts of law or authori-ties concerning blocking of websites due to rights infringements” 24 Sept. 2014.

[34]    Michael Geist “The Case Against the Bell Coalition’s Website Blocking Plan, Part 4: Absence of Court Orders Would Put Canada At Odds With Almost Everyone”, February 15, 2018, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/02/case-bell-coalitions-website-blocking-plan-part-4-absence-court-orders-put-canada-odds-almost-everyone/ .

[35]    See, “Michael Geist Bill C-32: My Perspective on the Key Issues“, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2010/09/c-32-perspective-on-key-issues/; Barry Sookman “An FAQ on TPMs, Copyright and Bill C-32”, Dec. 14, 2010, http://www.barrysookman.com/2010/12/14/an-faq-on-tpms-copyright-and-bill-c-32/.; Barry Sookman “Change and the Copyright Modernization Act” Nov 7, 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/11/07/change-and-the-copyright-modernization-act/.

[36]   Michael Geist “Canadian Copyright Diplomacy: My Appearance before the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs” Feb 7, 2018, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2018/02/canadian-copyright-diplomacy-appearance-senate-standing-committee-foreign-affairs/.

[37]    Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c 38, ss. 24, 24.1, 32, 51, 61(d) and 67(1).

[38]    Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-479, Public Interest Advocacy Centre – Application for relief regarding section 12 of the Quebec Budget Act Dec. 9, 2016.

[39]    CRTC Three-Year Plan 2017-2020, https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/backgrnd/plan2017/plan2017.htm.

[40]    Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c 38, Part IV.

[41]    Ibid.

[42]    Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, s. 28(1)(c).

[43]    Doré v. Barreau du Québec, [2012] 1 SCR 395, 2012 SCC 12.

[44]    Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/Pages/index.aspx

[45]    Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, https://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/eng/content/human-rights-in-canada

[46]    Barry Sookman “CASL: the unofficial FAQ, regulatory impact statement, and compliance guideline”, Jan 14, 2015, http://www.barrysookman.com/2015/01/14/casl-the-unofficial-faq-regulatory-impact-statement-and-compliance-guideline/.

[47]    Barry Sookman “Michael Geist’s defense of Canada’s indefensible anti-spam law CASL”, July 14, 2014, http://www.barrysookman.com/2014/07/14/michael-geists-defense-of-canadas-indefensible-anti-spam-law-casl/.

[48]    Compliance and Enforcement Decision CRTC 2017-367, Oct. 19, 2017. The decision is under appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal.

[49]    See Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., [2016] 2 S.C.R. 293: “The presumption of reasonableness is grounded in the legislature’s choice to give a specialized tribunal responsibility for administering the statutory provisions, and the expertise of the tribunal in so doing.  Expertise arises from the specialization of functions of administrative tribunals like the Board which have a habitual familiarity with the legislative scheme they administer: ‘… in many instances, those working day to day in the implementation of frequently complex administrative schemes have or will develop a considerable degree of expertise or field sensitivity to the imperatives and nuances of the legislative regime’ (Dunsmuir, at para. 49, quoting D. J. Mullan, ‘Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity?’ (2004), 17 C.J.A.L.P. 59, at p. 93; see also Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at para. 25)”.

[50]    International norms can be used to help interpret Canadian law. Of course, the weight to be afforded to international norms that have not been incorporated by statute into Canadian law will depend on all the circumstances of the case, including the legal authoritativeness of their legal source, their specificity and, in the case of customary international law, the uniformity of state practice. Further, effect cannot be given to unincorporated international norms that are inconsistent with the clear provisions of an Act of Parliament: Rahaman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 89.

[51]    JOINT DECLARATION by the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Opinion and Expression and the IACHR-OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, Jan 20, 2012, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=888&lID=1

[52]    General Assembly of the United Nations, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue”, May 11, 2011, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.

[53]    The declarations of Mr. LaRue have been criticized as not reflecting a balanced approach to protection of rights on the Internet and, in particular, for failing to take a balanced approach between the fundamental principles of freedom of expression and the protection of copyright which is also a human right. See, generally, IPKat, “UK response to file-sharing is still in trouble — but should it be?”, Jun 12, 2011, http://ipkitten.blogspot.ca/2011/06/uk-response-to-file-sharing-is-still-in.html; Chris Castle, “Artist Rights are Human Rights”, Music, Technology, Policy, Sep. 27, 2015, https://musictechpolicy.com/2015/09/. Voluntary blocking of unlawful content should not necessarily be prohibited. As this is not in issue in the proposal, I do not address that issue here.

[54]    Michael Geist, “UN Report Says Internet Three Strikes Laws Violate International Law”, Jun. 3, 2011, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2011/06/un-report-on-three-strikes/; Michael Geist, “Is Internet Access A Human Right?: The Implications for the Rules of Access”, June 21, 2011, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2011/06/internet-access-human-right-column/.

[55]    See, https://www.eff.org/about/advisoryboard.

[56]    Third-Party Intervention Submissions by Article 19 and the Electronic Frontier Foundation in the European Court of Human Rights App. No. 10795/14, at paras. 16-17, https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/170825-Submission-Kharitonov-v-Russia-A19EFF.pdf. Quoting with approval the May 2011 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur, above.

[57]  Ibid, at para. 36, but noting that regulatory models are more problematic than courts as government agencies are “more likely to call for measures that protect the interests they are tasked to protect, such as national security or child safety, rather than freedom of expression”.

[58]  See e.g. British Columbia Telephone Co. v. Shaw Cable Systems (B.C.) Ltd., [1995] 2 SCR 739, at para. 33; Shaw Cablesystems (SMB) Ltd. et al v. MTS Communications Inc. et al, 2006 MBCA 29, at para. 7.

[59]  Stanford University Law and Policy Lab, “The ‘Right to be Forgotten’ and Blocking Orders under the American Convention: Emerging Issues in Intermediary Liability and Human Rights”, at p. 66, https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-_Right-to-Be-Forgotten_-and-Blocking-Orders-under-the-American-Convention-Emerging-Issues-in-Intermediary-Liability-and-Human-Rights_Sep17-.pdf [Stanford].

[60]    ManilaPrinciples.Org, “Organizational Signatories”, https://www.manilaprinciples.org/organization-signatories

[61]    Stanford, supra at p. 55.

[62]    The Stanford Review acknowledges the effectiveness of blocking orders, saying that, “It is possible to bypass all three forms of blocking using circumvention tools, but the blocks are effective against the average Internet user”: Ibid, at p. 58.

[63]    Ibid, at p. 24, quoting Council of Europe, “Joint Declaration On Freedom Of Expression And “Fake News,” Disinformation And Propaganda (2017)”, https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/-/joint-declaration-on-freedom-of-expression-and-fake-newsdisinformation-and-propaganda.

[64]    See also, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), Official Journal L 178, 17/07/2000 P. 0001 – 0016, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32000L0031&from=en, Recital (45): “The limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers established in this Directive do not affect the possibility of injunctions of different kinds; such injunctions can in particular consist of orders by courts or administrative authorities requiring the termination or prevention of any infringement, including the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it.” Also, Articles 12(3), 13(3), 14(3).

[65]    Council of Europe, “Comparative Study On Blocking, Filtering And Take-Down Of Illegal Internet Content”, at p. 18, https://edoc.coe.int/en/Internet/7289-pdf-comparative-study-on-blocking-filtering-and-take-down-of-illegal-Internet-content-.html, quoting OSCE, “Freedom of Expression on the Internet”, (2011), https://www.osce.org/fom/105522?download=true.

[66]    Ibid, at p. 16.

[67]    Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on measures to promote the respect for freedom of expression and information with regard to Internet filters (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 26 March 2008 at the 1022nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?p=&Ref=CM/Rec(2008)6&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=original&direct=true. This recommendation was also referenced in the OSCE report that Geist cited for the statement that only courts of law must make decisions concerning human rights.

[68]    Article 6(1) of the ECHR further confirms that, as in Canada under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in the EU limitations on freedoms of speech can be made by an independent tribunal.  “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.  Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.”

[69]    Sameer Chhabra, ISED minister responds to anti-piracy group, defends net neutralityMobileSyrup, Jan. 29, 2018

[70]   See Neil Turkewitz “Internet Governance 3.0: The maturation of principles concerning Internet Governance” April 28, 2014 Music Notes Blog, https://www.riaa.com/internet-governance-3-0-the-maturation-of-principles-concerning-internet-governance/ describing that Brazil adopted a net neutrality law that expressly preserved the ability to enforce intellectual property rights online. “First after many years of deliberation, Brazil adopted legislation on net neutrality and privacy designed to enhance security, privacy, and competition (known as Marco Civil) while simultaneously rejecting proposals that would have hindered the application of the rule of law—particularly with regard to the protection of intellectual property.  Even within a highly charged political environment, the Brazilian government rejected the notion that freedom of expression and network neutrality somehow demanded that internet service providers remain blind to infringements on their networks, and ensured that ISPs retained the capacity to respond quickly when they became aware of such infringements. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff signed the bill at the opening of the NetMundial conference, a “global multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance.”  The NETmundial conference was the first of its kind, and we are hopeful that it contributes to the evolution of the Internet governance ecosystem that encourages freedom, responsibility, accountability and transparency.”

[71]    Proof of an International norm depends on all the circumstances of the case, including the legal authoritativeness of their legal source, their specificity and, in the case of customary international law, the uniformity of state practice: Rahaman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 89.

[72]    The recent FCC order is not yet effective. See, “Verizon, AT&T & Comcast Ask Congress to Make the Net Neutrality Repeal Stronger”, Digital Music News, March 18, 2018, https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/03/18/net-neutrality-repeal-fcc-isp/

[73]    FCC 17-166, adopted Dec 14, 2017, https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2018/db0104/FCC-17-166A1.pdf at paras. 207, 220.

[74]    See, State of Washington, SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL 2282, http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-18/Pdf/Bills/House Passed Legislature/2282-S.PL.pdf which only prohibits blocking or impairing traffic to lawful content and does not prohibit “reasonable efforts by a provider of broadband Internet access service to address copyright infringement or other unlawful activity”; “Washington becomes first state to pass its own net neutrality bill”, March 6, 2018, http://myedmondsnews.com/2018/03/washington-becomes-first-state-to-pass-its-own-net-neutrality-bill/?utm_content=buffer39d74&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

[75]    Shreya Singhal vs U.O.I on 24 March, 2015; Data Reign, “Department of Telecom India Blocks Vimeo, The Pirate Bay and Other Torrent Sites”, https://www.datareign.com/department-of-telecom-india-blocks-vimeothe-pirate-bay-and-other-torrent-sites.html

[76]    See, “TRAI Recommendations On Net Neutrality”, November 28, 2017, http://www.trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/Recommendations_NN_2017_11_28.pdf: “Rule adopted: Principle of nondiscriminatory treatment” “A Licensee providing Internet Access Service shall not engage in any discriminatory treatment of content, including based on the sender or receiver, the protocols being used or the user equipment.” “The Licensee is prohibited from entering into any arrangement, agreement or contract, by whatever name called, with any person, natural or legal, that has the effect of discriminatory treatment of content.  The Reasonable traffic management and other exceptions state: “Nothing contained in this provision shall restrict:…Implementation of any order of a court or direction issued by the Government, in accordance with law”.  The term “Content” is defined as including “all content, applications, services and any other data, including its end-point information, which can be accessed or transmitted over the Internet.” and “Discriminatory treatment” is defined as including “any form of discrimination, restriction or interference in the treatment of content, including practices like blocking, degrading, slowing down or granting preferential speeds or treatment to any content.” I am not expressing any opinion on whether in India blocking for copyright purposes is or is not permitted, and if so, what mechanisms are available.

[77]    EU Regulation 2015/2120, Nov. 25, 2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015R2120.

[78]    BEREC Report on the outcome of the public consultation on draft BEREC Guidelines on the Implementation by National Regulators of European Net Neutrality rules, Aug 30, 2016, http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/reports/6161-berec-report-on-the-outcome-of-the-public-consultation-on-draft-berec-guidelines-on-the-implementation-by-national-regulators-of-european-net-neutrality-rules.

[79]    The report summed up the submission: “Article 3(3) third subparagraph Stakeholder responses… Another suggestion from some civil society respondents and ISPs was for NRAs to support ISPs blocking content recognized as illegal under Union law or national legislation (as also referred to in paragraph 81 / paragraph 78 of the draft Guidelines), on a voluntary or self-regulatory basis, making reference to Recital 13.  For the specific case of child sexual abuse content, a reference to Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 combating child sexual abuse was suggested. It was also suggested that NRAs should also support the ability of ISPs to filter spam at any time.”

[80]    “BEREC Guidelines on the Implementation by National Regulators of European Net Neutrality Rules”, Aug. 30, 2016, http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/regulatory_best_practices/guidelines/6160-berec-guidelines-on-the-implementation-by-national-regulators-of-european-net-neutrality-rules.

[81]    Section 36 states “Except where the Commission approves otherwise, a Canadian carrier shall not control the content or influence the meaning or purpose of telecommunications carried by it for the public.”

[82]    Telecom Decision CRTC 2016-479, Public Interest Advocacy Centre – Application for relief regarding section 12 of the Quebec Budget Act, Dec. 9, 2016

[83]    Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2009-657, Oct. 21, 2009.

[84]    “The Commission is therefore not addressing, in this decision, ITMPs used only for the purpose of network security, nor those employed temporarily to address unpredictable traffic events (e.g. traffic surges due to global events and failures on part of an ISP’s network) in order to protect network integrity.”

[85]    Finally, the Commission clarifies the circumstances in which an ITMP employed by an ISP would result in the carrier controlling the content or influencing the meaning or purpose of telecommunications. In these circumstances, the Commission’s prior approval would be required, pursuant to section 36 of the Act, but the Commission would not use the ITMP framework in its review, as the matter is not one of discrimination or preference.

[86]    Michael Geist, “Child Pornography Blocking Plan a Risk Worth Taking”, Dec. 4, 2016, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2006/12/project-cleanfeed-column/

[87]    Geist also referred to a Dutch study on blocking the Pirate Bay which found no lasting effect from only this site block.  The conclusions of this study are consistent with the findings of Prof. Danaher referred to above.  However, they in no way undermine the finding of Danaher and Incopro that the cumulative effects of blocking do result in decreased usage of piracy sites as a whole.  See, Joost Poort Baywatch: “Two approaches to measure the effects of blocking access to The Pirate Bay”, Telecommunications Policy 38 (2014) 383–392, https://staff.fnwi.uva.nl/j.j.vanderham/research/publications/1401-Baywatch.pdf.

[88]    Brett Danaher et al., “Website Blocking Revisited: The Effect of the UK November 2014 Blocks on Consumer Behavior”, April 19, 2016, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2766795. The abstract summarized the findings as follows:

Whether and how copyrights should be enforced in the digital age has become an important policy question and an important question for empirical research. In a prior study, we found that the court ordered blocking of the Pirate Bay website in the UK in April 2012 had only a small impact on total piracy and no impact on paid legal streaming, but that the blocking of 19 major piracy websites in November 2013 caused a significant decrease in total piracy and a significant increase in usage of paid legal streaming sites.

In this update, we ask whether the blocking of 53 piracy websites in the UK in November 2014 — which more than doubled the total number of sites being blocked in the country — had an impact on consumer behavior and how that impact compared to the previous blocks. We found that these blocks caused a 90% drop in visits to the blocked sites while causing no increase in usage of unblocked sites.  This led to a 22% decrease in total piracy for all users affected by the blocks (or a 16% decrease across all users overall).  We also found that these blocks caused a 6% increase in visits to paid legal streaming sites like Netflix and a 10% increase in videos viewed on legal ad-supported streaming sites like BBC and Channel 5.

[89]    Incopro, “Site blocking efficacy study United Kingdom”, revised March 19, 2015, http://www.incoproip.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Site-Blocking-Efficacy-UK-revised-19-03-2015.pdf.

[90]    The report found that ISP site blocks had a significant impact on all blocked sites analysed for the UK, with all categories showing a significant decline in usage. On average, blocked sites in the UK lost 73.2% of their Alexa estimated usage following a site block and maintained those levels consistently over time. When compared to the global control, changes in Alexa estimated usage for blocked sites in the UK tracked lower in all categories and showed an overall decline in usage.  The report concluded:

It is clear from the following graph that the UK has experienced a decrease in traffic to the blocked sites over time, in contrast to the global control. Whilst the global usage has exhibited an overall increase of 7.8% for these sites, a decrease of 22.9% can be seen for the UK overall.  This demonstrates that site blocking has had an overall effect in decreasing the growth of sites in comparison with the rest of the world.

[91]    Incopro, “Report Site Blocking Efficacy: Australia”, May 2017, http://www.incoproip.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Australian-Site-Blocking-Efficacy-Report-Final-v.2.pdf.

[92]    Incopro, “Site Blocking Efficacy – Key Findings Australia”, February 2018, https://www.creativecontentaustralia.org.au/_literature_210629/2018_Research_-_Incopro_Study.

[93]   Geist doesn’t dispute the overall findings in the report. Instead, he referred to a single domain of blocked sites containing 82 domains and referred to an online source showing that Australia remained the top traffic source for that site. He provided no explanation for this including any data showing how the actual traffic to that site changed before and after the August 2017 block of the site.

[94]    Jaan Riordian, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp 494-495, referring to various UK decisions commenting on this point.  See also the cases referred to below on this point.

[95]    MPA,“MPA Study on Site Blocking Impact in South Korea (2016)”, http://www.mpa-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/MPAA_Impact_of_Site_Blocking_in_South_Korea_2016.pdf

[96]    Incopro, “Site Blocking Efficacy in Portugal (2017)”, http://www.incoproip.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Site-Blocking-and-Piracy-Landscape-in-Portugal-FINAL.pdf.

[97]    Evidence of the effectiveness of site blocking has been reported by the IFPI in annual IFPI Digital Music Reports.  According to the 2011 Report following The Pirate Bay being blocked in Italy, there was a 54% reduction in traffic to the site between February to October 2010; according to the 2012 Report following an order by the Antwerp Court of Appeal requiring 2 Belgian ISPs to block The Pirate Bay, there was an 84% reduction in site traffic between August and November 2011.  Traffic to The Pirate Bay in Italy was still down by 74% following the site being blocked by Italian ISPs in February 2010.  Further, following BTJunkie being blocked in Italy in April 2011, there was an 80% reduction in traffic to the site; according to the 2013 Report around 6.6 million Dutch Internet users were using unlicensed services in the Netherlands in January 2012.  However, following the closure of MegaUpload and The Pirate Bay being blocked, this fell by 4% to 6.1 million by December 2012.  Additionally, after ISPs in the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Italy and the UK were ordered to block The Pirate Bay, usage level of this site fell 69%.  In contrast, countries without the block saw traffic increase by 45%; according to the 2014 Report BitTorrent usage was down 11% across EU countries with website blocking vs an increase of 15% in BitTorrent usage in EU countries without blocks.  The effect was particularly noticeable in the UK and Italy where the highest number of sites have been blocked.  In Italy, BitTorrent traffic declined 13% in 2013 and in the UK, traffic declined by 20% in 2013; according to the  2015 Report since The Pirate Bay and numerous other sites have been blocked in the UK there had been a 45 per cent decline (from 20.4m in April 2012 to 11.2m in April 2014) in visitors from the UK to all BitTorrent sites, whether blocked by ISPs or not.  In Italy, where courts have ordered the blocking of 24 BitTorrent sites, there has been a decline of 25.6 per cent in the number of overall BitTorrent downloads in the country in the two years from January 2013.  See www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2011.pdf, www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2012.pdf, www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2013.pdf, http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Digital-Music-Report-2014.pdf, http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/Digital-Music-Report-2015.pdf

[98]    Institute for Prospective Technological Studies Digital Economy, “Working Paper 2015/01: Online Copyright Enforcement, Consumer Behavior, and Market Structure”, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/JRC93492_Online_Copyright.pdf.

[99]    “Our results have important implications for policy and must be interpreted with caution. While users of kino.to decreased their levels of piracy consumption by 30% during the four weeks following the intervention, their consumption through licensed movie platforms increased by only 2.5%…we also note that we cannot observe what kinds of offline-activities consumers turn to after the shutdown of kino.to, limiting our possibilities of measuring the full producer gains of the intervention. We also highlight that the effects of anti-piracy interventions are specific to the context in which they are implemented. In particular, it is likely that the effects of such interventions will vary in function of the licensed consumption alternatives available in the market. Because German licensed online consumption channels were scarce in 2011, consumers had only limited opportunities to switch to licensed digital consumption of movies after the shutdown of kino.to.  Given the importance of licensed alternatives to reduce piracy (Danaher et al., 2010, 2013), the results of these anti-piracy interventions may well be very different in an environment with more and better licensed offers available to consumers. In particular, they may be more effective in converting consumers from unlicensed to licensed consumption.”  (Emphasis added)

[100]  Brett Danaher / Michael D. Smith “Gone in 60 Seconds: The Impact of the Megaupload Shutdown on Movie Sales –September 2013”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167718713001288.

[101] District Court order quoted in Stichting BREIN v Ziggo BV, THE HAGUE  COURT, Commercial Law Division, Case/Docket Number District Court C/09/535341/KG ZA 17-891, Sept 22, 2017

[102]  Martin Gijzemijter for Benelux  “Ineffective’ Pirate Bay ban lifted by Dutch court” ZDNet, January 28, 2014, http://www.zdnet.com/article/ineffective-pirate-bay-ban-lifted-by-dutch-court/.

[103]  Stichting BREIN v Ziggo BV, First Chamber 14/02399 LZ/EE, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 13 November 2015, quoted paragraphs below from unofficial translation.

[104]  Case C-610/15 Stichting BREIN v Ziggo BV [EU:C:2017:99]

[105]  Stichting BREIN v Ziggo BV, THE HAGUE COURT, Commercial Law Division, Case/Docket Number District Court C/09/535341/KG ZA 17-891, Sept 22, 2017.

[106]  Kavita Iyer, “The Pirate Bay witnesses 40 percent drop in traffic in the Netherlands”, TechWorm  mar 4, 2018, https://www.techworm.net/2018/03/pirate-bay-witnesses-40-percent-drop-traffic-netherlands.html

[107] The Football Association Premier League Limited v Ecatel, ECLI: NL: RBDHA: 2018: 615, Court of The Hague , Jan 24, 2018, C / 09/485400 / HA ZA 15-36

[108] CJEU C-134/12, UPC Telekabel Wien

[109]  Cartier International AG & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch) (17 October 2014), affirmed [2016] EWCA Civ 658 (06 July 2016).

[110]  The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch) (16 July 2013)

[111]  Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Telecommunications plc, [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch), [2017] ECC 17.

[112]  1967 Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2014] EWHC 3444 (Ch) (23 October 2014).

[113]  Union Des Associations Européennes De Football v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors , [2017] EWHC 3414 (Ch) (21 December 2017)

[114] Universal Music Australia Pty Limited v. TPG Internet Pty Ltd, [2017] FCA 435, (28 April 2017)

[115] Disney Entertainment Inc. v. Telenor Norway AS et al.,17-093347TVI-OTIR/05, Norway, Oslo District Court (3 November 2017)

[116] Associação Para a Gestão e Distribuição de Direitos et al. v. Acessos e Redes de Telecomunicações et al., Portugal Tribunal of Intellectual Property (24 February 2015)

[117] Sonofon A/S v. Aller International A/S et al., B-530-08, High Court of Eastern Denmark (26 November 2008) “As a starting point, blocking at DNS level is sufficiently effective. It is an established practice that the respondents cannot be referred to asserting their rights against the owners of the website.”

[118] Asoiacion de gestion de derechos intelectuales (AGEDI), E/2012/00358, Spain, Intellectual Property Commission (28 October 2014) “Moreover, the condition is met that the aforesaid execution measures have the aim of impeding, or at least, making it difficult to carry out, non-authorized access to the protected works and subject matter, and of seriously dissuading internet users resorting to the services of the relevant internet access operations from consulting this subject matter made available to them in violation of the right to intellectual property; therefore, as indicated above, blocking the specific aforesaid domain name of the piratebay group would seriously hinder access to said content.”

[119] Sony Music Entertainment Sweden et al. v. B2 Bredband AB, PMT 11706-15, Sweden, Patent and Market Appeals Court (13 February 2017) “Even though it is rather simple for the operators of the services The Pirate Bay and Swefilmer to create new web addresses etc. to provide access to the services, in the opinion of the Patent and Market Appeals Court, it is clear that an injunction nevertheless would contribute in making it more difficult to access the services.”

[120]  Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) (28 July 2011)

[121]  The court also gave as a fourth reason, the reason quoted above from the Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications case. See also, to the same effect, Stichting BREIN v Ziggo BV, THE HAGUE  COURT, Commercial Law Division, Case/Docket Number District Court C/09/535341/KG ZA 17-891, Sept 22, 2017 “The fact that there are methods for circumventing that blockade, e.g. through proxies, mirror sites and Virtual Private Network (PVN) connections, and still gain access to the TPB website, does not change that entirely.  It goes without saying, that when the TPB website is blocked by the ISPs, it becomes less easy to reach, or in the very least access is made difficult (cf. points 62 and 63 of ECJ Telekabel Wine).  Put another way, the less seasoned surfer will have more difficulty reaching the TPB website and that is sufficient for the time being.  As a result, the imposing of a measure will prevent part of such circumvention (through mirror sites, for instance), because Brein can pass those websites on to the providers.  Brein has moreover indicated upon being asked that it wants to address VPN providers too.”

[122] VZW Belgian Anti-Piracy Federation v. NV Telenet et al., 2010/AR/2541, Belgium, Court of Appeal for Antwerp (26 Sept. 2011) “It must be assumed that the average internet user will not seek to find other ways of visiting the blocked website.”)

[123] Société Française du Radiotéléphone et al. v. Orange et al., Case No: 14/03236, France, Paris Court of First Instance (04 December 2014) “While it is correct that any blocking measures can be circumvented by some internet users, on the one hand it has not been established that the large majority of internet users, who are attached to the free-of-charge nature of communications and numerous services on the internet, have the firm intention to participate in globalised and large-scale piracy and, on the other hand, the measures sought are aimed at the majority of users who do not necessarily have the time and skills to research means of circumventing the law, which specialists find and store in their memory.”

[124] The Finnish National Group of IFPI et al. v. Anvia Oyj et al., Docket no. 2015/625, Finland, Mark Court (29th April 2016) “The necessity for a blocking order is not reduced by the fact that blocking measures can possibly be circumvented by some users.  Under the legal praxis of the Court of Justice, measures are effective enough when they prevent unauthorised acquaintance with protected material or at least considerably hamper acquaintance and significantly reduce the appeal for internet users to acquaint themselves with material made available unlawfully.  In Finland, a study has been done of changes in the numbers of users of The Pirate Bay service before the discontinuation orders granted by Helsinki District Court and after them.  It has clearly emerged that the discontinuation orders have reduced the appeal of The Pirate Bay service, causing a considerable fall in the number of users.”

[125]  Ofcom, “’Site Blocking’ to reduce online copyright infringement”, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/12838/1-186872101-attachment1.pdf?lang=en.

[126]  Council Of Europe, “Comparative Study on blocking, filtering and take-down of illegal internet content (2015)”, https://edoc.coe.int/en/internet/7289-pdf-comparative-study-on-blocking-filtering-and-take-down-of-illegal-internet-content-.html. The publication was prepared by the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law (SICL) and was qualified with the statement that “The opinions expressed in this document do not engage the responsibility of the Council of Europe.”

[127]  La Coalicion, “Observatory 2016: Piracy down 4%”, April 25, 2017, http://lacoalicion.es/2017/04/25/piracy-down-4/.

[128] “The situation proves that legislative measures have a positive impact, but the results of their implementation are still insufficient, so we need more resources to be allocated and greater agility in the procedure. We are witnessing the first decrease of piracy in the last ten years, and it is an excellent opportunity to revert the enormous damage it causes to creators, to the industries, but also to employment, the public purse and to our country’s competitiveness in a global market.  We want to keep up with our neighbours’ results, countries such as Italy or Portugal, and get as close as possible to the United Kingdom, France or Germany”, stated Carlota Navarrete, director of the Coalition.”  The Observatory also contain the result of a survey of what users believed would best counter illegal online file sharing that stated “Most efficient measures against piracy would be, to the Internet users’ own view, blocking access to the website offering content (68%) and penalising Internet providers (61%).  Following these two, the best measures to reduce infringements would be, according to consumers, imposing fines to users (53 %) and promoting social awareness campaigns against piracy (52%).”

[129] Hugh Stephens “The Effectiveness of Site Blocking: It is a Matter of Common Sense”, Mar. 11, 2018, https://hughstephensblog.net/2018/03/11/the-effectiveness-of-site-blocking-it-is-a-matter-of-common-sense/.

[130] A DNS server translates a domain name (e.g. www.Example.com) into an IP Address.  ISPs implement DNS blocking by coding their DNS servers to not resolve the blocked domain names.

[131] URL path filtering blocks access to particular website paths (e.g., YouTube.com/InfringingVideo).

[132] Cybertip.ca, “Cleanfeed Canada”, https://www.cybertip.ca/app/en/projects-cleanfeed

[133]  Ofcom, “’Site Blocking’ to reduce online copyright infringement”, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/12838/1-186872101-attachment1.pdf?lang=en.ment .

[134] International Chamber of Commerce, “Roles And Responsibilities Of Intermediaries: Fighting Counterfeiting And Piracy In The Supply Chain”, at pg. 75, https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2015/03/ICC-BASCAP-Roles-and-Responsibilities-of-Intermediaries.pdf.

[135] Ofcom, “’Site Blocking’ to reduce online copyright infringement”, at pg. 41, https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/12838/1-186872101-attachment1.pdf?lang=en [Ofcom].

[136] The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2013] EWHC 2058 (Ch), Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd, [2016] FCA 1503.

[137]  Union Des Associations Européennes De Football v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors, [2017] EWHC 3414 (Ch) (21 December 2017); See also, Universal Music Australia Pty Limited v. TPG Internet Pty Ltd, [2017] FCA 435, Australia, Federal Court of Australia (28 April 2017), court determining a blocking order would be effective without a risk of over-blocking.

[138] Constantin Film Verleih GmbH v. UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH, 4 Ob 6/12d, Austria, Supreme Court of Austria (11 May 2012. “The Plaintiffs applied, rather, for the Defendant to be ordered to deny access to the entire website for their customers.  This will, in any case, only be admissible if, rather than in individual cases only, systematic and regular infringements are committed against the exclusive right of the rights holders to make particular content publicly accessible, i.e. where, in other words, there is no danger according to a realistic assessment of the blocking also preventing the access provider’s customers from obtaining content made publicly accessible in a lawful manner.  This therefore rules out isolated infringements of rights by a content provider leading to general blocking by the consumers’ access providers.  This requirement would be met in the case in question by virtue of the website operated at kino.to being oriented towards making protected works accessible and there thus not being any risk of general blocking also denying access to lawful content.  There is no proof that, as contended by the Defendant, IP addresses of kino.to are also used by other (lawful) providers. In this respect, too, there is therefore no threat of blocking lawful content.”

[139] Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, v Eircom Limited Trading as EIR, Commercial, 2017 No. 11701 P (2018 No. 6.Com), Justice McGovern, Jan. 15, 2018

[140] FairPlay Coalition, CRTC Proposal, at para. 1

[141] Ofcom, “’Site Blocking’ to reduce online copyright infringement”, at pg. 38; see also Nigel Cory, How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without “Breaking the Internet” (August 2016), accessed: http://www2.itif.org/2016-website-blocking.pdf?_ga=1.221850136.1203660847.1473936817,

[142] UKIE, “Response to Ofcom site blocking Review”., at pg. 6, http://ukie.org.uk/sites/default/files/UKIE%20Policy%20Paper%20-%20Response%20to%20Ofcom%20site%20blocking%20Review.pdf

[143]  “Guidelines for the use of section 313(3) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 by government agencies for the lawful disruption of access to online services” July 17, 2017, https://www.communications.gov.au/documents/guidelines-use-section-3133-telecommunications-act-1997-government-agencies-lawful-disruption-access.

[144] See, Good money gone bad” – Digital Thieves and the Hijacking of the Online Ad Business, A report on the Profitability of Ad-Supported Content Theft (Digital Citizens Alliance, February 2014) http://media.digitalcitizensactionalliance.org/314A5A5A9ABBBBC5E3BD824CF47C46EF4B9D3A76/4af7db7f-03e7-49cb-aeb8-ad0671a4e1c7.pdf (Research project analysed advertising-supported web sites that dealt primarily in pirated content, and found that advertising yielded enormous profits.)

[145] Geist’s argument related to the need for court orders is dealt with above.

[146] Stanford Law School, Law and Policy Lab, Intermediary Liability & Human Rights Policy Practicum, “The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ and Blocking Orders under the American Convention: Emerging Issues in Intermediary Liability and Human Rights (2017)” P 56-57, https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/The-Right-to-Be-Forgotten_-and-Blocking-Orders-under-the-American-Convention-Emerging-Issues-in-Intermediary-Liability-and-Human-Rights_Sep17-.pdf.

[147] Frank LaRue, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression and others, “JOINT DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET”, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=849&lID=1.

[148]  Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] 1 SCR 467, at paras. 64-67.

[149] Compagnie Générale des Établissements Michelin – Michelin & Cie v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada), [1997] 2 F.C. 306 (Fed.T.D.), Drolet v. Stiftung Gralsbotschaft, 2009 FC 17, Fraser Health Authority v. Hospital Employees’ Union, 2003 BCSC 807, Canwest MediaWorks Publications Inc.v.Horizon Publications Ltd., 2009 BCSC 391.

[150] See, Television New Zealand v. Newsmonitor Services Ltd. (1993), 27 I.P.R. 441 (H.C.N.Z.)

[151] Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539 (1985), Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 US 186 (2003), Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).

[152] United Nations General Assembly on December 16, 1966), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx, Article 15(1)(c) “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone… To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”

[153] United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 available @ http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html, Article 27(2) “Article 2 Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.” See also, Chris Castle “Artist Rights are Human Rights”, Music, Technology, Policy, available @ https://musictechpolicy.com/2015/09/ describing the rights under other similar instruments, “article 13, paragraph 2, of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 (“Every person has the right…to the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or artistic works of which he is the author”); article 14, paragraph 1 (c), of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1988 (the Protocol of San Salvador) (“The States Parties to this Protocol recognize the right of everyone…[t]o benefit from the protection of moral and material interests deriving from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”)”.

[154] Construction Denis Desjardins inc. c. Jeanson, [2010] RJQ 1600, France Animation v. Robinson, 2011 QCCA 136.

[155] Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73.

[156] EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, http://fra.europa.eu/en/charterpedia/article/11-freedom-expression-and-information Article 11 Freedom of expression and information states: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”

[157] Article 10(1) states.  “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.  This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises,  https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.

[158] Ashby v France ECHR, judgment of 10 January 2013; Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay v Sweden – 19 February 2013)  (ECHR Case 40397/12).

[159] In the EU the protection of copyright is also regarded as a fundamental right that is protected under Article 17(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.CJEU C-314/12 – UPC Telekabel Wien, C-275/06, Promusicae v Telefónica de España, C-324/09, L’Oréal v eBay , C-70/10, Scarlet SA v SABAM. The European Court of Justice has also ruled that restrictions on the freedom to receive information are justified where there is a need to protect intellectual property rights. Laserdisken v. Kulturministeriet, ECLI:EU:C:2006:549.  Copyright has also been recognized as being a human right under the constitution in Ireland in a case in which a judge ruled that a graduated response regime to combat Internet piracy was required to protect the human rights of artists.  EMI Records & Ors -v- Eircom Ltd  [2010] IEHC 108 case, summarized, Barry Sookman “Is graduated response necessary to protect human rights from online copyright infringement?” April 19, 2010, http://www.barrysookman.com/2010/04/19/is-graduated-response-necessary-to-protect-human-rights-from-online-copyright-infringement/.

[160] See Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v Sweden – 19 February 2013)  (ECHR Case 40397/12).

[161] See, Floyd Abrams, “Property theft on the Web is no less wrong” The Washington Post, Dec 9, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/property-thefton-the-webno-less-wrong/2011/12/09/gIQAFxgDjO_story.html?utm_term=.1cf1e14c6dd9 where Floyd Abrams, one of the leading US First Amendment experts, rebutted the argument that providing a means to block rogue websites is censorship or would violate US First Amendment rights “Yet when legislation is introduced to put teeth in the effort to prevent rampant and unconstrained theft of copyrighted creative efforts, it has been denounced as creating “walled gardens patrolled by government censors.” Or derided as imparting “major features” of “China’s Great Firewall” to America.  And accused of being “potentially politically repressive.”  This is not serious criticism.  The proposition that efforts to enforce the Copyright Act on the Internet amount to some sort of censorship, let alone Chinese-level censorship, is not merely fanciful.  It trivializes the pain inflicted by actual censorship that occurs in repressive states throughout the world.  Chinese dissidents do not yearn for freedom in order to download pirated movies.  Nor is it criticism that finds support in U.S. law. Infringing materials have never been protected by the First Amendment…”

[162]   Capif Camara Argentina De Productores De Fonogramas et al. v The Pirate Bay, Court of First Instance Buenos Aires, No. 67921/2013, [2013], 24.

[163] The question of whether the relief is reasonably necessary considers the efficiencies of seeking relief against a service provider rather than pursuing claims against many individual wrongdoers. The remedy need not be a “measure of last resort” or “indispensable” to protect a right.  Rather, courts can consider if alternative measures are available that are less onerous. Cartier CA; Cartier; Universal Music v. Telefonica Germany, 1 ZR 174/14

[164] In considering the question of whether the relief is reasonably effective, courts do not require an order to eradicate the illegal behaviour.  As discussed above, orders may be made even if only to dissuade some users from accessing the illegal site and even if additional Internet locations have to be added later to address efforts to circumvent the orders either by site operators or users. Twentieth Century Fox v British Telecommunications (No. 1) [2011] EWHC 1981 at ¶185, 192-98 ; Cartier CA; Cartier; Telekabel Wien ; Twentieth Century Fox v. British Telecommunications (No. 2) [2011] EWHC 2714; BAF v. Belgacom & Telenet, (Court of Appeal, Case 2010/AR/2541); Telenor v. IFPI Denmark (Danish Supreme Court, case no. 153/2009).

[165] This involves examining whether the likely burden on the intermediary is justified by the efficacy of the remedy and the benefit to the claimant. Riordan §15.11; Cartier; Cartier CA; Twentieth Century Fox (No. 1); Telekabel Wien.

[166] CJEU C-134/12 UPC Telekabel Wien

[167] Riordan, Ch. 13; Cartier CA, Cartier ; Twentieth Century Fox v. Sky UK, [2015] EWHC 1082. UPC Telekabel Wien (CJEU case no. C-314/12); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc (No. 1), [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [2012] Bus LR 1471 (summarizing cases in the European Union).  See also the decisions summarized below.

[168] Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] 1 SCR 467 at paras. 64-67

[169] Court of Appeal Antwerp, 26 September 2011, No. 3399 Rep. 2011/8314, p. 14.

[170] Tribunal de Grandes Instances de Paris, 28 November 2013, No. 11/60013. .

[171] Paris Court of Appeal judgment of 15 March 2016 [No 040/2016].

[172] Warner Bros. Entertainment Norge AS and others v Telenor Norge AS and others, Oslo District Court, 01/09/2015, case number 15-067093TVI-OTIR/05,

[173] See also, STEF, samband tónskálda/eig flutningsréttar [Performing Rights Society of Iceland] v Fjarskipti hf., District Court of Reykjavik, 14. October 2014 A decision by an court in Iceland which made a blocking order against The Pirate Bay stating the following on the fundamental right to freedom of expression: “…the defendant claims that Article 59.a of the Copyright Act violates the freedom of expression cited in Article 73… the defendant’s or his customers’ freedom of expression, which includes the right to distribute and access information on the internet, is not seen to be great in relation to the plaintiff’s. In that respect it is, among other things, important to note that it is possible to access the copyrighted material with other, legal means.  As such, that the stipulation in Article 59.a of the Copyright Act violates Article 73 or Article 75 of the Constitution, is dismissed.  The human rights in question are allowed to be limited by law, and in the opinion of this court the requirements for limiting those constitutional rights have been fulfilled.”

[174] Cartier International AG, v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd, British Telecommunications Plc, [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch).

[175] Cartier International AG, v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd], [2016] EWCA Civ 658.

[176] 2012 District Court order quoted in Stichting BREIN v Ziggo BV, THE HAGUE  COURT, Commercial Law Division, Case/Docket Number District Court C/09/535341/KG ZA 17-891, Sept 22, 2017

[177] The Football Association Premier League Limited v Ecatel, ECLI: NL: RBDHA: 2018: 615, Court of The Hague , Jan 24, 2018, C / 09/485400 / HA ZA 15-36

[178] FCJ judgment of 26 November 2015, Case No. I ZR 174/14 and case no. I ZR 3/14. The references to the judgment below refer to the case no. I ZR 174/14.

[179] Constantin Film Verleih GmbH v. Vodafone Kabel Deutschland GmbH, 7 O 17752/17, Germany, Regional Court of Munich (1 February 2018).  Geist stated in a post dealing with whether ISPs generally oppose blocking orders that he had read this decision.  However, he did not refer to it in his post dealing with whether blocking orders were compatible with human rights.  He stated “Indeed, a review of many of the site blocking cases from around the world finds telecom companies opposing efforts to impose blocking orders.  Last week, Vodaphone challenged a German court order to block a streaming site, arguing that it undermines consumer rights and its freedom to operate.”

[180] Geist’s source for his second reference cites an article in which he is quoted as saying the costs of implementing lawful access technologies would put independent ISPs’ “financial survival on the line.” It World Canada, “Surveillance law could close small ISPs: Lawyer”, https://www.itworldcanada.com/article/surveillance-law-could-close-small-isps-lawyer/45062

[181] Shane Snick, “Lawful Access turns up the heat on ISPs”, https://www.itbusiness.ca/news/lawful-access-turns-up-the-heat-on-isps/1176

[182] Cartier International AG & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2003/3354.html

[183] Ibid, at paras. 43 and 45.  In 2012 BT acquired a second system called Nominum.  Nominum is a DNS blocking system.  Nominum is not able to block a website that shares a domain name with another website without blocking the latter.  BT spent a seven figure sum purchasing this system.  In addition, BT employs five people purely to support this system….  Nominum is also used to provide BT’s Parental Controls service, which was launched in December 2013. (BT also offers free downloadable Family Protection software developed in conjunction with McAfee which enables the user to protect a computer by, among other things, blocking inappropriate websites.)  The Parental Controls service allows subscribers to block access to 17 broad categories of website (including pornography, gambling, social networking and games) and to block individual websites selected by the users.  Users can set “light”, “moderate” and “strict” filter options.  There is no limit on the number of individual websites that the user can choose to block.”

[184] Ibid, at para. 46 See also the following passage from ITIF “How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without “Breaking the Internet”, supra, at pp11-12 “Detailed information on the specific costs of the various approaches and systems is unavailable, partly because this is still a relatively new policy area.  In the United Kingdom, legal documents filed by lawyers representing rights holders estimated that the cost can be as high as $18,900 per new website blocked for each ISP.  UK ISPs have not publicly stated what the ongoing costs of website blocking are: What figures exist vary from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars.  The cost to block the first website in the United Kingdom, for NewzBin2, was $7,100 for the main domain and $142 for each subsequent site (if the website operator tried to move to another site). Without providing a detailed breakdown, an Australian government estimate gave the cost per ISP to enact website blocking as $95,000 annually.  Estimates by Australian ISPs also vary—from $36 per domain name (TPG Internet), to $183 per site and $29 per DNS (M2 Communications).  Many countries have turned to website blocking to apply existing and new legislation to a range of legitimate public policy goals that involve the Internet. to $7,350 in labor costs for setting up initial compliance, $2,200 for a landing page, and $18 per additional site (Telstra).” (footnotes omitted.)

[185] Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd, [2016] FCA 1503 (15 December 2016)

[186] Universal Music Australia Pty Limited v. TPG Internet Pty Ltd, [2017] FCA 435, (28 April 2017

[187] Riordan §15.11; Cartier; Cartier CA ; Twentieth Century Fox (No. 1); Telekabel Wien.

[188] The Finnish National Group of IFPI et al. v. Anvia Oyj et al., Docket no. 2015/625, Finland, Mark Court (29th April 2016) “The teleoperators can at reasonable cost delete the domain names used by the service from their name servers and block their customers’ access to IP addresses used by the KAT site.”; Telenor v. Aller International A/S et al., Case No 153/2009, Danish Supreme Court (27 May 2010) “Having been informed about the costs and inconvenience incidental to blocking at DNS level, compared with the very extensive infringement of copyrights administered by the respondents which are effected via the website www.thepiratebay.org  … the Supreme Court concurs that there are no grounds for concluding that the injunction will imply any damage or inconvenience to Telenor which are out of apparent proportion to the respondents’ interests in the issue of the injunction.”; Elisa Oyj v. The Finnish National Group of IFPI et al., Decision No. 1687, Finland, Helsinki Court of Appeal (15 June 2012).  “On the basis of the above and the District Court judgment, the Court of Appeal considers that the Injunction cannot be regarded as unreasonable when taking into account the rights of the person disseminating the material to the public, the rights of Elisa, and the rights of the authors. On the same basis and taking into account the evidence produced on the impact and effectiveness of IP and DNS blocking, the Court of Appeal considers that the Injunction does not contravene the principle of proportionality either.”;

[189] Asociación De Gestión De Derechos Intelectuales (Agedi) v. Jazz Telecom, Judgment No. 219/16, Spain, 2nd Commercial Court of Barcelona (27 July 2016) “the measure appears proportionate from a material and temporal point of view. It pursues non-facilitation of access to the same.  Furthermore, it is appropriate to the gravity of the infringement.”  “The measure blocking access to the specific domain names of the piratebay group mentioned above, and which have very high audience indices in Spain… is a measure proportional to the end being sought, which is to safeguard the rights of the more than two thousand works that are the subject of this case in the face of their massive violation since, generally speaking, said measure will prevent Internet users in Spain from having normal access to the content offered illicitly on the website of the piratebay group.”.

[190] Warner Bros. Entertainment Norge AS v. Telenor Norge AS et al., 15-067093TVI-OTIR/05, Norway Oslo District Court (1 September 2015) “The consideration of the IPSs does not support not issuing an order.  They are in such situations as neutral intermediaries best placed to stop the infringements by blocking their customers’ access to notoriously infringing websites.  Orders against the ISPs are an appropriate and proportionate measure in this matter, even if it will entail costs and disadvantages. Such orders do not interfere with the core activity of the ISPs.  The suggested blocking method in this matter is further already being performed by the ISPs with respect to undesirable content such as spam and child pornography…  The court also finds that the disadvantages and the costs that the ISPs incur with an order to block The Pirate Bay do not seem disproportionate or costly.”

[191] Associação Para a Gestão e Distribuição de Direitos et al. v. Acessos e Redes de Telecomunicações et al., Portugal Tribunal of Intellectual Property (24 February 2015)  “However, it soon turns out that, despite having been stated, it was not demonstrated that implementing such DNS blocking measures entails significant costs or resource allocations, but only the simple human resources to carry out the necessary technical action; we do not think that this is a sacrifice for the defendants, much less that such a need has relevance for its operation, because they also have to comply with numerous other rules and legal and administrative constraints that imply costs and much more significant resources, i.e. these are actions that fit perfectly in the normal legal obligations of operators and that will always have to be part of their business.”

[192] Sony Music Entertainment Sweden et al. v. B2 Bredband AB, PMT 11706-15, Sweden, Patent and Market Appeals Court (13 February 2017) “An additional condition to issue an injunction subject to a penalty of a fine is that such a measure is proportionate. When assessing the proportionality, the court must strike a balance between the fundamental rights upheld by the legal regime… The requested injunction subject to a penalty of a fine would admittedly limit B2 Bredband’s abilities to conduct its business, i.e. the company’s freedom of enterprise.  The company would be forced to take administrative and technical measures that would entail extra costs for the company.  However, as remarked by the CJEU in its judgment in the UPC Telekabel case, such an injunction would not affect the very substance of the freedom of enterprise of an Internet service provider (see para 51 of the judgment).  B2 Bredband’s parent company after decisions rendered by courts in other countries, already blocks subscribers’ access to certain domain names and web addresses. B2 Bredband has also informed that the requested measures as such entail costs but that the costs are in a range that the company would be able to handle as part of its normal operations.  The Patent and Market Appeals Court therefore holds that an injunction is proportionate also with regard to the restriction of the freedom of enterprise that the injunction would entail.”

[193] See s7(1)(b) and 7(1)(d) of PIPEDA which permits collection and use of personal information for the purposes of investigating a contravention of the laws of Canada.

[194] BMG Canada Inc. v. Doe, 2005 FCA 193 (C.A.).

[195] Voltage Pictures LLC v. John Doe, 2015 FC 1364.

[196] EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd & Others –v- Data Protection Commissioner, [2012] IEHC 264, High Court of Ireland (27 June 2012),

[197] Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does, 1-40 326 F. supp. 23 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), Interscope Records v. Duty, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d 1043 (D.Ariz.2006)

[198] Recording Industry Association of America, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F. 3d 1229 (D.C. Cir.2003); Quoted in Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does, 1-40 326 F.Supp. 23 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

[199]   Amy Kraft “A third of pirated movie sites spread malicious software, report says” CBS NEWS December 14, 2015, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pirated-movie-video-download-sites-spread-malicious-malware/.

[200] Michael D. Smith and Rahul Telang , Piracy and Malware: There’s No Free Lunch | The Technology Policy Institute, March 13, 2018, https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2018/03/13/piracy-and-malware-theres-no-free-lunch/.

[201] He repeats this when claiming that the proposal would increase privacy risks.

[202]  Jaan Riordian, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford University Press, 2016), Chapters 14 and 15; Nigel Cory, “How Website Blocking Is Curbing Digital Piracy Without ‘Breaking the Internet’”, ITIF, August 2016, http://www2.itif.org/2016-website-blocking.pdf.

[203] See, “France’s government to fight racism and anti-Semitism online”, The Washington Post, March 19, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frances-government-to-fight-racism-and-anti-semitism-online/2018/03/19/8098c21e-2b5a-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html

[204] See, European Commission “A Europe That Protects” Countering Illegal Content Online”, http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50096 “The Juncker Commission made security a top priority from day one. It is the most basic and universal of rights to feel safe in your own home or when walking down the street. Europeans rightly expect their Union to provide that security for them – online and offline.  The Commission has taken a number of actions to protect Europeans online – be it from terrorist content, illegal hate speech or fake  news.  We are working closely with the Internet companies, Member States and EU Agencies through various initiatives and we are continuously looking into ways we can improve our fight against illegal content online.”  “Illegal content means any information which is not in compliance with Union law or the law of a Member State, such as content inciting people to terrorism, racist or xenophobic, illegal hate speech, child sexual exploitation, illegal commercial practices, breaches of intellectual property rights and product safety. What is illegal offline is also illegal online.” Also, “Elections Canada prepares to fight fake news, foreign influence in 2019 vote”, CBC News, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/elections-canada-fake-news-voting-1.4582291?cmp=rss

[205] Canada’s privacy watchdog launches investigation into Facebook after allegations of data leak – Politics, March 20, 2018, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-privacy-watchdog-facebook-investigation-1.4585210?cmp=rss

[206] Alex Boutilier :”Internet giants should support local news, culture, Melanie Joly says”, Toronto Star, March 14, 2018, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/03/14/internet-giants-should-support-local-news-culture-melanie-joly-says.html “But in recent weeks, the Liberals have taken a more aggressive tone with digital disrupters — saying the companies need to address problems like the spread of disinformation online, or face tighter federal regulations. Taylor Owen, a digital media and global affairs researcher at the University of British Columbia, said he feels there’s been a “sea change” within the Canadian government on digital governance issues.” Hugh Stephens “Internet Platforms: It’s Time to Step up and Accept Your Responsibility (Or Be Held Accountable)”,  March 25, 2018, https://hughstephensblog.net/2018/03/26/internet-platforms-its-time-to-step-up-and-accept-your-responsibility-or-be-held-accountable/, “The tide is turning, and the behaviour and role of the big Internet platforms is starting to lead to important questions being asked. If the platforms continue to act as if they were a law unto themselves, what is the appropriate role for regulation and legislation? To the Internet platforms I say, start assuming responsibility for your actions or accept the consequences.”

[207]  Sir Tim Berners-Lee “The web is under threat. Join us and fight for it. – World Wide Web Foundation”, https://webfoundation.org/2018/03/web-birthday-29/ “The threats to the web today are real and many, including those that I described in my last letter — from misinformation and questionable political advertising to a loss of control over our personal data…

What’s more, the fact that power is concentrated among so few companies has made it possible to weaponise the web at scale. In recent years, we’ve seen conspiracy theories trend on social media platforms, fake Twitter and Facebook accounts stoke social tensions, external actors interfere in elections, and criminals steal troves of personal data.

We’ve looked to the platforms themselves for answers. Companies are aware of the problems and are making efforts to fix them — with each change they make affecting millions of people.  The responsibility — and sometimes burden — of making these decisions falls on companies that have been built to maximise profit more than to maximise social good. A legal or regulatory framework that accounts for social objectives may help ease those tensions.”

[208]  See, the article by “the father of the Internet” Vinton Cerf writing about the problem with fake news, Vinton Cerf, “Vint Cerf: In 2018, we will tackle the Internet’s dark side” Wired, Jan 6, 2018, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/vint-cerf-internet-free-speech-censorship-fake-news. “The empowerment of individuals has been nothing short of exhilarating – but now we are starting to see the consequences. Freedom to speak has never been more available, but in the resulting babel, truth is obscured by manufactured falsehoods, misrepresentations, fake news, alternative facts and a medley of other phenomena.  In 2018 we will see a significant reaction to these side-effects and will grasp the nettle of how to balance free speech with an open Internet…

So here is the conundrum for our increasingly connected world: how do we stay aware of what is going on in the world and in the minds of its citizens while seeking to limit the pernicious consequences of unbridled freedom to spew hatred, falsehoods and society-damaging ideologies? How do we instil a capacity for critical thinking in our citizens so they can winnow wheat from chaff?  Is critical thinking sufficient defence against the digital acid rain that threatens to poison the ocean of useful online information?  These are the questions that should be at the front of our minds in 2018.”

See, also Laura Sydell, “The Father Of The Internet Sees His Invention Reflected Back Through A ‘Black Mirror’” all tech considered, Feb. 20, 2018, https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2018/02/20/583682937/the-father-of-the-internet-sees-his-invention-reflected-back-through-a-black-mir, “We know how that turned out. People with less lofty ambitions than Cerf used that loophole for cybercrime, international espionage and online harassment.”  Cerf admits all that dark stuff never crossed his mind.  “And we have to cope with that — I mean, welcome to the real world,” he says.”

[209]  Steve Overly et al, “House passes anti-sex trafficking bill in defeat for tech industry”, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/27/house-passes-anti-sex-trafficking-bill-367692?utm_content=bufferef461&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer.

[210]  “A Europe that protects: Commission reinforces EU response to illegal content online”, Brussels, 1 March 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-1169_en.htm. The Press Release announcing the initiative provided some of the rational as follows:

“Vice-President for the Digital Single Market Andrus Ansip said: “Online platforms are becoming people’s main gateway to information, so they have a responsibility to provide a secure environment for their users. What is illegal offline is also illegal online.  While several platforms have been removing more illegal content than ever before – showing that self-regulation can work – we still need to react faster against terrorist propaganda and other illegal content which is a serious threat to our citizens’ security, safety and fundamental rights.”

The spread of illegal content online undermines the trust of citizens in the Internet and poses security threats. While progress has been made in protecting Europeans online, platforms need to redouble their efforts to take illegal content off the web more quickly and efficiently.  Voluntary industry measures encouraged by the Commission through the EU Internet Forum on terrorist content online, the Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online and the Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods have achieved results.  There is however significant scope for more effective action, particularly on the most urgent issue of terrorist content, which presents serious security risks.”

“Today’s Recommendation sets out operational measures to ensure faster detection and removal of illegal content online, to reinforce the cooperation between companies, trusted flaggers and law enforcement authorities, and to increase transparency and safeguards for citizens:

Clearer ‘notice and action’ procedures: Companies should set out easy and transparent rules for notifying illegal content, including fast-track procedures for ‘trusted flaggers’. To avoid the unintended removal of content which is not illegal, content providers should be informed about such decisions and have the opportunity to contest them.

More efficient tools and proactive technologies: Companies should set out clear notification systems for users. They should have proactive tools to detect and remove illegal content, in particular for terrorism content and for content which does not need contextualisation to be deemed illegal, such as child sexual abuse material or counterfeited goods.

Stronger safeguards to ensure fundamental rights: To ensure that decisions to remove content are accurate and well-founded, especially when automated tools are used, companies should put in place effective and appropriate safeguards, including human oversight and verification, in full respect of fundamental rights, freedom of expression and data protection rules….”

[211]  See, Council Of Europe, “Comparative Study on blocking, filtering and take-down of illegal internet content (2015)”, https://edoc.coe.int/en/internet/7289-pdf-comparative-study-on-blocking-filtering-and-take-down-of-illegal-internet-content-.html

“In relation to child abuse material, terrorism, criminality (in particular hate crimes) and national security, many of the states with targeted legal rules for the removal of internet content provide for the urgent blocking of such material without the need for a court order.  Administrative authorities, police authorities or public prosecutors are given specific powers to order internet access providers to block access without advance judicial authority.  It is common to see such orders requiring action on the part of the internet access provider within 24 hours, and without any notice being given to the content provider or host themselves.  In other countries, such as Finland, where a court order is otherwise needed, hosting providers who have knowledge of such material may be expected to remove it voluntarily without judicial authority and to provide the content provider with due notice, which permits them to challenge the action through the courts.”

[212]  Jan 26, 2018, https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/about-the-opc/what-we-do/consultations/consultation-on-online-reputation/pos_or_201801/?platform=hootsuite.

[213]  Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics “Towards Privacy by Design: A Review of Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act”, http://ow.ly/7VH330iHAuk

[214]  Michael Geist, Child Pornography Blocking Plan a Risk Worth Taking, Dec. 4, 2016, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2006/12/project-cleanfeed-column/.

[215]  Bell Canada v ITVBOX.NET, 2016 FC 612 “I also find that the Plaintiffs have made a strong prima facie case that the devices sold by the Defendants are used to access content that may contravene paragraph 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act.  Streaming sites that rebroadcast the Distribution Plaintiffs’ programming are not authorized to communicate those works to the public.  A user who accesses these works might also contravene the Radiocommunication Act.”

[216]  Dramatico Entertainment Ltd & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors, [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch) (20 February 2012).

[217]  Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers2004 SCC 45.

[218]  Jo Oliver and Elena Blobel, “Website Blocking inunctions – A Decade of Development”, in Jacques de Werra (Ed) et asl, Droit d’auteur 4.0, Schulthess Verlag (2018) (“Oliver Website Blocking inunctions”).

[219]  Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v Sweden – 19 February 2013)  (ECHR Case 40397/12).

[220] Stichting BREIN v Ziggo BV, THE HAGUE COURT, Commercial Law Division, Case/Docket Number District Court C/09/535341/KG ZA 17-891, Sept 22, 2017 “In the view of the District Court the subsidiarity condition has been met.  Brein and other collective rights bodies already held several proceedings against The Pirate Bay and its operators and furthermore against hosting providers of The Pirate Bay. However, The Pirate Bay is still online because (the operators of) The Pirate Bay disregards the court decisions. Thus the users of The Pirate Bay, including part of the subscribers of Ziggo and XS4ALL can continue their infringing acts.”

[221]  Bell Canada v. 1326030 Ontario Inc. (iTVBox.net)2016 FC 612, aff’d 2017 FCA 55.

[222]  Bell Canada v Adam Lackman dba TVADDONS.AG,  2018 FCA 42.

[223]  “University of Ottawa internet law professor told MobileSyrup via email “that the [Lackman] decision highlights yet again how Canada already has some of the toughest anti-piracy laws in the world and why the proposed site blocking system is so ill-advised.” Sameer Chhabra, “Bell, Rogers, Videotron granted appeal against Kodi add-ons distributor”, Mobilesysrup. Feb. 21, 2018, https://mobilesyrup.com/2018/02/21/bell-rogers-videotron-appeal-kodi-media-player-add-ons-distributor/. Also, Geist tweet, “Whatever your thoughts on TVAddons, this case again confirms that Canada has some of the toughest anti-piracy laws in the world and – as @NavdeepSBains noted – that there are already many legal tools available to copyright owners” 2018-02-21, 4:05 PM

[224]  For example, in Brein v Wullems, Case C-527/15 ECLI:EU:C:2017:300 the Court of Justice of the European Union found that the sale of the filmpeler multimedia player ISD infringed the exclusive copyright making available right; U.S. courts have issued a preliminary injunctions prohibiting the distribution of ISDs and applications that were marketed, promoted, and adapted to receive infringing streams delivered from streaming servers and peer-to-peer networks. China Cent. Television v. Create New Technology (HK) Ltd. 2015 WL 3649187 (C.D. Calif. Jun 11, 2015; Universal City Studios Productions LLLP v TickBox TV LLC (C.D.Cal. Jan 30, 2018); the Dutch anti-piracy Group BREIN also obtained an injunction against a company that operated the website MovieStreamer that sold Kodi-based software which could be used to access infringing TV, movie and sports streams based on infringement of the making available right. See, The Kodi Crackdown is Now Targeting Stream Providers Who Don’t Host the Content Themselves”, Gizmodo UK, available at http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2017/10/the-kodi-crackdolwn-is-now-targeting-stream-providers-who-dont-host-the-content-themselves/.

[225] See, Société Française du Radiotéléphone et al. v. Orange et al., Case No: 14/03236, France, Paris Court of First Instance (04 December 2014) “the request to block access to the internet sites expressly referred to in the requests of the SCPP is the only genuinely effective manner that rightholders have at this time to fight against infringements of copyright on the internet.”; SCPP v. Orange S.A. et al., No. RG: 16/05527, France, Tribunal De Grande Instance De Paris (31 March 2016) “Consequently, the request to block access to websites specifically covered in the applications of the SCPP is the only way really effective currently available to rights holders intellectual property for the fight against piracy on the internet.”

[226]  See Filmpeler supra.

[227]  The Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors, [2017] EWHC 480 (Ch) (13 March 2017). A subsequent injunction was granted in Football Association Premier League Ltd v British Telecommunications plc, [2017] EWHC 1877 (Ch).

[228]  Union Des Associations Européennes De Football v British Telecommunications Plc & Ors, [2017] EWHC 3414 (Ch) (21 December 2017). A blocking injunction has also been made by a court in Ireland, see, “Websites infringing TV and film copyright to be blocked”, The Irish Times, January 15, 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/courts/high-court/websites-infringing-tv-and-film-copyright-to-be-blocked-1.3356668.

[229]  Barry Sookman, “Reining in the rhetoric on copyright reform”, Feb. 8 2012, http://www.barrysookman.com/2012/02/08/reining-in-the-rhetoric-on-copyright-reform/.

[230]  Barry Sookman “Why crackdown on pirate set-top boxes is good for innovation: a reply to Michael Geist”, Jan 29, 2016, http://www.barrysookman.com/2016/06/29/why-crackdown-on-pirate-set-top-boxes-is-good-for-innovation-a-reply-to-michael-geist/.

[231]  Michael Geist, “How the Supreme Court can avoid turning the Web into a Wild West”, March 24, 2017, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/how-the-supreme-court-can-avoid-turning-the-web-into-a-wild-west/article33303774/.

[232]  Michael Geist, “Global Internet Takedown Orders Come to Canada: Supreme Court Upholds International Removal of Google Search Results”, June. 28. 2017, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/global-internet-takedown-orders-come-canada-supreme-court-upholds-international-removal-google-search-results/.

[233]  Barry Sookman “Grasping at straws: the trouble with ‘The Trouble with the TPP’, a further reply to Michael Geist”, April 17, 2016, http://www.barrysookman.com/2016/04/17/grasping-at-straws-the-trouble-with-the-trouble-with-the-tpp-a-further-reply-to-michael-geist/.

[234] Australia Explanatory Memorandum to the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r5446

[235]  See, M.D. Smith & R. Telang, Assessing The Academic Literature Regarding the Impact of Media Piracy on Sales (2012), accessed: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132153 (Study finding that peer reviewed journals spanning both music and motion picture sales, found evidence of statistically significant harm to sales of recently released content as a result of unauthorized file sharing.); “Piracy to cost TV and film industry US$52bn by 2022”, Digital TV Europe, Oct 30, 2017, http://www.digitaltveurope.com/2017/10/30/piracy-to-cost-tv-and-film-industry-us52bn-by-2022/; “Pirates are selling cheap, live TV and some Canadians are signing up” CBC News March 30, 2018 http://www.cbc.ca/beta/news/business/piracy-iptv-services-live-tv-1.4560320. The latest MUSO report for 2017, accessible at www.fairplaycanada.ca, ranks Canada at 11 in the world for TV piracy, with a total of 2.496 billion visits to piracy sites for 2017, with web streaming being the most popular form of unlawful content accessed.

[236]  See, for example, the Open Media campaign “Join the Day of Action against a Bell-led censorship initiative” Feb 22, 2018.available @ http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/open-medias-blog/2018/02/join-day-action-against-bell-led-censorship-initiative. “This unprecedented Canadian proposal is deeply problematic for a number of reasons (as outlined by professor Michael Geist’s series The Case Against the Bell Coalition’s Website Blocking Plan), such as Canada already having some of the toughest anti-piracy rules in the world and the data showing declining piracy rates as well as a booming television and streaming industry — contrary to the story Bell’s coalition is telling the CRTC.”

Laura Tribe Executive Director, OpenMedia.”Bell’s Website Blocking Plan Is Authoritarian Overkill”, http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/laura-tribe/internet-piracy-website-blocking-proposal-protest_a_23372670/?utm_hp_ref=ca-business. “Last month, experts, activists, policy-makers and citizens across the country were shocked by an unprecedented proposal to regulate the Internet that, if enacted, could change the way Canadians share and collaborate online forever.”.

[237] https://act.openmedia.org/dontcensor. It also referred to an editorial in the Globe and Mail published before the proposal was even public that was heavily influenced by Geist’s misleading attacks on it. See, Barry Sookman “Globe and Mail editorial attacks on Canadian creators and broadcasters: what’s up with the Globe?” Jan 4, 2018, http://www.barrysookman.com/2018/01/04/globe-and-mail-editorial-attacks-on-canadian-creators-and-broadcasters-whats-up-with-the-globe/; also, Barry Sookman “Website blocking proposal good policy”, Dec. 8, 2018. http://www.barrysookman.com/2017/12/08/website-blocking-proposal-good-policy/. This is an instance of how his misleading writings influenced a mainstream media to uncritically repeat his views in an editorial and then how that editorial became a reference cited by OpenMedia to make its position appear credible. The Globe and Mail later published an op-ed of mine to help correct the misinformation from its editorial. Barry Sookman “Support for creators: pirate streaming and the value gap, my op-ed in the Globe” Jan. 19, 2018, http://www.barrysookman.com/2018/01/19/support-for-creators-pirate-streaming-and-the-value-gap-my-op-ed-in-the-globe/. Another op-ed of mine was published in The Hill Times, Barry Sookman “Why the CRTC should endorse FairPlay’s website-blocking plan: a reply to Michael Geist” Feb. 12, 2018, http://www.barrysookman.com/2018/02/12/why-the-crtc-should-endorse-fairplays-website-blocking-plan-a-reply-to-michael-geist/.

[238] “I am gravely concerned about the recent proposal from the so-called “FairPlay Canada” coalition to introduce a mandatory website blocking system in Canada, administered by the CRTC. This proposal would result in sweeping Internet censorship, penalize everyday online activities, and threaten Canada’s Net Neutrality rules that keep the Internet a level playing field for all. This is simply unacceptable, and not the Canada that I want to live in.”

[239] https://actions.sumofus.org/a/send-an-email-to-protect-net-neutrality-now?source=campaigns “I am deeply opposed to the recent proposal from the “FairPlay Canada” coalition calling for mandatory website blocking. This dangerous proposal would put too much control of the internet in the hands of a few, unaccountable corporations, and would result in sweeping censorship and threaten a fundamental pillar of net neutrality in Canada.”

[240] See, Igor Bonifacic “100,000 Canadians have voiced their thoughts on FairPlay Canada’s anti-piracy website blocking proposal”, mobilsyrup, Mar 22, 2018 https://mobilesyrup.com/2018/03/22/100000-canadans-fairplay-canada/ describing the two websites and the numbers of submissions to the CRTC coming from those sites.

[241] Feb 15, 2018, https://cartt.ca/article/commentary-4700-people-can-be-wrong?platform=hootsuite

[242] See, Kotylak v. McLean’s Agra Centre Ltd., 2000 SKQB 383 “Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworth, 1999) deals with the admissibility of similar fact evidence in civil cases.  At §11.183, pp. 594-595 the authors state:In civil cases the courts will admit evidence of similar facts if it is logically probative, that is, if it is logically relevant in determining the matter which is in issue; provided that it is not oppressive or unfair to the other side; and also that the other side has fair notice of it and is able to deal with it. Also, K. M. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 SKQB 287.

Canadian government response to copyright and digital policy issues

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The Internet and other digital technologies are transforming the everyday lives of all Canadians. The pace of change requires our legislative frameworks to be continually reviewed and adapted to these changing needs. The current government is tackling these challenges on numerous fronts including most recently in respect of copyright, anti-spam law (CASL), and privacy.

Copyright

The government has now started its mandatory review of the Copyright Act. The review was proceeded by a letter from Minister Bains and Heritage Minister Joly, both of whom share the copyright file, which provided some guidance to the INDU Committee. The letter underscored the importance of copyright to all stakeholders including that:

  • It is vital our modern economy. “This legislation is a key part of our suite of policy tools that promote Canadian creativity and innovation. A well-functioning copyright framework should contribute to a marketplace and environment where users have access to world-class content and services for information and enjoyment, for education and cultural heritage, and to inspire follow-on creation and innovation.”
  • “Many copyright stakeholders have experienced chronic disruption with the advent of the digital marketplace. Many business models related, in whole or in part, to copyright have changed significantly. New digital intermediaries and services have taken on significant roles, leaving some feeling ill-served by emerging value chains for copyrighted content.”
  • Intellectual property, ‘including copyright, is the currency of the modern economy” and “Canada must use the copyright regime to more strategically allow its entrepreneurs to innovate, grow to scale and create jobs here at home. We have heard that for many musicians, authors, developers, and several other creators, copyright protection is central to translating their achievements into earning a living, being competitive on the market, and continuing to create.”
  • The Committee should review and take into account “emerging and forward-looking considerations”.
  • Canada will “be well served to aim for a marketplace framework that functions well in the current environment but that also can stand the test of time.”

The government then asked the Committee to focus on “the following questions to help guide” the review:

  • — How can we ensure that the Copyright Act functions efficiently to foster a marketplace that is transparent, promotes innovation and access for users, and supports creators in getting fair market value for their copyrighted content?
  • — How can we ensure that the copyright framework continues to function in an environment of constant change in technology and business possibilities?
  • — Finally, how can our domestic regime position Canadian creators, users, and innovators to compete on and harness the full potential of the global stage?

Ministers Bains and Joly should be commended for their thoughtful approach to copyright reform.

Michael Geist criticized an early draft of the ministerial letter to the INDU Committee which he says contained the following passage that was not included in the final letter.

Let’s use this opportunity to move beyond the notion of balance. A lot, probably too much, has been said in the name of balance. It usually leads to polarized positions, leaving no room for finding common ground. In an era of reconciliation, we should aim to try to change this conversation too.

He also went on to state the following about that paragraph:

It should be noted that this passage was  In fact, the word “balance” does not appear in the final letter, presumably reflecting the common ground between two departments that bring different perspectives to a challenging policy issue.

While the rejection of balance ended up on the cutting room floor, assuming the Canadian Heritage language reflects views within the department, it represents a significant departure from the current state of Canadian copyright law.

Geist’s conclusion about a shift in thinking about copyright by the Department of Heritage from a deleted paragraph in a draft letter, the origins and authors of which are not known or fully known, is quite a stretch. However, there is much to be said in the paragraph that would have warranted keeping it in.

The statement that “probably too much, has been said in the name of balance” and that it “usually leads to polarized positions” is true, as anyone who has lived through the copyright wars from 2005 to 2012 when the Copyright Modernization Act was enacted would know. When rights holders, for example, hear Geist talk about “balance” they know it is usually a call to hollow out an exclusive right, or to oppose  a right or new remedy, or to argue for a broad new exception or weaker remedies, or for uncompensated uses of copyright materials. Undoubtedly, some people may believe that when rights holders use the term balance they are looking for more legal protection, control over and payment for the uses of their works. Balance is always something that is in the eye of the beholder.

The term “balance” is not only polarizing, it’s use doesn’t inform policy or policy makers to any specific or desirable course of action. For example, while one may refer to a “balanced budget” as a desirable fiscal goal, one would eschew any attempt to do any comprehensive law review in other areas by focusing on balance as a guiding principle. For example, one would not premise updating our laws related to tax, securities regulation, criminal law, immigration, energy, or housing, based on a principle of “balance” in the abstract. There would be more relevant guiding principles just as there are in copyright law.

The Supreme Court, as Geist has pointed out, has frequently used the term balance. But, it has made clear that the actual goals of copyright are not balance in an abstract sense. Rather it is to create incentives for and to reward creators and to promote access to works by the public. Therefore, focusing on legal frameworks that promote these goals is much more productive – and less polarizing – than focusing on some elusive concept of “balance”.

Moreover, the notion of balance is often characterized as a “zero sum game” in which a win for creators is a loss for users. That notion is untrue as the goal of providing the public with access to works cannot be achieved without providing appropriate incentives to creators. Both creators, users and the public benefit when copyright frameworks promote incentives to produce and distribute works and support functioning legal markets for creative products and services. The public suffers when inappropriate policy choices are shelved or good policy choices are traded away for poorer ones – including when the trade-offs are made to satisfy vocal advocates seeking to undermine copyright and necessary legal frameworks under a guise of pursing balance.

This convergence of interests between creators and users has been expressly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court. For example, in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 98 L. Ed. 630, 74 S. Ct. 460 (1953), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors. In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 15 (1975), the court stated:

The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly … reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest: creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an `author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.

While the letter from the Ministers did not include the “balance” mantra, it did focus on right target, namely to find the appropriate legal frameworks for copyright. The impugned draft latter also included a call for the same inquiry.

This approach to copyright policy has a long pedigree in Canadian copyright law. This approach is similar to the framework described in the Preamble to the Copyright Modernization Act which stated its objectives were:

(a) to create a marketplace framework law and cultural policy instrument that through clear, predictable and fair rules will support creativity and innovation in the knowledge economy; (b) to address opportunities and challenges that are global in scope for the creation and use of copyright works or other subject-matter; (c) to adopt coordinated approaches to copyright protection based on internationally recognized norms including those reflected in the WCT and WPPT; (d) to provide rights holders with recognition, remuneration and the ability to assert their rights; to enhance users’ access to copyright works or other subject-matter; and (e) to enhance the protection of copyright through the recognition of technological measures and other measures, in a manner that promotes culture and innovation, competition and investment in the Canadian economy.

The Supreme Court of Canada in Éditions Chouette 1987 (Inc.) v. Desputeaux, 2003 SCC 17 (S.C.C.) also held that the Act should be construed having regard to one of its purposes which is to establish system designed to organize the economic management of intellectual property.

The government was right to focus on the real objectives of copyright. More than ever, Canadians need good forward thinking policies. These need to be pursued based on a shared vision of achieving the goals of copyright and not by seeking compromises with advocates arguing for balance with reform proposals that are inconsistent with appropriate legal frameworks that enable the creative commmunities, users and the public to flourish.

CASL

Almost everyone agrees that Canada’s anti-spam law needs fixing. The INDU Committee recognized this recommending numerous changes to CASL. ISED Minister Bains responded to the Committee leaving little doubt that CASL requires, among other things, clarification to make our anti-spam law “an effective law that protects [the public] from spam and other electronic threats while at the same time minimizing the cost and administrative burden of compliance for Canadian businesses, charities, and non-profit groups.”

The Committee had recommended that the government clarify:

  • the definition of “commercial electronic message” and notably the status of administrative and transactional messages vis-à-vis this definition;
  • the provisions pertaining to “implied consent” and “express consent”;
  • the definition of “electronic address”;
  • whether business-to-business electronic messages fall under the definition of “commercial electronic message”;
  • whether electronic messages listed under subsection 6(6) of the Act fall under the definition of “commercial electronic message”;
  • how to best incorporate messages sent on behalf of an authorized person with regard to paragraph 6(2)(a) of the Act; and
  • the application of the Act and its regulations to charities and non-profit organizations.

Minister Bains on behalf of the government indicated that CASL will be clarified stating: 

The government recognizes that the more explicit the legislation and its obligations are, the more effective the Act will be. We also intend to work closely with stakeholders to identify ways to improve the areas that are the object of the Committee’s recommendations. Clear obligations support both senders and consumers, and it is the government’s aim that the CASL be as clear as possible while remaining adaptable and neutral to technological developments.

The government response is a positive development. Fixing CASL is fully consistent with the government’s policy of removing red tape and promoting innovation. The government should move swiftly to recast this framework law to be more in accord with sound economic and public policy principles.

Privacy

The government has moved ahead with two important initiatives. First, in February 2018, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics tabled in the House of Commons a report entitled “Towards Privacy by Design: Review of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act“. The Report makes 19 recommendations including an important recommendation to include an express “right to be forgotten”. The government has now also published the Regulations to the Digital Privacy Act and the Order in Council setting November 1, 2018 as the date the new provisions comes into effect.

The Unintended Equustek Effect: a reply to Michael Geist

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Cyberspace is not a “No Law Land”. That was the title to a study conduced for Industry Canada in 1997. It started with this quote from Bill Gates, Microsoft’s co-founder:

It’s always surprising how old concepts carry into the new medium. It’s overly idealistic to act like, Oh, the Internet is the one place where people should be able to do whatever they wish: present child pornography, do scams, libel people, steal copyrighted material. Society’s values have not changed fundamentally just because it’s an Internet page.

These dark sides of the Internet have increasingly been recognized by governments, the courts, and by the numerous individuals and organizations who have sought justice for criminal, intellectual property, tortious, extremist, and other illegal acts committed using the Internet. Not surprising, the long standing policies of laws to protect their citizens from harms need to adapt to provide remedies commensurate with the gravity and risks of multi-jurisdictional online illegal conduct.

It is with this backdrop that a recent paper written by Michael Geist, The Unintended Equustek Effect: How one case set a precedent for Canadian courts’ growing jurisdiction over internet activities, needs to be critically assessed.

The Equustek decision, Google Inc. v. Equustek Solutions Inc., [2017] 1 SCR 82, arose from a lower court decision that ordered Google to block websites that were selling goods that violated the trade secrets of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs obtained a injunction order against the defendant. It required it to cease selling products world-wide in breach of confidence. But, the defendant continued to sell the offending goods over the Internet. The plaintiffs, unable to enforce their injunction order, asked for Google’s help in blocking the websites. Google voluntarily de-indexed specific URL’s accessible only from the .ca domain, but this “whac-a-mole” process was ineffective. When Google refused to de-index the offending websites from its search results, the plaintiffs brought a motion against Google for interim relief requiring Google to de-index the websites from all of its search engines worldwide.

Over Google’s objections, in Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack 2014 BCSC 1063 Madam Justice Fenlon of the British Columbia Supreme Court granted the de-indexing order. Google unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc.,  2015 BCCA 265. Google then appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada which affirmed the decisions below. Importantly the Supreme Court held that:

  • The court had the jurisdiction to make a de-indexing order against the non-party search engine Google.
  • Since the court had personal jurisdiction over Google, it had the jurisdiction to order Google to carry out the search engine de-indexing from wherever it operated its servers, even if outside of Canada.
  • It was appropriate that the de-indexing be worldwide as that was the only way to make it effective including to help enforce the underlying inunction order that itself was world-wide. The only way to ensure that the injunction order attained its objective was to have it apply where Google operated — globally.
  • The de-indexing order was necessary to prevent the irreparable harm that flowed from the defendant’s carrying on business on the Internet.
  • By not de-indexing the defendant’s websites, Google was facilitating the defendant’s breach of the injunction order by enabling it to continue carrying on business through the Internet. Google was aware that in not de-indexing the websites, it was facilitating the defendant’s ongoing breach of the injunction order, the purpose of which was to prevent irreparable harm to Equustek.
  • The order did not require that Google take any steps around the world, it required it to take steps only where its search engine was controlled. This is something Google acknowledged it could do — and does — with relative ease. There was therefore no harm to Google which could be placed on its “inconvenience” scale arising from the global reach of the order.
  • The order did not violate any principle of comity. Google acknowledged that most countries would likely recognize intellectual property rights and view the selling of pirated products as a legal wrong.
  • The order did not violate any freedom of speech rights. It was an order to de-index websites that were in violation of several court orders.
  • Google did not suggest that it would be inconvenienced in any material way, or would incur any significant expense, in de-indexing the defendant websites. It acknowledged that it can, and often does, exactly what was being asked of it in the case,

After it lost its appeal in the Supreme Court, Google subsequently applied to a California court for a declaratory order that the Canadian de-indexing order was not enforceable against it in California. When the action was not defended by Equustek, Google obtained the default declaratory order. Google then applied to a BC court asking it to rescind the prior de-indexing order. This was denied by a B.C. court in Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Jack, 2018 BCSC 610 where Justice Smith held that Google was not able to show that the global delisting order made against it violated its First Amendment rights in the U.S. or the core values of the U.S. or that the California order undermined the effectiveness of the Equustek order.

Geist argues that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Equustek “has emerged as a cautionary tale about increasingly aggressive legal approaches with respect to the Internet.” In particular, he says the experience to date suggests that by opening the door to global takedown orders (which wasn’t the order in Equustek in which a global de-indexing order was made) the ruling:

  • invites and risks protracted global litigation;
  • has contributed to Canadian courts more aggressively asserting jurisdiction over online activities; and
  • has encouraged large internet intermediaries to disregard the rule of law online by placing them in the unenviable position of choosing the laws and court orders they wish to follow.[1]

None of Geist’s arguments about Equustek withstand scrutiny.

Protracted litigation

Geist argues that Equustek has resulted in protracted cross-border litigation. He claims “The most obvious consequence of the Supreme Court’s approach in Equustek was the likelihood of it sparking protracted cross-border litigation, with the further possibility of competing court orders from different jurisdictions.” The only example he gives is the subsequent aggressive litigation instigated by Google itself in California for the declaration that the de-indexing order was not enforceable against it in the U.S. and Google’s unsuccessful attempt to have the order rescinded by a BC court.

Expansion of Equustek

Geist claims that Equustek has contributed to Canadian courts more aggressively asserting jurisdiction over online activities. He states “that the Equustek ruling facilitated an expanded national approach to global internet governance issues, with the likelihood of Canadian courts relying on the decision to expand the applicability of domestic law beyond Canada’s borders.”

His argument fails to recognize that Equustek was merely an evolution of well established prior law and the decisions he refers to were premised much more on this body of existing jurisprudence than on Equustek. Further, the decisions he refers to are the result of new challenges of enforcing laws in this increasingly interconnected world rather than an expansion of law precipitated by Equustek. Moreover, to the extent extra-territorial orders have been made since Equustek, these orders represent a positive and gradual development in global internet governance and the rule of law.

Canadian courts have for a long time adapted our laws related to private international law to ensure that Canadian laws can be enforced extra-territorially to protect the public without breaching any norm of international comity. For example:

  • In Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 178 the Supreme Court recognized that all that is necessary to make a criminal offence subject to the jurisdiction of our courts is that a significant portion of the activities constituting that offence took place in Canada. It is sufficient that there be a “real and substantial link” between an offence and Canada.
  • In SOCAN v CAIP [2004] 2 SCR 427 the Supreme Court applied the real and substantial connection test to hold that the Copyright Act right of communication to the public can be infringed if there is a sufficient connection between this country and the communication in question. The SOCAN v CAIP case was followed in the Internet copyright case, Davydiuk v Internet Archive Canada2014 FC 944, and in a competition case, Desjean v Intermix Media, Inc2006 FC aff’d 2007 FCA 365.
  • In Impulsora Turistica de Occidente, S.A. de C.V. v. Transat Tours Canada Inc., [2007] 1 SCR 867 the Supreme ruled that when a court has in personam jurisdiction, and where it is necessary to ensure an injunction’s effectiveness, it can grant an injunction enjoining that person’s conduct anywhere in the world.
  • In Barrick Gold Corp. v. Lopehandia, (2004) 71 OR (3d) 416 (C.A.), the Court of Appeal of Ontario granted a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from disseminating, posting on the Internet or publishing further defamatory statements concerning Barrick or its officers, directors or employees.

It is surprising that Geist’s article did not mention any of these cases, especially as they factored more into the decisions he referred to than the decision in Equustek. Each of the decisions he cites to try and make his case easily fit within long standing precedents, do not involve global orders such as the order in Equustek, and, in fact, represent good decisions as a matter of policy and international governance.

He relies on A.T. v. Globe24h.com where the operator of a foreign website was ordered to remove content that violated the Canadian privacy law, PIPEDA. The defendant was publishing sensitive personal information online on a web site in Romania for the primary purpose of charging individuals to have it removed, a practice the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has labeled as “blackmail” in the OPC Guidance on inappropriate data practices. In reaching its conclusion that PIPEDA could apply extra-territorially, the court relied on the real and substantial connection test and the prior decisions in SOCAN v CAIP, Libman, Davydiuk, Desjean and a prior decision of the Federal Court in Lawson v Accusearch Inc (cob Abika.com), 2007 FC 125 in which the court also relied on the decision in the Libman case. It also merely cited, as an additional case, the BCCA Equustek decision.

The court also considered whether it could grant an injunction against the respondent to correct his practices in order to comply with PIPEDA. The court held that respondent not being a resident of Canada did not bar the making of an extra-territorial order because the underlying dispute was within the jurisdiction of the court. It ordered him to remove all Canadian court and tribunal decisions containing personal information from Globe24h.com and take the necessary steps to remove these decisions from search engines caches.

In making the decision, the court referred to the BCCA Equustek decision for the proposition that “once it is accepted that a court has in personam jurisdiction over a person, the fact that its order may affect activities in other jurisdictions is not a bar to it making an order.” However, the court also referred to the decisions in Impulsora Turistica and Barrick Gold, each of which provided the precedential support for this aspect of the judgment. The court also referred to several well known European cases in holding that “in the context of Internet abuses, courts of many other jurisdictions have found orders that have international effects to be necessary”.

Was the decision an aggressive assertion of jurisdiction over online activities? Hardly. In fact, despite the precedent for website de-indexing in the BCCA Equustek decision, there is nothing to indicate that the court even considered making an order against Google or other search engines to require them to de-index the respondent’s website. Rather, the court took a very restrained approach of granting injunctive and declaratory relief against the perpetrator to “assist the applicant in pursuing his remedies in Romania” and to “allow the applicant and other complainants to submit a request to Google or other search engines to remove links to decisions on Globe24h.com from their search results.” This conservative approach is especially notable having regard to Google’s published policy of not committing to remove content found to be illegal by courts even though this may be the most efficacious way of mitigating harm to individuals. According to the court:

Google is the principal search engine involved and its policy allows users to submit this request where a court has declared the content of the website to be unlawful. Notably, Google’s policy on legal notices states that completing and submitting the Google form online does not guarantee that any action will be taken on the request. Nonetheless, it remains an avenue open to the applicant and others similarly affected. The OPCC contends that this may be the most practical and effective way of mitigating the harm caused to individuals since the respondent is located in Romania with no known assets.

Geist also relies on the decision in College of Optometrists of Ontario et al v. Essilor Group Canada Inc., in which an Ontario court applied Ontario law to prevent a BC based company from dispensing prescription glasses in Ontario. The Colleges alleged that Essilor was in breach of the Ontario regulatory regime by accepting orders for prescription eyewear through websites and shipping the eyewear to patients in Ontario. The Colleges sought a declaration that the company had breached Ontario regulations “by dispensing, for vision or eye problems, subnormal vision devices, contact lenses and/or eye glasses, in Ontario”; and an injunction prohibiting Essilor from engaging in such dispensing except where the dispensing is performed by a Member of the Colleges or a Member’s delegate. The judge at first instance granted the declaration. This decision broke no new ground.

Canadian courts have consistently interpreted provincial statutes to apply to conduct beyond the borders of the province where protecting the public is at stake. The Essilor case was a classic example of a local court applying its own laws to regulate conduct taking place, in part, in its jurisdiction – in this case dispensing of eyeware in Ontario to Ontario residents. This approach to interpreting regulatory regimes to protect the public from conduct that has some extra-territorial connections has been the approach taken by Canadian courts since at least the decision of the Supreme Court in Celgene Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 1 SCR 3. It was applied by the Court of Appeal Ontario in College of Pharmacists v. 1724665 Ontario Inc. (Global Pharmacy Canada), 2013 ONCA 38. The same approach was taken by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Thorpe v. College of Pharmacists of British Columbia(1992) 97 D L R. (4th) 634 (B.C C.A.) where the court interpreted the scope of the Provincial Pharmacists Act as applying to control conduct beyond the borders of British Columbia where a licensed British Columbian pharmacist was selling drugs to doctors in the United States. This line of cases was the basis of the decision in the Essilor Group case, even though it was at odds with a similar case from Quebec,  Ordre des optométrists du Québec c. Coastal Contacts Inc.2016 QCCA 837, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, 2017 CanLII 442 (SCC). Equustek was referred to by the court, but only for the uncontroversial proposition that “the courts’ intention to see that their rulings are effective.”

After Geist published his article, the Essilor decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal of Ontario in College of Optometrists of Ontario v. Essilor Group Inc., 2019 ONCA 265. While the court agreed that Essilor was dispensing eyeware in Ontario, it held the Ontario regulatory scheme was not constitutionally applicable to its online sales as the mere delivery in Ontario of an order for prescription eyewear that had been processed in compliance with the British Columbia regulatory regime, without more, did not establish a sufficient connection between Essilor’s online sales and the controlled acts proscribed by the Ontario regulations.

In its reasons the Court of Appeal rejected the application of the Celgene and Equustek cases to show that a sufficient connection existed to support the application of the Ontario regulations. As for Equustek the court stated:

Finally, the issue in the Google case was whether a British Columbia court had the jurisdiction to issue an interlocutory injunction enjoining Google from displaying any part of a defendant’s websites on any of its search results worldwide in order to give effect to an earlier court order directing the defendant to cease carrying on business through any website. Google contested the jurisdiction of the court to make such an order on two grounds: (i) the order affected a non-party to the litigation; and (ii) the court could not issue an injunction that had extraterritorial effect. The Supreme Court upheld the injunction. Although its decision commented on the new reality of online commerce and advertising, the court upheld the injunction based on the existing jurisprudence that interlocutory injunctions could bind non-parties and have extraterritorial effect where the issuing court had in personam jurisdiction over the defendant: at paras. 28 and 36-38. (emphasis added)

Geist also relies on the decision in Autorité des marchés financiers v. PlexCorps, 2017 QCTMF 88 in which the Quebec Financial Markets Administrative Tribunal granted an injunction against the operator of several websites and a Facebook page to prevent the violation of Quebec securities laws to residents in Quebec and to residents outside of Quebec originating from inside Quebec. This application of a Province’s securities laws to conduct with a real and substantial presence to the Province has also long been recognized by the courts including by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Torudag v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2011 BCCA 458, which based its decision, in part, on the decision of the Supreme Court in the SOCAN v CAIP case. In fact, the appropriateness of applying a Province’s securities laws to protect the public outside of the Province was confirmed by the Supreme Court almost 50 years ago in Gregory & Company Inc. v. The Quebec Securities Commission [1961] S C R. 584.

The fact that the securities traded by appellant would be for the account of customers outside of the province or that its weekly bulletins would be mailed to clients outside of the province, does not, as decided in the Courts below, support the submission that appellant was not trading in securities or acting as investment counsel, in the province, within the meaning and for the purposes of the Act Respecting Securities.

The paramount object of the Act is to ensure that persons who, in the province, carry on the business of trading in securities or acting as investment counsel, shall be honest and of good repute and, in this way, to protect the public, in the province or elsewhere, from being defrauded as a result of certain activities initiated in the province by persons therein carrying on such a business.

In PlexCorps, the Tribunal also ordered Facebook to remove the offending Facebook pages. The court did refer to the decision in Equustek in making the order, but there was no suggestion that the jurisdiction to grant the order would not have existed without Equustek. In fact, it is well established that courts can make orders against third parties to prevent them from facilitating the breach of court orders. In Equustek the Supreme confirmed this to be the law referring approvingly to prior cases including its own case MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Simpson,  [1996] 2 S.C.R. 1048 and the decision of the Court of Appeal in Cartier International AG & Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd & Ors [2016] EWCA Civ 658 (06 July 2016), a decision on jurisdiction subsequently approved by the UK Supreme Court.

The last case relied on by Geist is the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Brecknell. In this case the Court ordered Craigslist to provide contact information about an individual who had made a post under the Criminal Code provisions related to production orders. Geist claims that the Court of Appeal “issued the order, drawing on the court’s willingness in Equustek to adapt the rules to reflect the jurisdictional challenges of the internet.”  This is not correct.

The Court’s decision in Brecknell was premised on several important policy considerations including ensuring that where courts have personal jurisdiction over a person the arbitrary location of a computer server cannot be determinative;[2] Parliament’s intention to modernize police powers to investigate Canadian crime that is increasingly occurring through the Internet;[3] the need to interpret legislation in light of contemporary technology and to take into account the changed technological environment to which it must be applied;[4] and because a principled and effective system of legitimate investigation based on international norms should not be contingent on business decisions taken by service providers in their own private interests.[5]

The court also relied on a long line of U.S. authorities that supported its decision,[6] as well as a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in eBay Canada Ltd. v. Canada (National Revenue), 2008 FCA 348 in which a production order was made against eBay under the Income Tax Act, in part in reliance on the need to interpret legislation in light of contemporary technology, as taught by the Supreme Court in the Libman and SOCAN v CAIP cases.[7]

The only reliance on Equustek in Brecknell was the well established principle referred to in BCCA Equustek that difficulties in enforcing a court order does not deprive the court of jurisdiction to issue it.

Increasing power of internet intermediaries

Geist argues that Equustek entrenches Google and other large social media companies with the choice of deciding which court orders they should give effect to and which they can simply ignore and encourages them to disregard the rule of law. He says:

The Supreme Court’s Equustek ruling may also have inadvertently vested increased power in the hands of internet intermediaries, who could leverage the legal uncertainty and conflict to self-select which laws would govern their activities…

The internet is often characterized as a “Wild West” where laws cannot be easily applied. Yet, the danger of extraterritorial application of court decisions — such as those involving Google — is that it encourages disregard for the rule of law online, placing internet companies in the unenviable position of choosing the laws and court orders they wish to follow.

Despite Google’s disagreement with the Equustek de-indexing order made against it, it did not decide to unilaterally flout the court order and face contempt of court sanctions. Rather, it used the courts to try, unsuccessfully, to get the Equustek order rescinded.  This was the same approach taken by Yahoo years ago when it sought to extricate itself from a decision of a French court that ordered it to cease making available objects for sale bearing Nazi symbols in violation of French laws. It applied, unsuccessfully, to a U.S. court in the Yahoo II case for a declaration that the order could not be enforced against it in the U.S..

There is no doubt that companies that operate globally are faced with the challenge of complying with the laws and court orders of their home countries as well as the laws in which they do business. But, this is not a flaw in our system of private international law. It arises from the business model of companies that carry on business globally. This was a finding made by Chambers Judge Fenlon who held that the BC courts had personal jurisdiction over Google in the Equustek case.

I will address here Google’s submission that this analysis would give every state in the world jurisdiction over Google’s search services. That may be so. But if so, it flows as a natural consequence of Google doing business on a global scale, not from a flaw in the territorial competence analysis. As Janet Walker writes in Castel & Walker: Canadian Conflict of Laws, loose-leaf, 6 ed (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis, 2005), ch 11 at 27, a legal person such as a corporation can be subject to multiple jurisdictions whether because it is resident there through registration, or because it is carrying on business in that jurisdiction. Further, the territorial competence analysis would not give every state unlimited jurisdiction over Google; jurisdiction will be confined to issues closely associated with the forum in accordance with private international law.

It is also true that companies that operate globally are increasingly faced with deciding what standards to apply to take down illegal or offensive content. This problem was recently adverted to by Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg who in an open letter published in major newspapers around the world argued for regulation of social media companies to establish global minimal standards for content takedowns. He rightly pointed out that “decisions about what speech is harmful, what constitutes political advertising, and how to prevent sophisticated cyberattacks” shouldn’t only be made by large social media companies. Rather, by “updating the rules for the internet, we can preserve what’s best about it — the freedom for people to express themselves and for entrepreneurs to build new things — while also protecting society from broader harms.” Even this proposal has its critics, would still require social networks to monitor compliance around the world, and wouldn’t prevent nation states from enforcing their own norms embodied in local laws or prevent the fragmentation of the Internet.

But, Geist’s suggestion that companies like Google should be free to “selectively” determine, as if they are above the rule of law, what orders made by courts in which they do business can simply be ignored or flaunted, offends well established rules of private international law upon which our civilized international order relies.

The rules of private international law establish norms which limit the types of orders nations can make to ensure conformance to principles of international comity. The decisions by the Supreme Court in Libman,[8] SOCAN v CAIP,[9] and Equustek[10]were only rendered after considering the appropriateness of the decision having regard to this norm and to avoid untoward conflicts in laws.

Private international law also establishes principled frameworks for determining, as a matter of comity, when a foreign judgment should and should not for policy reasons be enforced locally.[11]

While these principles may not be uniform from country to country, they do exist and act to restrain courts from making orders that may offend principles of comity and provide a mechanism to insulate persons from complying with orders that may offend the laws or policies of their home countries.

Of course, companies like Google are always free to oppose orders against them that have extra-territorial effects and then seek to have such orders found not to be enforceable against them in the U.S. as a matter of U.S. public policy, as Google did in the Equustek case. But, as offensive as even that is to civilized courts like those in Canada which rigorously apply principles of international comity before making such orders, that process is not the same as Geist’s suggestion that they can simply decide to ignore such orders.

The Larger Context

What is maddeningly frustrating about Geist’s article – besides his inaccurate assertions about the effects of Equustek – is the failure to acknowledge in an article on global Internet governance  of the need, in at least some circumstances, for laws and court orders to apply extra-territorially. In fact, as we have learned increasingly, information once available over the Internet and, in particular, through large social networks like Facebook and UGC sites like YouTube, can facilitate unfathomable harms that are at once both local and global.

The mass murder in Christchurch, New Zealand is only the most recent case in point. Supremacist extremism was propagated through social media networks which contributed to an environment that promoted and may have inspired the massacre.  Live streaming the events over Facebook and other platforms like YouTube further fanned the flames of extremism.

In this case, the platforms took steps to remove or disable access to the content and local ISPs voluntarily blocked Internet locations such as Reddit which had refused to disable access to the content. In the opinion of many commentators it took them far too long to act. There seems little doubt, however, that had these intermediaries not acted voluntarily a court in New Zealand would have ordered them to do so. In a recent Australian case, for example, X v Twitter Inc, a court granted a global takedown order against Twitter to prevent publication of information that was being published by a third party in breach of confidence, relying on many of the same legal principles the Supreme Court relied on in Equustek.

The events of Christchurch has provided further evidence of the need for global regulatory frameworks to address illegal, dangerous and inaccurate information disseminated via the Internet. Moreover, it crystalized the growing international frustration and anger over the failure of Silicon Valley giants to act responsibly to address harmful content, all the while fighting jurisdiction over them in the courts around the world and liability for illegal and objectional conduct their networks help make available including everything from terrorism propaganda, hate speech, child pornography, fake political news, defamation, and copyright infringement.

While there has been many calls for regulation of Internet platforms as well as a recognition that the Internet cannot be a “Wild West”, as a result of the mass shooting in Christchurch, the government of Australia announced it is introducing legislation that would fine social media companies that don’t expeditiously remove abhorrent violent content. If found guilty, a company can not only face fines of up to 10 percent of their annual turnover, but their executives can be imprisoned for up to three years. Australia’s action indicates that global regulators increasingly want to treat technology platforms like they do more traditional media companies.

The magnitude of the potential fine – the same as what can be levied for breach of Europe’s GDPR data protection laws – is a clear signal that countries outside the U.S. are now starting to demand compliance with the local rules of law and will no longer countenance non-compliance as a mere cost of doing business.

The Internet has changed the way we live, work and communicate with each other and the world. The Internet is now 30 years old and its about time theories about Internet governance caught up. Even the fathers of the Internet Vince Cerf[12] and Sir Tim Berners-Lee[13] are now calling attention to the problems and have acknowledged that new regulatory governance frameworks are needed to deal with the emergent global threats.

In the face of these threats, we need to recognize the importance of nations and their courts determining what is necessary to protect their citizens. Given the global threats from online sources, this will necessarily have to involve some continued evolution of extra-territorial application of local laws and court orders to address these threats. It will also involve a closer inspection of how things happen on the Internet, something courts including the U.S. Supreme Court in South Dakota v Wayfair and our Supreme Court in Equustek have recently been willing to engage in.

Notions of international comity will also have to evolve, preferably through a consensus that sets out the appropriate balance for the assumption of personal, prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction including the norms for when courts can make orders that have extra-territorial effects and when they should be recognized by courts in other countries. In the absence of international agreement, where harms emerge lawmakers and the courts will, of necessity, have to evolve approaches to Internet harms to maintain the rule of law online.

Concluding Remarks

Geist’s claims about Equustek having unintended adverse consequence have not be substantiated. In fact, the cases he refers to in support of his claims illustrate the application of well established legal principles to address situations arising from the use of the Internet to commit illegal acts. These developments in the law are positive and hardly exemplify developments to be concerned about.

The most serious flaw in Geist’s article, however, is the abject failure to recognize or even consider the need for nations to protect their sovereignty and to enforce their laws both locally and extra-territorially in accordance with evolving principles of jurisdiction and comity, especially where the nation has a real and substantial interest to the harm. It is not clear why a senior fellow in the Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI) International Law Research Program (and a Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law), in a paper published by CIGI, would simply ignore the need for online remedies to evolve to attempt to counteract new Internet harms when considering the implications of Equustek on the subject of online remedies and Internet governance. CIGI is an international think tank devoted to international governance issues and so the issues canvassed by Geist would be of keen interest to CIGI. Notably, CIGI does not necessarily endorse the views expressed by Geist in his article as its website contains a disclaimer that the opinions expressed in the article “are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIGI or its Board of Directors”.

The challenges posed by the Internet to questions of Internet governance, jurisdiction and comity do not admit of easy answers. However, while there can be potential challenges with every country seeking to apply its laws extra-territorially – particularly in the absence of any real or substantial connection to the claim – there is every reason to be concerned about a theory of Internet governance that would deny a nation the legal tools it needs to protect the public including by providing for effective legal remedies for multi-jurisdictional harms.

The Internet is not a “No Law Land”. Our theories about the appropriate legal tools to deal with online global harms including the enforcement of orders online need to reflect this.

* Updated April 7, 2019

—————————————————————

[1] Geist’s claims:

“Equustek Solutions v. Google Inc., a case that originated in British Columbia, Canada, in 2014, captured international attention as one of the first internet jurisdiction cases to be considered by a nation’s highest court. Since then, the case has emerged as a cautionary tale about increasingly aggressive legal approaches with respect to the Internet, with significant implications for online governance.”

“While critics of global takedown orders warned that upholding the validity of the order would invite global uncertainty through inevitable legal conflicts and further empower large internet intermediaries who could selectively choose which laws and orders to follow, the aftermath of the decision has placed the spotlight on an additional consequence. In part due to the Equustek doctrine, Canadian courts now more aggressively assert jurisdiction over online activities. Indeed, Canada could emerge as ground zero for internet litigation, with its courts and tribunals at ease with a principle that extends domestic law to an international arena.”

“The decision may have stopped short of creating a new liability framework, but it did open the door to three internet-related legal risks that strike at the heart of global internet governance: protracted litigation; increased power for internet intermediaries; and expansion of the Equustek approach to a broad range of legal disciplines.”

“In other words, Canadian courts are increasingly comfortable issuing orders involving internet platforms that may be difficult to enforce, given the global dimensions of the network, and adopting an approach where challenges associated with enforceability are not treated as a legal barrier. While some may applaud that approach, the proliferation of largely unenforceable court orders may ultimately undermine respect for the application of law online.”

“The internet is often characterized as a “Wild West” where laws cannot be easily applied. Yet, the danger of extraterritorial application of court decisions — such as those involving Google — is that it encourages disregard for the rule of law online, placing internet companies in the unenviable position of choosing the laws and court orders they wish to follow.”

“While critics of global takedown orders warned that upholding the validity of the order would invite global uncertainty through inevitable legal conflicts and further empower large internet intermediaries who could selectively choose which laws and orders to follow, the aftermath of the decision has placed the spotlight on an additional consequence. In part due to the Equustek doctrine, Canadian courts now more aggressively assert jurisdiction over online activities.”

[2] Brecknell “It is by no means clear to me what it means to say that a person has a custodial or record-keeping presence in the jurisdiction, particularly in a digital age where information can be instantly transmitted by a click of a mouse. Certainly, a custodial presence is not synonymous with a physical presence. A company may have offices or employees in the jurisdiction whose function is entirely unrelated to record keeping or exercising custody over documents. Moreover, the function of record keeping and exercising custodial authority are not necessarily the same thing and may be functions exercised in different locations. The authority to require the retrieval of documents may reside in one location, the act of retrieving them may be possible in various locations, and the documents may be stored yet somewhere else. Finally, the location of documents may bear little or no relation to the business activity that generates them. As Mr. Macklin observed, cheap warehousing of data may lead to storage outside the country. It is not obvious that Parliament intended jurisdiction in relation to the employment of this investigative tool to depend on such contingent, haphazard, happenstance resulting from the variable internal structures of businesses. Having said this, I recognize that in this case it is part of the reality that Craigslist has offices in California to which an order for documents needs to be transmitted and from which it can be implemented. The question is whether this fact is decisive to deprive a British Columbian court from issuing a production order in the first place…

In the second place, in the Internet era it is formalistic and artificial to draw a distinction between physical and virtual presence. Corporate persons, as I have noted, can exist in more than one place at the same time. With respect, I do not think anything turns on whether the corporate person in the jurisdiction has a physical or only a virtual presence. To draw on and rely on such a distinction would defeat the purpose of the legislation and ignore the realities of modern day electronic commerce. Moreover, the current facts illustrate the doubtful relevance of the distinction. Craigslist’s virtual presence is closely connected to the circumstances of the alleged offence, because at least some elements of the alleged offence were facilitated by relying on the services Craigslist provides virtually. In terms of the alleged offence, any physical presence Craigslist may have in the jurisdiction is beside the point. A corporate entity’s physical presence may have nothing to do with the circumstances of an offence. In my view, it would be curious if the presence of a retail outlet which is totally unrelated to the acquisition of information sought by a production order would ground a jurisdiction that did not otherwise exist.”

[3] Brecknell “There is, however, another way of looking at the issue, which in my view accords with Parliament’s legislative intent to modernize police powers to investigate Canadian crime that is increasingly occurring through the Internet or about which evidence exists in an international electronic world. On this view of the matter, the order goes against a person present in the jurisdiction and in effect commands that person to do certain things, namely to retrieve documents. It does not directly involve entry into a place by state agents who are authorized to search and seize property. The location of the documents is irrelevant to the essence of the order. What matters in terms of the invasion of privacy is the disclosure or production of the documents rather than access to them where they are stored. The impact on the privacy interest is not specific to a place and the existence of that interest has no direct relevance to whether the order has an extraterritorial reach. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Marakah2017 SCC 59 (CanLII), may be seen as having deemphasized the importance of physical place or geographic location in relation to searches with the majority placing emphasis on what is searched. In that case the search was treated as being of a text conversation, not necessarily the phone on which it was memorialized. Similarly, the private information produced through the production order is information generated in relation to postings that happen to be in British Columbia, although memorialized elsewhere. The territorial dimension of place in both contexts may be seen as being significantly attenuated.”

[4] Brecknell “I accept that legislation must be interpreted in light of contemporary technology and take into account the changed technological environment to which it must be applied. That imperative applies in the context of criminal investigation in the digital world and colours the analysis of whether a particular investigative technique has impermissible extraterritorial effects. The reality is that criminal activity involving such matters as human trafficking, child pornography, money laundering, commercial fraud and international terrorism conducted by means of electronic communication can be insulated from investigation if a production order is viewed as being implemented where the data is stored and its issuance is, therefore, impermissibly extraterritorial. Such a result is an open invitation to criminals to hide their activity targeting this jurisdiction by ensuring that information about their communications is stored in another. The MLAT may offer little by way of viable alternative investigative techniques for several reasons. Many countries are not parties to a treaty with Canada. Depending on local law, even if a country is a party, the information may be inaccessible if it is stored outside that country in a non participating jurisdiction. It also seems reasonably clear that the MLAT provides a slow and uncertain mechanism of investigation in an era when information moves instantaneously and may be stored only for a short time.”

[5] Brecknell “Additionally, I do not think that a principled and effective system of legitimate investigation based on international norms should be contingent on business decisions taken by service providers in their own private interest. It is notorious that service providers move customer information around the world frequently, no doubt for entirely legitimate commercial reasons, and it seems frequently break up data storing it in a variety of different places. The result may be the effective, if unintended, frustration of investigation into serious criminal conduct.”

[6] Brecknell  “I take some comfort in approaching the matter in this way, since there appears to be a well-established line of appellate authority in the United States that recognizes the intraterritorial validity of subpoenas directed to persons in the United States over whom there is personal jurisdiction to disclose documents in the United States even where they must be obtained from overseas. In this respect, see for example: Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, at 668‑670 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia,740 F.2d 817, at 820‑821, 826‑829 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, at 1270, 1283‑1284 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Minas de Artemisa, S. A., 150 F.2d 215, at 216‑218 (9th Cir. 1945); Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, at 412 (3d Cir. 2004). Moreover, this view of the matter was taken by certain of the dissenting justices on the petition for a rehearing of theMicrosoft Ireland case itself.

I take additional comfort from the fact that if a substantial body of United States authority does not treat a subpoena issued to a person in the United States to disclose documents in the United States although retrieved from another country as an extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, then the suggestion that the interpretation of the section I offer is inconsistent with principles of international comity tends to lose force. If the authority to which I have referred does represent settled judicial opinion, it seems unlikely that a court in the United States would regard this order directed to Craigslist as a violation of sovereignty.”

[7] Brecknell “The closest applicable authority is eBay Canada Ltd. v. Canada (National Revenue)2008 FCA 348 (CanLII). In that case, information identifying Canadian eBay sellers was stored as electronic records on servers in the United States owned by eBay Inc. (“eBay U.S.”), but was compiled and maintained by a Swiss corporation that was a wholly owned subsidiary of eBay U.S. An application was made under s. 231.2 of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), for production of the customer information. The issue before the court was whether the information was “foreign-based” because it was “available or located outside Canada” and should, therefore, fall under s. 231.6, despite the fact that the appellants, Canadian corporations, had been authorized to access it in Canada for use in their business, but did not download it to their computers.

The facts and the section at issue in the eBay case are different from this case, but the Court had little apparent difficulty in concluding that information stored on servers outside Canada was not foreign-based information since is was readily available to the appellants within Canada who were authorized to access it. Some of what the Court said is however relevant to the issues before us. Hence:

[17]      In reaching this conclusion, Justice Hughes observed that, since electronically stored information relating to PowerSellers was readily, lawfully, and instantaneously available in a variety of places to eBay entities, including to the appellants in Canada, the location of the servers on which it was stored was irrelevant (2007 FC 930 (CanLII), at para. 23). He relied on judicial descriptions of telecommunications from a foreign State to Canada, and vice versa, as being “both here and there” (see Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Assn. of Internet Providers2004 SCC 45 (CanLII), [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, at para. 59 (SOCAN)) …

***

[40]      Counsel for the appellants says that, as a matter of law, information in electronic form stored on a server is “located” where the server is situated and, until downloaded or printed, is not located anywhere else. He argues that the fact that information is “available” in another country to those who have access to the server through their computers is not sufficient to make it “located” in that other country for the purpose of section 231.6.

[42]      I agree that neither SOCAN nor Libman v. The Queen1985 CanLII 51 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, another telecommunications case, is directly analogous to the question in issue here. More important, however, SOCAN instructs courts to interpret legislation in light of contemporary technology and, if necessary, to “transpose” its terms to take into account the changed technological environment in which it is to be applied.

[48]      This is because, with the click of a mouse, the appellants make the information appear on the screens on their desks in Toronto and Vancouver, or anywhere else in Canada. It is as easily accessible as documents in their filing cabinets in their Canadian offices. Hence, it makes no sense in my view to insist that information stored on servers outside Canada is as a matter of law located outside Canada for the purpose of section 231.6 because it has not been downloaded. Who, after all, goes to the site of servers in order to read the information stored on them?

[49]      Nor is the extraterritorial application of the Act a significant issue on the present facts. For example, the agreements with eBay Canada expressly provide that they may disclose confidential “eBay System Information” (which the appellants say includes information about PowerSellers) which “is required to be disclosed by order of any court”: appeal book, Vol. II, at pages 295‑296. Nor does the requirement oblige a person outside Canada to do anything.

[8] “As I have already noted, in some of the early cases the English courts tended to express a narrow view of the territorial application of English law so as to ensure that they did not unduly infringe on the jurisdiction of other states. However, even as early as the late 19th century, following the invention and development of modern means of communication, they began to exercise criminal jurisdiction over transnational transactions as long as a significant part of the chain of action occurred in England. Since then means of communications have proliferated at an accelerating pace and the common interests of states have grown proportionately. Under these circumstances, the notion of comity, which means no more nor less than “kindly and considerate behaviour towards others”, has also evolved. How considerate is it of the interests of the United States in this case to permit criminals based in this country to prey on its citizens? How does it conform to its interests or to ours for us to permit such activities when law enforcement agencies in both countries have developed cooperative schemes to prevent and prosecute those engaged in such activities? To ask these questions is to answer them. No issue of comity is involved here. In this regard, I make mine the words of Lord Diplock in Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions cited earlier. I also agree with the sentiments expressed by Lord Salmon in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, supra, that we should not be indifferent to the protection of the public in other countries. In a shrinking world, we are all our brother’s keepers. In the criminal arena this is underlined by the international cooperative schemes that have been developed among national law enforcement bodies.

For these reasons, I have no difficulty in holding on the facts agreed upon for the purpose of this appeal, that the counts of fraud with which the appellant is charged may properly be prosecuted in Canada, and I see nothing in the requirements of international comity that would dictate that this country refrain from exercising its jurisdiction. Since these fraudulent activities took place in Canada, it follows for the reasons set forth in the Chapman case that the conspiracy count may also be proceeded with in Canada.”

[9] “The “real and substantial connection” test was adopted and developed by this Court in Morguard Investmentssupra, at pp. 1108-9; Hunt v. T&N plc1993 CanLII 43 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, at pp. 325-26 and 328; and Tolofsonsupra, at p. 1049.  The test has been reaffirmed and applied more recently in cases such as Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Containerline N.V. (Trustees of), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 907, 2001 SCC 90 (CanLII), at para. 71; Spar Aerospace Ltd. v. American Mobile Satellite Corp., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 205, 2002 SCC 78 (CanLII)Unifundsupra, at para. 54; and Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416, 2003 SCC 72 (CanLII).  From the outset, the real and substantial connection test has been viewed as an appropriate way to “prevent overreaching . . . and [to restrict] the exercise of jurisdiction over extraterritorial and transnational transactions” (La Forest J. in Tolofsonsupra, at p. 1049).  The test reflects the underlying reality of “the territorial limits of law under the international legal order” and respect for the legitimate actions of other states inherent in the principle of international comity (Tolofson, at p. 1047).  A real and substantial connection to Canada is sufficient to support the application of our Copyright Act to international Internet transmissions in a way that will accord with international comity and be consistent with the objectives of order and fairness.”

[10] “ Google’s argument that a global injunction violates international comity because it is possible that the order could not have been obtained in a foreign jurisdiction, or that to comply with it would result in Google violating the laws of that jurisdiction is, with respect, theoretical. As Fenlon J. noted, “Google acknowledges that most countries will likely recognize intellectual property rights and view the selling of pirated products as a legal wrong”.[6]

And while it is always important to pay respectful attention to freedom of expression concerns, particularly when dealing with the core values of another country, I do not see freedom of expression issues being engaged in any way that tips the balance of convenience towards Google in this case. As Groberman J.A. concluded:

In the case before us, there is no realistic assertion that the judge’s order will offend the sensibilities of any other nation. It has not been suggested that the order prohibiting the defendants from advertising wares that violate the intellectual property rights of the plaintiffs offends the core values of any nation. The order made against Google is a very limited ancillary order designed to ensure that the plaintiffs’ core rights are respected.

. . . the order in this case is an interlocutory one, and one that can be varied by the court. In the unlikely event that any jurisdiction finds the order offensive to its core values, an application could be made to the court to modify the order so as to avoid the problem.[7]If Google has evidence that complying with such an injunction would require it to violate the laws of another jurisdiction, including interfering with freedom of expression, it is always free to apply to the British Columbia courts to vary the interlocutory order accordingly. To date, Google has made no such application.

In the absence of an evidentiary foundation, and given Google’s right to seek a rectifying order, it hardly seems equitable to deny Equustek the extraterritorial scope it needs to make the remedy effective, or even to put the onus on it to demonstrate, country by country, where such an order is legally permissible. We are dealing with the Internet after all, and the balance of convenience test has to take full account of its inevitable extraterritorial reach when injunctive relief is being sought against an entity like Google.

This is not an order to remove speech that, on its face, engages freedom of expression values, it is an order to de-index websites that are in violation of several court orders. We have not, to date, accepted that freedom of expression requires the facilitation of the unlawful sale of goods.”

[11] See, Barry Sookman US court thumbs its nose at Supreme Court of Canada: Google v Equustek, where I summarized the applicable principles in Canada and the U.S.

[12] See, the article by “the father of the Internet” Vinton Cerf writing about the problem with fake news, Vinton Cerf, “Vint Cerf: In 2018, we will tackle the Internet’s dark side” Wired, Jan 6, 2018, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/vint-cerf-internet-free-speech-censorship-fake-news. “The empowerment of individuals has been nothing short of exhilarating – but now we are starting to see the consequences. Freedom to speak has never been more available, but in the resulting babel, truth is obscured by manufactured falsehoods, misrepresentations, fake news, alternative facts and a medley of other phenomena.  In 2018 we will see a significant reaction to these side-effects and will grasp the nettle of how to balance free speech with an open Internet…

So here is the conundrum for our increasingly connected world: how do we stay aware of what is going on in the world and in the minds of its citizens while seeking to limit the pernicious consequences of unbridled freedom to spew hatred, falsehoods and society-damaging ideologies? How do we instil a capacity for critical thinking in our citizens so they can winnow wheat from chaff?  Is critical thinking sufficient defence against the digital acid rain that threatens to poison the ocean of useful online information?  These are the questions that should be at the front of our minds in 2018.” Also: Google Evangelist Vinton G. Cerf: “We should be looking both ways before we log onto the Internet” Dec. 20, 2018 “Mr. Cerf also believes that global regulatory measures can improve our interactions on the Internet. “At this point, we are seeing both the positive and the negatives sides of this online environment with the negative becoming much more visible and apparent. And that causes us to desire better governance principles and better governance mechanisms. And those need to be international in scope. The reason for this is that the harms that can occur can be originated in one jurisdiction and the victim can be in another. That means we are going to have to cooperate with each other in order to protect people from harm on the net.”

[13] Sir Tim Berners-Lee “The web is under threat. Join us and fight for it. – World Wide Web Foundation”, https://webfoundation.org/2018/03/web-birthday-29/ “The threats to the web today are real and many, including those that I described in my last letter — from misinformation and questionable political advertising to a loss of control over our personal data…

What’s more, the fact that power is concentrated among so few companies has made it possible to weaponise the web at scale. In recent years, we’ve seen conspiracy theories trend on social media platforms, fake Twitter and Facebook accounts stoke social tensions, external actors interfere in elections, and criminals steal troves of personal data.

We’ve looked to the platforms themselves for answers. Companies are aware of the problems and are making efforts to fix them — with each change they make affecting millions of people.  The responsibility — and sometimes burden — of making these decisions falls on companies that have been built to maximise profit more than to maximise social good. A legal or regulatory framework that accounts for social objectives may help ease those tensions.”

 

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